Facing Competition: The History of Indigo Experiments in Colonial India, 1897-1920 by Kumar, Prakash








Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in History of Technology
Georgia Institute of Technology
August, 2004
Copyright © Prakash Kumar 2004
FACING COMPETITION: THE HISTORY OF INDIGO EXPERIMENTS IN
COLONIAL INDIA, 1897-1920
Approved by:
Dr. John G. Krige                                                                           Dr. Steven W. Usselman
Dr. August W. Giebelhaus                                                              Dr. Hanchao Lu
Dr. Anthony S. Travis
August 19, 2004
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents.
 iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of my advisors to the completion of this
doctoral dissertation. Over the last five years they have been extremely generous in
giving me their undivided attention.
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements       iv
List of Tables        vii
List of Figures                   viii
List of Abbreviations        ix
Measurement and Glossary of Terms         x
Summary         xi
Chapter 1 - Introduction
            The Historiography                      1
The Focus And Outline Of The Dissertation
The Land Where Indigo Was Produced – Bihar
The Actors – Planters And Natives
Chapter 2 – Indigo Rein And The History Of Planter-Peasant Relations  20
The Cultivation Of Indigo And Agricultural Costs
The Production Of The Blue Dye And Manufacturing Costs
The Indigo Enterprise And Financial Costs
Indigo Manufacturing And The Early Colonial Conditions
“Indigo Riots” In Lower Bengal
Indigo Plantations In Bihar At Transition
            Epilogue
Chapter 3 – Early Responses Of The Planters And The Government                     59
Early Response In London: Gathering Information
The Planters Consider Manufacturing Sugar
Planters Seek The Assistance Of The State For Queries On Indigo
               And Sugar Manufacturing
            Dunstan’s Report And The Sugar Committee: The Response
               Of Bihar’s Governor
            Epilogue
Chapter 4 – Science at Planters’ Laboratories, 1898-1902                                       87
Introduction
The Drive Towards Science, And Research Strategies
The Experiments At The BIPA Laboratory
The IIS Laboratory At Dalsingserai, 1899-1902
            Planters, The Bengal Government, And The Re-Organization Of
                 Indigo Laboratories, 1900-1902
 vi
            Epilogue: Eugene Charles Schrottky, The Java Variety
Chapter 5 – The Government Laboratories, 1903-05                                                140
Introduction
The Juxtaposition Of Pusa And The Indigo Laboratories In
                Bureaucratic Decision- Making
The Dilemma Faced By The Bureaucrats In 1903
Cyril Jonas Bergtheil And His Experiments, 1903
The Experiments At Dalsingserai, 1903-04
The Decision Towards Setting Up An Indigo Laboratory
                At Sirsiah And A Seed Farm In 1904
            Concluding Remarks
Chapter 6 - The Sirsiah Laboratory In India And The Clothworkers
                     Laboratory In Leeds, 1904-08                                                              190
             Introduction: A Hazy “Research Frontier”
             Developments Leading To The Inauguration Of Sirsiah
             Developments Leading To The Engagement Of
                 William P Bloxam At Leeds
             The Experts And The Direction Of Their Experiments, 1905-08
             Bloxam’s Report Of 1908
Chapter 7 - Bergtheil, Bengal Bureaucrats, And The Agricultural
                    Experiments, 1908-13                                                                            252
Introduction
The Outbreak Of Indigo Disturbances In Bihar, 1906-1908
Bergtheil At Sirsiah, 1908
The Decision To Continue Bergtheil’s Experiments At Sirsiah
“Reforms” And Scientific Experiments
            Epilogue
Chapter 8 - World War: The Re-Organization Of The
                     Indigo Experiments, 1914-1919                                                            296
Introduction
The Continuing Experiments Of The Agricultural Research
                Institute At Pusa, 1913-15
Parallel Developments In The Metropolis, 1913-15
The Crystallization Of A New Plan For The Indigo Experiments
New Experiments And New Results, 1916-17
New Challenges For Science And Its Organization, 1917-18
            Diminishing Enthusiasm For The Indigo Experiments And Their
               Final Stoppage
Chapter 9 - Conclusion                                                                                                384
References                                                                                                                    392
Vita                                                                                                                               400
 vii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 2.1                          Decline in synthetic indigo’s price                                      22
Table 2.2                          Index number for coolie wages                                           48
Table 2.3                          Index number for procurement prices                                  49
Table 3.1                          Import of Natural Indigo into Britain, 1896-1903               59
Table 3.2                         Indigo and sugar acreage in the four districts of
                                        Bihar in 1901                                                                         78
Table 3.3                         Eugene Schrottky’s patents registered in Calcutta                83
Table 4.1                         Average output result of 12 days with 100 maunds
                                        of plant                                                                                   111
Table 4.2                        Average output result of 3 days with 100 maunds
                                       of plant                                                                                    112
Table 4.3                        Quantity of natural indigo exported from India and
                                       average price, 1895-1905                                                        134
Table 6.1                        Area under Java indigo at the Belsand factory,
1904-1909 221
Table 6.2                        Yield claimed from the glucosode process against
                                       12 seers (69.2%) by ordinary process                                      236
Table 7.1                        Indigo Acreage in Four North Bihar Districts in India,
                                       1894-1934 (in hectares)                                                            254
Table 7.2                        Effect of salts on the production of indican                             263
Table 7.3                        Effect of Nitro-Bacterine on indigo plants                               283
Table 7.4                        Decrease in the yield of Java crop due to wilt at
                                       Belsund Factory                                                                        290
Table 8.1                        Comparative yield of leaves from pruned
                                       and cut down plants                                                                  301
Table 8.2                        Trial to ascertain the effect of phosphate deficiency
                                       on the growth of indigo plants                                                  352
 viii
LIST OF FIGURES




BSA: Bihar State Archives, Patna (India)
GOB: Government of Bengal
GOI: Government of India
IOR: India Office Records (Located at the British Library, London)
IPG: Indian Planters’ Gazette and Sporting News
NAL: National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, USA.
PRO: Public Records Office, Kew
Rs.: Indian Rupees (1 rupee=100 paisas)
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MEASUREMENTS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS
1 bigha=0.87 acre; 1 acre=0.4 hectare
1 maund = 80 lbs. Approximately
Abwab: exaction taken from the peasants by the landlords
Asamiwar: system of indigo cultivation in which the planter employed labor on the
plantation
                   owned by him
Indican: the glucoside present in the indigo leaves that was transformed into color
Indoxyl: an intermediate compound formed in the process of conversion into color
Indigotin/Indigo: the blue color
Khuski: the system under which the natives grew indigo independently and sold it to the
planter
              at the prevailing market prices
Raiyat: tenant
Raiyati: system of indigo cultivation by the tenants under contract with the planters
Satta: written contract
Sith: the refuse and wastewater from indigo manufacturing
Thika: lease of land for a definite period
Zamindar: lanlord
Zirat: proprietor’s private land
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SUMMARY
This historical study focuses on scientific research conducted across laboratories
and farm stations in colonial India and England to improve the yield of indigo – the blue
dyestuff extracted from the leaves of Indigofera tinctoria. The launch of cheaper and
purer synthetic substitute by two German companies in 1897 provided the primary
impetus for these endeavors. The commercial attack by synthetic indigo was predictably
resisted by those who were willing and ready to fight on behalf of natural indigo for a
slice of the Western markets. The solid resistance of the native indigo growers drove the
planters to use science rather than wage cut as a tool for reducing the cost of production
of the natural dye. These efforts of chemists, bacteriologists, botanists, and agricultural
experts continued till 1920. By studying the efforts of scientists called upon by the
European planers living in India and the colonial government this dissertation analyzes
the nature of science in a colonial context. At the same time it also reveals the dilemmas
faced by the producers of the natural dye as they tried to fight the competition of the
synthetic product in the market. The doctoral dissertation explains: when and how were
the laboratories and farm stations organized? Who were the experts and what type of
expertise was brought to bear on the problem at hand? What results were obtained? To
what extent did the efforts of the experts meet the goal of improving yield and
consistency? And finally, under what circumstances were those efforts abandoned at the
end of the period in question? Moving beyond the experts and outside the laboratories
and farm stations, the dissertation also elucidates the nature of the support for these





The purpose of this dissertation is to describe in detail the efforts made to protect
natural indigo – the blue dyestuff extracted from the leaves of the indigo plant
(Indigofera tinctoria) - against the market competition of cheaper and purer synthetic
indigo - which was derived from coal-tar hydrocarbons. Throughout the nineteenth
century British India was the pre-eminent producer and supplier to the West of indigo for
its thriving textile industry. The introduction of synthetic indigo on the market in 1897 by
two German companies threatened to end India’s dominant role in the indigo trade. To
counteract competition from the synthetic substitute the European planters living in India,
supported by the colonial and the national governments, conducted scientific research in
the laboratories and farm stations. This dissertation fundamentally focuses on these
scientific efforts made in India and England, and contributes to the scientific and
technological history of Modern South Asia.
Indigo, derived from plant sources in the nineteenth century, was an extremely
important dye (colorant) for the textile industries in the West. The main nineteenth-
century colorants were red, black, and blue. For dyeing cloth blue the primary colorant
the world over was indigo. This was mostly supplied from British India, Dutch Java, and
Spanish Central America, in that order of importance. It would no exaggeration to state
that indigo produced in the colonies was critical to the principal industry of Europe and
North America – the textile industry.
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The world of colonial, plant-derived blue entered a turbulent phase as the
hydrocarbon-derived synthetic blues began to enter the international market. In the 1860s
the aniline blues made their appearance. 1 These blues were cheaper than natural indigo
and were adopted to some extent for use by the dyers and printers. But the anilines never
really threatened natural indigo’s core market. Some later blues, particularly alizarin blue,
turned out to be more serious competitors by partly winning over some of the natural
dye’s previous consumers.
But, importantly for the future of natural indigo, efforts were underway in
Germany to discover a synthetic substitute for indigo itself. The tremendous demand for
natural indigo, particularly for the dyeing and printing industries of Lancashire,
stimulated research in Germany into a synthetic product. This became one of the main
scientific and technological endeavors of the 19th century, following the success of
synthetic alizarin (1869-1870), the red colorant that displaced the “natural red” earlier
extracted from the root of the madder plant. The German dye-making firms knew that
smashing the British monopoly would bring tremendous profits. During the 1870s and
‘80s, Adolf Baeyer, at Munich, and other academic chemists derived considerable
scientific benefits from collaborations with Heinrich Caro, at BASF, and other leading
industrial chemists. Caro provided Baeyer with information about potentially interesting
reactions and novel products that became topics for academic research. The technical
problems, particularly a synthetic route based on a low cost starting material, eluded both
Baeyer and Caro. Nevertheless, the eventual success of artificial indigo was based on
researches that Baeyer had commenced at the Gewerbeinstitut in Berlin in 1865, with the
                                                 
1 Anthony Travis, The Rainbow Makers: The Origins of the Synthetic Dyestuffs Industry in
Western Europe. (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1993): 72-73, 131-135
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encouragement and collaboration of Caro in the mid-1870s, and on Baeyer’s contractual
agreements with both BASF and Hoechst at the beginning of the 1880s.
Until the early 1880s, Caro was the principal industrial participant, even though
the process he scaled up on the basis of Baeyer’s research was a commercial failure.
Baeyer, following his understanding of the reaction, was able to establish in 1883 that the
intermediate product of the indigo degradation was pseudo-indoxyl, not indoxyl. This
enabled him to draw the modern chemical structure for indigo. This was announced in a
letter to Caro, dated 3 August 1883. The industrial manufacture of indigo is based on two
processes developed by Carl Heumann in 1890 at Zurich Polytechnic. The starting points
were the abundant coal-tar hydrocarbons benzene and naphthalene. In 1897, following
extensive research and development, BASF and Hoechst in Germany were the first firms
to manufacture synthetic indigo. 2
The “transition” from natural to synthetic – which itself was a belabored one and
occurred over a period of decades, implied a shift in focus from the colonies as the
primary producers of indigo to Germany as the main supplier of synthetic indigo.
Throughout, the centrality of indigo to the textile industries, however, remained. In the
first decade of the 20th century the newly industrializing East Asian countries turned out
to be the main consumers. The import of synthetic indigo into China alone went up from
10,000,000 lbs. to 38,000,000 lbs between 1908 and 1913. The outbreak of the First
World War disrupted the role of Germany as the supplier of indigo worldwide. The
                                                 
2 Relevant secondary literature delineating the invention and commercialization of synthetic
indigo would include: Anthony Travis, The Rainbow Makers: The Origins of the Synthetic
Dyestuffs Industry in Western Europe. (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1993); Carsten
Reinhardt and Anthony Travis, Heinrich Caro and the Creation of Modern Chemical Industry.
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000); Johann Peter Murmann, Knoweldge and Competitive Avantage: The
Co-evolution of Firms, Technology, and National Institutions. (New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
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English and American entrepreneurs responded to the shortage in the supply of the
synthetic indigo dye and other coal-tar products from Germany through indigenous
production.3
Scholars have rightfully acknowledged the critical importance of indigo as a dye
of international standing by studying its history, including the history of the “transition”
in great detail. But much of the literature on the subject has generally considered the
technological victory of synthetic indigo over natural indigo as an unproblematic given.
Based on sources within the synthetic dye industry in Germany and Britain, these works
essentially try to explain the process through which the dominance of the synthetic dyes,
including indigo, was established. They attempt no serious analysis of the efforts to
protect the blue natural dye against the synthetic alternative. 4
At a theoretical level, it would be fair to say that the current studies of the
transition from natural to synthetic indigo assume the death of the natural dye to be
inevitable. The onset of synthetic indigo appears in these writings as “progress” towards a
superior technique. It would seem, then, that the technology of production of the
agricultural product was “backward,” that the indigo planters were “conservative” -
                                                 
3 The disruption in the supplies of indigo and synthetic dyes from Germany during the First
World War led to their first large-scale production in the USA as covered in the relevant sections
of: David Hounshell and John K Smith, Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont R&D, 1902-
1980. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Anthony Travis, Dyes Made in America,
1915-1980: The Calco Chemical Company, American Cyanamid, and the Raritan River.
(Jerusalem: Edelstein Center/Hexagon Press, 2004); for an account of the production of synthetic
indigo in England beginning 1917, see M R Fox, Dye-Makers of Great Britain, 1856-1976: A
History of Chemists, Companies, Products, and Changes. (Manchester: ICI, 1987)
4 Augusti Nieto-Galan’s recent monograph on natural dyes largely focuses on the application end
of the industry in Europe as against the production end in the colonies: Augusti Nieto-Galan,
Colouring Textiles: A History of Natural Dyestuffs in Industrial Europe (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2001)
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standing in the way of the forward march of scientific advance and technological
progress.
Such an assumption is not tenable if one looks carefully at colonial records and at
the efforts made to protect the natural dye against the competition from the synthetics.
This dissertation shows clearly that neither the indigo planters nor the colonial
government in India were “conservative.” The planters and the government initiated a
robust program of scientific experiments and continued it for a long time.  The final
defeat of natural indigo in the market place does not imply that the indigo planters and
the colonial and imperial bureaucrats were innately “against science.” Rather, the
problem of improving the yield and consistency of natural indigo was difficult: key
scientific knowledge was lacking, profits were falling for the benefactors of science, and
time was short in which the experts were expected to deliver results. If anything, those
that stood to protect the natural dye failed in solving the problem even after they utilized
science. In highlighting the efforts made by those that fought on behalf of natural indigo
for a slice of the market this research modifies the earlier perception that the
technological transition from natural to synthetic indigo was painless and automatic.
Other than modifying the technological history of transition this research also
provides a fresh perspective on the scientific and technological history of Modern South
Asia. In the Indian context, a number of STS scholars have criticized colonial rulers for
their feeble attempts at developing indigenous scientific and technical institutions. 5 What
little progress was made in the introduction of technological projects – for instance in the
introduction of the railways, building of irrigation canals, and provision of public health –
                                                 
5 For a representative argument of this sort, see Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1857-1905
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995)
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it is argued, was a byproduct of the basic desire to secure economic advantages for the
metropolis and consolidate the authority of the foreigners. 6 Ironically - even if
understandably - the positive efforts of the state towards sponsorship of indigo
experiments in India, the subject of this study, have been the target of attack within the
anti-colonial discourse that dominates the history of science for the colonial period.
These scholars have criticized the colonial state for putting its meager resources
earmarked for promotion of science into commodities like indigo.  They criticize these
efforts as being inspired by the motive of supporting European investments, not securing
welfare of the teeming millions. 7 So the argument runs that first of all only limited
science was introduced into the colony. And whatever science was introduced was
destined to benefit the foreigners.
The economic historians of colonialism have added further weight to these
arguments. They contend that agricultural plantations, even if they created jobs for the
natives, on balance harmed Indian cultivators, agriculture, and the economy. In pursuing
that line of argument they have illustrated how the “commercialization” of agriculture
resulted in food scarcity and ultimately to famine because of the diversion of land from
food-crops to cash crops. 8
                                                 
6 For glimpses of such arguments on railways, see Ian J Kerr, “Colonialism and Technological
Choice: The Case of the Railways in India,” Itinerario (1995): 91-111; on canal irrigation
projects, see Ian Stone, Canal Irrigation in British India: Perspectives on Technological Change
in a Peasant Economy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 2002); in the field of
medicine, see David J Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in
Nineteenth-Century India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)
7 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1857-1905, see especially the section on plantation
research: 152-158
8 Binay Bhushan  Chaudhuri, “Growth of Commercial Agriculture in Bengal, 1859-1885,” Indian
Economic and Social History Review (1970) 7: 25-60
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These critiques are certainly valid. But, insofar as they relate to the historiography
of science and technology in India, they have barely dealt with plantation research and
development (R&D) - perhaps one of the most vibrant areas of scientific research and
technological innovation in colonial India. European planters invited some of the most
accomplished chemists and agronomists to carry out indigo experiments and assigned
resources for the conduct of goal-oriented research. What is more, they even persuaded
the colonial state to provide funds for these experiments.  As such these laboratories may
well have been enclaves supporting the “best” science practiced in the colonies, and
therefore deserve to be studied in more detail.
In that context, the present study advances Science and Technology Studies in
India in two ways: firstly, it focuses on science on its own terms to analyze a significant
aspect of the history of science in India. The plantation laboratories deserve more
attention from historians because they represent one of the earliest efforts to create a
modern scientific infrastructure in India. While they were set up to benefit a class of
foreign capitalists based in India, these early scientific endeavors also opened the way for
cultivating science indigenously. The tradition of inviting scientists from the West and
experiences gained with indigo experiments by the entrepreneurs and government
officials had consequences elsewhere. The case of indigo is very informative in this
regard. Records relating to indigo laboratories indeed indicate that planters’ laboratories
may well have inspired the government to employ experts for the benefit of other sectors
of agriculture. A direct link exists between the indigo laboratories and the first centralized
agricultural station of India that was set up in 1905 at Pusa to serve as a resource center
for agricultural crops in colonial India. Two agricultural experts from one of the indigo
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laboratories at Dalsingserai, Bernard Coventry and H M Leake, were re-employed to lead
the operations at Pusa. Bacteriologist Cyril Bergtheil, also working on indigo
experiments, was appointed as the first Imperial Bacteriologist of British India.
Secondly, this study borrows tools from Laboratory Studies within the STS
literature 9 to consider efforts to improve natural indigo in India.  Since the mid-1970s, a
considerable literature has emerged in the history and sociology of science that has
demonstrated the extent to which scientific facts are socially constructed – that is, they
are products of social practices and processes and not “pure” reflections of nature. These
theorists have proposed links between the nature of scientific knowledge produced on the
one hand and the structure of scientific community (David Bloor, 1976), “negotiations”
indulged in by groups of scientific experts (Harry Collins, 1985), and events in specific
laboratories, on the other. 10 The application of these new perspectives has generally been
inadequate for the study of science in the nonwestern context, and nonexistent in the
Indian context. Utilization of these newer methods of analysis will enable an
understanding of the very difficult process of knowledge formation, and undermine a
historically inaccurate understanding that the planters were “conservative.”
Lastly, this research brings the history of British Raj closer to the scientific and
technological history of Modern South Asia. A rich body of literature exists on the
                                                 
9 Bruno Latour, “Give me a Laboratory and I will Raise the World,” in Karin Knorr-Cetina and
Michael Mulkay (eds), Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science (Thousand
Oaks: Sage, 1983); Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life. The Construction of
Scientific Facts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Steven Shapin and Simon
Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the Experimental Life (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989); Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science
in Seventeenth Century England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994)
10 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976,
1991); Harry Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice (Sage:
Beverly Hills, 1991)
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several dimensions of the indigo industry in colonial India. Much of the existing literature
examines the cultivation and manufacturing of indigo as they bear on the rising tide of
the national movement in India. Within that larger interpretive framework economic
historians have examined the agriculture and commerce of indigo, 11 and prevailing labor
relations on the plantations. 12 Political historians have focused on the revolts on the
indigo tracts to make important arguments about the nature of peasant movements during
the British Raj. 13 Still others have studied the participation of natives on the indigo
plantations in the growing national movement in India culminating in the Gandhian
styagraha of 1917. 14 Indeed it is in calling every foreign actor simply a “colonialist” that
the current anti-colonial discourse fails to consider the factors that complicated the
synergies between the process of governmental decision-making and the requirements of
indigo business. This dissertation specially focuses on the sponsorship of indigo
laboratories by the government at different levels and at different periods of time - what
facilitated and what impeded these efforts - in order to explain the nature of the colonial
state in a new light.
By focusing on the scientific and technological dimensions of indigo cultivation
and manufacturing this research fills what is certainly a glaring gap in the current
                                                 
11 Benoy Chowdhury, Growth of Commercial Agriculture in Bengal, 1757-1900. (Calcutta: R K
Mitra, 1964)
12 Prabhat Kumar Shukla, Indigo and the Raj: Peasant Protests in Bihar, 1780-1917. (Delhi:
Pragati Publication, 1993)
13 Blair B Kling, The Blue Mutiny: The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal, 1859-1862. (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966)
14 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics.
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
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literature while also connecting with central themes of interest in the historiography of
Modern South Asia. First and foremost the dissertation considers the agrarian structure of
colonial India to situate the scientific and technological alternatives available for indigo
improvement. Secondly, through many of the chapters the narrative in the dissertation
examines the political context across colonial India and imperial Britain to explain the
patronage of laboratory experiments on natural indigo. In so doing it contributes to the
existing literature on the nature of the political relationship between the metropolis and
the colony. And, by focusing on the laboratories, farm stations, and on experts and their
work, this research addresses the nature of knowledge formation in colonial conditions,
another significant area of emphasis in the South Asian historiography.
The Focus And Outline Of The Dissertation
The commercial attack by synthetic indigo, as this dissertation will illustrate, was
predictably resisted by those who were willing and ready to fight on behalf of natural
indigo for a slice of the Western markets. Huge stakes were involved in the displacement
of the natural product. The plantation industry was a capitalist investment of Europeans
in colonial India. For hundreds of planters of European origin saving natural indigo was
important for protecting their livelihood and their way of life.
The national government in Britain and the colonial state in India had their own
reasons for trying to preserve the indigo industry of colonial India. The imperial
framework had throughout the nineteenth century facilitated the passage of the blue dye
from India to the dyers and printers in the home country. Their perspective on what they
considered worth saving in the metropolis vis-à-vis what they thought worth saving in the
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colony guided their response to the claims of the Indian indigo industry for support.
Metropolitan assistance in 1897 came through the sponsorship of some scientific
investigations in England, but largely though the encouragement of the colonial
administrators in India to support scientific research. Later, with the outbreak of the War
in 1914, the metropolitan interests in natural indigo were revived again in the context of a
disruption of supplies of synthetic indigo to England from the German sources.
In India the colonial administrators at the center and in the province had their own
motivations for backing the efforts to protect the natural indigo industry. The blue dye
was the primary article of export from colonial India and its key industry. The colonial
bureaucrats were wary of letting it wither away. In the early 20th century the central
government in India also supported indigo experiments as part of its overall goal of
encouraging scientific research and development in the colony.
From the perspective of the administrators, the decline of the industry would also
entail the loss of thousands of jobs for the natives who worked on the plantations and in
the factories where the actual production of the dye took place. The provincial
bureaucrats worried even more about the joblessness that would result from the
destruction of the regional industry. They had additional reasons to be helpful to the
planters with whom they had established intimate political and social linkages. The
planting community was a valuable ally in times of political disturbances. Planters also
helped authorities in carrying out sundry administrative tasks such as disaster
management or the disbursement of humanitarian aid when national calamities like flood
and drought struck the region.
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Is the story of the efforts made to protect natural indigo, then, merely the story of
imperialists and colonialists, and their endeavors in India? Not quite. This dissertation
will show that the natives – the indigo growers and the workers/coolies at the indigo
factories were not irrelevant in determining the nature of efforts to save the natural indigo
industry. It is true that the natives were politically dis-empowered on account of having
been excluded from self-representation and membership in the governing elite. But that
does not mean that they were completely powerless politically in the colonial context. In
fact, it was fundamentally the solid peasant resistance that drove the planters to use
science rather than wage cuts as a tool for improving yield and for reducing the cost of
production of the natural dye. The fear of discontent among the natives haunted the
administrators, who were not willing to risk an outbreak of political agitation. They in
turn made it clear to the planters that they would not permit any reduction of wages on
the plantations. Thus it may be said that peasant power, mediated through the colonial
administrators, was responsible for the onset and persistence of scientific investigations
to improve natural indigo in colonial India.
It is those scientific pursuits that are analyzed at the core of this dissertation.
When and how were the laboratories and farm stations organized? Who were the experts
and what type of expertise was brought to bear on the problem at hand? What results
were obtained? To what extent did the efforts of the experts meet the goal of improving
yield and consistency? And finally, under what circumstances were those efforts
abandoned at the end of the period in question?
Moving beyond the experts and outside the laboratories and farm stations, the
dissertation also analyzes the nature of the support for these experiments by the planters
 13
and the colonial government. The planters promptly initiated scientific research in India
in response to the introduction of synthetic indigo. Subsequently they sought and
received the colonial government’s subsidy for their experiments.
This dissertation overwhelmingly focuses on the three levels of administration -
India House and the Secretary of State in England, the central government in
Simla/Calcutta, and the provincial government of Bengal in Calcutta.  It is their enduring
support for the indigo experiments that concerns us here. The government soon became
the primary vehicle of scientific experiments in colonial India. Its resources turned out to
be the lifeblood of natural’s fight against the German synthetic dye. An examination of
the administrative records of colonial officials in British India reveals a fascinating story
of how political economy determined the support provided to indigo experiments by the
government at different levels and at different periods of time.
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters including the Introduction and the
Conclusion. Chapter 2 addresses the main argument by showing the options that were
available to the planters in 1897 on cost cutting. It considers the cultivation and
manufacturing imperatives to evaluate where the planters thought they could intervene to
reduce production costs. The historical evolution of the relationship between the colonial
state, the European planters, and the native indigo growers also determined the space that
was available to the planters for manipulating the cost of inputs like land, raw materials,
and wages.  Chapter 3 documents the move towards the option of conducting scientific
experiments. The planters knew the realm of agriculture best. It is in this field that they
sought their first solutions. They first considered switching from indigo to sugarcane,
which had attractive commercial possibilities.   The metropolitan government offered the
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services of experts within its institutions to explore the relative merits of the two
products. While a few planters began sugarcane production on a small scale, the majority
of them decided to stay with indigo manufacturing.
The next two chapters describe the initiation and conduct of scientific
experiments by scientists called upon by the planters. The colonial government was
willing to finance these experiments. An organized attack was launched to “improve”
natural indigo through the efforts of chemists, bacteriologists, botanists, and agricultural
experts. Chapter 6, for its part, describes the events between 1905 and 1908, especially
the new situation which arose when one of the chemists working on indigo was shifted to
a laboratory at the University of Leeds at the initiative of India House in London. The
period was marked by the polarization of views among experts who were broadly divided
into two camps – one vouching for the chemical approach and the other for the
agricultural route to improve yield.
Chapter 7 focuses on the efforts of the provincial government of Bengal and its
sponsorship of basically agricultural experiments in India to the exclusion of chemical
experiments. The last chapter documents the conduct of indigo experiments during the
War when the chemical approach was popular once again. It was basically the
unavailability of synthetic indigo from German sources at this time that stimulated the
interest of the imperial government in Indian indigo. That interest waned as British
manufacturers successfully produced synthetic indigo using German techniques.   All
laboratory and farm-based experiments on natural indigo ended soon after the end of the
War.
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The Land Where Indigo Was Produced - Bihar
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century Bihar, the northernmost division
within the larger province of Bengal, was the most significant supplier of finest quality
indigo from British India. More precisely, north Bihar or Tirhut, comprising the four
districts of Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Champaran, and Saran, were the most prominent
areas for the cultivation and manufacture of indigo. 15  These four districts showed an
increase in indigo acreage by 286 percent between 1830 and 1875, and by more than 69
percent between 1875 and 1894-95. 16
Parallel production of indigo also took place in other parts of British India besides
Bihar. Yet north Bihar or Tirhut remained the center of gravity for the export-based
natural dye industry. Since the early 19th century the natives in the territories to the north
and west of Bihar had been engaged in indigo manufacturing. These regions came to
comprise the North West Provinces when that new administrative division was formed
out of the newly conquered territories in 1835. In the second half of the 19th century
indigo production also spread to the Madras and Punjab provinces. But the indigo from
the rest of India was of an inferior quality, and was manufactured using inferior
techniques. It fetched a low price and catered to the lower end of the market. In contrast
the indigo from Bihar was of a high quality and was sold at the highest price. The
proprietors based in England, the agency houses of Calcutta, and the large retinue of
managers and assistants – all Westerners – controlled the production and shipment of
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and Orissa” from Bengal, and later another act of 1937 separated Bihar from Orissa.
16 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999) : 20-22
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indigo from Bihar. Indigo was produced in Bihar under their closet supervision using the
best available techniques. 17
North Bihar/Tirhut was part of the Indo-Gangetic alluvial plains. The Himalayas
to the north and the Ganges to the south bordered these fertile plains. The fertility of the
soil varied to an extent across Bihar. But the overall richness of the soil was an
advantageous factor for the indigo plantations. The dense population of the area also
provided relatively cheap labor for the planters.
These agricultural tracts also had an organic relationship with the city of Calcutta
- a port city and the commercial capital of India. Much of indigo plantations in Bihar
were controlled either directly by agency houses based in Calcutta or by proprietors in the
home country that operated through the agency houses.  All the indigo from Bihar was
ferried down the rivers Ganges and Hughly to Calcutta for export.
The Actors – Planters And Natives
The Planters As Indigo Manufacturers
Almost all planters in Bihar were British. In the early 19th century the East India
Company had turned a blind eye to the entry of some French, Italian, and Portuguese
immigrants at a time when the demand for the blue dye surpassed production. But
subsequently their entry was clearly discouraged.
The plantation industry in colonial India provided career avenues to the young
British aspirants. The recruits came from the middle and upper middle classes in British
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(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,1999): 3n.
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society. W. M. Reid, a planter himself, has vividly described the arrival of a young
planter at Calcutta looking ahead to a career in indigo planting. The agents based in the
port city generally received the newcomer. The latter would soon be given instructions to
proceed to an indigo concern somewhere in Tirhut. A couple of days after his arrival in
Calcutta the would-be planter would proceed to Muzaffarpur by train. After de-boarding
at Muzaffarpur he would be ferried to the lead factory to meet with the manager. He
would then be assigned a particular task. Over the next 5-15 years, according to Reid, the
ambition of the young man would be to prove himself in the “field.” He would aspire to
become a manager. At the same time he would also use his credibility with the financiers
in Calcutta to buy up factories. In the end, of course, he dreamed of one day selling his
factory, returning to his home country, and using the wealth acquired abroad to rise in the
social hierarchy. 17
Reid’s judgment on the quality of life for the British planters is a divided one. The
lifestyle for the British planter improved as he graduated from the position of an assistant
to the grade of a manager. The managers of bigger and better concerns led a more
comfortable life. The solitude of being away from home and living in the extremely hot
climate was compensated to some extent by the paraphernalia of an elitist and privileged
lifestyle. 18
The verdict of Jacques Pouchepadass on indigo planting as a career for the
Englishman is definitive. He says, “Whatever the occupational inconvenience and
hazards the planters had to face, the stakes were worth the gamble.” The stress of the
                                                 
17 W M Reid, The Culture and Manufacture of Indigo with Description of a Planter’s Life and
Resources. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1887): 3-11, 21-33
18 W M Reid, The Culture and Manufacture of Indigo with Description of a Planter’s Life and
Resources. (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1887): 12-20
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work itself was no doubt considerable. The business was risky too. But on balance many
men made their fortune in the industry. The profit margins were enormous before the
synthetic product was produced and marketed, and more than made up for the years in
which the crop failed. Stories of success kept bringing new aspirants into the field. 19
The Natives As Indigo Growers And Workers
The indigo tracts encompassed different forms of land tenure. The native
thikedars and zamindars, mostly belonging to the upper castes, had a special relationship
with the British planters. The thikedars or owners of very large holdings sold the thika
(lease) of their land to the planters for a fixed term of several years. Even in other areas
where individual growers cultivated indigo, the zamindars (proprietors) of the village
extracted the rent that they were conventionally entitled to from the planters.
The majority of native landed classes worked as contract farmers for the planters
or as wageworkers. Those who grew indigo on contract complained about the low prices
for indigo. Besides they always found themselves in a confrontational situation with the
planters because the latter wanted them to put their best and most fertile land under
indigo. The farmers wanted to use this land for growing subsistence crops or crops that
would fetch them a better price in the market than indigo.
The natives were also employed in the factories in other capacities. Jacques
Pouchepadass has pointed to the existence of two separate hierarchies of indigenous staff.
One looked after the management of the factory.  The other supervised the agricultural
and manufacturing operations.
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A factory could have one or several munshi. A munshi was the head of the
administrative staff and placed just below the manager. He was adept at handling
administrative and judicial responsibilities. Educated natives that could speak English
were hired to do this job. Most of them belonged to the higher caste of kayasthas. Two or
more musharrirs or clerks assisted each munshi.
The head of the supervisory staff was called the jamadar. He supervised the
manufacturing and cultivation on the plantations. He was most helpful in dealing with the
native contract growers. Every year the most contentious issue on the plantations was
deciding which plot should be put under indigo. The jamadar with his knowledge of local
agricultural conditions proved especially helpful in settling such issues. 20
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CHAPTER 2
INDIGO REIN AND THE HISTORY OF PLANTER-PEASANT RELATIONS
The arrival of BASF produced synthetic indigo, “Indigo Rein” on the market in 1897
brought new challenges beckoning a response from the producers of natural indigo,
“Bengal indigo.” The planters in colonial India were now required to undertake new
measures. Could they consolidate their holdings? Could they reduce wages and
procurement prices for raw material? What scientific and technological avenues were
practically available? The answer to these questions lay in the rural, colonial context of
late nineteenth century India. Only a consideration of developments leading up to 1897,
especially those bearing on the relations between the planters, peasants, and the state can
provide a window to the options that were available with the planters at this time.
Before the launch of synthetic indigo on the market at the end of the nineteenth
century indigo planters were never called upon to regulate the price of the natural dye. In
the decade before 1897, in fact, the price of one pound of the “good consuming” Bengal
variety natural indigo (60-65% concentration by weight) had varied between a maximum
of 5s. 11d. and 4s. 2 d. per lb. at auctions held in London. 1 Prices fluctuated in line with
cost of production in India, which varied from year to year. Bad weather, pests, and labor
disturbances on plantations could potentially harm the crop and reduce total output.
Whenever that happened the planters tried to recover their fixed costs by selling at a
higher price. Also, the demand for indigo within the British textile industries was
inelastic. Therefore any shortfall in the production of natural indigo automatically led to
an increase in its prices. On the other hand, good weather in certain years led to
overproduction and a slump in prices.
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Never before had the indigo planters faced the type of competitive threat that they
did now. Aniline blue, first patented by French inventors in July 1860, gradually became
available to the British dyers and printers over the course of the decade. 2 These coal tar
based dyes were relatively cheaper. But they did not give the level of fastness that was
provided by natural indigo. Alizarin blue later did win over some of the customer base
from the plant-derived indigo. But the challenge posed by the introduction of synthetic
indigo in 1897 was the most serious one ever. Initially the price of synthetic was up to 15
-25% higher than natural’s. But even at a higher price Indigo Rein altered the basic
demand and supply equation by making a larger quantity of indigo available in the
market. 3 Also, the consumers now had a choice. What was acceptable to them in term of
quality before 1897 was no longer acceptable now. Thus natural indigo producers began
to experience new types of pressure from the market to be both price and quality
competitive.
With the passage of time the threat from synthetic indigo became even more
serious. The German manufacturers of synthetic indigo showed an ability to drive prices
down continuously. By 1901synthetic began to set the bottom line in the price of indigo.
BASF’s production records affirm a continuous decline in the price of synthetic indigo
between 1897 and 1914. The most drastic reduction in prices in fact occurred within the
first seven years. (See Table 2.1 below)
                                                 
2 Anthony Travis, The Rainbow Makers: The Origins of the Synthetic Dyestuffs Industry in
Western Europe. (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1993): 72-73, 131-135
3 For the history of alizarins, including alizarin blue see Anthony Travis, The Rainbow Makers:
163-203; for the reference to the comparative prices of natural and synthetic indigo, again see,
Anthony Travis, The Rainbow Makers: 223. The initial hesitation of consumers against using the
new product soon wore thin. German manufacturers effectively persuaded the consumers into
believing that the new product was chemically the same – only purer.
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                                                     Table 2.1
                                                Decline in synthetic indigo’s price








                                                Source: BASF Corporate Archives 4
The planters were forced to respond. Indigo Rein soon began to take away
consumers that had earlier used natural indigo. Continental buyers as well as those
buying for the home trade in Britain showed an increasing interest in the synthetic
product. The lower price of synthetic indigo was an important aspect that made it
attractive to the consumers. Therefore, reducing the price of natural indigo appeared to
the planters to be a likely tool to beat the competition of synthetic.
The story in this chapter begins in 1897 with a consideration of the planter’s
options with regard to reducing the cost of production of natural indigo. The realm of
cultivation and manufacturing was the one that the planters knew best. And it is here that
they made their first intervention. The most critical questions in this regard were: Where
could the savings be made? How large or small were the margins for reducing cost in the
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long chain of production from the seed in the field to the indigo cake in the factory?
Which costs could be reduced and which ones were less amenable to change? Several
factors determined answers to these questions. The nature of the agricultural production
system, planter-peasant relationships, and government’s policy towards the indigo
industry on the one hand and labor on the other hand were the key determinants. A
consideration of all of those will form the subject matter of this chapter.
The chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first describes the basic
system of cultivation and manufacturing of natural indigo in order to illustrate the
different factors of production. It also borrows from the existing literature to break down
the costs involved in producing the indigo dye in colonial India. The historiography of
production of natural indigo is a relatively rich one. Benoy Chowdhury’s research on the
history of indigo plantations in Bengal and Bihar is a classic on the subject. 5
Chowdhury’s emphasis is on showing an extremely important characteristic of colonial
agriculture – its “commercialization.” There exists another more recent and equally
comprehensive account of indigo manufacturing in Bihar by Jacques Pouchepadass. 6
Production records of the indigo establishments in Bihar have not survived. Under the
circumstances Pouchepadass has effectively used administrative papers left by the
colonial bureaucrats to give an account of the life on plantations. In the first part of the
book Pouchepadass utilizes econometric tools to work out the cost of production and the
overall working of the plantation economy.  In the second part he traces the lineage of
peasant and worker’s opposition to the indigo system, and clarifies the growing
                                                 
5 Benoy Chowdhury, Growth of Commercial Agriculture in Bengal, 1757-1900. (Calcutta: R K
Mitra, 1964)
6 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics.
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
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connection of those movements with the rise of the Gandhian national movement in
colonial India.
The first section of the chapter will also provide the planter’s account as a
manufacturer of the blue dye. It will use very similar material to that used by the above-
named scholars, but to engage in a different kind of analysis. The basic issue forcing the
planters was that cheaper synthetic indigo had become a threat, and they had to formulate
a strategy to protect their product. The indigo enterprise may have been “exploitative” of
the peasants and workers. It may also have been unbeneficial to the natives. Those are not
the central questions examined here, which have been addressed by Chowdhury and
Pouchepadass before. Instead, the first section of the chapter considers the different
factors of production to calculate the different costs involved and analyze where the
savings could have been made.
The second section turns to examine historical reasons that constrained planters as
they strove to devise a strategy of land and labor management in order to protect their
business against the competition from the synthetics. Certain actions were possible and
others impossible in the colonial and rural context of North Bihar at the turn of the 20th
century. Only a consideration of the evolution of planter-peasant relations and the
government’s efforts to regulate them through the 1800s provides clues to the alternatives
the planters had in 1897.
Planting indigo required land, and as foreigners in a new country the European
planters had to acquire land. That did not prove to be an easy task despite the colonial
government being on their side. Slowly the planters negotiated ownership and cultivating
rights with the holders of superior land rights – called zamindars (thikedars in Bihar) –
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and ordinary peasants. A certain stage had been reached by the end of the 19th century
that left only specific possibilities and precluded others as far as supplemental efforts
toward land management were concerned.
The options on wages and remunerations to workers and cultivators were also
limited. Throughout the 1800s the indigo tracts had witnessed riots related to demands for
better remuneration.7 Towards the close of the 19th century the government was
particularly wary of permitting any adventurism on the issue of payments to the
cultivators and workers. Had the wages historically kept up to subsistence levels? Could
the planters consider wage reduction in 1897? Would the peasants tolerate lower wages
without revolting? And, would the colonial state risk restless natives in order to protect
the natural indigo industry?  These questions can be best answered by considering long-
term trends through the course of the nineteenth century showing how the government
had slowly but surely started responding to planters’ handling of wages.
The Cultivation Of Indigo And Agricultural Costs
Low technical and capital input was a notable feature of indigo cultivation in late
nineteenth century Bihar. 8 The fertile and traditionally densely populated flood plains of
Bihar provided a huge cache of cheap labor. In such a situation the indigo planters found
no incentive to raising labor productivity through the improvement of farming
techniques. Also, it was a norm for the European planters to aim for making quick and
short-term profits. They tried to recover their initial investment as soon as possible. A
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8 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: 4-47, 62-67
 26
few good seasons returned huge profits after which they routinely sold their factory
including the land, land rights, and the building and equipment at the manufacturing unit
to later batches of immigrating businessmen from Britain. They retired to England with
their profits. Thus in the normal run of things the planters had no real interest in making
long-term investments to improve the technical standards on the plantations. 9
Land and cultivation rights were an elementary factor in the production of the
blue dye. Planters chartered land from proprietors on different terms for which they had
to pay a rent. They preferred to take lease (thika) of land from the local landlord
(zamindar) who was the proprietor of the entire village. The thika provided to the planter
not just land but also the traditional coercion rights that the landlord as the superior
landed class had traditionally employed to collect rent from peasants. Planters used those
rights to persuade peasants in Bihar to grow indigo. The average annual rate of payment
for the thika lease in north Bihar amounted to 5 rupees per bigha.10
The planters also had indigo cultivated on contract. The most prevalent system of
contract was that of tinkathiya wherein the peasant cultivator was obliged to grow indigo
on three-fifths of his land. The planter gave an advance to the peasant for the current year
of operations on low terms of interest or even without interest. He also provided other
inputs for cultivation like seed and implements and took the responsibility to cart away
the produce. The peasant’s responsibility was then limited to sowing, weeding, and
harvesting. The planter purchased the produce at a pre-agreed price. The planter’s
                                                 
9 Benoy Chowdhury argues that a perennial problem of the indigo industry lay in the fact that the
profits from the industry were never ploughed back into the plantations, but rather repatriated to
the mother country.
10 Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the District of Muzaffarpur, 1892-
1899. (Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press, 1901): 886; 1 bigha=0.87 acre; 1 acre=0.4 hectare.
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association in Bihar had fixed a minimum procurement rate for this raiyati indigo
(cultivated by the raiyat or peasant) at 12 rupees per acre or 10 rupees 7 annas per
bigha.11
Another part of the cost incurred in cultivation was on fertilizers and seed. Bihar’s
loamy flood plains were a mixed blessing. They offered the advantage of loose soil that
was easier to dig and sow with indigo. But such lands would be typically deficient in
nutrients like phosphoric acid and nitrogen. To overcome this deficit the indigo
cultivators and planters added farm manures, chemical manures like saltpeter and lime,
bone dust, and oil cakes to farmlands. But adding fertilizers purchased from the market
was rare. Growers quite often utilized the refuse from the manufacturing process called
sith as manure. John Augustus Voelcker, an agricultural chemist invited to India in 1892-
93, has reported wide use of sith on indigo tracts. 12
Indigo seeds in Bihar came from the United Provinces, a region about five
hundred miles to the northwest of Bihar. The seeds produced locally in Bihar were
known to germinate poorly and deteriorate in storage. Thus the planters depended on an
external source of supply. Thousands of small, independent peasants in the United
Provinces engaged in production of seed to be sold to the planters in Bihar. Varying
output from year to year in the northwest and the extent of middlemen’s profit
determined the price of indigo seed. But the cost per bigha to the planter came to a
minimum of 3 rupees 8 annas. 13
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The last component of agricultural cost was labor. It was also the largest
component among the agricultural costs. There are two ways in which this expense can
be considered. For the raiyati indigo, the price paid to cultivators was primarily for their
labor since the planter provided all other inputs. Therefore, in cases when raiyati indigo
was acquired from culivators, the price for the raw produce was in effect the labor cost.
For calculating labor costs for the land held by the planters in lease, one must take into
account the fact that the wage rates differed for different kinds of agricultural operations.
Also, wage rates varied across seasons according to the extent of demand.
Indigo planting was a labor-intensive operation at every stage. The cultivation
pattern for indigo in Bihar generally followed the cycle of season. Cultivators began
preparing land as early as the beginning of December in an effort to retain moisture
received from the rains in October-November. In the first round of preparation the ground
was dug (tamni) with a hoe having blades as long as possible. The stubble from the
previous crop was uprooted and removed. The land was then dressed to break clods and
compact the soil below to minimize loss of moisture from below. After that the land was
ploughed. The extremely laborious process of ustanni followed ploughing – when natives
crouched on their knees to break all clods. The entire cycle from dressing to ustanni was
then repeated. Usually work on the plantations came to a halt in the month of January
unless an unexpected bout of rains hardened the top of the soil, requiring a repetition yet
another time of the three operations described above.
In February, when the nights became milder, sowing took place. Planters waited
for the winter rains. All the planting had to be competed within 3-4 days until after the
rain. The roller followed immediately after the sowing and covered the sown furrows.
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Young shoots appeared a few days later. The period of early growth of seedlings
required very close monitoring because the seedlings were prone to attack by blights and
hot winds. Moist Easterly winds (poorvaiya) and spring rains benefited early growth.
Then it was time for first weeding, which was performed by laborers provided with
grubbing hoes to uproot the weeds. A second weeding took place when the plant reached
a height of about 30 to 40 centimeters. When the plant was about two feet high the soil
was lightly ploughed to loosen and aerate the roots and to clear the weeds again.
At the beginning of June, when the small red indigo flowers blossomed and the
lower leaves turned yellow, it was time to harvest the crop. Sometimes harvesting could
be delayed until July or even August. The cutting was done before daybreak to keep the
harvest from the scorching sun. Laborers cut the branches with sickles and gathered them
in heaps on the field. Entire branches with leaves were cut and carted to the
manufacturing centers although only leaves contained color. This was simply a measure
towards saving labor and time. The branches were loaded on the carts and rushed to the
factories by early morning. Indigo had a self-extinguishing trait to it; soon after being cut
the leaves began losing their color, and therefore every effort was made to minimize the
time lag between harvest and the beginning of the manufacturing cycle.
On average the annual course of indigo cultivation thus demanded labor for 1
round of tamni, 3 ploughings, 2 ustanni, 2 weedings, 1 sowing, 1 cutting, cartage, and 1
round of manuring. The rates for tamni, ploughing, sowing, and cutting were 2 annas a
day, while ustanni, weeding, and sprinkling of manure were less expensive at 1 anna a
day. Based on those rates the total expense toward payment of wages per bigha may be
worked out. Pouchepadass has computed different costs to claim that agricultural
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expenditure, as against manufacturing and other expenditures comprised on an average
40-45% of the total cost on the indigo plantations.14
As we shall see below, the percentage of wage costs in the total cost of production
– including those for cultivation and manufacturing – was even higher.
The Production Of The Blue Dye And Manufacturing Costs
The actual production of the blue dye from the plant took place at “factories” - the
manufacturing unit located throughout the plantation lands. 15 Raw indigo was carried to
these outworks from the adjoining plantations and peasant lands.
The manufacturing process too was labor intensive. As the indigo consignment
reached the factories, workers - called bojhaniya - loaded them into vats. Water from a
tank (khajana) was poured into the vats either with pumps or with water wheels that were
worked by cattle. Meticulous attention was paid to have indigo vertically placed in tightly
bound sheaves that were kept submerged by beams secured on projections on the vats’
sides called majusi, tan, sirpaha, ballal, or kainch. Managers, usually Westerners, but
sometimes also trained natives, closely supervised the loading operation.
This was the first stage in indigo manufacturing when the indigo leaves were
made to undergo fermentation. Some planters had the leaves plucked from the branches
to be submerged in water in the fermentation vat while others put the leaves into vats
along with the branches. The plant was steeped in water for a duration varying between
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10-14 hours depending on air and water temperature. Steam boilers were used to warm
water in larger factories. At those factories sith or indigo refuge was used as a fuel.
The next stage in the manufacturing process involved the process of oxidation of
liquor obtained from the previous stage. The greenish-yellow solution was drained off to
the beating vat. Here another set of workers – called coolies in local dialect– vigorously
“beat” the extract for about three to four hours to facilitate its exposure to air. The coolies
used their feet to kick, shake, and stir the liquid. Many factories also used a beating wheel
operated by steam. The beating rake was variously called phahuri, pharuha, or pharma.
After oxidation a pulpy indigo precipitate settled down. The extra water from the
top was drained off, and the indigo pumped out or manually shifted to the boilers. The
boilers were made of copper, or iron; they were embedded in a brick structure provided
with a chimney. The boiling of liquor lasted for about two hours and a third set of coolies
continuously stirred the slush during the process of boiling. In the end indigo became
insoluble and separated from whatever water was still left.
The boiling indigo was poured onto a straining vat called a mej. This was a
brickwork basin with a roughcast coating. It could also be constructed of massive wood.
It was usually 10-12 meters long, 3-4 meters wide, and about 50 centimeters deep. A
coarse canvas cloth supported by a bamboo grid, called channa and chaddar, spanned it
at the top. The liquid that dripped from indigo through the cloth was repeatedly recycled
to extract the last bit of indigo from the liquid. The cloth was then folded over the indigo,
which had become pulpy by now. Indigo was left to drain for the night with a weight put
on top of it.
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The following day the blue pulpy mass was brought to the press. It was first
poured into wooden boxes lined with cloth and perforated with holes. The press, piris or
pirich in common language, a powerful apparatus with an iron screw, compressed the lids
of the box. The remaining water from the indigo was thus squeezed out. Pressing was a
delicate and time consuming process. It proceeded gradually so as not to damage the
blocks of indigo. The pressed indigo was then cut with a wire into bars and then into
“cakes” by a specialized cutter. Each cake was stamped with the plantation’s brand mark.
Filterers, pressers, and finally cutters carried out these operations in turn.
Once the cakes had been stamped they were transported to the drying house - a
brick building about 200 square meters or more. The walls of this building were pierced
with numerous openings to permit air circulation, but were provided with curtains to keep
out draught and direct sunlight. The interior of the drying house was furnished to the
ceiling with rows of deep bamboo shelves. Each day’s production was carefully labeled
on the shelves to avoid mixing cakes. In November or December, during the dry season,
the thoroughly dehydrated cakes were carefully cleaned to remove the thick layer of
mould that would have appeared on them. The cakes sometimes went to a sweating room,
a small airtight building in which desiccation was completed. The product was then ready
for packing.
There were fixed costs that were incurred in setting up the factories. The central
part of the factory was a fairly large building that accommodated several vats. Its size
varied according to the number of vats. A separate drying house was also an essential part
of the built structure. All of these required an initial investment but a meager
maintenance cost. Among the regular equipments in use at the factories were water
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pumps, vats, beating wheels, steam engines, boilers, and presses. These also required a
one-time investment. But the vats could require replacing after they wore out. Boilers and
steam engines could give mechanical problems during operation. Sometimes they could
be fixed and at other times they required replacing.
But the largest component of manufacturing cost was comprised of wages paid to
the laborers. A large number of names were in common use to describe workers handling
different operations – coolies for loading the fermentation vats, those at beating vats,
boilers, steam engines, and fitters and pressers, cake cutters etc. According to
Pouchepadass’s calculations the manufacturing costs comprised 20 % of the total cost of
production, of which the major component was comprised of wages paid to the coolies.
The Indigo Enterprise And Financial Costs
The indigo operations in Bihar were carried out with funds made available by the
commercial houses based in Calcutta. The principal banks advancing loans to the indigo
planters were the Agra and Masterman’s Bank and the Agra Bank. 16 They provided both
fixed capital for buying or renting land, buildings, and machinery, and short-term loans
for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers, advance to peasants, wages to laborers etc.
Initially the planters took loans to buy land and cultivating rights. These were paid back
over a period of ten to fifteen years. In addition the planters borrowed capital for their
annual operations. Short-term loans were raised at the beginning of the cultivating and
manufacturing cycle as an advance, and paid back after the product was ready for sale at
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the end of the season. Usually planters paid an interest of 10-12 per cent per annum on
the loans.
The sale of indigo transpired through brokers. The planters brought their produce
to the marts in Calcutta to brokers’ premises. J Thomas and Company and W. Moran and
Company were the principal brokers of indigo. They charged between 2 and 2.5 per cent
brokerage fee.
Some indigo was sold to buyers locally. The rest of it had to be forwarded to other
markets. It was usually the managing agents in Calcutta that took charge of the shipment
and final distribution of the produce in the overseas markets. From Calcutta indigo still
had to travel a long distance to the markets in the West and elsewhere. For the indigo
headed for Britain, the produce had to be safely shipped, enter English ports, reach
another set of brokers, and finally the retailers. Among the managing agents the
prominent ones were Begg Dunlop and Company, Schoene, Kilburn and Company,
Gisbourne and Company, Moran and Company, and Gillanders Arbuthnot and
Company.17
All the financial charges including interests, brokerage, and handling charges
together came to about 30% of the total cost of natural dye. 18 Planters paid interest on
both annual advances as well as the initial capital borrowed at the time of setting up of
the plantations. They also incurred miscellaneous charges such as those for accounting.
They paid commissions of numerous kinds too.
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18 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran: 32-33, 64
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Pouchepadass’s calculations are vital for understanding the alternatives that the
indigo planters had as far as reducing the price of their product was concerned. The
planters’ costs were distributed over agricultural, manufacturing, and financial
operations. The relative share of those costs was 50% agricultural, 20% manufacturing,
and 30% financial (including distribution costs). Also, wages to cultivators and laborers
formed between 50 and 75 % of the total cost of the dye. These economic data are
pertinent to make sense of the steps undertaken by the planters.
From a purely economic point of view the reduction of agricultural costs and
wage costs appeared as the likely direction for the planters to move. As the single largest
part of the total expense they offered the most obvious choice for implementing savings.
The value of land (and therefore land rents) had been buoyant over the second half of the
nineteenth century. But planters did not have any control over the forces that led to a rise
in land prices. Could the planters reduce wages? The rest of this chapter will present a
historical study of the evolution of planter-government relations as well as planter-
peasant relations to illustrate why the wages could not be reduced, and therefore, why the
planters did not consider that option.
Indigo Manufacturing And The Early Colonial Conditions
Bengal became the epicenter of indigo manufacturing in the third quarter of the
eighteenth century concurrent with the consolidation of the East India Company’s (EIC)
rule in that province. At this time the heart of indigo industry was Lower Bengal, one of
the four administrative divisions of Bengal. Most plantations were concentrated in the
three districts of Nadia, Jessore, and Barasat. Around the same time indigo manufacturing
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also began in the four districts of Bihar, another administrative division within Bengal.
The most prominent districts in Bihar were Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Saran, and
Champaran.19  Acreage and output in Lower Bengal far outweighed those in Bihar at this
time. 
The colonial administration actively encouraged entrepreneurs from home to set
up indigo plantations in Bengal. The company almost exclusively provided capital for
starting the operations of European planters. Immigrating planters did not come to India
with their own capital. Most of them were fortune-seekers from the British Isles,
generally young, and hoping to become rich in the fastest manner possible on the indigo
plantations. They had come on being invited by their relatives who were either company
officials or private traders based in the nearby port-city of Calcutta.
Support for indigo by the EIC partly emerged from the established policy that
called for commercial exploitation of agricultural products in the colony. Similar efforts
were made to introduce the long-stapled cotton and tea in India. But the exceptional
interest in indigo was for good reason. The export of indigo from India provided the
company and those company officials trading in a private capacity a convenient way to
remit their profit and salary to England.  Promoted by them, indigo soon rose to
prominence as the major article of export as well as the primary medium of remittance
trade.
The EIC continued to protect the indigo industry – indirectly when not directly.
As of 1802 the company decided to curtail its scale of financing of the indigo industry as
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the business had struck its own roots. Its role in the financing of indigo plantations was
taken over by a new type of mercantile institution that had arisen in Calcutta, called the
Agency Houses. Agency houses were engaged in a variety of activities that included
banking, manufacturing, and shipping of agricultural and bulk-handled products. They
also engaged in trade among the Asian countries. In addition they handled trusts, wills,
estates of their clients, and in several ways facilitated the transfer of wealth to Britain. 20
As the century wore on, and as indigo exports from India kept rising, the agency houses
retained their dominant role in the organization of indigo production. Because the destiny
of the indigo industry was so closely tied up with the agency houses, the EIC on
numerous occasions went out of its way to advance loans to these mercantile houses in
their times of financial trouble.
However, the EIC moved cautiously as far as regulating planters’ relationship
with native peasants was concerned. In the earlier period legal restrictions forbade land
ownership by the planters. The company government was extremely nervous that large
scale buying up of native lands by planters might result in clash with the established
proprietors, and thus had imposed restrictions through Regulation 38 of 1793 and the
Charter Act of 1813.
Planters obtained almost all of their indigo from native cultivators. They entered
into contract with individual peasants for cultivation of indigo under the “raiyati” system.
Cultivators were provided with a yearly advance to grow indigo on part of their plots –
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usually one-fourth of the total land. Once the crop was ready the entire produce was
carted away to factories by the farmer or by the planter depending on the specific terms
of the contract. The planters paid farmers for their produce at a rate fixed beforehand.
The seemingly innocuous ryoti system of indigo cultivation was built around
several forms of compulsion. Hard economic data is difficult to obtain for the earliest
period regarding net profit or loss to the farmers on indigo. A few surviving accounts
addressing that question do suggest that cultivation of indigo often brought a “dead loss”
to cultivators. For the poor peasants of Bengal, who were perpetually short of liquid cash,
the monetary advance offered by the planters was often an inducement to get into indigo
cultivation. The advance was not adequate to meet the entire cost of cultivation and
harvesting, and would usually be exhausted by the time the planting of indigo was
completed. Thereafter, the peasants supplied all other means of cultivation on their own
and bore the risks of cultivation. The price paid by the planters in the end never sufficed
so that the indigo growers could pay off the principal. Also, indigo was an extremely
precarious crop and when it failed, as it often did, peasants were indebted to the planters.
After that it was extremely difficult for the peasants to get out of their contractual
obligation to cultivate indigo. Even when a cultivator failed to return the advance at the
end of the cultivating season, the planter gave him more money for fresh planting in the
next season. Most commonly the debts on peasants kept accumulating until in the end
they had to be written off as bad debts. The planter did not begrudge this. Over the years
he obtained indigo worth several times the value of the monetary advance. Rather the
indebtedness of the peasants was an appropriate tool through which planters forced the
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peasants to sow indigo in their fields. The contract to grow indigo passed down the
generation keeping peasant families obligated to grow indigo.
For the planters raiyati remained the preferred system for organizing the
cultivation of indigo. There was a huge unpaid labor component to this type of cultivation
that the planters found advantageous.  Low prices paid for indigo did not cover all labor
costs incurred by the peasants in planting, cultivating, and carting. The peasants were
able to bear this burden only because they utilized the repertoire of “free” family labor
for indigo. The cultivation of food crops on three-quarters of their land enabled them to
feed their families. 21 Planters also employed a variety of unlawful means to maintain
their dominance in the raiyati system vis-à-vis the peasantry. And, colonial
administrators lacked the political will and power to intervene at the local level to
mitigate those ills.
Planters’ larger concern was to protect the sanctity of contracts that they signed
with peasants for cultivating indigo. They argued vehemently for the enactment of more
comprehensive laws arguing that peasants often refused to respect all the terms of their
contract. Official responses to such requests fluctuated over time. In the first half of the
nineteenth century sometimes the government allied with the capitalists and at other
times with the peasants.
In 1811 a case was made for legislating in this regard. Due to prodding by the
planters the Magistrate of Jessore argued to his superiors that the peasants often accepted
advances from more than one planter. Lack of honesty among lower classes and the
boldness of peasants due to the weaker legal status of the planters in the Indian
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countryside were cited to be at the root of such acts of misdemeanor. 22 The government
headed by Lord Mayo at that time, however, was reticent. It refused to accept the
argument that the peasants, who appeared to be quintessentially weak, often broke their
contract with the planters. The extreme case of indebtedness of some of them might have
pushed them into a situation where they found it impossible to cultivate indigo. Therefore
Mayo’s government ruled that acts of breaking the indigo contract could be adequately
monitored under the existing laws dealing with the non-payment of ordinary debts. The
cases of highhandedness by the planters in dealing with peasants on the indigo tracts were
well known and any additional powers would only make matters worse, the government
argued.
The contest over contract laws, their interpretation in courts, and their
implementation continued. The colonial government became more sympathetic to the
planters’ perspective subsequently. Regulation 6 of 1823 cleared the way for bringing
suits against the peasants and their “instigators” for hindering the fulfillment of contracts.
In 1830 an even stronger regulation was passed, which was paramount to being a
summary law for the enforcement of indigo contracts. The government of the day argued
that the boom of 1823 had started a spate of reckless speculation in the industry often
causing competing interest groups to indulge in unfair practices. Benoy Chowdhury has
rightly pointed out that statutes introduced by the government were partial. While they
aimed to stop “faithlessness” of the peasants, they did not address the unfair and often
illegal ways through which many of the indigo contracts were signed between the
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planters and the peasants in the first place. Even the Court of Directors in London
denounced the act as “class legislation.” The directors argued that the peasants were not
“free agents” when they entered into contracts, constrained as they were due to “poverty,
abjectness of spirit, intimidation, or bribery.” They also criticized the Regulation because
in their opinion it singled out only the peasants as offenders; it left out the planters from
scrutiny that were widely known to use unfair means to sign contracts. The Regulation
was repealed in 1835. 23
The court of judicial magistrates across various districts was another stage where
the actual import of the regulations and best ways of implementing them was debated.
The outcome of specific litigations on indigo contracts brought to courts by the planters
and peasants depended on the outlook of the particular presiding officer. Planters en bloc
resented and petitioned against any verdict that seemed to them to be going against their
interpretation of the contract laws. Overall, Chowdhury argues, planters achieved
“significant triumphs” in their attempt to secure the interests of indigo plantation, often at
the expense of peasants’ interests. The Charter Act of 1833 also gave planters the right to
purchase lands, which proved to be a key legislation as far as the future of indigo
plantations in Bengal was concerned.
“Indigo Riots” In Lower Bengal
The indigo industry underwent major transitions at mid century, and a number of
economic, administrative, and political developments at the time were at the root of those
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changes. Indigo lost its primary importance as a remittance commodity to the colonial
administrators. From 1826-1856, indigo was only surpassed by opium as an item of
export from India. But recently, yet another item of export had surged ahead of indigo –
food grains, and Bengal supplied half of the total export of food grains from India. In the
decade prior to 1859, indigo formed only ten per cent of the export from Bengal. The
relative decline of indigo as an export item, argues Blair B Kling, a historian of indigo
revolts in Bengal, somewhat curtailed the bargaining position of the industry overall. 24
 At mid nineteenth century the indigo-growing districts of Lower Bengal
witnessed increasing agitation by the peasants. John Peter Grant, (1854-61) Bengal’s
second Lieutenant Governor, took concrete measures to address peasants’ grievances
most of which were related to the alleged excesses of the planters. The Secretary of State
for India, Sir Charles Wood, supported Grant in his efforts.  These officials clearly
articulated the target of their attack – the illegitimate use of coercion by the planters in
making natives grow indigo and the payment of non-remunerative prices to them.
It is not difficult to see why the planters had to use various forms of compulsion. J
Cockburn, the Deputy Magistrate of Jessore, discussed the issue of net profit or loss to
the peasants accruing from indigo. Under most favorable conditions, when the peasant
received the advance in full and the weather was benign, a peasant could grow 20 bundles
of indigo on one bigha of land. At the price of 5 bundles for a rupee his 20 bundles would
sell for Rs. 4. The cost of cultivation for the same, according to Cockburn, came to rupees
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3 and 3 annas that gave a meager profit of 13 annas to the peasant. 25 Besides, indigo
cultivation was disadvantageous for the peasants because the cultivating cycle for indigo
interfered with that of an important staple - rice. While calculating the stakes for peasants
one must also take into account the profit that the peasant would have made if he grew
some other more remunerative crop in place of indigo. Factoring in this aspect Lieutenant
Governor Grant calculated that on average a peasant lost rupees 7 for every bigha of
indigo that he cultivated. 26 Basing his criticism on these facts, John Grant galvanized the
judicial and police administration in Bengal towards dispensing justice.
Kling has argued that the attack on the indigo system by Grant and Wood was
inspired by “the tenets of mid-Victorian Liberalism, as upheld by John Peter Grant in
Bengal and Charles Wood in London.” 27  The recent administrative reorganization of
Bengal under the “Lieutenant-Governor system” had certainly brought planter-peasant
relationships under closer scrutiny of the administrators. Many Christian missionaries
based in Calcutta had also voiced their concern over the treatment meted out to peasants.
But the steps of Grant and Wood were also ideologically inspired. Grant believed that the
indigo system inhibited free enterprise because it did not allow the peasant to sell his
produce in an unregimented market. Grant said that he would not let Indian peasants be
treated like “Carolina slaves.” He also upheld another principle of liberalism – that of
judicial supremacy, and thus directed his officials to take a neutral position in dealing
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with instances of disagreements between the planters on the one hand and peasants on the
other hand. All along in the past the planters had utilized their closeness with colonial
administrators to have executive fiats issued, which in effect forced peasants to cultivate
indigo. With Grant at the helm of affairs now, the peasants noticed a change of heart
within the government. A groundswell of opposition followed on the indigo tracts. Not
only did peasants turn to courts seeking justice, but they also took the extreme step of
refusing to take advances for the next cropping season. All this happened in the autumn
of 1859.
Describing the politics in Calcutta in 1860 Kling noted that, “the exploitation of
the indigo cultivators had already become the central political issue in the capital of
India.” Indigo interests comprising of brokers, managing agents, and merchants in
Calcutta, in addition to the planters, demanded a special law to enforce indigo contracts.
They received the support of the larger mercantile community in Calcutta that had been
growing in respectability and influence as the vanguard of private enterprise in India.
Provincial administrators headed by John Peter Grant stood their ground. Two additional
nodes exerting influence on this highly partisan politics were the offices of the Governor-
General, Lord Canning, who sympathized with the planters, and Secretary of State
Charles Wood, who was overall sympathetic to the cause of peasants.
Act XI was passed in the legislature in1860 to deal with the situation. To the
planters it provided a summary law for the enforcement of contracts and planting of the
crop for the current season. But, at the same time, John Grant went out of his way to
make peasants comprehend that they were free not to sign fresh contracts for planting
indigo. More importantly, the act provided for the appointment of a Commission of
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Inquiry (the Indigo Commission) that would look into all aspects of the working of the
indigo system and suggest measures to mitigate its ills.
Despite the success obtained in cropping during that season planters lost ground
in the long run. The large-scale conviction of peasants under the 1860 act reduced hopes
of reconciling the peasants to indigo. If anything, it incited further violence. An
unfavorable report of the Indigo Commission, reaching London in November 1860,
minimized any chance of political support from the metropolis. The commission was
fairly balanced in its composition. It comprised two officials, a representative of the
planters, another of the class of Indian zamindars (landlords), and a Calcutta missionary,
who was considered sympathetic to the interests of peasants. Although considered to be
mild in its tone by its critiques, the report still identified the paying of low wages to the
peasants by planters as the key anomaly of the indigo industry. Although skirting the
issue of forced contracts it nonetheless pointed out that the peasants had little chance of
getting out of an indigo contract once they had signed it. It also asked for the
discontinuation of the summary law for enforcing the contracts. 28
Although peace returned to Lower Bengal in 1863, a lack of trust between the
planters and the peasants continued. James Hills of Nadia district represented an ever-
decreasing minority in being able to continue. He succeeded in persuading the peasants to
re-grow indigo by raising the remuneration two-fold. Most planters, however, folded up
their business.
From the planters’ side there was a lack of willingness to offer a better price for
indigo. Most planters found offering higher prices for indigo an unattractive proposition.
A higher procurement price for indigo was in effect a higher wage for the peasants for the
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labor expended on growing indigo. The only way to recover the extra wage would have
been to improve yield and productivity from cultivation and manufacturing. But it was
not possible for the planters to take initiatives in this regard largely because under ryoti
indigo was grown privately on peasants’ plots. And any major changes in the pattern of
land management also did not seem possible in the volatile political situation.  From the
peasants’ side, on the other hand, there was a deep-rooted ill will against the indigo
system. Such was their antagonism for indigo by now that many of them refused to grow
indigo whatever the terms offered to them.
Planters squarely blamed the government for the demise of the indigo industry in
Lower Bengal. James Tissendie, a manager with an indigo company was so disillusioned
with government’s attitude on matters related to indigo that he wanted to resign his job.
Tissendie said, “I very much regret that I accepted the management of this concern.
When I accepted it, I was under the impression that Government would have supported
us in all that is lawful, but it is now quite evident that they have no such intentions.” 29
Robert T Larmour, the manager of Bengal Indigo Company, the largest indigo concern of
that time, also blamed the government. “Whatever estrangement has taken place between
the people and myself has been the act of Government alone, generated and fostered by
Government with the premeditated intention of driving me out of the District.” 30
It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the disenchantment of Tissendie and
Larmour. There had been a significant turnaround in the attitude of the political
establishment recently that had destabilized the world of indigo planters. So far the
government had followed a policy – by design or by default – of non-interference on
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matters of labor relations on the indigo plantations. But now, by insisting that the
procurement prices for indigo be fair and that the peasants be recompensed for their labor
in cultivating indigo, the government had initiated a new policy of social control of labor
market. The government’s posture on the question of peasants’ remunerations also
revealed a new political program wherein the state took it up to itself to guarantee the
basic rights of the rural classes.
The impetus for this change in policy could have come from several sources.
Some historians have argued that the government’s program of rural welfare was inspired
by the ideology of broader responsibility towards natives. 31 Other historians have
analyzed these measures as acts of political astuteness on the part of the government.
After the 1857 Mutiny the government had become more sensitive to the plight of the
teeming peasantry. Fearful that the peasants could be mobilized for future acts of treason
the government began looking into their grievances. Indeed it has been argued by
historians that in the second half of the nineteenth century the colonial government and
the Indian urban intelligentsia competed for the leadership of rural masses. 32
Indigo Plantations In Bihar At Transition
Although Bihar remained unscathed by the disturbances of 1860-63, the turn of
events in Lower Bengal significantly changed the nature and organization of indigo
cultivation and manufacturing in that division. Very soon Bihar became the primary
exporter of indigo to the West. The major increase of indigo acreage in Bihar took place
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in the four northern districts. As a matter of fact, the districts of Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga,
Champaran, and Saran showed an increase in acreage by 286 percent between 1830 and
1875. The most drastic increase took place after 1860. 33
Since the same managing agents based in Calcutta funded and sponsored the
indigo plantations of both regions, the experience gained in Lower Bengal was utilized to
make amends in Bihar. The first major impact came in an increase in the level of wages
for the plantation workers (coolies) and procurement prices for indigo. A second
important change came in the field of land management.
The planters in Bihar and the business houses in Calcutta had come to accept the
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position that indigo manufacturing could only be continued through payment of more
reasonable wages and remunerations to workers and peasants. A very prominent
managing agency of Calcutta, Gisbourne and Company, wrote to their managers in Bihar
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Source: Jacques Pouchepadass, Planter, Peasants, and Gandhian Politics
that: “A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor is the only way of establishing satisfactory
relations between employers and employed, and we wish you to act on this principle.” 34
So believing the planters generally raised the wages for the peasants. The wage and price
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increases across plantations has been documented by Jacques Pouchepadass (See Tables
1 and 2 above). 35
But wage increases were not brought about in isolation. The planters adopted
measures to make savings elsewhere in order to make up for the increased cost expended
on labor. These additional measures ensured that the final price for indigo before and
after the wage increase remained the same. 36 Planters took initiatives to increase their
control over land. A common refrain among many planters in the past had been that the
peasants were lackadaisical, and that they did not put their best lands and best efforts to
obtain higher and better yield. The planters were confident that an improved supervision
of the tillage, cultivation, and harvesting of indigo would bring better results.
Planters’ initiatives with regard to land and labor management in Bihar were
nonetheless of a “negotiated” nature. As before, the last thing the administrators wanted
was a restless native; they remained watchful of the steps taken on the plantations. But a
new element of the planter-peasant relationship in the third quarter of the 19th century
was also the stronger position of the colonial administrators to monitor them. In that
sense peasant power – even if it was of a mediated nature – had become a more crucial
determinant of developments on the plantations.
Much of the indigo in Bihar was grown under the asamiwar system of contract.
Under this system the peasants were obliged to grow indigo on six katthas out of every
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bigha of land that they cultivated. Following peasant agitations in Bihar in 1867-68, the
government intervened to reduce peasants’ obligation for cultivation of indigo to three
katthas of land. The new system so inaugurated was called the Tinkathiya (three-katthas)
system.  At the same time, however, the government also mandated that the peasants
practice crop rotation.  Peasants always preferred to give their best lands to food crop
production year after year, while the planters tried to persuade them to rotate the land on
which indigo was grown. The government was clearly trying to be even-handed. They
intervened on behalf of the peasants in reducing their tillage obligation and in favor of
planters by making peasants adopt crop rotation.
The most significant initiative by the planters beginning 1860s came in starting
the neez system of indigo cultivation on privately owned lands. The planters followed an
aggressive policy of buying up personal lands of smaller peasants and landlords,
variously called khas, nij, sir, and khas khamar lands. These were the lands that the
proprietors had reserved for their subsistence and that of their family. The ownership
rights to these personal lands were authenticated not by any written documents, but by
the custom of the village. 37 Often the means employed by the planters to acquire
peasants’ land violated local customs and conventions. They invited criticism from the
government in 1876-77 in this regard. But the process of transfer of land ownership
continued. Planters used loopholes in the existing system and also took advantage of the
poverty of the farmers to buy up land.
Planters had clear motives behind starting neez cultivation. Clear titles in land
helped in the task of closer supervision of indigo production. But, more importantly,
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buying up of lands also enabled the planters to assume stronger legal rights vis-à-vis the
laboring classes. Landless laborers and tenants-at-will (those tenants that could be evicted
at discretion) did not quite possess as much protection under the law as landed
proprietors. Benoy Chowdhury has argued that, “ If the planter could oust the peasants
from land, and the peasants, as a consequence, sank into a position of landless labourers,
a class unprotected by the existing regulations, the situation would be ideal for the
planters.” 38
The government for its part took steps in an effort to regulate the working of the
indigo plantations. After the disturbances of 1868 it made a sincere effort to promote the
khuski system of contract cultivation under which the terms were relatively favorable for
peasants. In this system peasants grew indigo on their own lands without planters’
supervision and sold it to them at market rate. Jacques Pouchepadass has called khuski a
“free contract system” to draw a contrast with the other prevailing contract system,
asamiwar/tinkathiya.  The colonial government looked at this contract system with favor
and thought that its popularization would reduce the conflict-ridden relationship between
the planters and the peasants. In 1871 the officials introduced khuski in the Saran district
on a large scale. Hathwa estate, which was under the control of Court of Wards, became
the site for this trial.39  However, despite the government’s active promotion khuski did
not become prevalent in Bihar.
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Simultaneously the government took steps to improve its monitoring of the wages
on plantations. Planters in Bengal were not unified within any organization. There was no
centralized body through which the government could have initiated industry wide
reforms. It was primarily on account of these concerns that the administrators persuaded
the planters to form a unified body representing all planters - the Bengal Planters’
Association (BPA) in 1877. Subsequently administrators also persuaded BPA to initiate
the norm of fixing a minimum payable wage and price for indigo on a yearly basis. Once
their association had announced the minimum rates at the beginning of the season all
planter-members were expected to respect it. This brought a certain amount of regularity
in the nature of wages.
Epilogue
Not all efforts initiated by the government were of a constraining nature as far as
the natural indigo industry was concerned. As the events after 1897 showed, the state also
undertook positive steps to save the natural indigo industry. Those efforts were made in
the context of current state policies towards agriculture in general and agricultural
innovations in the colony in particular.
As the planters braced themselves to meet the competition of synthetics they
sought the support of the government. There was certain expectancy with regard to state
aid. Planters’ anticipation of support from the government was based on existing
precedents in British India, other British colonies and dominions, and even Dutch and
French colonies. The planters invoked those precedents to demand support.
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A consideration of those policies and precedents is important in order to situate
governmental support for the indigo industry in the two decades after 1897. After all the
indigo industry was not “only” a private, profit-making enterprise of Europeans based
overseas. It was also an important colonial industry that provided a livelihood for
thousands of natives. While the government showed an inclination to monitor wages paid
to natives, as shown before, they also did not want the industry to disappear altogether. A
thorough understanding of the situation demands a consideration of the inner
contradictions of fiscal and imperial imperatives that shaped the apparently contradictory
state policies towards the natural indigo industry.
A self-perception of the government’s expanded role with regard to Indian
agriculture had emerged by the 1860s and 1870s. The transfer of power from the EIC to
the British crown in 1858 and the supervision of the Secretary of State for India by the
British Parliament changed the context of decision-making with regard to India. Both
Russell Dionne and Deepak Kumar have argued that a series of famines that caused
political embarrassment, as well as proving expensive in terms of loss of revenue and
welfare payments, set the stage for the evolution of a more comprehensive agricultural
policy.39 A severe famine raged in parts of Bengal and Orissa in 1866. The Famine
Commission set up to get an overview of the disaster suggested that the government “take
cognizance of all matters affecting the practical improvement and development of the
agricultural resources of the country.” 40
                                                 
39 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj: 41-42, 96-98; Dionne, Russell Jude, “Government
directed agricultural innovation in India, the British Experience.”  Unpublished PhD dissertation,
Department of History, Duke University, 1973: 21
40 F G Sly, “The Department of Agriculture in India,” Agricultural Journal of India (1906) 1: 1
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Indian Governor-General Mayo responded positively to the proposal for setting
up agricultural departments. His correspondence with the Secretary of State, the Duke of
Argyll, at this time also indicated that the government’s outlook towards Indian
agriculture had changed. He said, the “Government of India has never held that
agricultural improvement is a matter to be left entirely to private enterprise and private
interests.”  Until now the government had merely acted as the pioneer of private
enterprise as in the case of commercial crops like tea, cotton, and opium. It had done so
by supporting small-scale scientific experiments, farm trials, and even establishing
plantations to open the way for private investments to flow in. But in an apparent
expansion of the role played by the government until then, Mayo now implied that British
government was responsible for improvement of agriculture in India because it was not
only the supreme political authority but also the chief landlord in the country.
The momentum culminated in the founding of a new department at the center –
Department of Revenue, Agriculture and Commerce, a development that Russell Dionne
considers to be landmark. The department was wound up shortly after in 1871, citing
financial constraints that the government was facing. Dionne has argued that “although
the department folded, those who ruled India had reached a point where they accepted the
fact that government was the appropriate agent for agricultural development.” 41
Peter Robb has pointed towards differing perspectives among the colonial
officialdom in the 1880s and 1890s relating to agricultural innovations. One important
administrator, T W Holderness, argued that a point would be “speedily reached beyond
which increased returns from an acre are not to be expected” and thus non-agricultural
income must be the salvation of the country. But the dominant trend was represented in
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the opinion of colonial India’s pioneering Revenue Secretary Sir E C Buck. Buck was
optimistic about improving agricultural productivity in India, and continued in his official
role to promote agricultural development. 42
The official machinery continued to explore the ways and means for introducing
change into native agriculture. Most significant steps were taken in the direction of
institutionalization. Another round of famines precipitated the next step towards further
expansion of agricultural administration. The Famine Commission of 1880 emphasized
the need for agricultural departments in the country and the government once again
obliged. A Department of Land Records and Agriculture came into being in 1881 and
gradually provincial agricultural departments also emerged across the country. An
agricultural chemist from the Royal College of Agriculture in Cirencester, John Augustus
Voelcker, was invited to India to suggest measures for improving Indian agriculture.
Following his proposal the post of an Agricultural Chemist was created and Walter
Leather was hired for a term appointment of five years in 1892. The policies with regard
to agricultural innovation were constantly reassessed in government circles. From 1892,
for instance, a decision was made to cut down the number of experimental farms under
the control of the government as not much was seen to be resulting from those efforts.
A policy of agricultural advance through patronage of laboratories also began to
gain ground in colonial India during the last decade of the nineteenth century. There were
two assumptions at the core of this policy: first, that conduct of systematic experiments
will lead to increase in agricultural productivity and second that government must assume
                                                 
42 Peter Robb, “State, Peasant and Money-Lender in Late Nineteenth Century Bihar: Some
Colonial Inputs,” in Peter Robb (ed.), Rural India: Land, Power and Society under British Rule.
(London and Dublin: Curzon Press, 1983): 113
 57
responsibility for patronizing experiments in laboratories and research institutions. At
two agricultural conferences officials gathered to discuss what would be the best
approach to improve Indian agriculture. There was considerable agreement that the
benefits of scientific research must be brought to Indian agriculture. Two possible tracks
were discussed – either to set up a limited number of higher centers of learning in the
country to generate appropriate knowledge for Indian agriculture or to start at the bottom
by making agricultural sciences part and parcel of primary education. The view of E C
Buck prevailed: he preferred the latter option. A policy resolution of 1894 stated that the
central government would make agricultural science part and parcel of primary education
throughout the country. 43Another resolution followed in 1897 that spoke of the
government’s plan to top the edifice of vocational education with institutes dedicated to
agricultural research of a generic type that would focus on improving all Indian crops. 44
The new policy also favored the setting up of specialized laboratories in different parts of
the country.  Chemical examiners attached to provincial governments headed some of
these. Calcutta University and the office of the Reporter on Economic Products also got
their own laboratories.45
The government was also no longer averse to the idea of setting up specialized
laboratories to protect the interests of agricultural industry if the need arose. The decision
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to serve specific industries was made on a case-to-case basis. The first major support
from the government was for silk. The indigenous silk industry was in a depressed state
and was also being threatened by the spread of pebrine disease. The central government
set up a laboratory at Berhampur in 1887 that was exclusively dedicated to conducting
experiments on silk. Scientists employed by the government studied all matters related to
the propagation of mulberry trees and improving silk worms in addition to investigating
the harmful disease. 46  Officials later turned over the control of the sericulture laboratory
to business houses.
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CHAPTER 3
EARLY RESPONSES OF THE PLANTERS AND THE GOVERNMENT
This chapter focuses on the early efforts made by the indigo planters and the
imperial/colonial government to meet the challenge of synthetic indigo that had
immediately started eating into the natural’s market. These efforts comprised
explorations to gauge the precise nature of the challenge.  These were also early attempts
to devise an adequate response. There was no time to be lost. The adverse impact of the
competition from synthetics was already being reflected in the drop in the import of
natural indigo into Britain. Board of Trade figures from Britain confirm the declining
trend (See Table 3.1 below). The import of synthetic into Britain was rising at the same
time.
Table 3.1













                          Source: Board of Trade Returns 1
                                                 
1 The figures have been taken from the issues of Journal of the Society of Dyers and Colourists
between 1898 and 1904, Vols. 14  – 20
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Early Response In London: Gathering Information
The ability of the planters to operate in the British market was constrained by
many factors. First of all, the selling line for natural indigo was not integrated. Once
indigo left the planters, the planters had little control over its sale. By comparison the
synthetic companies (BASF and MLB in Germany) employed a network of salesmen to
persuade buyers. Their sales personnel offered special prices to the buyers as part of
innovative marketing strategies to attract clients. Sometimes they made the supply of
other drugs required by the dyeing companies conditional on the purchase of synthetic
indigo. They also offered much reduced prices if the dyers and printers signed contracts
to purchase synthetic in the coming seasons.
There were other factors that put natural indigo manufacturers and sellers at a
disadvantage. Planters in Bengal did not know the exact price at which consumers bought
synthetic indigo, and thus were unable to manipulate their own prices to secure
competitive advantages. The German companies and their agents did not readily disclose
the production cost and price for synthetic indigo. They did so with a purpose. To give
one instance, Zilz and Stott, agents for BASF in London, declined to give the price of
synthetic indigo or the total quantity they sold in Britain to Imperial Institute officials,
maintaining that it was not in their trade interest to do so. 2 As part of a company strategy,
BASF fixed the price for BASF Rein below that of natural indigo. Heinrich Caro, ex-
                                                 
2 Letter from Zilz and Stott, dated, May 17, 1900, addressed to W R Dunstan, Director, Scientific
and Technical Department, Imperial Institute. Public Record Office, London, AY4/2047, 100168;
These files are available at the Public Record Office at Kew, London; henceforth called “PRO.”
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manager of BASF, said that, “the price of artificial indigo [at BASF] is regulated by the
market price of natural indigo to such a degree as to allow a fair competition.” 3
It is therefore only logical that one of the first things the indigo planters did was to
gather information related to the new product. They concentrated their efforts in England
as early as 1898. In September of that year the planters took the initiative to subscribe to
a limited company in London, the Indigo Defence Association. Planters realized the need
to intervene more directly in the market and to gain access to commercial information.
One of the stated objectives of this company was “ to obtain and turn to account
information relating to … manufacture, trade, and commerce.” The company would also
initiate investigations, scientific and otherwise, buy patents relating to improvements, and
complete agreements with the government to benefit the natural indigo trade. The
company’s subscription expanded subsequently. In 1900, the company changed its name
to The Behar Indigo Planters’ Association. 4
In early 1900 Begg, Dunlop and Company, one of the largest managing agents of
indigo in Calcutta, wrote to the Commercial Intelligence Department of the Board of
Trade in London, asking that the facts relating to the comparative merits of natural and
artificial indigo be examined and clarified. They were intrigued by rumors about the
respective qualities of the two indigos. Claims and counter-claims about natural and
synthetic indigo were rampant in the early years. The commercial department in turn
forwarded the query to the Scientific and Technical Department of the Imperial Institute
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and Technical Department, Imperial Institute. Public Record Office, AY4/2047, 100168
4 Incorporation papers of Indigo Defence Association Limited, PRO, BT31/8154/58924/100052
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and asked for their professional opinion on the issue. 5 It was customary for the Imperial
Institute to undertake investigations of this nature. It had been founded in 1887 to
function as the “central school for the arts, manufactures, and commerce of the whole
Empire.” Especially since the appointment of chemist Wyndham R Dunstan as the
director of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Institute, it had been
rhetorically called the “Kew of Chemistry.” (Kew was the widely acknowledged imperial
center for conducting botanical research on flora of all kinds in the British Empire.)
Investigating the question of the relative merits of natural and synthetic indigo seemed
especially within the remit of the Imperial Institute. 6
  Wyndham R Dunstan gave due attention to all aspects of the question. Dunstan
was a qualified chemist and a “leading authority on chemistry of natural products.” 7 He
promptly dispatched letters of enquiry to several people. He sent a letter to the suppliers
of synthetic indigo to British markets, Zilz and Stott, asking how much synthetic indigo
they supplied currently and at what price. The agents refused to disclose any information,
as pointed out earlier. But Dunstan had other avenues to elicit information. He sent
another communication to Heinrich Caro in Germany, ex-manager of the BASF, and
asked him to clarify whether synthetic indigo and natural indigo were chemically
identical. He also asked if the synthetic dyed as effectively as natural, how synthetic was
exactly manufactured, and what was the estimated total output of BASF Rein. Dunstan
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belonged to the network of British and German chemists that regularly communicated
regardless of the existing trade rivalry between the two countries. Anthony Travis has
very recently pointed to the personal channels of communication existing at that time
between English and German chemists. 8 Caro confirmed that natural and synthetic
indigo were absolutely identical despite the argument of the producers of natural dye that
theirs was the “real” indigo. He also disagreed that the presence of additional elements in
natural indigo imparted any advantage to dyeing with natural.  On the contrary Caro
stated that the artificial product imparted a brighter color to clothing. He also claimed that
BASF manufactured synthetic indigo from naphthalene and by using the chemical
pathway suggested by Carl Heumann. Having retired from the BASF for some time, he
had not seen the operational process first hand, and therefore did not have any further
precise details about production to share. He argued that the “more economic production”
of synthetic indigo had enabled BASF to sell the product at a cheaper price. Lastly, Caro
said that though he did not have data on the total output of synthetic at BASF, he knew
that the production was on the rise at the firm and also that it was “rumored” that both
Hoechst and Basle would shortly take up the production of synthetic indigo. That would,
if anything, further flood the market with additional amounts of artificial indigo. 9
Dunstan also wrote to two other chemists in this regard. The first was Christopher
Rawson, who had recently presented a paper on the issue of the relative capabilities of
natural versus synthetic indigo at the Society of Arts in London. Rawson was also very
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knowledgeable about the dyeing techniques employed in the Yorkshire region. For a long
time he had been in contact with the community of dyers in Britain and also served in
official positions at the Society of Dyers and Colourists at Bradford. Rawson replied that
the experiments he had conducted proved that both natural and synthetic indigo were
entirely identical chemically. He additionally claimed that in Britain the use of synthetic
was so far limited to cotton printing and to those sectors of woolen dyeing where lighter
shades were needed. Printing operations did require a higher level of purity due to
technical reasons. Foreign solid substances often present in natural indigo were
commonly known to harm printing machines. 10
The third scientist Dunstan wrote to was Hugo Muller. Muller replied that it was
perhaps too early to answer the question whether synthetic would replace natural indigo
due to the lack of credible trade information on the issue. He said, “To obtain a reliable
and unbiased opinion with regard to the behaviour of artificial indigo when used in place
of the natural indigo, seems still a very difficult matter.”  He suggested getting in touch
with Prof Hummel, a well-known chemist that studied dyes and dyeing. 11
On the basis of all the information that he had collected and analyzed Wyndham
R Dunstan came to certain conclusions. In his report submitted in May 1900 Dunstan
refuted all claims about the superiority of natural indigo over artificial indigo. Dunstan
argued that the basic chemical composition of the dye extracted from coal tar or
vegetable leaves was fundamentally the same. His report thus called the artificial dye “in
every respect identical with the natural blue coloring matter of indigo.” Dunstan advised
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the imperiled natural indigo industry in Bengal to focus their efforts on finding a cheaper
way of producing the dye and selling it in a form liked by consumers. While he pointed
out that BASF would further lower the cost of artificial dye in the future and flood the
markets with additional quantities of artificial dye, all this did not mean that the natural
indigo industry was necessarily doomed. Dunstan argued that natural indigo could
survive synthetic indigo’s competitive threat in the market. He called for investigations
“on scientific lines” to improve the methods of growth and collection of the indigo plant,
the process of extraction of coloring matter from the plant, and the preparation of the
final product for sale.12
Begg, Dunlop and Company got back to Dunstan, thanking him for the
information he had provided. The London branch of the company wrote a letter to
Dunstan saying how “indebted” they were for his expert opinion. They could not have
over-stated the case. Dunstan’s report sealed the debate on some of the questions that had
served as stumbling blocks in the emergence of clear agendas within the natural indigo
industry. 13
Dunstan’s report also won the approval of officials at the apex of the colonial
government in London – the office of the Secretary of State. George Hamilton concurred
with Dunstan in saying that, “If the Indian indigo industry is to compete successfully with
the Badische (BASF) dye, the process of manufacture and of production must be
improved and cheapened after full scientific investigation.” The Secretary of State not
only forwarded the report to the government in India, but also recommended that in view
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of Dunstan’s conclusions it would be worthwhile for the local government in India to
give “assistance and guidance” to indigo-related research. 14
Indeed the India Office in London, headed by the Secretary of State for India,
closely monitored developments related to natural indigo. 15 From the very beginning this
office counseled governments in India and Bengal over steps they should take to
safeguard the future of a colonial product. India House used its location at the epicenter
of an expansive empire, its access to parliamentary debates, and physical proximity to
Western markets to elicit pertinent information on the indigo trade. They readily passed
on such commercial information to the planters and officials in India.
For instance, a letter from the office of George Hamilton clarified the situation on
the competition between natural and synthetic indigo in France. 16 The letter included a
report submitted by Her Majesty’s Consul at Marseille that spoke quite pessimistically of
the future of natural indigo in France. About ten years ago, according to the report,
France imported 1,400 to 1,500 chests of indigo, but in 1899 only 600 chests were
imported. Of those 600 chests, 130 originated in Java, 50 in Bengal, and 420 in the
Coromandel (Madras coast of South India). Auctions of Bengal indigo had practically
ceased at Marseille. A few small buyers imported Bengal indigo directly from Calcutta.
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While the report pointed out that natural indigo would not die altogether, much of the
natural variety that would continue to be used in France would be the cheaper
Coromandel variety.
The report argued that the primary reason for the decline of natural indigo in
France was price competition. The buyers from Japan and the Levant continued to offer
high prices for natural indigo of the Bengal variety, but “European [continental] buyers”
were no longer willing to pay a higher price for natural when cheaper synthetic was
available. Bengal indigo, which as a rule sold at a higher price than Coromandel indigo,
no longer caught the fancy of the European buyers. The report gave details of prices to
illustrate the nature of competition. Present prices of synthetic left a huge profit margin
for its manufacturers. Costing 10 francs per kg. (3s. 7 1/2d./lb.) to produce, synthetic was
being sold at the price of 17.50 francs per kg. (6s. 4 _ d./lb.). Improvements in production
and the competition between two firms manufacturing synthetic in France - BASF and
Hoechst’s collaborator in France, Societe Chimique des Usines du Rhone, - was likely to
further bring down the price of synthetic to about 12 francs per kg. (4s. 41/4 d./lb). The
report argued that the producers of natural indigo would never be able to offer that price,
and therefore their future was gloomy.
The report also cited the opinion of dyers in France on the relative qualities of
natural and synthetic indigo. Traditionally silk-dyeing was not done with indigo, and
therefore dyers in Lyons did not particularly care for indigo. For producing clear and pure
tints in cotton and wool, as in the “Indiennes,” the dyers of Marseille preferred synthetic
indigo. These dyers particularly appreciated the uniform composition of synthetic that
offered “great advantage of facilitating its manipulation; of enabling equal shades of
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colouring; almost mathematically.” On the other hand, natural indigo continued to be
preferred for providing background color because the resinous materials and other
impurities present in the natural covered the fiber and gave it a metallic sheen.
According to the report at least “one authority” argued that synthetic gave a color
that was “more pleasing to the eye.” Since the report was based on accounts of dyers and
importers it is quite likely that the person cited would have been a dyer or an importer. It
would, of course, be more interesting to know how the buyers of cloth in the French
market evaluated the comparative richness of color offered by natural versus that offered
by synthetic. Also, it would be interesting to note how much the final users valued the
durability offered by the natural dye as against the synthetic dye. As a matter of fact,
natural offered a much higher level of fastness than synthetic. Of more direct interest to
the dyers would be its cheapness and manipulability. To the importers synthetic offered
the advantage of consistency of price as against natural whose price varied “wildly” year
after another year, and introduced unpredictability in business that they could not control.
Representing the perspective of these sections, the report concluded, “Durability has less
charm. And if the [synthetic] dye will last the cloth in cotton prints, and in most woolen
fabrics except in cloths for uniforms exposed to sun and rain, what advantage can the
manufacturer on the continent find in a dearer though better dye, if the cheaper [synthetic
dye] is more attractive to the eye, and gives so much greater profit!”
The Planters Consider Manufacturing Sugar
As planters’ sales continued to plummet they considered a variety of options to
maintain the profitability of their plantations. Planter Rowland Hudson’s note of January
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1900, proposing a detailed scheme for combining the manufacture of cane sugar with
indigo, represents an early response of indigo manufacturers to deal with the problem of
competition with synthetic indigo. Hudson planned to use the existing storage facilities,
steam engines, and boilers at his indigo factory for combining the manufacture of blue
dye with cane sugar. Usually an indigo factory comprised the manufacturing unit
surrounded by huge tracts of land for cultivating indigo. By alternately growing indigo
and cane on different parts of the landed estate, Hudson’s scheme aimed at keeping the
manufacturing operations at the indigo factories running all year round. 17
Hudson argued that the system of changing land between indigo and cane would
work well, and be financially rewarding. Cane would be planted in the month of February
and brought to factories for processing the next year between January and early April.
Thereafter the land would be fertilized with indigo refuse obtained from the previous
crop and allowed to lie fallow. Alternatively the land could be rented out to natives to
raise an autumn crop. In either case the land would be free to be planted with a fresh crop
of indigo in the coming season. Hudson’s experience with indigo cultivation had
convinced him that a piece of land gave the best output when cultivation of cane
alternated with two subsequent seasons of indigo cultivation. While the roots of cane only
penetrated to a depth of 8-12 inches, the taproots of indigo went down several feet.
Because the two crops extracted nutrients from different depths in the soil, alternating
them in the field made sense. After growing to a height of about three feet cane also
overshadowed and suffocated weeds in its surroundings, thus preventing an avoidable
depletion of soil.
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Rowland Hudson’s note also provided an estimate of the cost of manufacturing cane
sugar and calculated the profits that would accrue. Sugar manufacturing had especially
become an attractive proposition after the imposition of duties on the import of ‘bounty-
fed” sugar from European countries and from Mauritius by the Indian Tariff Act
(Amendment) of 1899. Even without having to fertilize lands with artificial manures, on
an average, one acre of existing indigo lands would yield 1.5 tons of sukkur (unrefined
sugar) and 0.5 ton of molasses, which could be sold at the neighboring Sakri Sugar
Refinery for £ 13 – 6-0 and £ 1-0-0. Thus the total revenue obtained from one acre of
sugar plantation would be £ 14-6-8. The rent of land, cost of cultivation of cane on one
acre, and the conversion of the cane juice into sukkur and molasses would total £3-0-0.
Therefore, Hudson calculated that one acre of land under cane cultivation would give a
net profit of £11-6-8. Hudson forcefully argued that his estimate regarding profits from
cane sugar manufacturing, based on factoring of prevailing prices, would hold good for a
long time to come. He based his optimism about prices on the fact that a huge demand for
sugar and its byproducts existed in India. Reduced imports of sugar after the recent
imposition of duties would further ensure that the prices stayed at a high level.
Another planter, Francis Murray of the Kurnool Indigo Concern, also expressed
optimism about the prospects of sugar manufacturing in Bihar, claiming that it would
definitely give a return of 25% on investments. He planned to procure machinery for
starting the manufacture of cane sugar at his indigo factory. In early 1900, Murray
corresponded with the McOnie, Harvey and Company, a large firm in Glasgow
(Scotland) that sold machinery for manufacturing sugar. He visited Glasgow to inspect
the machines available at the firm’s works. He also began making arrangements for the
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possible visit of a sugar expert John Wilkie to Bihar who could help him set up his sugar
business. A few other planters also contacted the Glasgow based company regarding the
possible purchase of machinery to start the manufacture of sugar in Bihar. 18
Rowland Hudson had already planted different varieties of cane on an
experimental basis to ascertain which variety would grow best in Bihar’s soil.  He wrote
to J Walter Leather, Agricultural Chemist to the Government of India, asking for his
expert opinion on the feasibility of importing and growing the Barbados variety of cane
from the West Indies.
Planters Seek The Assistance Of The State For Queries On Indigo And Sugar
Manufacturing
Planters regularly interfaced with the government at the three administrative
nodes headed by the Secretary of State in London, the Governor-General of India in
Simla, and the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in Calcutta. In times of need they
contacted the executive heads directly bypassing the regular bureaucratic hierarchy. But
more routinely they corresponded with the bureaucrats of the Revenue and Agricultural
Department at the center and the Revenue Department of Bengal.
In 1899 the Bihar planters made a plea to the Lieutenant Governor J Woodburn to
send a government emissary to Java. Planters told Woodburn that according to
information available to them, indigo planters in Java had devised very economical ways
of manufacturing indigo. Planters wanted to learn about the improvements and adopt
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them locally in order to compete with cheaper synthetic. Woodburn, while sympathetic to
the planter’s demand, said he could not think of a person with an intimate knowledge of
the field. He encouraged the planters to select one of their own to visit Java plantations, a
person who would have the ability to understand the nuances of indigo manufacturing. 19
In March 1900, planter William Hudson wrote to the Revenue and Agricultural
Department at the center, asking that the government loan him £80,000 towards buying
additional machinery for manufacturing sugar on an experimental basis. When he did not
receive a response to his application he wrote another letter in May, once again sending a
copy to the Secretary of State for review. This time the Secretary of State sent a reminder
to the Governor-General, enquiring if the Governor-General had reached a decision in
this regard and requesting to be informed of the “purport of the decision.”  20
The communications between Hudson and the different arms of the government
are insightful because they provide a window on the outlook of the state toward private
industry controlled by European entrepreneurs on the one hand, and native peasants and
labor on the other hand. Hudson firstly justified his claim by pointing to precedents of
government support to private industry. He cited the case of the sugar industry in the
dominions of Queensland that had received direct financial support from the imperial
government. He also cited the recent remarks made by the Secretary of State at the
Society of Arts where a public lecture had been organized on the subject of competition
between natural and synthetic indigo. The Secretary of State had publicly assured “to do
                                                 
19 BSA, Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, Nos., 7-8, “Notes and Orders,” pp., 6-7
20 William Hudson’s letter to Under-Secretary of State for India, dated 21st May, 1900, BSA,
Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, Nos. 9-10
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everything they legitimately can to encourage the industries of the [indigo] community.”
Hudson argued that manufacture of sugar in Bihar presented a “very legitimate opening”
for government’s assistance. It was a sound business idea in itself. Under the
circumstances it would also provide financial relief to the planters that felt the squeeze
due to the falling prices of indigo.
Hudson also justified his demand on the grounds that sugar manufacturing on the
indigo tracts would lead to “increased employment of labour.” In this way he appealed to
the sensibilities of the administrators in their role as creators of employment for
agricultural labor. He also assured the authorities that the cultivation of sugarcane that he
was proposing would take place on land on which the planters had only “cultivating
possession,” and not ownership rights. Buying of land by the planters since the 1860s had
aggravated the problem of landlessness in the area. The government had been
increasingly critical of the growing dispossession of peasants.
Initially the Secretary of State and the central government in India favored giving
financial assistance to Hudson. But in the end the central government reconciled itself to
the views of the provincial government. On matters affecting a local industry it is not
surprising that the view of the local government prevailed. The Lieutenant Governor
argued that the government could not make a financial loan to “any particular member of
the planting community.” But he recognized that “the indigo planters as a body had
claims on the government,” and therefore his administration was open to the idea of
giving assistance with enquiries towards improving methods of cultivation and
manufacturing of indigo, or substituting it with more profitable crops. 21  The Viceroy in
                                                 
21 “Resolution – By the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department,” BSA, Agriculture,
October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, No., 25
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India wrote back to the Secretary of State more or less conveying the gist of what his
provincial Lieutenant Governor had argued. He said, “loan to individual[s] for
establishment of new industry is contrary to government policy.” But he also added that
the government in India was “anxious” that the prospect of sugar manufacturing in Bihar
be explored. 22
Dunstan’s Report And The Sugar Committee: The Response Of Bihar’s Governor
The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal was quite convinced that the sugar industry
could be revived in Bihar. The planters in Bihar had engaged in sugar manufacturing
until about 1850 before switching to indigo. Due to a number of reasons it appeared that
sugar could again be made remunerative.  There was evidence that considerable new
demand had arisen for cheaper kinds of refined sugar among the inhabitants of the region.
New machinery was now available that enabled manufacturing at a lower cost. Thirdly,
communication had vastly improved with the introduction of the railways in the province.
This removed a serious handicap of delays in transit and consequent higher freight
charges. Noticing this new opportunity, many peasants in north Bihar had begun
cultivating cane. Initial plantations had been on the banks of rivers and streams where the
peasants used floodwater to irrigate cane and thus further minimized their costs of
cultivation. Going by these indications the Lieutenant Governor reasoned that the indigo
tracts in Bihar could be comfortably and profitably turned over to sugarcane production.
In May 1900, he sent a communication to the central government requesting
permission to set up a sugar committee. The Lieutenant Governor’s encouragement of
                                                 
22 Letter from Viceroy in India to Secretary of State in London, dated, July 20, 1900, BSA,
Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, Nos., 9-10
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sugarcane as a new venture appears logical in the context of the realities of agricultural
production, the dynamics of labor market, and the nature of synthetic’s competition. The
cultivation of sugarcane demanded more labor than indigo, and saving employment for
the natives was an immediate and primary concern of the provincial government.
Revenue officer C. J. Stevenson-Moore, who conducted survey operations in an indigo-
growing district of Bihar, commented on the benefits offered by indigo through
employment generation for the natives. He noted that indigo was a labor-intensive crop,
but also added that tobacco and sugarcane were even more labor intensive. Apart from its
superiority in offering additional employment cane also offered the advantage of not
exhausting the soil like indigo. 23Also, there existed no immediate threat of future
competition from a synthetic substitute. On the other hand, saving indigo and the future
of labor dependent on it required “experiments with regard to the best seed to be used, the
most appropriate varieties of the plant, the cultivation of the soil, and the manner of the
extraction of the dye, patiently continued for a term of years.” 24
The Lieutenant Governor’s efforts to set up a sugar committee were welcomed by
planters. The private emissary that the planters had sent to Java had returned. He
informed them that in Java the application of “science” had improved the prospects of
indigo. But he also said that some indigo planters in Java had started growing cane and
tobacco to make up for shrinking profits from indigo. Thus the planters enthusiastically
supported the government’s move to set up a Sugar Committee.  In fact, they also offered
                                                 
23 C. J. Stevenson-Moore, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the
Muzaffarpur District, 1892-1899 (Calcutta, 1901): 340, 348-50
24 “Resolution – By the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department,” BSA, Agriculture,
October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, No., 25, p., 10
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to spare E A Hancock, an agricultural expert working for Begg, Dunlop and Company,
indigo agents, to serve on the sugar committee. 25
Even as the administrators in Bihar were in the process of setting up the Sugar
Committee they received the communication from the Secretary of State recommending
state assistance for scientific experiments on indigo. As described above, the political
impetus for supporting scientific experiments initially came from India House in London.
George Hamilton was quite persuaded by the scientific report of Wyndham R Dunstan of
the Imperial Institute. Against governor Woodburn’s provincial outlook, Hamilton, as a
metropolitan bureaucrat, also brought a broader imperial perspective to the indigo
question. The Secretary of State strongly endorsed Dunstan’s counsel that given the
importance of indigo to the “Indian Empire” the local government in India must assist
efforts to improve the scientific basis of the cultivation and manufacture of indigo.  The
Governor-General in India concurred and asked the provincial government to take
initiatives in this regard. He also suggested that the brief of the sugar committee being
constituted be broadened so that they might additionally investigate the problems of the
indigo industry. 26
The reply of the governor clarified the provincial government’s policy regarding
sponsorship of a market study on sugar and providing a subsidy to planter’s experiments.
The Lieutenant Governor doubted if any benefits would accrue from expanding the remit
of the Sugar Committee. The proposed committee was conducting a feasibility study for
                                                 
25 Letter of G H Sutherland of Begg, Dunlop and Company to F A Slacke, Revenue Secretary,
Govt. of Bengal, dated, August 22, 1900, BSA, Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, Notes
and Orders, p., 12
26 Letter from Under-Secretary, Revenue and Agriculture Department, Government of India to
Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Bengal (with enclosures), dated, July 20, 1900,
BSA, Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-I/3 3-32, Nos., 11-12
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sugar that required investigation of a particular nature. Besides, he did not want the
members of the committee to lose focus and compromise the quality of their investigation
of an issue he thought held promise for Bihar. Referring to the conduct of experiments on
indigo by the planters he indicated, “the Bihar Indigo Planters’ Association is already
doing all that is at present possible.”  Planters had sent an application to his government
requesting financial assistance for the conduct of their specialized experiments in August
last. In his opinion the best course of action for the government would be to support the
planters’ experiments through a state subsidy. 27
      On balance, Bihar’s governor was more readily inclined to investigate a larger
agricultural question befitting his performance of a “public duty.” The government
looked at itself as the overseer of the commonwealth. As the officials saw the crisis in the
indigo industry they responded to the situation by first thinking of available options to
recreate employment that could be lost. But that does not mean that they had practically
written off the natural indigo industry. They waited for the planters to take the initiative
to protect their business. And when the planters turned to them for support, they gave
their proposal due attention.
The report of the Sugar Committee, submitted in February 1901, concurred that
transferring indigo lands to sugar production would be a sound business idea. It made a
detailed survey of land under indigo and sugarcane cultivation in the four indigo growing
districts of Bihar, and assessed the results of an increase in sugar production on market.
Planters who the committee had consulted claimed that given the imperatives of land
                                                 
27 Letter from Secretary, Revenue Department, Bengal to Secretary, Revenue and Agriculture
Department, Govt. Of India, dated, September 4, 1900, BSA, Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-
I/3 14, No., 19
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ownership patterns and conditions of cultivation, they could readily grow sugar on one-
fifth of their land in the short-term. If cultivated on 20% of the land in Bihar devoted to
indigo, the committee calculated, an additional 60,000 tons of sugar would be produced.
This marked an increase of 42% in sugar production for the region.  The Sugar
Committee believed that this extra amount of sugar would not have the effect of over-
supplying the market and of depressing prices to an unprofitable level. 28
                                                           Table 3.2
               Indigo and sugar acreage in the four districts of Bihar in 1901





Total = 316,000 Total = 142,000
                                Source: Report of the Committee to Inquire into the Prospects
                           of the Cultivation of Sugar by Indigo Planters in Bihar 29
                                                 
28 BSA, Agriculture, May 1901, File, 2-I/3 8-12, pp., 1-2
29 BSA, Agriculture, May 1901, File, 2-I/3 8-12, p.1
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The members of the Sugar Committee thus identified the possible market for
Bihar’s refined sugar as being “large” and “an expanding one.” For the last four years
preceding 1900, India had on average imported more than 170,000 tons of refined sugar
annually. An additional 18,000 tons of molasses had landed at the port of Calcutta from
Mauritius, which sold in the market at the price of 3 rupees per maund (1 maund = 80
lbs.). If efficiently produced, Bihar’s sugar (besides molasses) could be sold in Calcutta
and other nearby port cities on the Bay of Bengal as well as throughout North India, thus
capturing part of the market so far monopolized by the imported sugar. The “gray sugar”
from Bihar, relatively impure, would find a market in north India because imported sugar
sold there at a higher price than on the coast. When completely purified in the proposed
central refineries, the indigenous white sugar would be able to compete with the imported
white sugar. To facilitate tapping of markets in the north the committee also suggested
that a distributing agency be established either at Somastipore or Mokameh to serve as
gateway to the north Indian markets.
In the long term, the committee proposed that the planters initiate large-scale
production and refining of cane sugar in Bihar on the pattern being followed in the
English dominions of Queensland and New South Wales. Inviting the planters to come
together to form a syndicate or a company, the committee outlined various elements of
the Australian model for the planters to emulate. Local farmers would grow cane under
arrangement with the company. The cultivators would be provided with working capital
as well as supplied information on the kinds of cane varieties to be grown, nature of soil,
and the suitability of the climatic conditions. The company set up by the planters would
build cane-crushing mills in different districts to which the cane from nearby districts
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would be forwarded. The company would also set up one or two centralized refineries
where the gray sugar supplied from various mills in the cane-cultivating districts of Bihar
would be turned into white sugar.
Realizing, however, that creating the Australian system of sugar manufacturing in
Bihar required investing huge amounts of capital and a high level of reorganization of the
production system, and therefore that the switch must necessarily be “gradual and
tentative,” the committee also made recommendations for steps to be taken in the short
term.  It criticized unequivocally the present methods being used for making sugar by
some of the planters on a small scale. The mill currently in use, the “beheea mill,” gave a
low daily output and also failed to extract all the juice from the cane. The present method
of boiling cane juice in an open pan over a fire lit in a hole in the ground was also
considered “primitive and inefficient in the highest degree.” If a planter grew a hundred
acres or more of cane and manufactured sugar using these methods, he would “certainly
lose money.” The planters’ sugar would not be able to compete with sugar produced by
the small cultivators who used similar methods, far less with the imported sugar. To these
planters, the committee suggested that they assemble on their plantations an improved
version of a cane-crushing machine, evaporating pans, and a centrifuge. Such a complex
of equipment could be set up at an expenditure of Rs. 5,325, would have a working cost
of Rs. 16 daily, and turn out 2 tons of gray sugar every day. At those costs, the planters
would be able to make sufficient profit by selling the gray sugar in the local and north
Indian markets. The machine on which this calculation was based was capable of
servicing cane grown on 200 acres. Slightly larger machines for larger sugar estates could
also be acquired for an additional investment.
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The Sugar Committee also reiterated the government’s stand that it would not provide
financial assistance for setting up the sugar industry. The role of the provincial
government in the matter was limited to setting up an expert committee to see if the sugar
business would be a profitable venture. The committee rejected the case being made by
some planters that the precedent of state aid to sugar manufacturers in Queensland be
followed in Bihar. It pointed out that financial support in Queensland had been offered as
a sop to invite industries to a hitherto unsettled area. Such a case, which formed part of
the colonial policy of settling inhabitants in a barren area, could not serve as an example
to be followed elsewhere. Making an example of the case of Queensland the committee
actually argued to the contrary that the government’s provision of financial assistance in
Queensland had resulted in financial waste and loss of money.  Thus defending the
government’s refusal of state aid to the planters, the committee implored the planters to
independently raise capital for their sugar project.
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the planters slowly began
producing sugar on their estates. The rate of switch from indigo to sugar also depended
on other conditions being favorable. The key problem was that of credit. Contrary to the
claims of the sugar committee, trade journals suggest that the planters faced a scarcity of
capital in setting up production centers for sugar. But, most importantly, at the turn of the
twentieth century, a large majority of planters still believed that natural indigo’s
prospects were bright, and that it was too early to abandon the indigo business.
Epilogue
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Even before the introduction of synthetic indigo, the planters in Bihar were not
disinclined to the idea of laboratory experiments towards improving the yield of the
natural product. Improving productivity through the application of science and
technology appeared logical to them.
There were clear reasons behind the initiation of those efforts. Until the mid
nineteenth century indigo manufacturing was largely based on mastering the craft of
running the production cycle diligently. The best practices in the trade had emerged with
experience. Most planters had learnt the art of manufacturing indigo as apprentices with
the older planters in India. Whatever little innovation was introduced in manufacturing
was based on the counsels of “old hands,” rather than on “science.”
But from the 1850s and 60s the chemistry of indigo was improving. Edward
Schunck did pioneer work on the coloring element within indigo - indican, and disproved
the earlier theory of Chevreul about “indigo-white.” 30 New knowledge gradually spread
to the indigo manufacturers in Bihar. The primary medium for the spread of key
information in Bihar was Eugene Schrottky – a chemist and a successful planter. A
former student of the renowned German chemist Justus von Liebig, Schrottky played a
key role in disseminating information on oxidation and fermentation processes during the
process of manufacturing. He used his knowledge of chemistry of indigo to offer
professional assistance to his fellow planters.
                                                 
30 A G Perkin and A E Everest, The Natural Organic Colouring Matters. (London: Longmans
Green and Company, 1918): 480
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Schrottky wrote a pamphlet in 1879 called The Science of Indigo Manufacture.31
During the 1870s and 1880s, Schrottky registered seven patents for introducing specific
improvements in fermentation and oxidation processes (See Table 3.3 below) and
licensed them to a number of planters.  Many of the buyers of the patented processes
were large, influential planters with the means to invest and the willingness to take risks
with the new processes.
                                                        Table 3.3
     Eugene Schrottky’s patents registered in Calcutta
Date of
registration
Short description of the patent
Sep 20, 1877 Use of yeast from fermenting vats and other precipitates in
the manufacture of indigo
April 5, 1879 Use of yeast from previous fermentation, of borax, and other
alkaloids in the manufacture of indigo
Aug 16, 1881 Use of oxidizing salts in the manufacture of indigo
June 13, 1882 Use of saltpeter, nitrates, and sulfates in the manufacture of
indigo
May 7, 1884 Re-steeping of the indigo plant and the use of a perforated
base for the fermenting vat in the manufacture of indigo
March 9,1886 Improvements in the re-steeping process and the yeast
process in the manufacture of indigo
Aug 12, 1887 Use of carbolic acid and antiseptics in combination with
saltpeter in the manufacture of indigo
      Source: Board of Trade Papers, Public Record Office, Kew 32
                                                 
31 It has not been possible to locate the original pamphlet. However, Schrottky makes reference to
the conclusions of that pamphlet in a publication of a later date. Eugene Schrottky, “Indigo
Cultivation and Manufacture,” Indian Planters’ Gazette and Sporting News, February 2, 1907, p.,
143. The holdings of this newspaper are available at the National Agricultural Library at
Beltsville MD), USA; henceforth called “IPG.”
32 “The First Schedule,” incorporation papers of the Bengal Indigo Manufacturing Company,
Public Record Office (Kew, GB), Board of Trade Papers, BT 31/4628/30398/100052
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The same document gives a list of names of proprietors who bought those patents: the
proprietors of Kurnoul Indigo Concern in Muzaffarpur (1883), J M Gibbon for Moorlah
Indigo Concern in Champaran (1885), Henry Hill for Turcouleah Indigo Concern in
Champaran (1886), and George Toomey for Kanti Indigo Concern in Muzaffarpur
(1887). 33
Through the 1870s, many resourceful factories also began to decant and warm
water used during fermentation. Schrottky’s 1879 pamphlet had referred to the fact that
the blue dye was not present in the leaves at the time of harvest. Enzymes present in the
sap of the plant initiated the process of fermentation. Subsequently bacterial action also
speeded up fermentation of the indican present in the leaves. Slightly warm water
provided an appropriate condition for steeping to take place. By the early 1890s, the
warming of steeping liquor with steam was commonly practiced by the large factories in
Bihar. 34
The impetus for scientific investigations may also have emerged on account of
forces that were characteristic of the rural context of Bihar. As we have seen before in the
previous chapter, through the 1860s to 1890s wages for workers and procurement prices
for indigo had been on the rise. Significantly, the same years also saw an increasing trend
of indigo lands going into the private control of the indigo planters. In Muzaffarpur
district out of 74,719 bighas under indigo 43,202 bighas were under neez cultivation by
the year 1876-77. At the same time out of 54,000 bighas under indigo in Darbhanga
                                                 
33 “The Second Schedule,” incorporation papers of the Bengal Indigo Manufacturing Company,
Public Record Office (Kew, GB), Board of Trade Papers, BT 31/4628/30398/100052
34 Bihar State Archives, Report on the Administration of Bengal, 1892-93: 26
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almost three-fourths were under planters’ ownership. The major extension of indigo
cultivation in Saran district had also taken under neez. The picture was similar for the
district of Champaran. Planters had little control over the rising trend in wages and prices.
Under the circumstances they used the loopholes in the legal system and their local power
and influence to acquire land. Through a better control over land they hoped to achieve a
better supervision over the cultivation process and possibly increase yield and quality of
the crop.
However, even as the wages continued to rise the process of land acquisition was
reaching its limits by the late 1870s. Benoy Chowdhury has pointed towards how limits
could soon be set to the process of land acquisition by the planters. The densely
populated villages did not have an endless supply of wastelands of which the planters
could purchase lease from the landlords. A very aggressive buying up of peasant’s lands
could also become counter-productive. If peasants lost hereditary occupancy rights to all
of their lands they simply moved elsewhere creating a shortage of hands to work those
lands. It is precisely on these fronts that the move towards further consolidation of land
was thwarted. 35
Therefore, it is not merely coincidental that the efforts towards engaging scientists
and adopting scientific methods first emerged in the 1870s and 1880s. Once it was clear
to the planters that productivity gains were no longer possible through bringing additional
land under private control they thought of other measures. Achieving higher productivity
through the application of science and technology emerged as a clear option.
                                                 
35 Benoy Chawdhury, Growth of Commercial Agriculture: 126-27, 136-37
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Whatever the impetus, the planters subsequently built on the early efforts of the
1870s and 80s towards the application of scientific knowledge to manufacturing.
Encouraged by the efforts of Schrottky, the planters showed an increasing trust in the
ability of science to solve their problem. They took significant steps to organize scientific
experiments of a chemical and agronomical nature by some of the best scientists in the




SCIENCE AT PLANTERS’ LABORATORIES, 1898-1902
Introduction
The period from 1898 to 1902 witnessed a growing effort in India to employ
laboratory-based science to reduce the price of natural indigo through yield improvement.
Some preliminary experiments were also conducted to make the natural dye more
consistent in composition. Synthetic indigo, when first launched on the Western markets
in July1897, was available to consumers at a price that was 15 - 25% higher than natural
indigo’s. 1 But its market price kept dropping consistently as the production cost in the
German factories was lowered and the distribution channels were speedily rationalized. 2
The German firms also campaigned in the market that the artificial product would offer
advantages to commercial users on account of its higher consistency in comparison to the
pre-existing natural colorant. 3 As synthetic continued to capture natural’s erstwhile
                                                 
1 Anthony Travis, The Rainbow Makers: The Origins of the Synthetic Dyestuffs Industry in
Western Europe (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1993): 223
2 An aggressive salesmanship was also part of the synthetic firms’ bid to oust the natural product.
An overview of the process by which the German dye companies effectively used a network of
salesmen to push their product in foreign markets is briefly discussed by John Joseph Beer, The
Emergence of the German Dye Industry (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1959): 95-96.
Information about the selling strategies of dye companies can also be gleaned from a review of
the company records of Calico Printers’ Association of Manchester, the large printing
conglomerate formed by the federation of 46 printing companies and 13 merchant firms in 1899
and a significant consumer of dyes in the British market. CPA records reveal that the German
firms offered especial “contract” prices, made the supply of other colors conditional to the
purchase of synthetic indigo, and lowered prices on commitment to purchase future supplies.
These records are available at the Manchester Archives and Local Studies, Manchester: M464.
Planters responded to the aggressive marketing strategies of their competitors. Their efforts,
though dismal in comparison to the scale of market manipulation by the German firms, will form
the subject matter of later chapters.
3 Historians in other cases have documented similar efforts. There exists ample economic
literature within the history of technology that dwells on efforts by the manufacturers and sellers
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Western markets, its qualities that were understood to give it an edge with the consumers,
defined the agenda of scientific investigations in India.
The planters in India, aided by the colonial state, set up laboratories and
established agricultural experiment stations, which became the site for the endeavors to
improve the natural product. Some of the best-known experts in the field, chemists and
agronomists, were employed to conduct scientific research with well-defined targets. The
primary goal at these centers was to find ways to improve the yield in the field and
factory and thereby reduce the price of the final product: how to enhance output per acre
of the indigo crop? How to increase the color bearing ability of the plant? How to
enhance the efficiency of the manufacturing process so that maximum dye was extracted
from the leaves?  Apart from the attempts to enhance yield some efforts were also made
to tinker with the constitution of the final product. Could natural indigo be made more
uniform in composition? Those efforts, however, were limited in scope and soon given
up because a limited understanding of the chemical constitution of the blue dye at that
time hindered progress along those lines.
Expanding from an analysis of the strategies of scientific experimentation the
chapter also addresses patronage of scientific research in colonial India. It studies the
organization of laboratories and agricultural stations in India during the period in
question, and principally focuses on the patrons of scientific research – the planters and
the colonial government. What motivated the planters to set up and run laboratories
                                                                                                                                                  
of substitutes at framing their product’s better usability and other advantages vis-à-vis the pre-
existing product.  One specific example closer to the case of substitution of natural by synthetic
indigo is that of celluloid trying to displace rubber: Robert Friedel, Pioneer Plastic: The Making
and Selling of Celluloid (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983)
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beginning 1898? What were the reasons behind the government’s decision to provide
subsidies to those experiments subsequently? To what extent did the experimenters meet
their goals? How tight were the connections between continuing patronage of scientific
research and the progress with experiments?
The Drive Towards Science, and Research Strategies
The drive towards laboratory-based science in colonial India was facilitated by
several factors. The primary patrons of these efforts, the European planters, had the
means and the motivation to exploit science. Working within their organizations, the
Behar Indigo Planters’ Association or BIPA and the Indigo Improvements Syndicate or
IIS, they pooled their resources in order to hire experts from England. Those among them
that visited England, attended public meetings at the Society of Arts in London, the
Society of Dyers and Colourists at Bradford, the Society of Chemical Industry at
Manchester and similar bodies. They were exposed to the debates in the professional
organizations about the state of research on indigo. Thus they were sensitized to the
claims of experts about the promise of science. On their return to India many of them
canvassed support for setting up laboratories to benefit the plantations. Indeed, a majority
of planters at the turn of the century put their trust in the ability of scientists to deliver
results towards yield and quality enhancement of natural indigo.
The government was also sympathetic with the efforts to set up the indigo
laboratories, and made funds available when the planters turned to them. As discussed in
Chapter One, by the end of the nineteenth century, the administrators were relatively
more willing to be agents of agricultural innovation in India. In some sectors of
 90
agriculture they had welcomed the setting up of laboratories. On the question of indigo,
the official Dunstan’s Report of May 1900 had further set the stage for a positive outlook
within the bureaucracy to the idea of scientific research. 4
Let us begin our analysis of scientific endeavors by briefly reviewing the basic
features of the production of the blue dye in colonial India, and identifying the points at
which interventions were made. As described in the Introduction, the indigo plant
(biological name: Indigofera tinctoria) was grown predominantly in the loamy fields of
Bihar. As soon as the crop was ripe, the leaves along with the branches were transported
to the manufacturing center. The process of dye production was divided into three-stages
(see Figure 1 below) that basically involved chemical changes to convert the glucoside
indican of indigo leaves to indigotin, the coloring element. Traditionally, in the first
stage, some soluble enzymes might be added to accelerate the process of fermentation.
Figure 1
The Manufacturing Cycle
 _  _ ___
_ _
Steeping vat                                      Beating vat                                       Boiler
                                                 
4 For Dunstan’s report see Bihar State Archives, Patna (India), Agriculture, October 1900, File 2-
I/3 3-32, Nos. 11-12. These files are available at the Bihar State Archives in Patna (India).
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The enzymes naturally present in leaves facilitated fermentation. In the second stage, the
greenish-yellow solution obtained after fermentation would be drained off to the beating
vat. Here the solution would be vigorously beaten for about three to four hours to
facilitate oxidation. In the third stage, the precipitate – the blue dye - was boiled and
stirred continuously for about two hours. After washing, the insoluble dye was dried and
cut in the form of cakes.
The colonial officials and planters attacked the problem from different angles.
Firstly, they considered a chemist’s role central to the task of streamlining the
fermentation and oxidation processes. In a letter to the Lieutenant Governor, dated Aug
13, 1900, F A Slacke, the Revenue Secretary, thought that much good could be done to
the cause of protecting native natural indigo industry, “if the Government could find the
money for the employment for three years of two really good chemists.” The head of the
Indigo Improvements Syndicate, G H Sutherland, also thought “the employment of good
chemists for two or three years to make scientific researches with a view to improving the
methods of manufacture [of indigo] must do good.” 5
The improvement of post-harvest extractive processes was not the only strategy
followed in colonial Bihar. Other planters supported an agricultural program focused on
the plant in the field. They hoped to improve the output of the indigo plant per acre
through the use of the right blend of fertilizers and improved farming and harvesting
techniques. They also hoped to enhance the color content of the leaves of the indigo plant
by adding nutrients to the soil and varying conditions during the course of plant growth in
the fields.
                                                 
5 For Slacke’s and Sutherland’s letters see BSA, Agriculture, Notes and Orders, File 2I/3, October
1900
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The planters supported the two approaches equally energetically in the initial
years. The chemical laboratory belonging to the BIPA at Mosheri that was later shifted to
Peeprah, specialized in the “chemical approach.” The other laboratory cum experiment
station at Dalsingserai, belonging to the IIS, tried the “agricultural approach.”
The Experiments At The BIPA Laboratory
Chemist Christopher Rawson Is Hired In London To Be Sent To India
English dye chemist Christopher Rawson had a long association with indigo,
which pre-dated his arrival in India. As a member of the Society of Dyers and Colourists
in Bradford and as a practicing chemist he had long experimented with natural indigo. In
the very first volume of the Journal of the Society of Dyers and Colourists in 1884 he
contributed an article describing various methods for testing the purity of natural indigo.
He was involved as a professional chemist with the London and Manchester end of the
indigo trade. Indigo imported from India was of variable constitution and its color
potency also widely varied. Sellers and buyers of the dye in the British markets therefore
routinely engaged chemists to fix the price of the dye. Rawson offered his expertise for
testing color percentages. He later co-authored a book on dyeing practices, discussing the
details of all aspects of manufacturing and dyeing with both natural and synthetic indigo.6
The representatives of the Indigo Defence Association, a front office of the indigo
planters in London, first spotted Christopher Rawson. They were searching for an
appropriate scientist to send to India to work in their indigo laboratory. Because of his
                                                 
6 Edmund Knecht, Christopher Rawson, and Richard Loewenthal. A Manual of Dyeing : For the
Use of Practical Dyers, Manufacturers, Students, and All Interested in the Art of Dyeing, Vol 11
(London: Charles Griffin and Company, 1893):798-811
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credentials as an expert well versed in all aspects of indigo’s chemistry, Rawson appeared
well suited for the position. Besides, he was also in touch with the dyers and printers, the
primary customers of indigo planters. He could thus bring his understanding of the
requirements of the dyeing and printing trade to the task of improvement of the natural
dye. IDA hired Christopher Rawson to work for the planters in India.
Before he left for India, Rawson publicly exhorted everyone associated with the
natural indigo trade to focus efforts on increasing the percentage of indigotin in the
natural dye and also giving it a fixed consistency. His experiments with natural and
synthetic indigo had convinced him that the two products were chemically identical. Thus
he rebuffed earlier claims by a section of planters that natural indigo was the “real” dye
and that synthetic indigo was a “poor imitation.” Those were anyway the rhetoric of a
class of businessmen who, in the absence of clear information about synthetic indigo in
the initial stage, instinctively ridiculed the substitute as not being the real thing.
Rawson also undertook a long tour of the establishments of dyers and printers in
the Yorkshire region to get a first hand account of the way the commercial users were
responding to the two products. Obviously, now the users were comparing the two
products on the criteria of price, fastness, ease of application, and quality of color
produced before making their purchase decision. What was acceptable before 1897 was
no longer acceptable to them. The amalgamated natural blue contained indigotin, but also
indigo red (indirubin), indigo-brown, indigo-glutten, and a small proportion of mineral
elements. Rawson believed that additional constituents in the plant-derived indigo helped
the dye in holding on to the fabric better, and thus made it more “fast” to washing and
exposure to sun. He also took particular note of the universal fondness for a red tinge
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imparted by the natural dye that came from the presence of indigo-red and indigo-brown
in it. On the basis of his conversations with the dyers as to what results they were
obtaining in their use of the two dyes and from his own expert understanding, Rawson
came to the conclusion that the best blue dye would be the one with ninety percent
indigotin and ten percent indigo-red and indigo-brown. He did not think that synthetic
indigo, known to be hundred percent pure, would offer the best value for money as far as
dyeing and printing were concerned. 7
Reaching India in the early summer of 1898, Rawson went on a reconnaissance
mission to the various indigo plantations across Bihar, looking closely at the
manufacturing practices followed by the planters. The specific factories visited by him
were at Motihari, Chylaha, Hurraj, Mirapur, Purnahi, Belwa, Bisambharpur, Barra,
Mohowa, Jugowlia, Rajpur, Siraha, and Tataria. He brought his expert’s gaze to routine
matters of manufacturing operations, things that may have escaped the attention of
planters. Indigo manufacturing required extensive use of water for carrying out the
processes of fermentation and oxidation as well as for boiling and washing. Factories
were thus located close to a stream or a similar source, from where water was drawn and
stored in a tank, called khajana, on the factory premises. Rawson looked closely at the
properties of water being used. How pure was it? What minerals were dissolved in it?
Was it hard? How did the quality of water differ from factory to factory and in the
different districts? What was the temperature of water when used for steeping? Could any
pattern be discerned between the nature of water being used, its temperature, and high or
                                                 
7 Rawson’s letter to the Indigo Defence Association, London, dated 28 February1898, BSA,
Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1901
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low yield? He also looked for patterns of yield in other contexts in order to form his
initial conjectures. For instance, he noticed that most planters delayed the beginning of
oxidation after the completion of the first stage of fermentation. The process of
transferring the liquid to the oxidation tank and getting coolies ready to start beating and
thrashing took too much time for his comfort. He conjectured that this delay decreased
the efficiency of the process. Having completed his survey of the manufacturing methods,
he was confident that he could contribute to streamlining the manufacturing processes
and improving yield. He declared with a sense of optimism:
The yield of colouring matter from a given weight of plant [as
manufactured by the planters in India] can be considerably increased. 8
Rawson At The Planters’ Club Laboratory
Rawson finally arrived at Muzaffarpur in June 1898, ready to start his
experiments. A temporary laboratory with small “experimental vats” had been hastily
built on the premises of the Planters’ Club so that the chemist could start his work and
give suggestions in time for the current manufacturing season. Rawson immediately
began conducting his experiments. The first three reports of Rawson to BIPA in 1898
reveal the direction of his experiments in those months.
In his first scientific report to the Secretary of the BIPA in July 1898, Rawson
made two “preliminary” suggestions to the planters. Firstly, he recommended that the
process of oxidation start immediately after the completion of the steeping stage. Any
                                                 
8 Mr. Rawson’s report No 1, dated July 14, 1898, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1901
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delay in starting oxidation of the liquor, he elaborated, led to setting in of unwanted and
wasteful chemical reactions. Secondly, Rawson asked the planters to wash the indigo
precipitate obtained after oxidation with water or dilute hydrochloric acid in the boiler.
Dissolving the unwanted mineral elements/impurities in such a manner would firstly
increase the percentage of indigotin in the dye. Besides, from his prior consultation with
the dyers and printers he knew of the latter’s reservations against the presence of solid
substances in natural indigo that harmed printing machines and also gave imperfect
pattern and color. Rawson therefore believed that removing such impurities with water
and acid was a small inconvenience for obtaining a product that would be more suited to
user tastes.  9
Rawson’s second report to the BIPA of August 1898 provides a window on why
he wanted the planters to start the oxidation process as soon as possible after
fermentation. The chemical pathway for the conversion of the glucoside in the leaf to
indigo-blue was this: during steeping/fermentation, while the leaves were submerged in
water, the enzymes and bacteria acted on the glucoside to convert it into indoxyl. The
liquor containing the dissolved indoxyl was passed on to the next tank. During
beating/oxidation air (oxygen) was passed through the liquor that changed indoxyl into
indigo. From what Rawson said in the report, it is apparent that he was guided by the
dominant perspective on the chemistry of indigo prevailing at that time – that of the
English chemist, Edward Schunk. Schunk first isolated the glucoside present in indigo
leaves, indican in 1879. He also argued that indican was a very unstable compound, and
                                                 
9 Rawson’s letter to the Indigo Defence Association, dated 31 July 1899; Rawson’s letter to the
Behar Indigo Planters Association, dated 16 August 1900, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March
1901; “Mr. Rawson’s report No 1,” Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
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resulted in a variety of compounds as soon as it chemically reacted with other reagents.
10Rawson stated in his report that the results of his investigation were “in accordance with
the researches of the eminent Dr. Schunk made many years ago.” He said:
The colouring principle in the plant is highly susceptible to change; it is
decomposed with the greatest facility in various ways. Under the most
favourable conditions, indigo-blue is one of the chief products of that
decomposition, but under other conditions instead of indigo-blue, brown
substances are formed from which it is apparently impossible to regenerate
useful colours. 11
The problem at hand, hence, was to manipulate and control the fermentation process so
that indican was usefully converted to indigo-blue and nothing else. Indican was acted
upon by water and bacteria/enzymes. Rawson did not have an adequate understanding of
how to control bacteria and their behavior. So he turned his attention to water. Was it the
presence of specific minerals in water that was affecting the nature of the change to
indigo-blue? Rawson collected thirty-eight samples of water from the planters in different
regions and put them to systematic analysis. 12
But Rawson did not get positive results from the analysis of water as far as the
goal of understanding and controlling fermentation changes was concerned. In his third
                                                 
10 Disproving Chevereul’s theory of “indigo-white,” Schunk had made key findings on the nature
of the coloring element in indigo in the mid 19th century. In 1879, he finally isolated the glucoside
present in indigo and named it indican. He also disclosed that the glucoside was very unstable in
chemical reactions. The original papers by Chevereul, Schunk, and Roemer are cited in Arthur
George Perkin and Arthur Ernest Everest, The Natural Organic Colouring Matters (London:
Longmans, Green and Co, 1918): 480
11 “Mr. Rawson’s Report No. 2,” dated August 19, 1898, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
12 “Mr. Rawson’s Report No. 2,” dated August 19, 1898, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
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report of September 1898 Rawson acknowledged his failure in following this line of
query. In his experimental work he was able to analyze the mineral content of water in
the various samples he had been supplied with. But he simply did not have a clue as to
which minerals were acting on indican and in which way. He said: “An analysis of water
is of little or no use unless there exist some means of interpreting the results. Hitherto, to
my knowledge, there has been nothing published to indicate what kind of water is most
suitable for use in… (steeping) indigo.” 13
Meanwhile the planters were clamoring for results that they could use. In a way,
Rawson may have earlier raised their expectations from analysis of water. For planters, of
course, changing the type of water being used for steeping presented an easier option
towards augmenting production. In most cases, all that it required was changing the
source of water – switching from a stream to a well, or from one well to another. Unless,
of course, the ground water itself in the entire area was deficient in a particular way.
Perhaps that explains the overwhelming response of planters to the idea of sending their
water samples to Rawson, and their disappointment in the end, when he said that he could
not offer a “definite opinion” on what type of water was more suitable. 14
In the same report Rawson presented his initial finding about the optimal
temperature to maintain during steeping. At that point all that he could offer was the
observation based on limited experimental work carried out at the Mosheri laboratory -
that when the temperature of water was lower the fermentation-related changes during
                                                 
13 “Mr. Rawson’s Report No. 3,” dated September 26, 1898, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March
1900
14 “Mr. Rawson’s Report No. 3,” dated September 26, 1898, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March
1900
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steeping slowed down, and vice versa. But the planters wanted him to be more specific
than that. What was the ideal temperature for steeping? Did there exist a visible or
another easily determinable marker to detect when the steeping process was complete so
that the planters could decide when to turn over liquid into the next tank for oxidation.
Once again Rawson was apologetic.
The third measure on steeping discussed in the report relates to adding milk of
lime in an additional vat placed between the fermentation and oxidation vats. Bernard
Coventry, a planter and agricultural expert, on whose estates the Indigo Improvements
Syndicate (IIS) had set up the second laboratory at Dalsingserai, had patented that
method of steeping. The Bihar Indigo Planters’ Association (BIPA) had asked Rawson to
visit Coventry’s laboratory in Dalsingserai, witness the working of the new method, and
to report back on its usefulness. Rawson spoke positively of the procedure that involved
depositing organic matter present in a dissolved or suspended state in the indigo liquor
obtained from the fermentation tank. That ensured that purer liquor passed on to the
oxidation tank. Finally, some hydrochloric acid was added to the boiler so that any excess
lime was washed out from the final product.
Rawson agreed that the principle employed in Coventry’s process was
“undoubtedly a good one.” In his subsequent reports too Rawson accepted that the
addition of an alkali – ammonia, soda, lime, silicate of soda, sodium peroxide – brought
favorable results. 15 In fact, the practice of adding alkali gained wide acceptance among
                                                 
15 Rawson’s report to the Indigo Defence Association Limited, dated, July 31, 1899, p., 1, BSA,
Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
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the planters in Bihar subsequently, and may be counted as one of the best process
innovations introduced to indigo manufacturing in Bihar. 16
Rawson did meritorious scientific work in another direction – on purifying the
natural dye in order to get rid of all substances other than indigotin while saving some
amount of indigo-red and brown in the dye. He reported on an experiment that he had
conducted on refining indigo in the laboratory. The experiment was an “illustration” that
some members of the BIPA had been earlier invited to witness. The report provided
details that involved heating measured proportions of ground indigo with slaked lime at
or near boiling point. Separately, a fixed proportion of diluted bisulphate of soda was
heated with zinc powder in near vacuum for fifteen minutes to obtain a hydrosulphite. An
effort was made not to let the temperature rise during the chemical change. The two
liquids and their sediments were then mixed and brought to the boil for another half hour.
When the liquid turned yellow, heating was stopped, and the sediment allowed to settle.
The yellow liquid was siphoned off and oxidized with air to obtain indigo of remarkable
purity.
This was a long process, and required constant monitoring. Although successful
on a laboratory scale, and of definite “scientific” merit, its adoption on the indigo tracts
appeared doubtful to begin with. The steps were complex. The next course, that of
adapting this process for implementation on a manufacturing industrial scale, was not
taken up by either the scientists or the planters. Yet, if nothing else, the experiment shows
                                                 
16 This was a process for which Bernard Coventry rightfully claimed credit. He was certainly the
first to demonstrate the benefits arising from the addition of alkalis just before oxidation.
Coventry was not a professional chemist, but rather an experienced agriculturist and a planter. In
that sense the exchanges between Coventry and Rawson represent successful transfer of
knowledge between from agricultural field to laboratory.
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the sensitivity of the planters and scientists to the issue of achieving consistency at an
early stage.
Rawson At The Mosheri Laboratory, 1899-1900
In June 1899, the chemical laboratory was shifted to a more permanent and
spacious location at Mosheri, a small sub divisional town not too far from Muzaffarpur.
As opposed to the earlier laboratory that only had small experimental vats, the Mosheri
laboratory possessed a “miniature factory.” One part of this laboratory had two steeping
vats of 100 cubic feet each, and beating vats, boiling tanks, drying tables, presses, and
everything else of proportionate size as used in actual manufacturing. The other part of
the laboratory had two larger steeping vats of 1,000 cubic feet capacity. The set up at
Mosheri also provided access to an agricultural farm for sowing and observing the
growth of the indigo plant if the chemical experts chose to do so. Also, this season
Rawson had returned from England with an assistant of his choice – S. Burtt. Mosheri as
a site for experimentation represented quite an advance over the previous chemical
laboratory at the Planters’ Club. Rawson was quite happy with the arrangements at the
new laboratory and said that they would “unquestionably prove to be of greatest value.”17
In his second year in Bihar, Rawson was able to visit many factories where he
observed the results of scientific interventions on a manufacturing scale. Thus in June,
1899 he went to the Sirsiah factory and stayed there for two days to watch the
manufacturing operations incorporating the new measures that he had suggested. The
                                                 
17 Rawson’s report to the Indigo Defence Association Limited, dated, July 31, 1899, p., 1, BSA,
Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900; we do not have any additional information as to the training
and qualifications of Rawson’s assistant S. Burtt, except a note in the report that says that the
person was Rawson’s nephew!
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same month he also visited the Dalsingserai concern managed by Bernard Coventry. At
Dalsingserai, Rawson additionally made enquiries into the ongoing agricultural trials at
that station. In July he was at another factory, Turcouleah. With the assistance of the local
proprietor, F. M. Coventry, he made a series of experiments at that factory on a large
scale. On the whole he found most results in agreement with his findings made
previously in the laboratory, although there were a few unexplainable deviations too. 18
The experiments and the respective results obtained at Mosheri until the end of
1899 can be divided into three groups – on fermentation, boiling, and oxidation. The
experiments on fermentation/steeping were the least productive. The thread on water
analysis had led nowhere. Rawson did not yet know which minerals in water fruitfully
acted on the glucoside to produce indigo blue and which ones catalyzed wasteful
conversions. A key item of information not available to Rawson was the nature and
chemical property of the glucoside – indican. 19In such a situation Rawson proposed that
the treatment of water and its purification might be beneficial. He gave a detailed
proposal for constructing tanks of 1,000 cubic feet capacity that should have perforated
pipes at the bottom connected to a Korting’s blower or an air compressor. For achieving a
purer product he suggested adding chemicals to water through the blower and compressor
that were basically used for oxidizing. For a round tank of 14 ft, 9 in. in diameter the
construction cost would have been Rs. 1,200 each, and on an average each factory would
need two or three of them. He also calculated the prices for blower or compressor and
                                                 
18 Rawson’s report to the Indigo Defence Association Limited, dated, July 31, 1899, p., 2, BSA,
Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
19 It may be pointed out in parenthesis that crucial advances in understanding the nature of
indican were made by Dutch chemists in the Netherlands and the Dutch Java. However, that
information was kept a closely guarded secret and not published in the hope that it would soon
offer commercial advantages.
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pipes. But, in the end, the scheme sounded quite impractical. He acknowledged that the
exact nature of chemicals that would be needed and the amount required for adding to
water would have to be determined by an expert on site each time! 20That was indeed a
difficult proposition, and was never followed up.
His suggestions on the boiling stage were more specific, and primarily directed at
improving the purity of the dye. This measure basically involved dissolving impurities
with an acid. Rawson noted that hydrochloric acid would give quicker results. But on
grounds of economy he recommended instead using the cheaper sulfuric acid. He
proposed that 5 seers of acid for 20 maunds of dry indigo would be an appropriate
equivalent. In this regard, Rawson also addressed concerns raised by some indigo dealers
that the addition of acid in the boiler might compromise the quality of indigo and harm
clothes dyed with it. Rawson assured them that those apprehensions were not valid. Any
extra acid used in the boiler could be easily washed away and the final product would not
retain anything acidic. 21
The process of using acid in the boiler subsequently became quite widespread. To
be able to use acid in the boilers it was necessary that the boiler be coated with lead. Lead
lined boilers were not too difficult or expensive to install. Those who were using slaked
lime before fermentation, another one of the innovations suggested earlier, were anyway
using acid in the boiler to remove the extra alkali. Interestingly, the previously tried
                                                 
20 Rawson’s report to the Committee of the Indigo Defence Association Limited, dated February
6, 1900 (although referring to experiments of the previous year):  3, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3,
March 1900
21 Rawson’s report to the Indigo Defence Association Limited, dated, July 31, 1899, pp., 2-3,
BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
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method of “refining” seems to have been given up by this time. Never again was the
approach ever discussed at this time or later.
Rawson’s most earnest efforts were directed towards improving the efficiency of
the second stage in indigo manufacturing – the oxidation stage. With the aim of ensuring
faster and more complete oxidation of the solution, he considered passing a current of air
using blowers and compressors instead of “beating” with a wheel or manual thrashing as
in use until then. He reasoned that blowing air/oxygen through pipes at the bottom of vats
would achieve a more complete oxidation. To achieve efficiency in bringing air and
liquid into contact with each other he also proposed the use of deeper vats.
In February 1900, Rawson finalized his scheme for an extensive trial to use
blowers and compressors at four designated factories. This was his attempt at trying out
on a manufacturing scale what he had experimentally observed at the Mosheri laboratory.
Different combinations were designated to be tried at four factories in separate locations.
Rawson wanted the vat arrangements with the following combinations: 22
Factory 1 (headquarters)
a) Shallow vats with Korting’s blower
b) Shallow vats with Korting’s blower and chemicals
c) Deep vats with air compressor
d) Control – Shallow vats and ordinary beating/thrashing
Factory 2
a) Shallow vats with Root’s blower
b) Shallow vats with Root’s blower and chemicals
c) Control - Shallow vats and ordinary beating/thrashing
Factory 3
a) Shallow vats with Korting’s blower
b) Control - Shallow vats and ordinary beating/thrashing
Factory 4
                                                 
22 Rawson’s report to the Committee of the Indigo Defence Association Limited, dated February
6, 1900, pp: 1-3, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
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a) Shallow vats with Root’s Blower
b) Control - Shallow vats and ordinary beating/thrashing
Some of the equipment would have to be imported from England while some was locally
available from Arthur Butler & Company located at Muzaffarpur.
Information on the details of the oxidation trials is, unfortunately, sketchy.  On his
return from England at the start of the next season, Rawson apparently found the
arrangement for the trials faulty. He complained that the size and power of blowers
installed was less than half of what he had suggested, and doubted if accurate and useful
comparisons could be made. But he managed to complete some trials at Mosheri, wherein
he claimed the average yield was higher by 32% compared to that obtained with the
ordinary process, and the maximum increase was 42%.23 In his subsequent reports he
continued to implore the planters to reorganize their production set- up around deep
oxidation vats fitted with blowers and perforated pipes.
Beginning in early 1900 Rawson had also been experimenting with manures at
Mosheri to improve yield in the field. He specifically looked at variations in output of the
final product from plants that had been treated with different chemicals/fertilizer in the
field. He clarified that while the addition of seet, the waste from manufacturing, aided the
growth of the plant, it did not help enhance the amount of indigo obtainable after
manufacturing. His trials for the season showed that the plots treated with superphosphate
and saltpeter produced the best plant as far as its color-giving potential was concerned. 24
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24 Rawson’s letter to BIPA, dated, August 16, 1900: 2, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1900
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The Dilemma At The End Of 1900
There is a certain gap in the availability of scientific publications and government
reports on laboratories for the year 1901. But reports from the end of 1900 give an idea of
the dilemmas faced by the scientists at that time.
The use of blowers did not become widespread. Perhaps it is not too difficult to
explain this. While the cost of blowers cited by Rawson does not appear to be too high,
the change to deeper vats fitted with blowers did require new investment and changes in
the factory architecture. Later records suggest that the few prosperous planters who
adopted them initially did not get yields anywhere in the vicinity of the high yields that
Rawson had claimed to obtain under experimental conditions. Planters’ lack of positive
response to blowers can be readily explained in terms of the nature of improvement the
blowers were promising. Marginal improvement of yield constituted a “scientific
improvement” or an “innovation.” But that by itself would not have solved planters’
problem in the market place. Planters needed drastic not incremental improvements to
survive the competition of synthetics. Blowers seemed to offer too little, and thus were
largely not adopted.
The solution had to emerge from some other direction. The reports at the end of
1900 are illustrative of the search for solutions elsewhere. If we recall, the fermentation
stage had proven to be some thing of a “black box.”  The fermentative changes had so far
defied clearer scientific understanding and therefore precluded the possibility of devising
steps to modify them usefully. In a confidential letter written to BIPA in October 1900,
Rawson had said:
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If I have said little about the steeping vats in my reports, it is not because
its importance has been overlooked but merely for the reason that I have
not yet discovered anything of value to communicate. 25
Rawson believed that there was a scope for a drastic improvement of
fermentation. To get a better grip on the fermentation processes he requested the hiring of
a bacteriologist. In August 1900, Rawson wrote a letter to the BIPA executive committee,
justifying the need for a bacteriologist who could work on perfecting fermentation. In a
subsequent letter he suggested that any one of the many bacteriologists attached to
numerous breweries in Britain could be hired for the purpose. Those in the wineries had
an expertise on the behavior of microbes, enzymes, and the fermentation produced by
them.
Rawson backed his demand for the hiring of a bacteriologist with hard
calculations. In late 1900, at the meeting of the Society of Dyers and Colourists in
Bradford, Rawson presented the following equation: 100 maunds (1 maund = 80 lbs.) of
the indigofera tinctoria variety of indigo plant should yield 14.7 seers of 60 per cent
concentration indigo. In his trials with the same plant only 12.5 seers of indigo came after
the due manufacturing procedure. He also provided evidence that the other 2 seers were
getting dissipated during fermentation in the steeping stage. He firmly believed that an
improved process of fermentation of leaves would raise the amount of recoverable
indigotin. 26Persuaded by his calculations, George Watt, the Reporter on Economic
                                                 
25 “Private and Confidential,” Rawson’s letter to the Behar Indigo Planters Association, dated 4
October 1900, BSA, Agriculture, File 2I/3, March 1901
26 Christopher Rawson, “ The Indigo Industry,” “Prospects of the Indigo Industry,” The Journal
of the Society of Dyers and Colourists  (1901): 75-79
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Products to the Government of India also supported his recommendation for the hiring of
a bacteriologist. 27
Bacteriologist Cyril Bergtheil At Peeprah, 1902
BIPA hired Cyril Bergtheil, a German trained British chemist, to conduct
bacteriological experiments on steeping indigo in Bihar. The BIPA put an advertisement
in Nature, London, for the job of a scientist to assist Christopher Rawson with their
indigo-experiments in Bihar. The advertisement specifically invited candidates well
versed in both “chemistry and bacteriology” to apply for the job. Cyril Bergtheil was
selected. 28
Born in London in 1878 to Alice Collins and Louis Bergtheil, the latter belonging
to a family of Jewish immigrants to England, Cyril Bergtheil’s early education was in
London. By the time Bergtheil finished his school, he had decided to make a career in
chemistry. Since Germany “was regarded as the best country in which to be trained [in
chemistry],” Bergtheil went to live in Germany with his relatives on his father’s side. For
two years, from 1895-97, he stayed in Nuremberg, studying chemistry at the
Industrieschule. Coming back to England in 1897, he began working in the chemical
laboratory of Professor William Ramsay at University College, London, who at that time
                                                 
27 Christopher Rawson, “ The Indigo Industry,” “Prospects of the Indigo Industry,” The Journal
of the Society of Dyers and Colourists (1901): 75-79
28 Cyril Berkeley, My Autobiography (privately published, n.d.), pp., 1-6; Cyril Bergtheil, after
his immigration to Canada around the time of the World War, changed his name to Cyril
Berkeley, to get by the anti- Germen sentiments prevailing there. His earlier surname easily gave
away his German ancestry, and he saw sense in dropping it for good. (henceforth
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of the scientist at the University of Calgary in Canada.
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became famous working on nitrogen, identifying argon and other rare gases. While with
Professor Ramsay, Bergtheil worked on reactions between iodide and iodate leading to
the freeing of iodine. But breaking away from this kind of experiment, he decided to get
specialized training in agricultural chemistry and bacteriology because both these fields
seemed to have prospects for employment at that time. Between 1899 and 1900,
Bergtheil went to learn agricultural chemistry in the newly set up Agricultural College at
Wye, and also bacteriology. Besides, Bergtheil had nurtured a “great interest” in the
subject of the struggle between the natural and synthetic indigo, all of which must have
ensured his selection for the job. 29
Cyril Bergtheil’s appointment resulted in a renewed focus on fermentation
experiments at the BIPA laboratory, which had been moved from Mosheri to a new
location at Peeprah (Champaran district). Bergtheil immediately turned his attention to
the fermentation processes in the manufacture of indigo, a process that he understood
well due to his previous training in bacteriology. He got the active support of the other
scientist at the station, Rawson, who was convinced that the real problem lay with
indigo’s steeping.  Thus the stage was set for a series of experiments toward getting a
better understanding and control over processes underlying fermentation in the steeping
vat.
Four months later, Bergtheil submitted a report to BIPA in which he responded to
planters’ concerns, explained how he understood the scientific problem, and deliberated
on the strategies he had formulated for handling them experimentally. The planters
wanted their scientists to tell them when exactly to stop steeping.  Bergtheil responded
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that the conditions under which steeping was performed, varied widely. The time of
actual steeping would depend on the type of plant, where it was grown, how long it had
been cut, how it was packed in the vat etc. It was thus not possible to suggest any fixed
estimate for the steeping period. 30
Bergtheil also provided a scientific explanation of the process of
steeping/fermentation. The enzymes already present in the leaves and bacteria of the
steeping liquor acted on leaves’ glucoside, forming a body that on oxidation gave
indigotin. But the liquor contained several kinds of bacteria, some of which produced the
desired change in glucoside, a few that remained non-reactive, and a few others that
brought undesirable changes in the glucoside leading to a loss of recoverable indigotin. It
was virtually impossible to pick and choose the appropriate bacteria while removing
others. To achieve “uniformity in working” of steeping, therefore, Bergtheil decided to
adopt a process in which all bacteria would be killed, producing a “sterile” environment,
and then bring about the chemical changes involving glucoside by enzyme action alone.
Either antiseptics or plain heating could kill bacteria; since the antiseptics were
expensive, heating appeared to be a better option.
Indeed, Bergtheil disclosed that trials conducted at the Peeprah laboratory had
confirmed that when heat was used during steeping, fermentation became “more speedy
and complete.”  Three alternatives existed to use heat: First, steam the plant and then
conduct steeping with warm water or water at ordinary temperature. Second, boiling
water could be used to destroy both bacteria and enzymes, and then the greenish-yellow
liquid could be oxidized by especially cultured enzymes. The second option appeared
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tortuously long and expensive. Lastly, warm water at a temperature of 150 – 160 F could
be used for steeping. Bergtheil told his clients that experiments were currently underway
to determine which was the best and most economical way of using heat for
fermentation.31
Rawson’s Growing Hopelessness At Peeprah, 1902
In 1902 Rawson’s experiments at Peeprah went in three directions. Firstly, he
perfected his patented “ammonia gas process,” which required passing of ammonia gas
through the liquor to achieve oxidation. Instead of oxidizing with air/oxygen, as was done
previously, the ammonia gas process achieved oxidation with the help of ammonia. In the
current season he demonstrated two sets of experiments with ammonia. The report
provides the following results:
Table 4.1
                                    Average output result of 12 days with 100 maunds of plant
Process Total weight in seers
produced in the vat
Ordinary process 9.80
Ammonia gas process 12.00
Increase per cent 22.5
                                                 
31 “Bacteriologist’s Note I” Cyril Bergtheil, dated 9 August 1902, BSA, Agriculture, p., 2,
December 1903, File 2-I/7 3
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Table 4.2
                                    Average output result of 3 days with 100 maunds of plant
Process Total weight in seers
produced in the vat
Ordinary process 11.27
Ammonia gas process 12.78
Increase per cent 13.5
Rawson claimed that the process was “decidedly the best process which … [had] hitherto
been put forward.” Rawson also began work on two other types of experiments, but
stopped work mid way realizing that the cost of inputs were too high relative to the
increase in yield that would result from them.  One of those was the “hot water process”
and the other the “persulphate” process to obtain indigo blue from leaves. The cost of
obtaining a very large amount of steam and the high price of ammonia persulphate put a
stop to these efforts.
The planters were getting impatient with the results of Rawson’s efforts. His more
recent recommendations – blowers, deep vats, steaming of plant, the persulphate method
had not found many takers.  The results were not consistent to begin with. Or, the returns
from the innovations did not justify the costs required for introducing them. The
Inspector General of Agriculture Mollison’s comment, dated September 1902, sounded
warning bells by foretelling that the planters were not likely to continue funding his
chemical experiments.
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Mr. Rawson and his assistants have accomplished striking work. ….. Yet very
few useful results have been obtained ….. The cost of applying Mr. Rawson’s
suggested improvements exceeds the value of increase of produce at existing
market rates. 32
During the rest of the year Christopher Rawson conducted experiments to
complement the efforts of Bergtheil on steeping. He alluded to some steeping
experiments conducted at Peeprah to test the impact of an antiseptic, a disinfectant
carbolic acid, and mercuric chloride on the steeping process, which did not give
definitive results. On certain days, when conditions turned out to be perfect, he believed
that the output from current methods of fermentation was “not more than 10 per cent
below the theoretical.” But at most other times, the extraction from fermentation “was far
from complete.” He knew that the hope for any real improvement lay with steeping. But
he was getting pessimistic. He said, “The steeping process is receiving every possible
attention but the difficulties of regulating the operation are very
great.” 33
Aside from talking about the scope and status of experiments on yield
improvement, very significantly, Rawson also briefly alluded to the unfinished task of
removing impurities from the natural dye. Rawson had been cognizant of the need to
match the purity of synthetic dye, which was sold in either 100% concentration of color,
or in a 20% concentration in a neutral base.  In either case, the synthetic product
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contained only indigotin, the color, and nothing else that could act on the fabric. Also, the
percentage of color in the synthetic dye was fixed. Chemical experiments at the Planters’
Club, at Mosheri, and Peeprah had led to recommendations for improving purity (or the
percentage of color in natural dye) by adding slaked lime before oxidation and by
washing with acid in the boiler. On the other hand, the trials on refining had proved
impractical for adoption due to the high cost of materials. In that context, Rawson’s
admissions are illustrative. They put in a perspective the relative futility of previous
efforts in India with regard to improving the consistency of color, as against the efforts to
improve the output of the dye.
Did the scientists have a realistic chance of improving percentage of indigotin in
natural dye beyond the mark of 60-65% - the upper limit for color in the “best variety
Bengal indigo”? And what were the implications of that for the future of natural indigo?
Rawson’s comments, once again, are insightful.  The addition of slaked lime and acid
wash, by Rawson’s own admission, were most useful in cases where the dye was
particularly impure. Their effectiveness in other cases where the purity was already
expected to be 60-65% was marginal at best. At the same time, Rawson stated that
improvement of percentage and obtaining natural dye of near 100% purity was a
legitimate agenda if the collapsing market had to be protected:
It is now generally admitted that in order to compete more successfully with
artificial indigo the quality of the natural product should be materially
improved although for many purposes there are dyers who much prefer to use
60 to 65 per cent natural indigo to pure indigotin. It is not likely in the future
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that there will be a great demand in European and American markets for
indigo of low quality. 34
But he did not really have a plan to inspire confidence on the issue of purity and
consistency. He briefly mentioned that he had consulted with the London Committee of
BIPA in the beginning of the year. After due consultation with them “ an experimental
piece of apparatus” had been ordered that had recently arrived in Calcutta. He believed
that the apparatus could help produce indigo with 80-85% purity at a nominal cost. Never
again did he mention anything else about this experimental apparatus. In all likelihood
either the experiments were never conducted or did not give replicable results.35
Christopher Rawson’s contract with the BIPA came to an end in March 1903, and
the BIPA did not renew it. This does not seem unusual given planters’ dissatisfaction
with the fact that none of the measures suggested by him recently were found to be
sufficiently successful for application. Rawson himself may well have lost faith in the
possibility of further improving the natural dye. His lack of trust in natural’s prospects
against the synthetic is reflected in the fact that on his return to Britain in 1904 he took up
employment with the BASF, the manufacturers of synthetic indigo.
The newcomer Bergtheil, however, was more positive. He did not share Rawson’s
pessimism. He carried on residual experiments on the fermentation stage of indigo
manufacturing. 1903 was a key date in terms of the reorganization of indigo laboratories
in India. Peeprah laboratory was closed down, and some staff at Peeprah including Cyril
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Bergtheil and biologist H. M. Leake were transferred temporarily to the Dalsingserai
laboratory. Later in 1904 Bergtheil was appointed the Imperial Bacteriologist and also
allowed by the government to lead the newly set up indigo laboratory at Peeprah the
same year. 36A longer discussion of the reorganization of laboratories in terms of the
issue of patronage will appear later in the Section Four of this chapter.
The IIS Laboratory At Dalsingserai, 1899-1902
Let us now shift focus to the other laboratory set up by the planters where parallel
efforts were being made to enhance the yield of indigo. The IIS had set up an experiment
station at Dalsingserai in 1899 to carry out agricultural experiments to improve indigo. In
contrast to Rawson’s and Bergtheil’s experiments, which largely focused on post-harvest
extraction processes, the experimenters at Dalsingserai set their sights on improving the
output of the indigo plant per acre and the percentage of the coloring principle in the
leaves. In 1900, the IIS additionally built a chemical laboratory at Dalsingserai with the
aim of augmenting the efforts of agronomists there.
Improving Output Through Better Cultivation Practices
Between 1899 and 1901, experiments and trials were made at Dalsingserai under
the leadership of scientist E. A. Hancock and planter Bernard Coventry. We do not
possess any additional information about Hancock’s educational and professional training
beyond the fact that he was an “agricultural chemist” who had been invited from England
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by the IIS. Bernard Coventry, on the other hand, was an experienced planter,
entrepreneur, and innovator. Not a professional scientist, Coventry was more of a
“tinkerer.” He offered his indigo estate for the conduct of experiments and trials, and in
fact, collaborated with Hancock. We also know that he had initiated the use of slaked
lime in the vats, and won a patent for it. Rawson, as earlier mentioned, spoke highly of
that procedure and recommended its use during manufacturing.
Under the leadership of E A Hancock and Bernard Coventry the experts at
Dalsingserai achieved useful results in establishing optimal cultivation practices. Most of
the success in the earlier phase came from trials with different manures. A hundred and
twenty plots spread over nearly a hundred acres of land were put under indigo to
ascertain the result of application of different combination of manures. Besides, as the
note of E A Hancock explained, the experimenters also perfected the best possible
methods of planting and crop rotation. 37
Further experiments with the use of manures enabled the scientists at Dalsingserai
to provide concrete suggestions to the planters. Through tests of the local soil and by
experimentally observing the effect of the addition of different minerals on the growing
indigo plant, the scientists recommended the application of two categories of manures -
the primary manures and the secondary manures. Coventry, Hancock, and others
fundamentally suggested adding phosphoric acid in combination with nitrogenous
fertilizers and potash. Also having noticed that indigo leaves with a higher content of the
coloring matter invariably also contained a high percentage of magnesia, the scientists
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additionally advocated adding sulfate of magnesia to indigo lands. They claimed that by
applying the above two categories of manures to indigo plants in the month of December,
an increase in the indigotin content in the leaves between 45 per cent and 63 per cent
could be obtained. 38
The Search For Better Seeds
The experts at Dalsingserai also invested efforts in regulating the flow of seeds to
the indigo farms, and in improving their quality by conducting systematic experiments
and trials. Seeds for the indigo lands had traditionally come from the North-West
Provinces and the United Provinces where indigo was grown by a large number of small-
scale farmers. Dealers based in those areas purchased the seeds from individual farmers
and sent them to Bihar. No systematic effort had ever been made to monitor the quality of
seeds produced. Over a period of time this neglect in selection had led to deterioration in
the seed’s quality. Planters realized that a problem existed with the quality of seeds
supplied to them that needed deft handling.
Before 1901, Bernard Coventry made efforts in the direction of accumulating data
on the indigenous variety, Indigofera tinctoria and the foreign variant Indigofera arrecta.
To test the productivity of the indigenous breeds he sent seeds of the Madras, North-West
Provinces, and Oudh varieties to the Royal Botanic Gardens in Calcutta to be grown
under a horticulturist’s supervision. Coventry also procured a small quantity of seeds of
the Natal variety from South Africa and the Java variety from Southeast Asia and sent
them to Calcutta to get their productivity compared with the indigenous varieties.  The
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preliminary tests suggested firstly that the foreign varieties gave a higher output of leaves
per acre, and secondly, that the Natal and Java varieties were of similar origin. The
Javanese had apparently replaced the Guatemala species grown previously with the South
African variety a long time before and since then the Natal variety had been acclimatized
to grow to its full potential.
By 1902, Coventry began more extensive trials to compare the productivity of the
tinctoria and the arrecta varieties at Dalsingserai. In his efforts with the Indian varieties,
Coventry first applied himself to finding out the location of origin of different seeds and
then categorized them according to their potency. His trials showed that the seeds of the
more western Multan germinated more quickly with a lesser amount of moisture.
However the advantage of easier germination was lost due to the scarcer amount of
leaves on the plant. Thus he suggested to the planters that they use seeds from the more
eastern sources of supply, preferably those from southeast Punjab and North West
Provinces. In support of these efforts the research station’s biologist, H M Leake and
Captain A T Cage, curator of the Calcutta Herbarium visited upper India to get precise
information on the sources of supply of different seeds. The Bengal government came
forward to partially fund the trip of Leake and Page that took place in September and
October 1902. 39
Coventry’s second set of trials was conducted with the Natal variety of indigo
seeds, the arrecta variety. Once again the colonial government supported Coventry’s
efforts by partly funding the visit of private entrepreneur H A Baily to Natal in July 1902
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to procure seeds from South Africa. Baily sent a message that, if the planters in Bihar
were willing, a supply line could be established for sending Natal seeds on a regular
basis. There were, however, no takers for this proposal. The import of seeds from another
continent was an enormous enterprise requiring employment of people, establishing
supply lines, monitoring quality during transit, and dispensing to a large number of
customers. The purpose of importing a sizeable quantity of genuine Natal seeds having
been considered, the planters moved on. Foreign variants needed acclimatization, and it is
in that direction that their efforts were directed.
Coventry tried to find out the best way to grow the arrecta variety in Bihar. At the
end of his trials he pointed out that the Natal variety would not germinate in the month of
March, the usual time for sowing in Bihar, but rather between June and July given its
especial characteristics and the climate of Bihar. He also discouraged planters from
practicing transplanting as was the practice in Java, and additionally suggested sowing
with ordinary drill or broadcast at the rate of 6 seers per acre.  40
Perfecting The Rotation Crops
The experimenters at Dalsingserai also focused on crops other than indigo. The
initial attention to other crops came on account of their importance to the planters as
rotation crops. Planters knew well that the indigo lands began suffering from “indigo
sickness” after repeated sowings of indigo. When turned over to other crops in between,
they regained their fertility and gave a better output. But gradually the planters also
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became interested in crops other than indigo because such crops fetched a good price in
the local market, and helped compensate for the diminishing margin of profit on indigo.
Responding to these needs, the scientists at Dalsingserai turned their attention to
sugarcane, and more elaborately to the fiber, rhea. Bernard Coventry carried out detailed
investigations to ascertain the profitability of cultivating rhea and exporting it to Europe.
He calculated the average cost of manufacture for a ton of rhea at £10, and of bailing,
insuring, and selling it in Europe at £ 5. Since the average price for rhea in Europe stood
at £25, planters could make a profit of £10 for every ton of rhea produced. Since a ton of
rhea could be obtained on 2.5 acres of land, the average profit for the planters, if they
switched to rhea, would be £4 for an acre. Coventry also asserted that the prices for rhea
would hold fast in the coming few years. 41The efforts of Bernard Coventry in this regard
also won the praise of colonial officials. Such efforts were seen as making useful
contributions toward combining the manufacture of indigo with other cash crops. 42
Planters, The Bengal Government, And The Re-Organization Of Indigo Laboratories,
1900-1902
Moving beyond the content and direction of scientific experiments, and the
expertise of chemists and agronomists, this section will instead focus on the re-
organization of the indigo laboratories in India from 1900. That year marks a departure
point in terms of funding and sponsorship of scientific experiments. Started primarily as a
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planters’ enterprise, the laboratories began to be co-funded by the government from that
year. From 1903, planters stopped funding the two laboratories. They solicited the
government’s support for carrying forward the work at their laboratories. The Bengal
government stepped in, providing funds for the laboratories while leaving the actual
responsibility for the conduct of experiments with the planters. From 1904 onwards the
government became the primary sponsor of indigo experiments. The period 1900-1903
provides a convenient vantage point to address issue of patronage for science in the
changing context of diminishing results from the laboratories, plummeting profits for the
planters, and the government’s desire to start its own agricultural research station at Pusa.
In this section patronage of science in colonial India will be studied by focusing on
specific questions: Under what circumstances did the planters demand government
support? Why did the government feel obliged to support them? Did the involvement of
the bureaucrats change the orientation of indigo experiments? Lastly, what re-kindled all
round hopes in indigo experiments after 1903?
The Planters Turn To The Government For Subsidy
From 1900 forward, citing declining profits, the planters made a claim for a state
subsidy for their chemical and agricultural experiments. They invoked precedents of
various sorts to demand funds. The government had after all provided assistance to
laboratory experiments on tea. Why not to indigo then, they argued. “It is understood that
in Java, for instance, and also in America, the Government give[s] very great financial
assistance in scientific research, whole department[s] …[are] maintained by it,” pointed
out E Macnaghten, BIPA’s Secretary in his letter to the government, imploring them to
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help out with scientific experiments on indigo. He also argued that the benefits of such
scientific research would not be limited to the indigo industry alone. “Knowledge”
emerging from the laboratories would after all also be disseminated to thousands of
natives that worked on the plantations - thus bringing overall benefit to the entire
province. 43
The administrators in Bihar were positively inclined to help out planters. Apart
from the general political and economic reasons for supporting the indigo industry, the
officials also had close personal ties with the planters. Revenue officer C. J. Stevenson-
Moore, who conducted survey operations in an indigo-growing district, rightly
commented that the indigo industry had brought into being “a large community of
honourable Englishmen joined together by a common bond of interest.” Planters
promptly came to the aid of the colonial government “in times of danger and difficulty.”
44Planters helped the bureaucrats with the performance of several administrative tasks.
A few administrators like the Revenue Secretary F A Slacke strongly supported
the planters’ case for a state subsidy. He went on to plead the planters’ case for state aid
within the administration for scientific investigation. In an official communication to the
Lieutenant Governor, he pointed out that in Java, where indigo planters also faced the
problem of competition with synthetic indigo, the colonial government had come forward
to help the Dutch planters. He rhetorically argued:
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If such a petty Government as the Dutch consider[s] such expenditure by
the State essential, there would probably be a strong reason for getting
Imperial assistance here [in Bengal]. 45
Without disrupting the plan for initiating agricultural research under its own
control, the government showed willingness to fund planter’s private research. In the
long-term the government intended to initiate research at Pusa on all agricultural crops
including indigo, sugar, jute, and oilseeds. It was planned that the benefits of that
research would accrue to all farm-based industries in India. But since the problem faced
by the indigo industry required immediate attention, a policy decision was taken to
finance indigo experiments conducted by the planters for three years. While the details
and modalities of fund disbursement would be worked out later, towards the end of
March 1900 the government communicated its decision to the planters that it had decided
in principle to fund their experiments for the next three years. 46
The Government Imposes Its Own Regime On Indigo Research
Important changes came to mark the organization of indigo research following the
commitment of government funds for the conduct of indigo experiments. On grounds of
economy, and based on their assessment of what kinds of experiments and which experts
would benefit the indigo industry most, the government officials compelled the planters
to introduce changes in their program of indigo research. The bureaucrats also persuaded
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the two planter bodies to merge and constitute a joint research committee to oversee the
functioning of the laboratories. Let us turn our attention to the changes made to the
organization of indigo research as a result of a partnership with government.
In August 1900, BIPA first wrote to the Bengal government requesting financial
assistance for the employment of a bacteriologist. The government acceded to that
request for support, allotting _500 to the planters. BIPA came back in November with a
request for additional funds to enlarge the scope of its experiments. This time BIPA
attached a scheme drawn out by its in-house scientist, Christopher Rawson. In addition to
Rawson and his assistant working at the time, the scheme asked for aid to employ a
Research Chemist, an Agricultural Chemist, four Assistant Analytical Chemists, a
Botanist, and an Entomologist. 47
The Indigo Improvements Syndicate also wrote to the Government of India and
the Government of Bengal in January 1901 and requested a grant of Rs. 40,000 for the
next three years. The Syndicate wanted to use the money to appoint a chemist in its
existing laboratory at Dalsingserai to support the analyses carried out by the agricultural
experts there, and to set up another laboratory and experimental farm in Punjab and the
North-Western Provinces to cultivate improved indigo seeds. 48
The response of federal bureaucrat George W Watt, the government’s Economic
Reporter, to the BIPA request for government funds in November 1900 reflects key
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aspects of the official outlook on the engagement of experts to improve indigo – an
outlook that came to mould the organization of laboratories and scientific research on
natural indigo.  Watt found the scheme “far too liberal” in terms of number of experts
demanded. He remarked:
Mr. Rawson [who had drafted the proposal for BIPA] proposes a larger
scientific staff to investigate indigo alone than is in the employment of the
Government for all branches of the agriculture and industry of the entire
empire. 49
To bring the proposal in line with what would be considered “expedient” within
government circles, Watt suggested a substantial curtailment of the scope of the proposal.
Against Rawson’s original demand for a Research Chemist and an Agricultural Chemist,
Watt recommended that the planters aim for the employment of one additional chemist
and an assistant chemist. Watt also considered the demand for a separate botanist and
entomologist extravagant. Instead, he suggested that the planters hire a biologist to
perform the functions of these two specialists. He pointed out that the recently appointed
entomologist to the Indian Museum and a soon to be appointed mycologist to the
Botanical Survey in Calcutta could offer specialized advice to the planters in Bihar when
needed. A biologist, Watt thought, would be sufficient to the task of selection of the right
varieties of plants and in establishing optimal cultivation practices for indigo.
Secondly, Watt suggested an equitable emphasis on the chemical and agricultural
branches in the ongoing investigations at the BIPA laboratory. Looking especially at the
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poor state of knowledge about the indigo plant Watt called for additional agricultural
experiments and trials.
By far the most important task over and above chemical and mechanical
improvements in the manufacture of indigo is the study of the plant itself and
the improvement of stock by selection on parallel lines with the chemical
investigations already discussed… It is, in my opinion, a disgrace to the
industry that so little should be known of the botany and agriculture of a plant
upon which so much capital has been invested. 50
In that light, Watt thought that additional efforts by the BIPA’s scientists towards
selection of higher yielding varieties under the supervision of a biologist would be
fruitful. This suggestion was indeed in line with the agricultural focus of experiments at
Dalsingserai.
Thirdly, George Watt expressed concern about the way indigo experiments were
being organized. He specifically objected to the functioning of BIPA and IIS
independently of each other despite working towards the same goal of improving indigo.
Watt recommended the amalgamation of the IIS with BIPA to facilitate the efficient
conduct of indigo experiments. The two bodies, Watt thought, should jointly design a
concrete program of research and pool the maximum funds that they could generate.
Thereafter, to make up the shortfall, they should approach the provincial governments of
North West Provinces, Punjab, and Madras besides the government of Bengal. Since
indigo was also grown and manufactured in the other three states, the governments of
                                                 
50 G W Watt’s letter to Secretary, BIPA, op. cit
 128
those states could be expected to offer monetary support to a unified and rational program
of research on the cultivation and manufacture of indigo.
The provincial bureaucrats had, independently of Watt, long demanded the fusion
of the research programs of BIPA and IIS to avoid what they thought was a “duplication”
of experiments taking place in planters’ laboratories. The first occasion for the
bureaucrats to review the organization of indigo experiments came when the planters
approached the provincial government for partial funding of their experiments. Now that
the planters had come back to ask for a larger financial contribution, the officials
assertively asked the two planters’ bodies to coordinate their research. They
communicated to the planters that government funds to support indigo experiments
would be given to them only on the condition that the two planter bodies merged. After
due discussion between BIPA’s members in India, non-resident members living in
Britain, and the representatives of Calcutta agency houses and brokers, the secretary of
the BIPA announced the amalgamation of the two organizations in March 1901. 51
The state level administrators also played an important role in finalizing the
details of the planters’ research program. Initially the planters were unhappy with the cut-
back to their program as suggested by the government officials. But in the end they
revised their proposal in line with the broad outlines of George Watt’s scheme, which had
been endorsed by provincial officials. In their unified research program the planters
proposed to conduct experiments at two centers - the manufacturing experiments at
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Peeprah under the leadership of Christopher Rawson and the agricultural experiments at
Dalsingserai headed by E A Hancock. The two arms would be centrally supervised by a
research committee comprising seven members – four indigo planters representing the
four Bihar districts, two representatives of the Calcutta agency houses that traded in
indigo, and one representative of the buying brokers. The group would be headed by a
secretary. The planters also deviated from the original scheme prepared by Rawson in
which they had proposed to hire a research chemist, an agricultural chemist, a botanist
and entomologist. In line with Watt’s recommendations, the revised scheme dropped the
demand for the agricultural chemist and in place of the botanist and entomologist
proposed to hire a biologist.  52
Finally, the officials played an important role in settling the budget and fixing
norms for apportioning the research money. Firstly, they lowered the aggregate cost of
the indigo experiments in the revised proposal. The planters’ proposal had envisaged an
expense of Rs. 150,000 with even contributions from the planters and the government –
while the government would make a contribution of 75,000, the planters belonging to the
erstwhile BIPA and IIS would contribute 50,000 and 25,000 respectively.  The
bureaucrats scaled down the total budget to 125,000, putting their own contribution at
50,000 per annum and the share of the planters at 75,000 on the principle of two-fifths
and three-fifths contributions respectively. On the question of the apportioning of funds,
it was decided that two-thirds of the funds would meet the expense of experiments at
Peeprah while one-third would go to Dalsingserai. The bureaucrats also clarified that the
government’s share of the research money would be forthcoming only after the
                                                 
52 Biologist H M Leake was employed by the Research Committee who later joined the Peeprah
station in 1902 and moved to Dalsingserai in 1904.
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Accountant General confirmed that the planters had submitted their share to the central
research committee. Once planters agreed with the terms of contribution and
disbursement of funds, the way was cleared for the joint funding of experiments at
Peeprah and Dalsingserai from April 1, 1901. 53
The Planters’ Contribution To Laboratories Tapers Off
The planters continually fell short of meeting their financial obligation to the
central research committee. In the calendar year 1901, the amalgamated association did
not provide its full contribution, citing its inability in receiving the subscriptions from the
planter-members. As a result, the government too reduced its share based on the agreed
principle of two-fifths from the government to match three-fifths from the planters. The
earlier commitment to provide funds for the joint research program was also
compromised as the planting community became beset with group politics and regional
alignments. The planters from the western districts – those in Champaran, Saran, and
Muzaffarpur who were mostly members of the erstwhile BIPA wanted their contribution
to go towards supporting the experiments at Peeprah only. A section of the planters,
especially those belonging to the Darbhanga sub-committee, wanted their subscription to
go to fund the experiments at Dalsingserai. By the middle of 1902, the amalgamated
association formally split.
Most trading groups, those who had formerly been members of IIS, raised money
independently to support research at Dalsingserai. Although unhappy with the split, the
                                                 
53 Extract from the proceedings of a General Committee Meting of the Bihar Indigo Planters’
Association held at Muzaffarpur on the 8th December 1900,” BSA, Agriculture, January 1901,
File, 2I/3 28-29, Nos. 40-41; BSA, Agriculture, May 1901, File, 2I/3 1-7, Nos. 3(b), 3(c), 4-8,
Notes and Orders
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bureaucrats continued their financial support for the indigo experiments. The BIPA,
which had now separated, again fell short of contributing the amount due on them for
1902. Later the BIPA members came back to the government, requesting additional
money for the payment of salaries to experts at Peeprah. The planters and traders owing
allegiance to the former IIS also failed to raise sufficient money to pay for the expenses
already incurred at Dalsingserai.54
In a situation where the planter organizations were unable to provide funds, the
government agreed to engage with groups of planters still willing to contribute. In a
meeting with the Lt. Governor J Woodburn in June 1902 some planters explained why
the planter organizations had failed in meeting their financial obligations. On behalf of
the BIPA, planter H. Hudson pointed that the planters had been incurring losses due to
the prevailing low prices of indigo. In such a situation the BIPA was unable to make the
obligatory contribution for the experiments as decided in the agreement with the
government earlier. He pleaded that the government bring the Peeprah and Dalsingserai
experiment stations under its control and take overall responsibility for the experiments
with the support of those planters that wished to contribute. Other members of the BIPA
present on the occasion, J B Norman and L I Harrington, supported the views of Hudson.
Bernard Coventry, an erstwhile member of the IIS, expressed interest in continuing the
experiments, and hoped that the government would support the efforts at Dalsingserai.
Given the inability of the planter organizations to stand by the previous agreement the
Lieutenant Governor decided on an alternative modus operandi. Henceforth the
                                                 
54 Letter of L Hare, Commissioner, Patna to Revenue Secretary, Bengal, dated, May 12, 1902,
BSA, Agriculture, June 1902, File, 2I/3 of 10-14, Nos. 66-67; Notes and Orders, dated, December
2, 1902, pp. 3-4, BSA, Agriculture, December 1902, File 2I/8, 15-16
 132
government would give funds to specific laboratories on being assured that the planters
and traders had made sufficiently strong efforts to keep the experiments running there. 55
The funds from the indigo interests, whether from planters or traders, continued to
taper off through 1902. The BIPA completely stopped funding the Peeprah experiment
station from January 1, 1903, and began to wind up its operations. Bernard Coventry
barely managed to keep the operations running at Dalsingserai. Coventry’s current trials
were largely funded with the help of carry over money from the previous year, with
contributions from the Calcutta based trading interests, and subscriptions of a few
planters around Dalsingserai.  Begg, Dunlop, and Company, the honorary secretaries of
the IIS, suggested to the government that an exception should be made to the earlier rule
of three-fifths and two fifths contribution from planters and the government, and that
matching funds should be awarded to Dalsingserai. By early 1903, the station was at the
end of its resources and its closure seemed imminent. 56 Only the grant of government
funds in March 1903 gave a fresh lease of life to the laboratory at Dalsingserai. 57
The Question Of Patronage
                                                 
55 Revenue Secretary W C Macpherson’s note, dated June 3, 1902 and Lt. Governor J
Woodburn’s note, dated, June 9, 1902, Notes and Orders, pp., 6-7, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), June
1902, File, 2I/3 of 10-14
56 Letter from Begg, Dunlop and Company to Commissioner, Patna Division, dated, May 6, 1902;
Notes and Orders, pp., 4-5, BSA, Agriculture, June 1902, File, 2I/3 of 10-14; Revenue Secretary
W C Macpherson’s note, dated June 3, 1902, Notes and Orders, pp., 6-7, BSA, Agriculture, June
1902, File, 2I/3 of 10-14
57 Letter of A Earle, Revenue Secretary to Commissioner, Patna, dated, March 21, 1903,
Agriculture, December 1903, File, 2I/8 3. The developments that led to disbursement of funds for
continuing the Dalsingserai laboratory will be discussed in the next chapter.
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The previous sections have clarified two aspects of patronage of science in
colonial India: one, that when faced with market competition the planters showed
willingness to set up laboratories and sponsor scientific experiments. The colonial
government, too, showed willingness to support indigo experiments. The administrators
looked at the class of European planters as political allies and genuinely wanted to help
their efforts with scientific investigation. As the protector of the commonweal, they also
wanted to save an important colonial industry that generated revenue and employment.
Both planters and bureaucrats certainly did not betray any innate “conservatism” as far as
a positive attitude towards the employment of science was concerned.
Let us turn our attention to re-consider the issue of patronage of scientific research by
asking why the financial contribution from the planters continued to taper off till it
stopped from the beginning of 1903. Any assessment of the falling contribution from the
planters to scientific research on indigo must include a consideration of the state of that
industry in the period. The total export of indigo from India had come down from a peak
of 187,000 cwt in 1895 to 60,000 cwt in 1903. The fall in export reflects a widespread
divestment by the planters; a large number of planters had quit indigo and gone into sugar
and food crop production. Obviously this large section of planters no longer sent their
quota of funds to the indigo laboratories, thus bringing down the total amount of planters’
contribution.
 134
                                                                            Table 4.3






(In Rs. and Paise /cwt.)
1 Rupee = 100 Paise
1895-1896 187,337 53,545,112 285.82
(i.e. Rupees 285 and
Paise 82)
1896-1897 169,523 43,707,570 257.83
1897-1898 133,849 30,574,019 228.42
1898-1899 135,187 29,704,781 219.73
1899-1900 111,420 26,925,107 241.65
1900-1901 102,491 21,355,808 208.37
1901-1902 89,750 18,522,554 206.38
1902-1903 65,377 12,056,819 184.42
1903-1904 60,410 10,762,026 178.15
1904-1905 49,252 8,346,073 169.46
         Source: Indian Planters’ Gazette and Sporting News, September 8, 1906: 299
The indigo industry in India was indeed in a sorry state. Those planters that stayed
in business increasingly felt the financial squeeze as the price fetched by natural indigo in
the international market continued to drop. Director of Commercial Intelligence Noel
Patton’s Review of the Trade of India for 1906 gives indigo’s export figures for the
previous ten years from Indian ports, from which the average price fetched by natural
indigo between 1895- 1905 can be deduced (see Table 4.3 above). As the prices dropped
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and consequently profit margins kept shrinking, the planters pleaded for a “free ride,” –
they sought and received government’s support for continuing their experiments. 
At the same time, the planters’ stoppage of funds to Peeprah and Dalsingserai
laboratories from 1903 also shows a certain lack of enthusiasm with work being done at
those laboratories. The logic behind investment in scientific research was precisely to
stop the slide in profits. If planters believed that science at their laboratories held clear
promises to revive profitability, they would have continued to support those experiments.
To find a definitive answer to this question we must again review the work performed at
the chemical and agricultural laboratories. What had these laboratories achieved for the
indigo industry? In what respects had they failed the planters?
The experiments conducted within the planters’ laboratories between 1898 and
1903 had met with a mix of success and failure. Science had certainly resulted in yield
improvement through perfecting the post-harvest extractive strategies and cultivating
strategies. Quantifiable data is lacking as to how much yield improvement had precisely
resulted. But a number of general remarks prove beyond doubt that the initial work at the
planters’ laboratories had proved to be beneficial in this regard. In his notes J. Woodburn,
the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal reported the planters as saying that Christopher
Rawson’s “discoveries” had caused to “increase enormously the output of leaf and the
output of dye.” E. A. Hancock’s experiments at Dalsingserai, it is reported, had also led
to an increase in the indigotin content of the leaves.
However, among the most notable failures of scientists at this stage was their
inability to produce indigo of a uniform quality. Rawson’s attempts to refine indigo, first
at Mosheri in 1901 with the help of slaked lime, and later at Peeprah in 1902 were
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successful in principle, but totally inapplicable on an industrial scale due to the
complicated nature of the chemical reactions involved or their high costs. Anthony Travis
has argued that the dyers and manufacturers in the Western markets switched to synthetic
indigo because it maintained the uniformity of its color from batch to batch.  Peter Reed
has also counted the “consistency” of synthetic indigo as the single most important factor
that attracted the dyers worldwide. Scientists found achieving consistency in natural
indigo to be a particularly intractable problem. The researchers seemed to have reached a
ceiling in their attempts to give Bihar’s indigo the same level of consistency as given by
factories to the artificial indigo through controlled chemical processes. 58
The situation widened the gulf between the scientists and their patrons in India.
Time was running out for the planters. While their scientists in laboratories continued to
maintain that natural indigo had not yet passed into the realm of a “failed technology,”
most traders found the rhetoric of the scientists difficult to practice and live by. In the
face of declining export of indigo from India and shrinking profits, the planter-
businessmen found scientists’ promises to deliver in future irrelevant. They needed
immediate results that the scientists were not in a position to offer. It is this different
reading of the situation between the scientists in laboratories and the planters that brought
about the imminent closure of the laboratories, not planters’ “distrust” in science or
scientific research.
                                                 
58 “Mr. Rawson’s report No 3,” Agriculture, March 1901, File 2I/3; “Notes on Experimental
Work done at Peeprah During the Morhan Mahai 1902,” By Christopher Rawson, dated 11
August 1902” BSA, Agriculture, August 1903, File 2I/7; Anthony Travis, Rainbow Makers: The
Origins of the Synthetic Dyestuffs Industry in Western Europe. Bethlehem: Lehigh University
Press, 1993: 224; Peter Reed, “The British Chemical Industry,” British Journal for the History of
Science (1992) 25: 116
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Epilogue: Eugene Charles Schrottky, The Java Variety
Perhaps it would be useful to note here that 1903 was not a year marked only by
hopelessness in the efficacy of science and scientists. Just when planters within the indigo
organizations withdrew support to indigo laboratories, others persuaded Eugene
Schrottky to resume his trials with the manufacturing process. Schrottky returned to India
from Java in 1896, and took a break from indigo experiments to teach botany and
chemistry classes at the Grant Medical College in Bombay. Several planters implored
him to resume his indigo experiments and trials in 1903. 59
In 1903, Schrottky investigated a new process of fermentation at the Burhurwah
outwork of the Turcouleah Indigo Concern. In his initial experimental trials he claimed to
have obtained an output of 15 seers of indigo, analyzing 72.75 % indigotin, from 100
maunds of the plant. This compared very favorably with the usual output of 8-9 seers of
indigo, testing 60-65% indigotin, from the same amount of the plant. Some planters
responded with disbelief to Schrottky’s claim of obtaining such a high yield, asking,
“could he give us substantiated figures and state when and where he made his trials?”
Later that year, Schrottky moved to Peeprah to repeat his trial with the khoontee crop at
the factory of planter A W N Wyatt. He failed in replicating the high yield results of
Turcouleah, which were carried out with the morhun crop. The German chemist blamed
the inferior quality of indigo plant and the defective fermentation vat at Peeprah factory
for the failure of his second trial. He also admitted that the process needed modifying in
order to be applied to the khoontee crop, an aspect of his new invention that he was then
                                                 
59 Eugene Schrottky’s letter to Behar Planters’ Association Limited (February 1907), NAL,
Indian Planters’ Gazette and Sporting News (March 16, 1907): 297-301
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turning his attention to. In subsequent years Schrottky continued to work towards
perfecting his process, which he thought held promise for the future. 60
The year 1903 provides a convenient point to end the chapter. The developments
of the previous years had resulted in stoppage of funds from the planters to the two
laboratories. Chemist Christopher Rawson, a very important figure in the indigo
experiments being conducted in India so far, left for England in the beginning of the year
expressing hopelessness with the progress of his experiments.
But even as the planters were exasperated with the returns from the existing
laboratories, there were other developments in parallel that sustained hope. It was in 1898
that for the first time seeds of a new variety of indigo plant, the Java variety, were
imported by a group of entrepreneurial planters to be tried out on their private estates in
Bihar. Initial trials by this handful of planters seemed to indicate that the new breed was
capable of a much higher yield. That excited the planters who asked their agricultural
experts at Dalsingserai to further investigate if the new breed was actually capable of
higher yield consistently, and if it could be successfully grown year after year in the local
environs. The experts were optimistic, although they were still encountering a few
problems related to the seed’s germination. More seeds of the Java variety were grown in
Bihar and more extensive cultivation of the new breed undertaken by the planters. Over
these years the experts also confirmed that the new variety, if successfully cultivated,
could give at least 50% higher yield than the native variety. At least theoretically this was
                                                 
60 Eugene C Schrottky, “Extract from circular letter to Behar Planters, dated, the 14th September,
1903,” NAL, Indian Planters Gazette (February 27, 1904): 284; for the planters’ suspicion of the
scheme see, NAL, Indian Planters’ Gazette (March 12, 1904): 344; for Schrottky’s response to
the planter’s letter see NAL, Indian Planters’ Gazette (March 19, 1904): 377- 378; In subsequent
years Schrottky performed more experiments and explained the nature of his “glucosode”
process. A study of those efforts will be included in the next chapter.
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the most drastic improvement in yield that had ever seemed possible to the planters since
the beginning of efforts in India to improve the yield of natural indigo after 1897. The
question now was to solve the problems related to the acclimatization of the new breed.
But at least the planters were provided with a glimmer of clear hope.
Thus Java indigo rekindled optimism. The planters increasingly believed that they
had a definite tool in the new variety to beat the competition from synthetic indigo. Based
on this optimism they persuaded the government to fund their new research program that
was qualitatively different from the previous one. A study of the developments leading to
the establishment of new laboratories and agricultural stations and the nature of scientific
explorations at those centers will form the subject of study for the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES, 1903-05
1) Introduction
This chapter focuses on the indigo laboratories supported by the government’s
funds in India between 1903 and 1905. Even as the Peeprah laboratory closed down in
early 1903, the colonial administrators stepped in to support the other indigo laboratory
cum agricultural station at Dalsingserai. They hoped to transfer the ongoing agricultural
experiments and trials at Dalsingserai to a new station that they soon planned to set up at
Pusa. The Pusa Station was supposed to focus on all crops including indigo.
Subsequently discussions continued among the officials in Bengal, at the center, and in
the office of the Secretary of State in England over what kind of station Pusa was going
to be, which inevitably delayed its inauguration. Bureaucrats basically debated to resolve
questions like under whose control the new station would be – the center or the province,
and which crops would the station focus on. Money also had to be provided for Pusa and
final approval for its opening had to be sought from the Secretary of State. In these
circumstances the provincial officials went ahead to set up a new indigo laboratory at
Sirsiah in late 1904 realizing that the problems faced by the indigo industry could not
wait for the resolution of issues related to Pusa. Later the Sirsiah Station was allowed to
continue as a center exclusively devoted to indigo under the control of the provincial
government. An Imperial Agricultural Institute was inaugurated at Pusa in 1905, which
developed into British India’s first and leading agricultural resource center emphasizing
research, education, and outreach programs covering all crops in colonial India.
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The administrative decision to continue the Dalsingserai Station and later set up
the Sirsiah Station got entangled in complicated ways with the goal of the metropolitan
and central government officials to start the Imperial Agricultural Station at Pusa. The
Bengal government owned the Pusa estate. Initially they had hoped to start their own
agricultural station at Pusa. They wanted to turn Pusa into a center of excellence devoted
to supporting agricultural progress in the region. Later, when the central government
showed interest in setting up a far larger “imperial” center under the central government
at the same site, the provincial bureaucrats more than welcomed that proposal. They
offered to make land available to them for the purpose hoping that the location of a
prestigious center in the province would also benefit regional agriculture. In that context,
this chapter focuses on the bureaucratic debates at the imperial and at the provincial level
to understand the impulses behind the decision to support the three laboratories and
agricultural stations all of which were situated within the sub-division of Bihar.
The existing literature on the subject has considered all official efforts leading to
the establishment of indigo laboratories and, more importantly, the Pusa Station, as
efforts basically directed at securing the interests of the European planters. Why was Pusa
set up in the Bihar sub-division in the middle of indigo tracts? Why was Bernard
Coventry, the head of the indigo station at Dalsingserai, appointed to lead the Imperial
Agricultural Institute at Pusa? Based on these two facts historian Deepak Kumar has
considered all such efforts as being primarily directed towards benefiting foreign
capitalists, not native agriculture. 1
                                                 
1 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj:  152-158; Deepak Kumar, “Science in agriculture: A study
in Victorian India,” Asian Agri-History (1997) 1 No. 2: 91-92
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Such arguments are only partly true. A consultation of the official records
describing the bureaucratic debates enables an understanding of the style of functioning
of the colonial bureaucracy as an additional factor determining the nature of decisions
taken with regard to the indigo industry. Metropolitan, imperial, and provincial concerns
on the question of indigo improvement or overall agricultural progress in the colony were
different, which made the administrators often act at cross-purposes. In the extremely
bureaucratized set-up in colonial India the motivations and consequent decisions taken at
the three levels had major consequences. A study of that process is insightful not only for
understanding the nature of policies adopted with regard to indigo experiments and the
indigo industry, but also for furthering our current understanding of the late colonial state
in India. As we shall see below, they reveal the preparedness of metropolis and the
central government to undertake agricultural research in India for its own sake. At the
same time in so far as these efforts took some attention away from the patronage of
indigo laboratories, they also point towards the changing nature of the colonial state that
was trying to re-define its relations with the European economic interests based in India.
Besides discussing the bureaucratic motives this chapter also follows the scientists
and their work in the laboratories. What goals did the scientists pursue? Which research
strategies were preferred by different experts and why – chemical or agricultural,
intervention in the vat or in the field? The dilemma over chemical and agricultural
experiments was probably the most important one confronting the scientists and the
administrators in colonial India at the beginning of the period in question. By 1905,
however, it had been practically decided to focus solely on agricultural experiments in
India. Whatever little experimental and analytical work of a primarily chemical nature
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had remained was transferred to the University of Leeds in 1905. This chapter will
disclose the reasons for abandoning the chemical experiments in India, a decision that
emerged out of the experience in the laboratories between 1903 and 1905.
The Juxtaposition Of Pusa And The Indigo Laboratories In Bureaucratic Decision-
Making
The Proposed Alliance Between The Government And The Planters For Research Prior
To 1903
The bureaucratic way of evaluating economy and administrative expediency had
its typical dynamics. The officials of the agriculture department in colonial India did not
always look at their obligation to promote indigo experiments independently of their
obligation to promote scientific research on all agricultural products. As government
servants they tried to balance the interests of an important industry, indigo, with that of
all other agricultural crops. In doing so they aspired for economy in their efforts. They
often found themselves asking if a way could be found so that the government’s money
was spent in a manner to bring optimal benefit to indigo as well as other crops.
The administrative machinery also abided by its own internal dynamics.
Professional rivalries, personal energy, and motivation of key administrators and imperial
figures determined what policy decisions were made with regard to experiments on
indigo. Additionally, regional goals and commitments also influenced the decisions of the
officials. For instance, on numerous occasions the provincial bureaucrats in Bengal went
out of their way to argue with the central bureaucrats the case for the protection of the
indigo industry based in the region.
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 In early 1901, when the planters approached the government for the second time
requesting additional financial support for their indigo experiments, some officials
wondered if they could forge an alliance between the private indigo interests and the
government towards starting the Pusa station. The idea was to pool all available resources
to initiate a comprehensive agricultural research program that would address the needs of
all crops including indigo. Especially the federal agricultural bureaucrats favored this
route.
This question was discussed at a confidential meeting on March 6, 1901, when a
group of central agricultural bureaucrats including George Watt, the Advisor on
Economic Product and J E O’Connor, the Director-General of Statistics met with the
Revenue Secretary of the province of Bengal, F A Slacke. O’Connor strongly emphasized
the necessity of combining the work of private indigo stations with the agricultural
station that they were planning to set up. George Watt supported the suggestion citing the
example of the initiatives taken in Ceylon where the government and the tea industry had
come together to conduct scientific research. A similar arrangement for collaboration
between the government and the industry could be worked out in Bengal, too, and placed
under a Board of Control comprising of the representatives of the government and the
indigo associations, he argued. 2
The provincial Secretary, Slacke, agreed that the proposal for an alliance was a
sound one. However, in his subsequent letter to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, J
                                                 
2 Confidential, “Minutes of the Proceedings of Meeting held at the office of the Revenue
Secretary to the Government of Bengal, on 6th March, 1901, to consider the question of an
Agricultural Research Institute at  in the district of Darbhanga,” Government of India,
Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for 1903, February, 1903, File No. 72
of 1902, Serial No. 1, India Office Library, P/6592 (These files are available for consultation at
the British Library in London under the general rubric of India Office Records. Henceforth these
files are referred to as: IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr
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Woodburn, he pointed out that working out the modalities for such collaboration would
take time. Besides, many other financial and executive issues remained to be resolved
before the Pusa could go on stream. He begged to differ from the line advocated by the
central government officials that the idea of collaboration with the planters should be
pursued, and that a decision about a subsidy for their experiments should be put on hold.
He pointed out that the indigo industry was in a crisis and the planters’ experiments
required immediate help from the government. His argument prevailed. Thus the Bengal
government went ahead to provide financial support to the indigo planters from 1901. 3
A Provincial Station At Pusa?
The proposal to start an agricultural station at Pusa was first initiated by the
Bengal government. The provincial bureaucrats made a case that the province was a large
one and that the existing agricultural stations at Dumraon, Burdwan, and Chittagong were
too small and therefore not sufficient to meet the requirements of agricultural
improvement in the province. In a letter to the Secretary of the Revenue and Agriculture
Department at the center these officials also lamented the fact that the office of the
Director of the Agricultural Department in Bengal was both understaffed and short of an
adequate number of agricultural experts on its rolls. In fact, they rhetorically argued that
the department was worse off  than at the time when it was first opened in 1885. It was
also comparatively deficient than similar departments in other provinces. Thus they made
                                                 
3 Revenue Secretary, F A Slacke’s letters to Lieutenant Governor, dated Feb 2, 1901 and March
14, 1901, Notes and Orders, Government of Bengal, Revenue (Agriculture), File 2 I/3, 1-7, May
1901. These files are available at the Bihar State Archives in Patna (India). Henceforth, these files
have been referred to as BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.).
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a case for the sanction of a large research station at Pusa that would be devoted to
improving the quality of all crops in the province and in the region. The Lieutenant
Governor was willing to provide Rs. 50,000 out of the state’s budget for this purpose. He
pointed out that since other provinces in north India could utilize the results from the
station, the central government and the government of the neighboring United Provinces
should also provide supplementary funds for its establishment and operation. 4
The central government had its own plans to set up an Imperial Agricultural
Station in India. This came out of considerations totally unconnected with indigo. In a
letter seeking sanction from the Secretary of State in England the Indian Viceroy, Lord
Curzon, pointed out how the plan for a centralized station was within the remit of long-
term official plans for agricultural improvement in India. With that aim the government
had appointed an Inspector General of Agriculture in 1901 “as a first step towards the
more active prosecution of the policy of scientific and practical enquiry and experiment
in agricultural matters,” the Viceroy’s letter noted. In continuation of the same plan it was
now considered imperative that the Inspector General have his own team of experts and a
well-equipped laboratory at a central station. 5
                                                 
4 Letter from W. C. Macpherson, Officiating. Secretary, Government of Bengal to Secretary,
Govt of India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, dated June 30, 1902, “Utilization of
Government Estate of  in Darbhanga for Agricultural Experiments,” No. 9, File no. 72, Serial no.
1, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, Feb 1903, P/6592
5 Letter from the Viceroy’s Council to the Secretary of State for India, dated June 4, 1903,
“Establishment of an Experimental Farm in , Darbhanga,” No. 7, Serial No. 2, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, July 1903, P/6592
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Lord Curzon, American Philanthropy, And The Accelerated Drive Towards A Central
Agricultural Station At Pusa
The plan for the Pusa Station now got a new twist. The central government had
initially thought of locating their new station in Dehradun, a hill-station with a colder
climate. The government’s agricultural chemist was already stationed there. The cold
weather of Dehradun was considered conducive to the conduct of experiments on
agricultural crops, especially the bacteriological ones. In the meantime the officials of the
Bengal government wrote pointing to the availability of the 1,284 acres farm at Pusa, and
also of providing Rs. 50,000 from their budget for their provincial station with assistance
from the central government. The government officials at the center looked at the
proposal within the parameters of their own plans. Could they utilize the same site for
setting up their own station?  A committee established at the center to inspect and report
on the suitability of the site gave a favorable report. Most importantly, the government
officials considered the availability of the large farm at Pusa to be a distinct advantage
over the hilly Dehradun since the results obtained at the station by the experts in the
laboratories and experimental plots could also be tested at the adjoining large farm. Thus
they gradually leaned towards the choice of Pusa as a site for the central station.
The central government accepted the offer of the Bengal government for the site,
and their money, and then contributed their own resources towards Pusa. But they also
got the provincial government to agree that regardless of their support with land and
finances the station would be an “imperial” one and that the central government would
exercise complete control over it. They clarified to them that the provincial government
did not have the staff with the requisite training to supervise and manage an institution of
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the size they were contemplating. Besides they also considered that it would be wrong on
the part of the central government to invest so much “imperial” resources into an
institution and then leave it in the hands of a provincial administration. The imperial
government in fact decided that they would turn Pusa into the headquarters of the central
government’s agricultural department. The Bengal government accepted the proposition,
being more than happy that an establishment of that size was going to be located in the
region. Thus the way was opened for the establishment of Pusa. 6
The year 1903 saw more concrete steps being taken in the direction of starting the
central station. For the first time it seemed possible that the planned agricultural research
station would become a reality. The establishment of Pusa got tied up with the personal
pride and motivation of a very important imperial figure in India. Support for the idea of
a research station at Pusa came from the very top of political and administrative
establishment – from Lord Curzon, British India’s eleventh viceroy. Lord Curzon is
widely known to the historians of modern India for his unpopular act of bringing about
the administrative division of Bengal, an act that provoked a nationalist uprising – what
has been called the Swadeshi movement in the historiography. 7 But even his detractors
in England and India acknowledged Curzon’s contributions in initiating a series of reform
in the fields of general administration, police, agriculture and revenue collection, and
science.
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“Establishment of an Experimental Farm in , Darbhanga,” No. 7, Serial No. 2, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, July 1903, P/6592
7 For a discussion of Curzon’s role in the division of Bengal that turned out to be a hugely
unpopular step with the masses see Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908
(New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1994)
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Curzon was a science enthusiast. He had a vision of scientific research that would
enable an optimal utilization of the agricultural resources of the colony. He worked
relentlessly towards this goal, not even letting the scarcity of funds dampen his efforts.
He canvassed for support. Finally, an American philanthropist, Henry Phipps, donated
£20,000 to Curzon for the establishment of “a laboratory to determine the economic
value, and the medicinal qualities of the plants of India – or to be used in any other way
that promises enduring good to India.” It was decided to use that money to set up the
Pusa Station. As plans settled for establishing the Pusa station Henry Phipps, encouraged
by the efforts of the colonial administrators, donated an additional £10,000. 8
Curzon put his personal pride behind this project, and did everything he could to
bring the project to a successful completion. He envisioned the agricultural station to be
“a centre of Economic Science,” meaning that the researches carried out there should
bring economic benefits to Indian agriculture. His topmost bureaucrats in the Viceroy’s
Council, including Sir Denzil Ibbetson, the Lt Governor of Punjab and John O Miller,
Secretary of Revenue to the central government, joined in the efforts to bring to
completion what came to be called in official circles “the Pusa scheme.”
The Secretary of State in London approved the Indian Viceroy’s plans for
establishing the station at Pusa. He commended the initiative of the Viceroy in this regard
                                                 
8 Letter from the Viceroy’s Council to the Secretary of State for India, dated June 4, 1903,
“Establishment of an Experimental Farm in , Darbhanga,” No. 7, Serial No. 2, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, July 1903, P/6592; Letter from Curzon to Henry Phipps, dated January 28th, 1904,
No. 225, Letter from J. O. Miller to Henry Phipps, No. 227, Letter from Henry Phipps to Curzon,
dated March 12, 1904, No. 301, The Lord Curzon: Correspondence with Persons in England and
Abroad Commencing from July 1901 (confidential), European Manuscript, F111/182, India
Office Records (the British Library, London). Henceforth referred to as IOR, Curzon Papers;
Letter from Curzon to Henry Phipps, dated, April 27, 1905, No. 28, Letter from Henry Phipps to
Lord Curzon, dated, July 24, 1905, The Lord Curzon: Correspondence with Persons in England
and Abroad Commencing December 1904 (confidential), European Manuscripts, F111/183, IOR,
Curzon Papers.
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echoing the necessity of agricultural research and education in the colony. He agreed that
the new research cum college at Pusa would serve the stated purposes well. 9
The Dilemma Faced By The Bureaucrats In 1903
Indigo Versus Other Crops: Explaining The Colonial Agenda
In 1903 the central colonial officials at Simla and in the province (Bengal) were
generally at odds as to how they should apportion their resources between the indigo
laboratories and a centralized agricultural research station dedicated to research on all
native crops that they planned to set up shortly. On the one hand, the officials were
motivated to support the experiments of the indigo planters of European origin. On the
other hand, the bureaucrats in India were also excited with the prospect of setting up an
agricultural research station at Pusa in Bihar that they hoped would become the backbone
of agricultural progress in colonial India. A study of how the bureaucrats resolved their
dilemma is insightful because it provides an opportunity to evaluate the nature of the late
colonial state in India.
As argued in Chapter One, the colonial state reflexively adjusted to the new
political and fiscal realities. At the end of the nineteenth century the colonial officials
generally watched the growing tide of national movements in the subcontinent with
alarm, especially in Bengal, which was one of the epicenters of native political resistance.
The last thing the administrators wanted was a restive plantation labor force and
aggrieved indigo contract-cultivators. Thus when the problem of competition from
                                                 
9 Letter from the Secretary of State, dated Aug 14, 1903, Selections from Despatches Addressed
to the Several Governments in India by the Secretary of State in Council, 46th Series, Part II, 1st
July-31st December, 1903, India Office records (British Library, London), V/6/350. Henceforth
referred to as IOR, Despatches.
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synthetic indigo first arose in 1897, the state forbade the purely exploitative way of wage
reduction on the plantations by the European planters to reduce the cost of the natural
dye. The way that support for Pusa deflected resources away from indigo laboratories
provides an additional opportunity to study how the colonial state was re-defining its
relationship with European economic interests based in India. Thus it supports the larger
argument made in this dissertation that the technological history of the natural indigo
industry of British India provides an opportunity to evaluate the nature of the late colonial
state in new terms.
It is in this context that the debates occurring among administrators about
Dalsingserai laboratory and Pusa research station assume extra importance. Deepak
Kumar, the historian of science in colonial India, has analyzed the response of the
agricultural bureaucracy in the setting up of indigo laboratories simply as an effort to
advance the sectional interests of the “colonialists.” The enterprise of the European
planters, after all, fitted well into the overall colonial agenda of the exploitation of native
resources for the benefit of the metropolis, and by the foreigners. It was therefore only
natural that the colonial administrators should support planters’ efforts, he has argued.  In
fact, Kumar goes on to accuse the administrators of partisanship in selecting Pusa as a
site for the new station on agricultural research and education. Embedded in the indigo
tracts, and headed by the ex- indigo expert from the Dalsingserai laboratory, Bernard
Coventry, the setting up of Pusa, Kumar argues, was inspired by the wish to help out
indigo planters. 10
                                                 
10 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, pp., 152-158; Deepak Kumar, “Science in agriculture: A
study in Victorian India,” Asian Agri-History (1997) 1 No. 2: 91-92
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There is a certain truth to Kumar’s general line of reasoning. The administrators
and planters belonged to the same political and economic “class” even if their acts were
not always in harmony. To deny that would be to deny the existence of a colony and of
colonialism. They also belonged to the same social group. The planters had social and
personal ties with each other and with members of the British civil services that extended
within their networks back in the home country.
But there were also countervailing interests at work that generated conflicts
between the government officials and planters, and complicated the synergies between
the process of governmental decision-making and the requirements of indigo business. It
is indeed in calling everyone simply a “colonialist” that the anti-colonial discourse fails
to capture the complexity of factors at work. For instance, it does not account for the
difficulties that the planters encountered in persuading the administrators to subsidize
their indigo experiments. Nor does it capture the spirit of public policy measures leading
to the establishment of the Pusa station that were intended to serve the general good of all
farmers going beyond merely the sectional interests of the European indigo planters.
Indeed the study of records related to the setting up of indigo laboratories and the Pusa
station disturbs the earlier picture painted by historians like Deepak Kumar and allows an
alternative explanation of the bureaucratic efforts made in this regard.
The Planters Ask The Government To Take Over Dalsingserai
As pointed out at the end of the previous chapter, in the beginning of 1903 the
planters stopped providing funds for the Peeprah and the Dalsingserai Station. In a
private meeting with the Lieutenant Governor J Woodburn at the hill station Darjeeling
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earlier in June 1902, a group of planters explained that the planters’ bodies were facing
difficulties in persuading their members to send subscriptions, and that it was thus
impossible for the organization to provide the money that they had earlier committed to
support the laboratories. Thus they suggested that the government take over the
Dalsingserai Station and take responsibility for continuing the experiments in progress
there. 11
There is a danger in reading too much into the stoppage of funds from the
planters. The significance of the fact that the planters halted the supply of funds through
their organizations BIPA and IIS can be considered in two ways. Does such a lack of
willingness to provide financial support in 1903 indicate the planters’ lack of faith in
science? Second, did the passing over of the management of laboratories from the
planters’ hands into government’s control have a long-term effect on the nature of indigo
experiments?
The assumption about planters being anti-science is contradicted by the fact that
the planters continued to be partners in research with the government for several years
after 1903. They had a qualified response to the type of work being done at the two
laboratories. As far as Peeprah Station is concerned, it would be fair to say that the lack
of returns from this laboratory had frustrated the planters. But they were optimistic about
the outcome of work being done at Dalsingserai. That was in keeping with the nature of
the Dalsingserai Station that specialized in agricultural experiments. The planters were
                                                 
11 Revenue Secretary W C Macpherson’s note, dated June 3, 1902 and Lt. Governor J
Woodburn’s note, dated, June 9, 1902, Notes and Orders, pp., 6-7, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), June
1902, File, 2I/3 of 10-14
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hopeful that the agricultural trials could prove rewarding in terms of the adaptation of the
foreign breed of the Java plant for cultivation in India.
But the planters now wanted to be “free-riders” in the scheme of scientific
research currently in progress. In other words, they wanted public funds for their
experiments. In a way there was nothing new about the planters’ demands for public
funds. From the very beginning they had maintained that they were entitled to the
government’s financial support for research whose benefits were going to be industry
wide.  The government first provided limited subsidy to the indigo experiments in 1900.
In 1901, the government made much more money available to the planting organizations
in the ratio of three-fifth contribution from the planters to two-fifth from the government.
Facing financial losses and in the absence of any immediate returns from the laboratories,
in 1903 the planters requested the government to take full financial responsibility for
their indigo research program.
An entitlement to public funds by the planters was not considered an oddity – not
in the way the planters perceived the question, nor in the way the government defined its
role. From the very beginning the planters had claimed that an important industry on
which the livelihood of thousands of Europeans and natives depended, was threatened. In
such a situation it was only appropriate for the government to provide all types of
support. Besides, the planters assumed that the government had to perform the role of a
primary provider of scientific infrastructure based on which private entrepreneurship
could prosper. And indeed the government readily accepted that argument.
The year 1903 turned out to be a watershed in organizational terms. Although the
planters were delegated the operational control of the Sirsiah Laboratory, the
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administrators gained a deciding voice over the type of experiments to be conducted in
the laboratory. Which experts were to be appointed? What research trajectory was going
to be preferred? The government offices and bureaucratic deliberations became additional
elements shaping the resolution of these questions. The future of indigo experiments in
India after that date was thus additionally influenced by how the government officials
perceived the problem.
The future of the indigo laboratories remained uncertain at the beginning of 1903.
The planters had stopped their contribution, and there were no concrete plans under
consideration to save the laboratories, or replace them. Only a fortuitous combination of
circumstances and steps, as we shall see below, ensured the survival of the Dalsingserai
Station.
The Agricultural Bureaucracy And Dalsingserai
To understand the survival of the Dalsingserai center beyond 1903 as a laboratory
supported on government’s funds it is important to understand the type of work being
performed there. More precisely, it is also important to bear in mind how the
“agricultural” laboratory at Dalsingserai had come to win the favor of the agricultural
bureaucracy in Bengal, especially compared to the treatment the “chemical” laboratory at
Peeprah had recently received.
At the provincial level, there was no slackening in the commitment to help with
indigo experiments. But the officials in the beginning of 1903 differentiated between the
chemical laboratory at Peeprah and the agricultural station at Dalsingserai; they evaluated
the usefulness of the work at the respective laboratories differently. The provincial
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bureaucrats seemed to have accepted the position by now that there was little hope of
improving the extractive processes beyond what Rawson had already achieved at
Peeprah. They thought that future prospects for improvement largely lay in improving the
output of the crop in the field and the percentage of color in the leaves.
Some of this optimism from agricultural experiments was certainly linked to the
prospects that the newly imported Java variety was showing. Besides, many of the
administrators also thought that the salvation from the problem of competition from
synthetic indigo for the planting community chiefly lay in divesting into other
agricultural crops. Mollison’s note, widely cited in the relevant orders and circulars of the
government of Bengal, provides a snapshot view of the current official perspective on
indigo research in India. The note from the Inspector General for Agriculture in India
said:
Indigo should not be neglected, but in my judgment laboratory investigation
regarding crops[,] which can profitably take the place of indigo are much
more important if the main object is to help the interest of the planting
community. 12
The agricultural bureaucracy at the provincial level largely endorsed the policy as
outlined in Mollison’s notes.
The Dalsingserai station, then, seemed to be a better site for pursuing the agenda
of the provincial agricultural bureaucracy than Peeprah. From the beginning the chemical
laboratory had focused on improving the post-harvest extractive processes. Its head,
Christopher Rawson, was a trained chemist. In contrast the Dalsingserai station was a
                                                 
12 Mollison’s notes as cited in BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December 1903, File 2I/8 3, Notes and
Orders: 3
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“composite” laboratory cum field station attached to the private indigo estate of an indigo
planter, Bernard Coventry. From the very beginning the experts at Dalsingserai had
combined the experiments on indigo with those on other crops like sugarcane and the
fiber rhea in particular. Coventry himself, described in agriculture department files as “a
trained agriculturist,” enjoyed a better rapport with the agricultural officials than Rawson.
It is no wonder then that Coventry’s station won the race against Peeprah for official
funds.
Meanwhile, as the drive towards setting up such a federal station for agricultural
research at Pusa gathered momentum, it crossed paths with the commitments of the
provincial administrators to patronize indigo laboratories. Central bureaucrats, Ibbetson
and Miller in particular who were trying to advance Curzon’s agenda, wanted to raise as
much resources as possible for Pusa. They tried to rope in Bihar’s governor, J A
Bourdillon in their efforts. They asked that the provincial administration turn over funds
earmarked for the indigo laboratories in the provincial budget for Pusa.
In support of Coventry’s efforts at Dalsingserai and partly also in deference to the
wishes of the central government officials, the new Lt Governor of Bengal, J A
Bourdillon, ordered a new grant. As shown by his personal communication with Sir
Denzil Ibbetson, the Lt Governor of Punjab, Bourdillon had for some time been
considering support to the Dalsingserai station. If the Peeprah laboratory closed, as it
seemed it would because of lack of initiative from the BIPA, Bourdillon had assured
Ibbetson that he would divert all of government’s funds apportioned for the improvement
of indigo to Dalsingserai. 13
                                                 
13 Sir Denzil Ibbetson’s letter to Lt Governor, J A Bourdillon, dated March 10, 1903, BSA, GOB,
Rev (Agr.), December 1903, File, 2I/8 3, Notes and orders
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Another section of the bureaucracy, mostly comprising officials at the federal
level, favored the continuation of Dalsingserai experiments on totally different grounds.
They wanted to retain the personnel at that station simply so that they could be re-
employed at the Imperial Agricultural Station at neighboring Pusa in 1905. The Secretary
of Revenue to the federal government, John O Miller, bypassed the provincial
government to contact Bernard Coventry and asked him to submit to him directly a
budget towards continuing the experiments at Dalsingserai for the current year. Miller
later forwarded that budget to the provincial revenue officials requesting its approval.
Miller did not have a long-term interest in the experiments at Dalsingserai, which
is proven by the fact that when Coventry submitted a demand for supplementary funds
for the continuing experiments there, Miller turned down his request. He pointed out that
the previous support for the station was purely of a temporary nature. Sir Denzil
Ibbetson’s letter to Bourdillon, who was also in the forefront of efforts to start a federal
research station at Pusa, also discloses similar intentions. Ibbetson stated that there would
be no point subsidizing or taking over the operations at Peeprah, a laboratory “which is
concerned solely with [the] manufacture of indigo.”  As contrasted with the primarily
chemical experiments at Peeprah, the agricultural experiments at Dalsingserai appeared
more useful to Ibetson in terms of his plans of shifting experts from there to the central
agricultural station at Pusa. He recommended immediate financial help to Coventry:
It is important that he [Coventry] should get [to retain] some of those
employed there, as we know them to be good men, and, above all, they have
the experience of the Indian conditions, the want of which so hampers a man
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new from England. And if you cannot give money at once I fear that the work
must be stopped, the staff dispersed, and a great opportunity lost.
The conflating of the interests of the bureaucrats wanting to protect the indigo industry
through agricultural experiments, and those wishing to centralize agricultural research at
Pusa, ensured the provision of funds temporarily to Dalsingserai for the year 1903.  The
new secretary of revenue, A Earle communicated the decision to advance government’s
monetary support to Dalsingserai. 14
Cyril Jonas Bergtheil And His Experiments, 1903
Bergtheil’s Future Employment: With BIPA Or The Government?
At the time of the closing down of BIPA’s Peeprah laboratory on 1st January
1903, Cyril Bergtheil’s future employment in India looked uncertain. The term of
Bergtheil’s contract with the BIPA had not ended. But short of funds the BIPA was not in
a position to either keep the laboratory running or retain Bergtheil. The BIPA
functionaries first turned to the Department of Agriculture requesting further grants in
order to be able to pay Bergtheil’s salary for a few additional months. They also
suggested to the government that Bergtheil and biologist H M Leake could be possibly
employed at Dalsingserai that had been taken over by the government. They submitted
that they would be able to pay remunerations due on Bergtheil for the intervening period
if the government could offer him employment at Dalsingserai in the near future.
                                                 
14 See the reference to J O Miller in the letter from Bernard Coventry to Commissioner, Patna,
dated, May 1, 1903, BSA, GOB, Agriculture, December 1903, File, 2I/8 5-17, Nos. 67-68; Sir
Denzil Ibbetson’s letter to Lt Governor, J A Bourdillon, dated March 10, 1903, BSA, GOB,
Agriculture, December 1903, File, 2I/8 3, Notes and Orders; letter of A Earle, Revenue Secretary
to Commissioner, Patna, dated, March 21, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December 1903, File,
2I/8 3
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Sympathetic to planters’ financial plight S L Maddox, the head of the Department of
Land Records and Agriculture, argued with senior officials that Bergtheil be re-employed
at Dalsingserai. 15
The provincial government in consultation with Bernard Coventry offered to re-
employ H M Leake at the Dalsingserai Station from 28 November 1903, after his contract
with the BIPA came to an end on 20 November 1903. However, the Revenue Secretary
turned down the request for hiring Bergtheil to work at Dalsingserai, calling the proposal
“impracticable.” Instead he suggested that if the BIPA was not in a position to pay the
salary due to Bergtheil, they should terminate the contract with him prematurely, and
compensate him for the early termination of his services. They advised the BIPA to come
to an amicable solution with Cyril Bergtheil that would be mutually agreeable to the two
parties. 16
It is not difficult to see why the provincial bureaucrats did not commit to hire
Bergtheil. The qualifications of biologist Leake seemed more suitable for the type of
agricultural experiments in progress at Dalsingserai as well as in tune with the future
plans of conducting agricultural research at Pusa. In contrast, Bergteheil’s credentials
were established more as a bacteriologist dedicated to research on indigo. The plans for
future indigo experiments were still in a state of flux. The provincial administrators were
still not sure whether the indigo laboratory was going to be located at the Pusa Station to
                                                 
15 Letter from Secretary of BIPA, E Macnaghten to Commissioner of Patna Division, dated, April
9, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December 1903, File 2I/8 5-17, Nos. 64-65; letter from S L
Maddox to Revenue Secretary, Bengal Government, dated, July 13, 1903. copy of letter from
Cyril Bergtheil to E Macnaghten, dated, June 26, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.),  December 1903,
File 2I/8 5-17, Nos. 70-71
16 Letter from A Earle, Revenue Secretary, Bengal Government, dated, 14 August, 1903, to the
Director of the Department of Land Records and Agriculture, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December
1903, File 2I/8 5-17, No 75.
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which they had volunteered to contribute, or if it was going to be housed in a separate
indigo station. It was perhaps too early in the day for the bureaucrats in Bengal to commit
to Bergtheil’s employment even though they appreciated his credentials as a man well
versed in work with indigo.
It is interesting to note that around the same time the chemist currently at
Dalsingserai, William P Bloxam, asked that a bacteriologist be employed at that station to
work on the manufacture of indigo. However, he explicitly stated in his letter of request
that Bergtheil be not considered for the position. In Bloxam’s opinion it was important to
understand the role that microorganisms present in soil played in the growth of the indigo
plant. All the manure related experiments to date in India had been based more or less on
“the rule of thumb.” A bacteriologist, he thought, could be helpfully associated with the
efforts to find appropriate manures and fertilizers. But he did not want Bargtheil to be
considered. First of all, Bloxam thought that Bergtheil was trained as a chemist rather
than a bacteriologist. Secondly, Bergtheil in Bloxam’s opinion was “too inexperienced”
to do the work Bloxam was proposing. 17 Bloxam’s argument that Bergtheil was not a
bacteriologist or that he was inexperienced are difficult to accept as facts. There are
reasons to believe that Bloxam’s negative opinion of Bergtheil was colored by his
personal dislike and professional rivalry with Bergtheil. Indeed the differences between
these two scientists persisted in the following years and left their mark on later scientific
controversies.
Bergtheil’s Experiments In A Temporary Location At The Sirsiah Factory
                                                 
17 Bloxam’s “demi-official” letter to Bernard Coventry, dated May 1, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev
(Agr.), December 1903, File 2I/8 5-17, No 60-60 1/2
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BIPA first began negotiating with Bergtheil if he would agree to prematurely
terminate the contract of service that he had signed with the planters’ body. BIPA was in
disarray organizationally and its members were debating if BIPA’s office should be
totally folded up. The organization was unable to ensure that the members paid their
subscriptions and was as a consequence facing a financial crunch. It could not even
conduct routine matters on a day-to-day basis. Paying a salary to scientists then simply
seemed impossible. Under the circumstances its office bearers turned to the government
hoping that it would bail them out by employing Bergtheil at Dalsingserai. When the
government refused to oblige, they began negotiating with Bergtheil to come to an
agreement over his early termination.
Bergtheil was not very enthusiastic about his early retirement from the job. He
mentioned that he had barely been in employment for close to a year, and that he was not
contemplating taking up a job in England in the near future. While he wondered what
kind of compensation the organization could offer to him, he leaned towards abiding by
the original agreement. 18
BIPA shifted Bergtheil to the Sirsiah factory temporarily where he continued his
work. Not surprisingly a reference to his relocation to Sirsiah or to the work done by him
during that period does not find mention anywhere among the government records. The
bureaucrats had more or less washed their hands of this episode, and asked BIPA to
resolve the issue of Bergtheil’s continued engagement and work on their own. However,
Bergtheil’s privately published and circulated autobiography describes the events of these
                                                 
18 Copy of letter from Mr. C. Bergtheil to Mr E Macnaghten, Secretary, Bihar Indigo Planters’
Association, dated the 26th June, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December 1903, File 2I/8 5-17,
Nos. 70-71
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months and also provides a broad outline of the nature of experiments conducted by him
there.19
Bergtheil tells us that the laboratory in Sirsiah was based at a “disused factory.”
The owners of the factory at Sirsiah had probably abandoned manufacturing operations
there. It was not uncommon to find several such factories in Bihar at that time because
planters were abandoning the indigo business by dozens every year. Bergtheil was
actually quite pleased with the facilities for work and personal comfort at Sirsiah. The
station had separate bungalows for himself and his two assistants. One of his assistants
was Richard Victor Briggs, a chemist who had earlier worked with Christopher Rawson
at Peeprah. The other was a general superintendent who helped with supervising the
loading of vats in the experimental factory. The latter may have been a native.
Trained as a bacteriologist, Cyril Bergtheil continued to work on perfecting the
fermentation processes in the manufacturing cycle. Those were the processes he knew
best. Besides, he did not share the pessimism of his previous co-worker at the Peeprah
laboratory, Christopher Rawson, that the fermentation processes could not be perfected
with the available scientific knowledge.  Bergtheil’s Autobiography provides a
compressed account of his work at the laboratory in Sirsiah where he subsequently went
on to work for a total of nine years. 20  He also published a paper in the Journal of the
                                                 
19 Cyril Berkeley, My Autobiography (privately published, n.d.): 9-10. A copy of the
autobiography survives with Cyril Berkeley’s granddaughter, Prof. Mary N Arai, a marine
biologist based at Nanaimo in Canada. Henceforth referred to as: Autobiography
20 Bengal Government established a permanent indigo station at Sirsiah in 1904 and retained
Bergtheil at that station, as will be described later in the chapter.
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Chemical Society that specifically describes the scientific experiments at Sirsiah in
1903.21
Bergtheil’s work mostly revolved around studying what he called “enzymic
fermentation” of the indigo leaves. He wanted to get a better understanding of the process
that could possibly lead to knowledge of the favorable conditions for streamlining the
method of steeping. He was thus building on the work accomplished in the previous year
at Peeprah. His earlier report had documented that the presence of microorganisms
(bacteria) in water and air, and the enzymes in the leaves, catalyzed the process of
steeping as practiced in India. He was now turning his attention to the enzyme contained
in the plant specifically.
Bergtheil’s explorations were also partly inspired by a new “theoretical interest.”
The bacteriologist was at this time also getting occupied with the question as to how
much indigotin was actually recoverable from the leaves. Working towards that he aimed
to isolate the enzyme present in indigo leaves and the glucoside on which this enzyme
acted, then use known quantities of the two to derive quantitative values.
Bergtheil faced problems in isolating the enzyme and the glucoside for the
analytical side of his work. Preparing an extract of the enzyme in an active form that
would readily act on the indigo leaf extract proved difficult initially. The enzyme was
only partly soluble in cold water. Bergtheil found a lead through reviewing the work of
another scientist working locally in India on foliage enzymes  – Harold Mann. Mann had
been working at the behest of the Indian Tea Association, the central government, and the
                                                 
21 Cyril Bergtheil, “LXXXIX The Fermentation of the Indigo -plant,” Transactions, Journal of
the Chemical Society (1904) LXXXV: 870 -892
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governments of Assam and Bengal on tea experiments since 1899. 22 Mann had recently
proposed in a published paper that the difficulty in extracting the enzymes from tea
leaves was due to the presence of tannin, and that this problem could be overcome by
fixing tannin with some reagents. On following the procedure in the case of indigo
leaves, Bergtheil got encouraging results; he thought that the concentration of the enzyme
in his enzyme extracts (and not the enzyme per se) was large enough for his experimental
purposes. 23 His attempts to isolate the glucoside were less successful. After repeated
attempts to isolate the glucoside failed, he came to agree with the proposition of Edmund
Schunck, first published in 1855, that the glucoside present in indigo leaves, called
indican, was far too unstable chemically to be isolated. It is worth pointing out that
Bergtheil was aware of the works of Henri ter Meulen and Hoogerwerf published in
Amsterdam in 1900 in which they described a procedure for isolating the crystalline
indican. However, Bergtheil failed in replicating the experiments of the Dutch chemists,
and instead decided to proceed in his analytical work using the “crude extract” of
indican. 24
Bergtheil did not let these bottlenecks in analytical exploration impede or slow
down his work. With his less than precise specimens Bergtheil formed his tentative
conjectures about the efficiency of the manufacturing process currently in use in India.
                                                 
22 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj: 155-156
23 It may be stated that the Dutch chemists by this time had already made considerable progress in
terms of isolating and identifying the properties of the indigo enzyme, and named it indimulsin.
Although initially these chemists did not intentionally publish this information hoping that it
could be used for the benefit of the Java based indigo industry, by 1903 some of this information
had definitely been published in journals. Bergtheil seems quite unaware of that information.
24 Cyril Bergtheil, “LXXXIX The Fermentation of the Indigo -plant,” Transactions, Journal of
the Chemical Society (1904) LXXXV: 873 -877
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These results convinced him that there was scope for improving output from steeping. He
then went on to experimentally determine and recommend that a temperature between 46
and 51 degrees Celsius was ideal for maintaining optimal efficiency of the steeping
processes. He also made other suggestions about whether acidity or alkalinity accelerated
or impeded the fermentation process.
The Experiments At Dalsingserai, 1903-04
The insistence of the officials on enlarging the scope of research resulted in an
additional focus on crops like sugar, rhea, and jute at Dalsingserai. As early as February
1901, the provincial government’s Sugar Committee had indicated that the planters had
the option of switching to sugar production. Later, throughout 1902, Coventry’s trials
with rhea had demonstrated that the planters also had the option of substituting indigo
with rhea.  At a time when the chemical experiments with indigo seemed to have hit a
ceiling at Peeprah, the bureaucrats persuaded the experts to put additional focus on crops
other than indigo.
Chemist William Popplewell Bloxam, biologist Hugh Martin Leake, and a newly
appointed jute expert R S Finlow were brought together to work at Dalsingserai. Leake,
who had been brought from the Peeprah laboratory, conducted his biological
experiments. Bloxam, who had been appointed at Dalsingserai under the joint research
program as finalized in 1901, conducted chemical experiments on indigo.
Leake At Dalsingserai
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Leake was trained as a biologist. He had a degree from Christ’s College at
Cambridge in England where he had studied botany, zoology, chemistry, and geology. He
was later a fellow of the Linnean Society in London. Before coming to Dalsingserai he
had been the biologist for BIPA.
Leake used his expert understanding of the conditions of plant growth to modify
some of the continuing experiments at Dalsingserai. He characterized Coventry’s
methods for applying fertilizers in his previous trials at Dalsingserai as being inadequate
and reminiscent of those “in vogue in England some fifty years ago.” Keeping in mind
that indigo was a legume requiring a lot of nitrogen during growth, he drew on the
current knowledge of biological sciences to suggest the application of two types of
manures – carbonaceous manures in combination with a small quantity of sodium nitrate
or ammonium sulfate; while the former would ensure the legume’s long-term
requirements of nitrogen the latter would supply the element in the short-term. The basic
aim of improving the supply of nitrogen was to create a conducive environment under the
soil for an effective functioning of the nodule bacteria in the plant’s roots.
Again, basing his prognosis on the primary characteristic of indigo as a legume,
which required the action of nitrogen fixing bacteria in its underground nodules, he called
for a deeper investigation of soil mechanics. He made tentative suggestions regarding the
preparation of field for the plant. A minimum of ten to twelve percent moisture in the
second inch below the surface would ensure germination of the seed and the continued
good health of the indigo plant. But the heat generated from the tropical sun and the
resultant evaporation made retaining moisture in the sub soil a challenging task.  Leake
suggested “consolidation” of the land immediately after the use of the plough, and
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leaving a loose surface of dry or nearly dry soil at the top. Making the lower soil compact
and ensuring a complete rupture with the layer of very loose and dry soil at the top would
decrease capillary action that sent moisture upward and made it come into contact with
dry air. Leake maintained that more trials were required to determine the depth at which
the rupture point should be located. 25
Leake also helped with Bernard Coventry’s continuing attempts to classify indigo
seeds supplied from different regions, and to regulate conditions for the cultivation of
Java-Natal indigo. He conducted very extensive trials in the field with indigo supplied
from different centers located to the west of Bihar and determined their respective
potency. He also addressed the frequently encountered problem of development of a hard
seed coat in Natal indigo, which prevented its proper germination in Bihar. Developing a
hard seed coat was a problem that, Leake noted, appeared even in other leguminosae such
as clover. Seed turning “hard” was particularly frequent in the case of Natal seed under
Indian conditions; sometimes as many as 95% of the seeds developed the impenetrable
seed coat. Leake recommended physical scratching of the seed coat, called “scarifying,”
as a solution to this problem. But the process being tedious, and requiring ample time and
labor for processing, Leake applied himself to finding economical ways of treating Natal
seeds on a large scale.
Lastly, Leake and Bloxam together made some effort towards localization of the
color-yielding substance in the plant - indican. Their experiments in this regard were of a
preliminary nature. They were totally independent of the parallel efforts of Bergtheil in
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the same direction at Sirsiah, and quite preliminary compared even with those of
Bergtheil. 26
Further, to study the behavior of microorganisms present in the soil and in the
nodules in a systematic manner, the scientists at Dalsingserai requested that a trained
bacteriologist be employed. However, government officials turned down the request for
the appointment of a bacteriologist and for building a separate laboratory dedicated to
bacteriological experiments, pointing out that in view of the plans to shut down the
Dalsingserai station it made no sense to expand its operations. 27
Bloxam At Dalsingserai
At Dalsingserai, W P Bloxam designed his experiments differently from Rawson
and Bergtheil. Rawson and Bergtheil had conducted vat experiments in the factories,
tinkering with the fermentation, oxidation, and boiling processes and suggesting specific
measures to improve yield. In addition, Bergtheil had in 1903 explored the question as to
what amount of color could be theoretically extracted from the leaf. But these endeavors
for Bergtheil were more in the nature of running a check to see if his current focus on the
fermentation processes was the right line of query. Bloxam, quite distinctly from
Bergheil, made a study of these questions the central focus of his efforts.
                                                 
26 Bloxam and Leake, 29-42; A G Green, “William Popplewell Bloxam,” Journal of the Chemical
Society Transactions (1914) 105: 1197; W P Bloxam, Report to the Government of India,
Containing an Account of the Research Work on Indigo Performed in the University of Leeds,
1905-1907 (Published by Order of His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India in Council, 1908):
116
27 Bernard Coventry’s letter to Revenue Secretary, Bengal and Commissioner, Patna, enclosing
the letter of demand from Bloxam, dated, May 1, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December 1903,
File 2I/8 5-17, Nos. 60-60 1/2; Revenue Secretary, Bengal, A Earle’s letter to Bernard Coventry,
dated, June 2, 1903, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), December 1903, File 2I/8 5-17, No. 66
 170
Bloxam too believed that the primary task at the hands of the chemists was to
maximize the percentage of recoverable indigotin. But, having reviewed the works of his
predecessors, Bloxam came to the conclusion that the appropriate approach to the
problem lay in establishing, first of all, the total indigotin that could be obtained from any
specimen of green indigo leaf. Then, in order to record at which stage in manufacturing
the losses in recovery were taking place, one needed to accurately check the output of
indigotin at different stages in the manufacture of indigo. Knowledge of these two facts
could serve as a focusing device for guiding the future efforts of the experimenters.
Bloxam’s entire work at Dalsingserai was designed to meet these two goals. His
analytical explorations did not stop there. Bloxam’s strategy towards deriving the
theoretical values of recoverable and recovered indigotin in turn encouraged him to test
the accuracy of tests being used in India and abroad to measure indigotin percentages,
and even to explore aspects of the “pure chemistry of indigo.” Indeed, he argued that the
task of enriching indigotin percentage must await a fuller understanding of the “pure
chemistry of indigo,” which according to him was presently in a state of confusion.
Within these parameters Bloxam principally invested his efforts at Dalsingserai in
accomplishing two things. On the one hand, he prepared elaborate samples of indigo
from different stages of the production process - from the leaf to the final indigo cake. It
was planned that these samples would be subjected to precise tests for measuring the
percentage of indigotin.28
Secondly, Bloxam tried to develop a precise test to measure the percentage of
indigotin in the natural dye.  He first tried to obtain pure indigotin for validating the tests
that were currently being used. Bloxam entertained a great deal of skepticism about the
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nature of chemical reactions during the administration of the permanganate test - the most
widely used test for measuring the purity of dye in India. He suspected that residual
impurities in the amalgamated dye were getting estimated as indigotin, and therefore, that
inflated values of indigotin content were being reported. He also doubted if the factor for
titration in the permanganate test had been fixed using absolutely pure indigotin. In order
to resolve his dilemma regarding the dye tests Bloxam made substantial effort towards
obtaining sufficient amount of pure indigotin for the experimental work. He initially
procured two samples of  “BASF Rein” from Britain, which were supposed to be 100%
pure. But on analysis with the Kjeldahl’s test (for measuring the weight of nitrogen and to
determine the purity of indigotin), he found the two samples to be of 91.88% and 90.85
% purity. Thereafter Bloxam conducted very detailed experiments aimed at obtaining
pure indigotin in the laboratory. He began by treating finished indigo cake with reagents
that revealed the presence of components in addition to indigotin. 29  On treatment with
acetic-sulfuric acid Bloxam managed to obtain indigo of 96% purity. He got still purer
indigo (98.71% purity) by sublimation of indigo in cake obtained from the vats.  While
these purification processes did not permit their use on a commercial scale, they left
Bloxam with a sizeable amount of extremely pure indigo for his analytical experiments.30
As Bloxam began his validation experiments by using pure indigotin, he first
reported problems with the accuracy of the permanganate test. In his preliminary trials he
got inconsistent results on applying the permanganate test repeatedly on pure indigotin
whose composition was constant and known. First proposed by Mohr in 1856, the generic
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 172
Permanganate Titration method had been modified several times since. The version
currently in use in India had been introduced by Rawson initially in 1885 while still in
England, and subsequently modified by him in 1899 when in India. Rawson’s version
required dissolving indigotin in sulfuric acid at 70-80F, and then diluting the sulphonated
indigotin to the concentration of 1 in 10,000. The suspended impurities from the resulting
indigotin disulphonic acid were removed by adding a precipitant, barium chloride.
Finally, to get an estimate of indigotin, titration of a known volume of the sulphonated
indigotin solution (or the acid) was carried out with oxidizing agent potassium
permanganate (N/50 strength). Rawson had predicted that 1cc. of permanganate would be
required to oxidize 0.0015 grams of indigotin (as present in the sulphonated form), and
based on this factor, the amount of permanganate “consumed” by the solution indicated
the total weight of indigotin in the dye. Starting with pure indigo whose percentage he
knew, Bloxam obtained 50cc. Indigotin disulphonic acid containing 0.05 gm. of
indigotin. By Rawson’s calculation 33.3 cc. of N/50 potassium permanganate should
have been sufficient to oxidize the solution. However, in practice, Bloxam was frustrated
in not being able to determine the “end point” in the reaction; the indigo solution used 50
cc of permanganate and still Bloxam did not detect any signs of excess permanganate that
should have been left after completing the oxidation of sulphonated indigotin. Thereafter,
Bloxam added adequate quantities of permanganate to three samples of indigotin
disulphonic acid separately and left them to react for one minute, 15 minutes, and 30
minutes respectively. He found that with an increase in time, the disulphonic acid
solution reacted with higher proportions of permanganate, based on which he obtained
different values for indigotin percentage. By pointing out that the results of the test varied
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on different occasions Bloxam asserted that the inferences based on them were
“altogether useless and misleading.” He called for more accurate tests and for
establishing more standardized conditions for their administration so that the progress
made towards improving the manufacturing process could be accurately gauged. 31
Not everyone appreciated the significance of work completed at Dalsingserai by
Bloxam. The planters were especially lukewarm in their response to Bloxam’s chemical
experiments. Bloxam admitted this in his report:
I know that objection has been made that the results obtained from this station
have not been of immediate utility to the planter, but have been too academic
in character.32
Bloxam’s Exit From India
In December 1903, Bloxam wrote to the officials in the Department of Land
Records and Agriculture of Bengal requesting that they consider an extension of his
employment for another year. His current service contract was due to expire at the end of
March next. And Bloxam explained that the work that he along with his assistants had
                                                 
31 Bloxam and Leake: 26-28; For the original espousing of the permanganate test see, Mohr, “,”
Dinglers Polytechnisches Journal, cxxxii: 363; Christopher Rawson, “On Testing Indigo, With
Notes on a Yellow Compound found in Java Indigo,” The Journal of the Society of Dyers and
Colourists, 15 (May 1899): 128-129
32 Bloxam and Leake: 45
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been carrying on was in an unfinished state. It would require another year to bring that
work to a successful completion. 33
On the basis of his work completed over the past year Bloxam made certain
claims and promised more definitive results in the future. The current methods of
measuring percentage of color in the natural dye were erroneous, they overstated the
efficiency of the manufacturing process, and were therefore distracting everyone from
what should be the legitimate agenda for scientific explorations, he argued. Bloxam
believed that the present processes of manufacturing in India only extracted 8-12% of the
color present in leaves. He pointed out to the government officials that he was now
working to develop two new tests – one for deriving the total recoverable color from the
leaves and another for testing indigotin percentage in the finished dye. Those tests when
applied on his specimens would prove his conjectures about low efficiency and re-direct
the efforts of the experts in the appropriate direction. He thus argued that the results of
his work had the potential to save the market for natural indigo by providing key
information related to efficiency.
Additionally, Bloxam highlighted the fact that the work in progress would
eventually bring unmatched “scientific reputation to all here concerned.” He pointed out
that dye testing and indigo chemistry were critical areas for scientific research.  A
successful completion of the difficult research had the potential to bring fame not only to
his team, but also to the government as the sponsor of such work.
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Bloxam was now facing problems in generating interest for his work among
patrons. Many in official circles as well as within the community of planters in India
doubted the usefulness of his project in saving the indigo industry of Bengal, Bloxam’s
personal enthusiasm for his research work notwithstanding. Even before he approached
the government Bloxam had contacted indigo business interests in Calcutta asking if they
would be willing to fund his work for another year. They had declined. Important
officials and other influential people that were in important decision-making positions in
India were also not persuaded about the usefulness of his research program.
S L Maddox, the Director of the Department of Land Records and Agriculture,
criticized Bloxam’s entire approach. The opinion of Maddox was critical since he was at
the head of the structure of agricultural bureaucracy in the province. He said
disparagingly: “It would seem more promising if Professor Bloxam would hold out hopes
not so much of determining the quantity of the blue in the plant nor of proving that the
present methods of extraction of the blue were faulty, as of inventing new methods for
the extraction of a far higher percentage of blue.” 34 The co-manager of the Dalsingserai
concern, F M Coventry, a planter himself, also wondered what good would come out of
Bloxam’s research program. In comparing the work of biologist H M Leake on the
germination of the Natal variety of indigo seeds with that of Bloxam, he noted that the
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latter’s work ‘could probably not be put to immediate practical use.” 35 Thus Bloxam was
fast running out of patrons in India who would be willing to fund his work.
It is then not surprising that the Lieutenant Governor, in consultation with J
Mollison, the Inspector general for Agriculture in India, decided to withdraw official
support to Bloxam’s work at Dalsingserai. The Revenue Secretary dispatched a letter to
that effect to the Director of Land Records and Agriculture asking him to make
arrangements for Bloxam’s departure and for taking control of the assets at Dalsingserai.
36 The government’s decision practically put a seal on Bloxam’s stint in India.
Unsavory and bitter controversies broke out between Bloxam and the agricultural
bureaucrats before the scientist left India. Much of the difference of opinion between
Bloxam and the officials rose over proprietary rights to the scientific specimens prepared
at Dalsingserai and about how and when the technical report on the work done at
Dalsingserai should be published.
Bloxam and his assistants had collected about 700 specimens of plant indigo from
different stages in the manufacturing process. Once it had been decided that Bloxam
would be leaving India the officials demanded that the indigo specimens be left behind.
Their reasoning was that those samples were the result of work done on the government’s
money and therefore they were public property. They wanted the samples to be
surrendered to the officials so that anyone else taking over the research work on indigo
under the government’s employment subsequently could make use of them.
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Bloxam was bitterly offended by this suggestion.  He had painstakingly
catalogued and labeled the specimens. He also nurtured the ambition to make use of them
to bring his current research on indigo testing to a successful end, publishing his findings.
He pointed out to S L Maddox that it was a well-established custom in all scientific
establishments that experts had the first right to scientific specimens and materials
collected by them during their work at an institution. He cited the convention followed by
the Board of Admiralty in England in his own case. Bloxam had worked at the laboratory
of the Royal Naval College at Greenwich for 12 years. In the end when he decided to
move from that laboratory he said he had been allowed to remove his specimens. 37
 The other controversy was over the demand by the government that Bloxam
should present “a full technical report” on the results obtained by him at Dalsingserai. In
a subsequent letter A Earle, the Revenue Secretary, asserted that the chemist and the
biologist at Dalsingserai should submit “as full a report as possible” on their respective
works. He also demanded that Bloxam explain in his report the nature of his specimens
and the ways in which his samples could be used in any follow up research. Of course, he
believed in the “right of the Government to the specimens.” He also asked Bloxam to
surrender the pure indigotin that he had been able to obtain at Dalsingserai. He noted that
the government planned to continue indigo experiments at Pusa. The indigo specimens
and pure indigotin were likely to be used by the experts in the country after he left. 38
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Bloxam did not want to give away “his” specimens and he was not prepared to
publish a full technical report on his findings immediately for the government. He
explained that he intended to continue his current work on the chemistry of indigo after
returning to England. He had already applied to the Davy-Faraday Research laboratory of
the Royal Institution in London for a position there. As soon as he had finished the last
remaining bits of his current work, he intended to submit the findings to the Chemical
Society. 39
Bloxam believed that he had obtained the “most valuable and far-reaching
experimental results,” which would have a bearing on the knowledge of the “pure
chemistry of indigo.” The application of that knowledge would in turn bring benefits to
the natural indigo industry. Since he was a member of the Chemical Society, Bloxam
argued that the columns of the Society’s journal were the “proper place” where such
chemical discoveries should be first published. If he included his findings in the report to
the Government of Bengal, he might lose “priority of claim to be considered the
discoverer of the novelties.” He belabored to explain to the bureaucrats in Bengal the
norms of the Chemical Society that would usually not publish any paper the subject
matter of which had appeared elsewhere. Thus he explained that he stood to lose
professionally in abiding by the request of the government to publish a full technical
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report on his work. He assured them that he would turn over to the Government a
comprehensive report soon after he had presented his findings at the Chemical Society. 40
The Bengal bureaucrats relented as Bloxam refused to be accommodating on
these points. He adamantly refused to turn over the pure indigotin or the indigo samples.
In a personal meeting with S L Maddox, Inspector General J Mollison, and F M
Coventry, he defiantly stated that he was also not bound to disclose any discoveries made
at Dalsingserai to the government because he was primarily “bound by the rules of his
Society to publish them in the first instance to that Society.” Thus Bloxam strongly
defended his identity as a research chemist, his primary association with his professional
society, and his obligation to abide by the norms of his Society. The bureaucrats were left
with little choice. Maddox wrote to the Revenue Secretary, “ Mr Mollison and I do not
see how we can compel him to make a full report on his … discoveries, and Mr Mollison
is of the opinion that the samples of indigo are useless to any expert successor.” Indeed
without Bloxam’s presence and without any explicit reference left by him the samples
could hardly have been put to use by another expert. Under the circumstances Maddox
suggested to the Secretary that Bloxam be given money for his passage to England, and
another six months to turn over a complete report to the Government of Bengal. Once
that report was received Bloxam could be paid Rupees 3,000 as a remuneration for it. The
Revenue Secretary agreed with the proposals since he did not have any other option. 41
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Bloxam was not totally without supporters. He had cultivated a constituency for
himself in England among his peers. Two of them – British chemists William Ramsay
and Arthur Green - were instrumental in getting him employed to do future work on plant
indigo in England. On their initiative, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Secretary of
State in London and the India Office hired Bloxam and sponsored the continuation of his
experiments at the Dyeing Department of the Cloth Workers’ Research Laboratory of
University of Leeds in England.
Such a step was anyway in keeping with the imperial government’s policy of
centralizing scientific research on colonial products at numerous centers in Britain. Much
of such research was undertaken at the Imperial Institute of the United Kingdom, the
Colonies and India, and in specific university departments and research centers across
Britain. On the British Indian government’s pay rolls, Bloxam continued to work at
Leeds on experiments related to indigo under the supervision of Arthur G Green, one of
the best known experts on vegetable colors. Bloxam carried forward his work at Leeds,
the results of which he finally submitted in a report of 1908.
The Decision Towards Setting Up An Indigo Laboratory At Sirsiah And A Seed Farm In
1904
The Lieutenant Governor’s Consultations At Pusa: Its Significance
The next round of steps by the government with regard to indigo are traceable to a
crucial meeting that took place at Pusa on February 18 1904 wherein the Lieutenant
Governor of Bengal held discussions with senior officials and a group of planters.  The
Inspector General of Agriculture, as well as Bengal officials - head of the Board of
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Revenue, Director of the Land Records and Agriculture, and Revenue Secretary - were
present at the meeting. Planters E Macnaghten, Webb, and Studd were also invited to
attend.
The officials met with a sense of urgency since they were facing the prospect of a
“hiatus” in the scientific experiments on indigo. It had been decided to discontinue work
by chemist Bloxam. And it seemed it would be another two years before the laboratories
at the Pusa Station could become operational, where they had hoped to continue the
indigo experiments. 42
Before we discuss the details of what transpired at this meeting it is important to
emphasize the exceptional commitment shown by the provincial bureaucrats towards
continuing laboratory experiments on indigo. Earlier they had collaborated with the
central bureaucrats to draw up the blue print of a plan that would facilitate the conduct of
indigo experiments at Pusa. Now that the inauguration of Pusa was being delayed, there
seems to have occurred a turnaround in their thinking. They now wanted a new
laboratory as soon as possible for indigo under the support of the provincial government.
They were willing to provide funds from the provincial budget for that.
That the aforesaid meeting was held at Pusa is also significant. Pusa was the
office of the new Inspector General of Agriculture in India, J Mollison. The post of the
Inspector General was created in 1902, an initiative that marked the crystallization of a
centralized infrastructure for scientific research on agriculture. Mollison quickly became
an important voice on all matters relating to agricultural research in India. That the
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meeting to decide the future of the indigo experiments in Bengal was held in the office of
Mollison indicates his growing individual authority, as well as the institutional authority
of the new office at the center that he occupied. On this occasion the provincial
bureaucrats were seeking Mollison’s opinion on what kind of experiments were required
and on the appointment of future experts. In future too Mollison’s opinion would bear its
mark on the decisions taken by the Bengal bureaucrats on indigo experiments.
Re-Thinking On Rawson
The officials that gathered at Pusa were distressed that the services of chemist
Christopher Rawson had been dispensed with the previous year, and that the former had
left the country. The Lieutenant Governor regretted that he had not been able to retain
him. “I should have employed him under the Government of Bengal, had it not been for
the delay which would be incurred in obtaining the sanction of the Secretary of State [in
England],” he said. 43
The Lieutenant Governor and Mollison agreed that Rawson had done useful work
in India during his previous stint, and that there was scope for a person of his
qualifications to do more. The governor noted that the great advantage of Rawson over
Bloxam was that while “both were thoroughly scientific men,” the former also had a
“thoroughly practical turn of mind.” Bloxam’s experiments, while “scientifically
interesting,” were not conducive to the improvement of indigo or to agricultural research.
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Thus they proposed to invite Rawson again to India to undertake experimental work on
indigo.
Plans were discussed to approach and invite Rawson. The governor disclosed that
Rawson was looking for employment back in England. Therefore he needed to be
approached soon and to be asked if he would consider coming back to India. Mollison
“strongly” supported the idea. He said he would do all he could to help with the task of
getting Rawson from England. For one, he undertook to employ Rawson later at Pusa
when the establishment there took off. That would guarantee a continuous employment
for Rawson in India. The planters’ representatives also agreed with the proposal. They
promised to make available to Rawson on his arrival a local factory in Bihar where he
could conduct his investigations. Together the governor and Mollison drafted a letter of
invitation to Rawson and dispatched it the same day. A brief telegram was
simultaneously sent to Rawson to serve as an advance notice of the detailed letter to
follow.
On the Lieutenant Governor’s request, at the meeting Mollison also enlightened
the indigo planters on the prospects of growing cotton and sugarcane. Mollison’s
presentation to the planters was intended to be instructional. The Inspector-General was
particularly upbeat about the chances of sugar manufacturing and thought that it could be
remunerative if the planters artificially irrigated the crop to get higher yield. The
governor on his part disclosed what the government was doing to extend irrigation in the
region. Two irrigation schemes in the neighborhood of Ottur were being implemented. A
proposal for a third channel of irrigation, originating from the river Jamwari/Gandak and
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headed to the Dholi area, also an indigo-growing tract, was being actively considered by
the government.
Rawson’s Refusal To Come To India
Christopher Rawson turned down the invitation to come to India. 44  In the trade
journal, the Indian Planters’ Gazette and Sporting News we get the information that
Rawson instead accepted a job with BASF. The latter used him for propaganda purposes.
We hear of Rawson being used by the company to promote sales for synthetic indigo in
Persia. As someone earlier associated with the task of improving natural indigo, his voice
in favor of the synthetic substitute would have gone a long way in winning new
customers for synthetic indigo. 45
On the advice of the Revenue Secretary, S. L. Maddox attended the meeting of
BIPA’s executive committee on March 27 1904. He informed them that Chrisopher
Rawson had refused to come down to India. He wanted to know the planters’ opinion on
the general direction in which they would in the circumstances want scientific
explorations on indigo to proceed. 46
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Ten of the most important Bihar planters, including E Macnaghten, T Barclay, J
Wilson, and G Richardson, represented the planters’ perspective to S L Maddox. The
planters had come to believe what Rawson had apparently alluded to in his
communication – that no material improvement in the manufacturing processes was
probable, but that on the agricultural side there was “room for great improvement.” The
planters said they would greatly appreciate the government’s assistance in the setting up
of a seed farm and nursery. They recommended that Mr Gollam, the Superintendent of
the Government Gardens at Saharanpur, who had for four years been experimenting with
indigo seeds from all parts of the country and with Natal seeds, be invited to head the
seed farm. They also recommended that an expert be associated with him who could do
any laboratory tests that may be required. The planters supported Cyril Bergtheil’s
appointment to work with Gollam. They thought that since Bergtheil had been
conducting agricultural experiments including those to solve the problems associated
with the germination of the Java seeds, he should be an appropriate choice.
The planters in Bihar had traditionally favored importing seeds grown in the
neighborhood of Delhi, which was located to the northwest of Bihar. In planters’
experience, the seeds grown on irrigated banga lands, and especially those coming from
the Delhi region gave best results. They knew of a Darbhanga planter who had relocated
to Dasna near Delhi, one R E Flavell who now managed the zamindari there on behalf of
his proprietors. The planters wondered if the government could use its good offices to
persuade Flavell to grow seeds for the planters in his zamindari and sell it to the Bihar
planters. 47
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Inspector General J Mollison and Director of Land Records and Agriculture S L
Maddox met Flavell at Dalsingserai to ask if he would agree to grow seeds on his
proprietor’s land. Flavell was open to the idea. He asked that the planters use their
contacts with the Calcutta based indigo merchants to procure Java seeds. He was willing
to grow the seeds and sell them to the planters at an agreed upon price.
The officers were still scurrying around to put together a team of experts to work
on indigo. They turned to H M Leake and R S Finlow, the biologist and the jute cum
indigo expert who had been working at Dalsingserai.  In a meeting with Mollison and
Maddox that took place on March 27, the two experts declined to work on indigo. They
said that they would either work under W P Bloxam on indigo, or if independently
employed, they would start work on indigo only after Bloxam had presented his findings
to the Chemical Society in England. 48
Mollison’s Perspective Prevails: Way Opened For The Appointment Of Bergtheil And R
V Briggs, And The Setting Up Of A Seed Farm
Once again S L Maddox called a meeting that was attended by Dalsingserai
manager F M Coventry, BIPA Secretary E Macnaghten, and J Mollison to discuss the
next course of action. The discussions at the meeting and the subsequent exchange of
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correspondences among them clearly reveal the decisive voice of Mollison in the choice
of experts and in determining the nature of experiments to follow. 49
Mollison disagreed with the opinion expressed by the group of planters at the
previous meeting that not much could be gained by investing efforts in improving the
manufacturing processes. On the contrary he argued that “inquiries into the chemistry and
bacteriology of indigo should be vigorously pursued.” E Macnaghten supported the stand
taken by Mollison saying that at the last meeting he did not have the “voting rights” and
was therefore unable to express his reservations against the opinion that there was no
point in trying to improve manufacturing. Mollison further suggested the engagement of
Bergtheil and Briggs, a recommendation that Maddox accepted and forwarded to the
Revenue Secretary for approval.
Mollison also more or less laid out the program for the type of trials to be
undertaken with seeds in the future. His stress was on “selection.” He asked that as far as
the native variety was concerned, the plants that excelled in leaf growth and in giving
maximum leaf area should be selected. For the Java variety, he proposed that untreated
seeds of that variety should be planted and those giving favorable results should be
singled out for propagation. This was because he believed that the germination capacity
of the seeds was an inheritable quality. He also advised crossbreeding among the selected
varieties in order to improve the pool. He promised to send an expert to Dasna who he
thought could help with the selection and crossbreeding experiments. On the other hand,
he shot down the idea of employing Gollam, saying that the growing of different varieties
                                                 
49 “Proposal to Continue Mr Rawson’s Work and the Establishment of An Indigo Seed Farm,”
Note by the Director of Land Records and Agriculture, Bengal, No. 59, File, 2-I/2 15,
Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department for the month of July 1904, IOR,
GOB (Rev), P/6793
 188
of plants to collect seed at Dasna, as proposed, was not such a specialized activity as to
require the assistance of an expert.
S L Maddox asked BIPA to take responsibility for procuring the Java variety of
seeds with the assistance of indigo merchants based in Calcutta and forward it to Dasna
for planting. He also asked the planters to enter into an agreement with R E Flavell, and
propose a budget for their seed farm. The budget was then to be sent to J Mollison. Once
the Inspector General approved it, it was to be submitted to the Revenue Secretary for
sanction.
The government of Bengal readily approved Mollison’s recommendation as
forwarded by S L Maddox. They immediately dispatched letters to Bergtheil and Briggs
inviting them to come to India to carry out experiments on the bacteriology and chemistry
of indigo. They also approved the proposal for starting the Dasna farm in the same form
as Mollison proposed it. 50
Concluding Remarks
A self-evident aspect of the scientific efforts during the period in question was
that the government officials assumed the power of decision-making. What experiments
were to be conducted and by whom was primarily decided by the bureaucrats. While the
planters’ perspective was always solicited in these matters, it would not be wrong to say
that the planters became junior partners in the decision-making process. Did that have an
impact on the nature of experiments and their results? Or, if one may ask the
                                                 
50 Revenue Secretary A Earle’s letter to the Director, Department of Land Records and
Agriculture, Bengal, dated, March 30, 1904, No. 60, File, 2-I/2 16, Letter No. 2068 Agriculture,
Proceedings of the Government of Bengal, Revenue Department for the month of July 1904, IOR,
GOB (Rev), P/6793
 189
counterfactual question - would the results of the scientific experiments have been
different if they had been conducted under the management of the planter-businessmen?
There is another set of questions related to the general colonial conditions that
also needs to be addressed. Did the overarching colonial context bring any difference to
the nature of experiments? Were there constraints in a colony related to the level of
resources available, even if the colonial state was responsive and willing to invest
resources for protecting the natural indigo industry? Those questions resonate with
arguments about the “locality” of the scientific knowledge. Colonial conditions
represented one aspect of that locality. The narrative on the scientific experiments leading
up to 1908, the focus of the next chapter, will engage with the question of colonial
context and its impact on the indigo experiments.
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CHAPTER 6
THE SIRSIAH LABORATORY IN INDIA AND THE CLOTHWORKERS
LABORATORY IN LEEDS, 1904-08
Introduction: A Hazy “Research Frontier”
The present chapter covers the years 1904 to 1908, the two being key turning
points in the history of natural indigo experiments. 1904 witnessed a demonstration of the
renewed commitment of the Bengal bureaucrats towards scientific explorations on indigo
leading up to the establishment of a new research station at Sirsiah. Between 1905 and
1908, the national government sponsored chemical experiments on natural indigo by
chemist William Popplewell Bloxam at the Clothworkers’ Laboratory in the University
of Leeds. Besides, a handful of planters independently supported the experiments of the
freelance chemist, Eugene Schrottky across several indigo factories in Bihar during this
period.
Whatever their respective reasons may have been, the metropolitan (in England),
imperial (in Calcutta/Simla), and provincial (in the province of Bengal) bureaucrats, who
were the primary sponsors of experiments on indigo, in effect ended up bifurcating the
research program for indigo during the period in question. The key scientists William P
Bloxam and Cyril J Bergtheil were placed in two separate laboratories on two continents.
While chemist Bloxam conducted his experiments at a laboratory in the University of
Leeds in England, bacteriologist Bergtheil was stationed at Sirsiah in India. One had
access to the scientific resources in a metropolis while the other expert’s work was
influenced by the demands placed on him by his local patrons. The physical distance
 191
between the scientists also had a material impact on the nature of scientific discourse
taking place between them.
The third stage of experiments between 1904 and 1908, especially in the last three
years, was also marked by extremely contentious debates among scientists in which the
they publicly contested the findings of their colleagues. Each one argued in favor of his
explanation of chemical reactions underlying the manufacturing processes and discounted
the version favored by another. On the basis of their different analyses they also
recommended different strategies for improvement.
Borrowing tools from the Laboratory Studies literature within the field of Science
and Technology Studies, this chapter interprets these scientific debates as those occurring
among experts working on a “research frontier.” 1 The scientific basis of the process of
manufacturing for natural indigo was not understood yet, and therefore uncertainty
existed as to what were the “scientific facts.” In such a situation the scientists tried a
variety of approaches and debated the nature of experiments being conducted. For
instance, Eugene Schrottky worked on fermentation processes and claimed success in
determining and controlling the nature of chemical reactions. Cyril Bergtheil, however,
could not replicate those experiments and their results. Between 1906 and 1908, chemist
Bloxam at the University of Leeds and bacteriologist Bergtheil in India could not agree
on the validity of assay tests and on the fact as to how much color the plant leaves could
theoretically yield.  Did their differences arise from the separate and dissimilar technical
frames of analysis that they employed? Were their experiments and inferences impacted
                                                 
1 Relevant literature detailing the concept of “research frontier” would be most typically be
represented by: Harry Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice.
(Sage: Beverly Hills, 1991)
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by their location in different institutions? Was personal pride a factor inhibiting the
building of consensus among the researchers? The chapter will argue that all three were
partly true and thus the chapter will imply that technical, institutional, and personal
factors cannot be separated in accounting for the process of the formation of scientific
knowledge in this instance. Thus part of the chapter reverberates with the existing
literature on the social construction of scientific knowledge.
As far as the history of scientific experiments on indigo is concerned, the year
1908 again turned out to be an important one. That year Bloxam published his scientific
report on the process of indigo manufacturing that was generally considered to constitute
a significant advance in scientific knowledge by the community of chemists in England.
But the patrons of indigo experiments in India and England largely ignored the report.
Despite claims about the scientific merits of Bloxam’s results, the national government in
England decided against continuing Bloxam’s work. The planters and the government in
India also did not follow up on the recommendations made in the report. Thus 1908
provides a useful cut off point for ending the present chapter on indigo laboratories.
Peter Reed, a historian of chemistry, when alluding to Bloxam’s findings of 1908,
has criticized the planters in India for their failure in pursuing the recommendations of his
report. This is why he has called the planters “conservative.” 2 It is precisely this kind of
misunderstanding that can be avoided by a more careful study of the process of formation
of scientific knowledge. This chapter will consider the rhetorical authority of key
scientists in India, and the nature of experiments currently in progress in the Indian
laboratories to explain why Bloxam’s views did not gain acceptance.
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Lastly, the arguments made in this chapter will also engage with the prodigious
literature on the nature of colonial science by specifically highlighting how the colonial
context constrained access to scientific information and therefore the inferences of
experts, and scientific work generally in the colony. On what basis did William Bloxam
in England make knowledge claims contrary to those by Cyril Bergtheil in India? The
chapter will argue that Bloxam’s privileged access to scientific information and his
borrowings of critical specimens from the Dutch scientists -glucoside indican and indigo
enzyme indimulsin - were crucial factors that account for the divergence in the direction
of experiments on natural indigo. Thus the chapter further develops the thesis about the
“locality” of scientific knowledge by displaying the impact of different levels of
information on the work carried out by the experts in the metropolis as opposed to that in
the colony.
Developments Leading To The Inauguration Of Sirsiah
Bergtheil’s Engagement For Pusa/Sirsiah: The Metropolitan, Imperial, And Provincial
Perspectives
In early 1904 the metropolitan bureaucrats at India House in London and the
central government officials in India were busy selecting experts to employ at the Pusa
Station. They first approached Cyril Bergtheil while he was vacationing in England in
early April and offered to him the post of an Agricultural Bacteriologist at Pusa. 3
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The British imperial policy on agricultural research in colonies in general, and in
India in particular, had its own dynamics. Let us remember that the Imperial Institute was
established in 1893 in London as a centralized institution to conduct basic and applied
scientific research on products across all of the Empire. The Institute was built and
maintained on revenue supplied by the colonies. As a matter of fact, British India bore a
major part of the cost of the Institute’s establishment, and continued to provide an annual
grant for its running. In the initial years a significant part of studies undertaken at
Imperial were related to products from India - raw materials like rubber and coal, or plant
products like fibers, oilseeds, medicinal plants, tanning agents, indigo etc. But very soon
the colonial administrators based in India began to show dissatisfaction with the work
performed for them at Imperial. One of them complained in 1902 that of the 16 instances
when scientific cases had been referred to the Institute, only in 2 cases had beneficial
results been received. The reluctance to make use of Imperial’s expertise was also in
keeping with a goal that was fast emerging in British India - to establish a local
infrastructure for science, especially in the fields of agriculture and health. Thus very
soon the Imperial Institute began diverting its focus away from Indian products on to the
products of Crown colonies that were slow in developing their own scientific
infrastructure. 4
The impetus for the establishment of local infrastructure for agricultural R&D in
India emerged over the long-term in response to the resistance of the native population to
repatriation of Indian revenue to institutions like Imperial located in the metropolis.
Bureaucratic misgivings also arose over the outsourcing of scientific investigations. The
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bureaucrats in the departments of agriculture started leaning towards a policy of
conducting agricultural research locally in the colony itself. A perception gradually arose
that even if the experts were trained in the West, they needed to develop knowledge of
local conditions in order to contribute effectively. The bureaucrats then insisted on
bringing the scientists over to India and sponsoring their experiments in the colony.
Indeed the agro-climatic zones in a large, tropical country were not only very different
from the temperate climates in the West, but also varied regionally. The stationing of
experts in the colony was found to be useful. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century an imperial policy was emerging that favored the creation of indigenous
institutions for agricultural research in India.
The official correspondence between London and the Viceroy’s office in India
bear testimony to the strong commitment of the officials in London and Calcutta/Simla to
start Pusa and initiate agricultural research in India. They put Pusa before everything else.
Therefore, when the Bengal bureaucrats wrote to the Secretary of State to spare Bergtheil
for the regional laboratory in Bengal on indigo, the former, in consultation with the
central government, were quite reluctant to agree.
On hearing from the Bengal Government, India House dispatched a letter to the
Government of India asking if relieving Bergtheil to work on indigo temporarily would
compromise the plans for agricultural research and education at Pusa. The buildings and
laboratories for Pusa were still being set up. It did not appear that the station at Pusa
could go on stream very soon. In light of the slow progress in the creation of
infrastructure the officials in India reported back that the station would not be ready until
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October, and therefore that the agricultural bacteriologist could be dispensed with until
then.5
Bergtheil too wrote to India House independently after he received a
communication from the Bengal Government who had contacted him directly. He
mentioned that the Bengal Government had invited him to come to India to carry forward
the research work on indigo from the point where Chritopher Rawson had left.  Bergtheil
was also invited to bring R V Briggs, the expert who had worked before with Rawson
and later with Rawson and Bergtheil at Peeprah. He was assured a laboratory at Mosheri,
and a guaranteed service of two years on indigo. The letter also mentioned the possibility
that after two years he might be transferred to Pusa to continue the work on indigo.6
Bergtheil was in a dilemma. He did not want to forego the opportunity of an
assured, permanent job with the Government of India at the Pusa Station. At the same
time he was also attracted to the idea of working on indigo under the Government of
Bengal. He had been working on the product for sometime, his project was unfinished,
and he was hopeful of obtaining more positive results. Thus he proposed to the officials
at India House two possible courses. One, if the metropolitan and imperial officials could
keep their offer for the job of bacteriologist on hold, he would be willing to work on
indigo for two years and then join Pusa as the Agricultural Bacteriologist. Two, he could
accept appointment as Agricultural Bacteriologist with immediate effect and also work
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on indigo as an added responsibility. Incidentally the letter from the Bengal Government
had suggested that after two years they might manage to have Bergtheil employed at Pusa
where he could continue to work on indigo – thus envisioning a situation of dual
responsibility for him. 7
The central government in India asserted their position on the issue in
unambiguous terms, and it was their decision that prevailed. Their position, as compared
to that of regional bureaucrats, clearly de-focused indigo The imperial office at
Calcutta/Simla thought that the best plan would be to immediately employ Bergtheil at
Pusa, and to allow him to work at the indigo laboratory on deputation. They did not
consent to relieve him for a period of two years as requested. Actually they did not
commit to any time period, implying that Bergtheil could be recalled whenever Pusa was
ready to receive him, and as soon as his services were required there. They also told the
Bengal bureaucrats in no uncertain terms that once Bergtheil reverted to his position of
Agricultural Bacteriologist “he would be required to drop his special indigo work.” The
Bengal bureaucrats, not having any alternative, agreed with that line, the Government of
India made a recommendation to that effect to the Secretary of State, and Bergtheil was
appointed the Agricultural Bacteriologist. 8
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Bergtheil arrived in Bombay. On July 9, 1904, two separate but simultaneous
notifications by the government announced his employment as the Agricultural
Bacteriologist and his deputation to work for the Bengal Government. 9
The officials in the province acted swiftly to get the laboratory work started as
soon as possible. Bergtheil, accompanied by R V Briggs, who probably came together
with him from England, reached Muzaffarpur. On reaching Mosheri they found the pre-
existing indigo laboratory there in a shambles; all equipment and construction had been
either dismantled or damaged. In these circumstances, plans were made to immediately
take on lease a small factory at Sirsiah and to assemble the laboratory there. The site was
soon inspected by the officials and approved. Necessary buildings were planned and the
budget approved. An advance amount was also sanctioned to expedite the process of
starting work at Sirsiah. 10
R S Finlow Comes Aboard For Sirsiah
On April 1, 1904, after the Dalsingserai Laboratory closed down, the indigo
expert R S Finlow was retained by an arrangement between the government and BIPA.
The government sanctioned an advance out of the indigo grant that they had earlier
committed to pay towards Finlow’s salary.
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As we saw in the previous chapter, Finlow had been working with Bloxam at
Dalsingserai. When contacted for reemployment to continue work on indigo, he had
refused saying that he was bound to not do any research work on indigo until Bloxam had
publicly presented the results of his research, the research on which Finlow had
previously assisted Bloxam at Dalsingserai.
But the government in their wisdom still decided to retain him. Experts were
scarce, especially those with a knowledge of the local conditions in the colony. Besides,
getting a new person out from England always involved belabored discussions and
several mandatory rounds of communication between the different levels of government
in India and England as the search for a new person was conducted. It was not always
easy to find a competent person who would also be willing to come to India.
Finlow had other merits. Other than his primary work on indigo he also had some
knowledge of jute. The officials reckoned that he could be possibly put to work on the
problem of deterioration of jute in India, which had recently become a serious issue. Jute
was another important industry in Bengal. Merchants based at Dundee had financial
interests in the jute industry of British India, and therefore there were adequate reasons to
have an expert address that problem. Besides, as a jute expert, Finlow could always prove
useful to those indigo planters that ever considered switching to that commodity. For
some time it had been an avowed policy of the government to encourage indigo planters
to divest.
The plan to retain Finlow was also affected by the discussions that were underway
to turn Sirsiah into a permanent agricultural station under the provincial government. The
regional bureaucrats had been slowly but surely veering around to the position that indigo
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experiments should be conducted in a separate laboratory. Now that the Sirsiah
laboratory was up and running, the next step in their plan was to turn it into a permanent
station. They were also mindful that the central government had stated it would recall
Bergtheil as soon as the Pusa laboratories became functional. The Bengal bureaucrats
planned that once Bergtheil moved to Pusa, they could have R S Finlow head the
provincial station. 11
They were so determined to retain Finlow for their Sirsiah Station that they
wondered if the normal bureaucratic hierarchy of seeking approval could be bypassed to
accommodate him. S L Maddox was concerned that the Secretary of State had recently
sanctioned the post of a Deputy Director for the agricultural department. In view of the
recent support for a post for the agricultural department he might not be positively
inclined to defend another post. Both Maddox and J W Mollison felt that there was
already enough work to do on the chemistry and bacteriology of jute in the country.
Therefore, it might be worth the time to explore and ask if the Bengal Chamber of
Commerce, which was supported to a large extent by jute interests, would be willing to
pay his salary. 12
In the end, however, the agreement of the Secretary of State was sought for R S
Finlow’s appointment to the agricultural services of the Government of Bengal. He was
to be given a permanent position as an expert on both indigo and jute. Pending Bloxam’s
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presentation of his findings on indigo in England Finlow had been engaged on
miscellaneous tasks by the agricultural department in Bengal. Bloxam published his
report in March 1905 thus releasing Finlow to work on indigo if he so wished. An
understanding was immediately reached that while official support was awaited for his
permanent appointment, during the peak season for the manufacture of indigo – July to
August - he should assist the other experts working full time on indigo. Once the formal
approval came from England Finlow began to divide his time between work on indigo
and jute. 13So the stage was set for the next round of experiments and trials at Sirsiah to
be undertaken by Bergtheil in association with Finlow and Briggs.
Developments Leading To The Engagement Of William P Bloxam At Leeds
Bloxam’s Relations With William Ramsay And Other Metropolitan Chemists
Bloxam had failed to convince the provincial government to extend his tenure.
The bureaucrats had shown neither the inclination to keep the Dalsingserai Laboratory
running, nor to move Bloxam to another laboratory. When Bloxam came to know that the
proprietors of the Dalsingserai estate had refused to let out their property any longer for
indigo experiments and trials, he suggested to the officials that he should be moved to the
Indian Museum at Calcutta. Bloxam had contacted the chief scientist working at the
laboratory of the museum - one Mr. Burkill, who was willing to accommodate him in the
laboratory at Calcutta. Bloxam expressed the view that his re-location at the Indian
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Museum laboratory would actually be ideal as in the city of Calcutta he would have
easier access to scientific apparatus. And whenever he needed to collect additional
samples of indigo plant he could visit the indigo fields that were not too far from that city
and well linked by trains. 14
But the provincial administrators were unmoved. There was a basic lack of
interest among the Bengal bureaucrats for the work that Bloxam did. They were
unwilling to invest their meager financial resources in the very specialized chemistry of
indigo that Bloxam’s work incorporated. It would be fair to say that they were,
unsurprisingly, “provincial” in their outlook. They wanted to help a local, regional
industry. And they wanted to assign their resources to arrange the work of experts that
could bring benefits to the industry in the short-term. They could not afford to support
any scientific pursuit that could be characterized as anything otherwise. The
administrators were not moved at all by Bloxam’s arguments that his work would also
bring, as Bloxam described, “scientific reputation.”
But even as Bloxam faced the threat of banishment, he turned to another
constituency that he had painstakingly cultivated over the years. This constituency was
comprised of notable chemists in the metropolis – in England. He turned to them for
support. Two of them in particular, William Ramsay and Arthur G Green, appreciated the
significance of his current work and ensured, as we shall see below, his continued
employment to do research on indigo in England beginning 1905.
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After returning to England Bloxam spent the next six months or so writing his
report on the work done at Dalsingserai. As agreed upon, he submitted a copy of the
report to the Government of Bengal. But he also sent across a copy of the report to a
prominent chemist in England, William Ramsay at University College, London. He had
known Ramsay for some time, having worked in his laboratory previously. In fact,
Ramsay had been instrumental in securing appointment for him in the first place in India
in 1901. Thus Bloxam was well aware that the metropolitan and imperial bureaucracy
respected Ramsay. On this occasion, Bloxam wanted him to read his report on indigo
work and comment on it as an expert. He also desired that Ramsay intervene with the
India House bureaucracy and impress on them the need to employ him for an additional
year so that he could finish his work.
Ramsay was happy to oblige. He was admittedly struck by the brilliant work
Bloxam had just completed. As requested, he wrote to India House, attesting the value of
Bloxam’s work and urging that Bloxam be given an opportunity to continue his work for
another year. He expressed confidence that a continuation of his current work would
bring fruitful results. 15
Ramsay made another crucial point. He stated that the metropolis England rather
than colonial India was the appropriate location for the critical work that Bloxam was
engaged in. First of all Bloxam had obtained pure indigotin, which in itself involved a
mastery of the very difficult chemistry of the relevant processes. He had also discovered
                                                 
15 Letter from William Ramsay to the Under-Secretary of State for India, India House, dated,
November 6, 1904, “Employment by the India Office of Mr W P Bloxam for the purpose of
carrying on further researches regarding the methods of production of natural indigo,”
Government of India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for May 1905,
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that the red bodies present in the dye did not contain nitrogen. It was “not unlikely” that
this red body was an intermediate compound from which the coloring matter was finally
formed in the leaves. Thus Ramsay raised expectations that Bloxam might be close to
uncovering the very basis of the formation of color in the plant, an insight that was
certain to prove critical. Ramsay also attested that Bloxam was currently trying to devise
a correct method to estimate color percentages that would enable putting the knowledge
of the field of natural indigo on firm footing. Having demonstrated the usefulness of
Bloxam’s work in progress, Ramsay also strongly urged that for carrying out such cutting
edge chemical research Bloxam should be placed in one of the fine laboratories in
England. Such work “could be better carried out in this country, where advice from
skilled chemists is easily obtainable, and where the literature on the subject is easily
accessible, than in India.”
Ramsay’s letter to India House had the desired effect. The communication
immediately had the bureaucracy there interested. The Secretary of State asked back
immediately which way Ramsay thought the government should assist him. They also
asked him to name the specific laboratories where Bloxam’s work could be carried out. 16
Ramsay suggested that Bloxam could work at the Inland Revenue Laboratory
under the supervision of Dr Thorpe. Bloxam had previously presented a copy of his
report to Dr Thorpe too. The latter had thus read the report and Ramsay confirmed that
Thorpe also had a positive opinion of Bloxam’s work. The Scientific and Technical
Department of the Imperial Institute could be the other place that could be considered for
locating Bloxam. But if these two places were not available, Bloxam could be gainfully
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employed at the Clothworkers Laboratory in the University of Leeds to work under the
general supervision of Prof Arthur G Green, a well-known natural dye expert. As an
afterthought Ramsay added that Bloxam’s location at Leeds would actually be the best
option, considering the fit between the specialization of that laboratory and Bloxam’s
interests.
Those at India House consulted other experts too. They were in touch with Dr
Thorpe “unofficially.” After hearing from their counterparts in India they decided to
engage Bloxam and place him at the University of Leeds.
The Position Of The Metropolitan, Imperial, And Provincial Governments On Bloxam’s
Work
While corresponding with William Ramsay, Dr Thorpe and other experts, the
Secretary of State’s office wrote to the government in India asking that a copy of
Bloxam’s report be supplied to them, as well as to send their opinion on the subject of the
continuation of Bloxam’s research in England. 17
The Secretary of State’s query galvanized the provincial bureaucracy in Bengal
into action. An honorarium of Rupees 3,000 was immediately sanctioned for payment to
Bloxam as promised. S L Maddox the head of Bengal’s agricultural department as well as
J W Mollison, the Inspector General for Agriculture in India, were asked to submit their
opinion on the matter of employing Bloxam again.
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R W Carlyle, Bengal’s Revenue Secretary, represented the perspective of
Bengal’s bureaucrats. They concurred this time that it would be helpful to have Bloxam
undertake further research on indigo. Bengal’s bureaucrats could very well feel the pulse
of the situation. William Ramsay’s letter attesting the potential of Bloxam’s completed
work and the usefulness of extending his research had a major influence on all. The
Secretary of State, too, seemed to be tilting towards it. Notwithstanding that just a few
months ago they had disengaged Bloxam from his work in India, they recapitulated to say
that the extension of his work in England was a good idea. 18
The letter from Carlyle also suggested that Bloxam would be better off
conducting “analytical work on manufactured indigo” rather than on the “indigo plant.”
Carlyle argued that since it was not possible for Bloxam to obtain fresh samples from
India, he should focus on the samples of manufactured cake. This suggestion appears a
bit odd because these officials knew very well that Bloxam had carried samples of both
plant leaves and the dye in stages of manufacturing from the mahai of 1903. In his
previous letters as well as in his last report Bloxam had indicated that he was currently
engaged in devising a method for the estimation of color in the leaves and in the dye in
order to answer the question as to how much color the leaf could give and how much was
actually extracted. Thus his current work encompassed examination of the samples of the
leaf and the dye.
Were they, then, trying to propose a division of work between Bloxam in England
and their own expert Bergtheil in Bengal? That seems to be a possibility. The same letter
                                                 
18 Letter from R W Carlyle, Revenue Secretary, Government of Bengal to Secretary, Revenue and
Agricultural Department, Government of India, dated March 27, 1904, Letter no. 1717, No. 28,
File 2-I/2 6, Government of Bengal, Proceedings of the Revenue Department for the month of
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also stated that Bloxam’s work must be carried out “in conjunction” with similar work on
indigo in India, and expressed hope that the two experts would communicate and keep
each other informed of the progress of their respective works. Apparently the Bengal
bureaucrats, from their own perspective, were trying to bring an element of organization
into the scientific endeavors by proposing such division of work, bring an element of
efficiency, and thus maximize benefits from the government money spent on research.
The central government officials forwarded the recommendations of Bengal
bureaucrats. They amended the suggestions sent from Bengal only on the matter of the
proposed division of work between Bloxam and Bergtheil. They had a slightly different
perspective than the regional bureaucrats on the issue. The central government officials
considered themselves inadequate to advise on the matter, and instead proposed that
expert advice should be sought on how to establish a division of work. They also stated
that in their opinion only that work should be supported that would bring “the greatest
hope of results of practical value.” 19
India House finally offered Bloxam a job for one year at the University of Leeds
that started in August 1905. They only asked that he should coordinate his research
efforts with the efforts of Bergtheil in India. They too did not raise the issue about the
division of work. 20
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The Experts And The Direction Of Their Experiments, 1905-08
The Turf War: Bloxam Versus Bergtheil, And The Questions Of “Core” And “Periphery”
The issue about the division of work between the experts was, however, not going
to die down easily. It erupted in the form of a turf war between the two scientists wherein
each accused the other of encroaching on the work assigned to them by the government.
This was partly a reflection of the fact that experts’ notions of the division of work were
dramatically different from those proposed by the Bengal bureaucrats. In other words, the
tensions arose from the imperatives of the nature of experimental work that they wanted
to undertake.
But equally importantly, the confrontation also arose out of professional ambition
to claim success in a critical area of chemical research, to present the results of
experiments at professional societies in England, and to publish in the journals in
England. This directly leads us to examining the question of the identity of these experts
working on indigo. They were all, of course, applied chemists working to improve indigo
or examining questions that would eventually assist the process of improving plant
indigo’s yield and quality. That is what their immediate patron – the government -
expected of them. But their identity was not limited to working for the government or
industry in British India. In a general way all of them aspired also for a definite,
independent academic and professional stature. They published the results of their work
in various academic journals and presented their findings at various professional societies
like the Society of Dyers and Colourists, the Society of Arts, and most importantly the
Society of Chemical Industry and the Chemical Society.
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Maintaining visibility among their peers in England was critical. This was
especially true of Bloxam who sought the final validity for his work from the
metropolitan chemists. Bergtheil, too, moved among his peers in England and was
cognizant of the need to keep his credibility with them. This was generally true of all
Western-trained experts working in British India who aspired to one day return to their
home country and seek employment there. But unlike Bloxam, or at least more than him,
Bergtheil also sought validity for his work from his local employers in colonial India –
the central government officials, the Bengal bureaucrats, and the indigo planters.
 It was Bloxam who first protested to the officials in England in May 1906 that
Cyril Bergtheil had failed to communicate to him the results of his experiments in India
over the last year. He reminded them that the terms of his appointment had mandated that
Bergtheil should keep him informed of his work in India and that he keep Bergtheil
posted of the progress of his work in England. There was thus a real danger of
duplication of work by the two experts who were both employed by the government. That
might possibly result in wastage of public funds. 21
This firing of the first salvo publicly evoked a similar response from Bergtheil
and to a disclosure of communication that had transpired between them previously. Two
things become apparent on a reading of the “personal” letters that had passed between the
two. First, both scientists had failed in communicating the results of their experiments to
each other over the past year. This was largely the result of their intent to keep the results
of their experimental work clandestine and their ambition to publish the results in the
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Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry before their colleague. Secondly, the letters
also reveal an extreme eagerness shown by Bloxam to reserve analytical chemical works
related to color estimation and the nature of the “red bodies” (indirubin) in the dye for
himself. These were incidentally the aspects on which he had worked before at
Dalsingserai during 1902-03.
Soon after joining the Clothworkers Laboratory Bloxam sent a letter to Bergtheil
asking him about the result of his experiments in 1904-05, and the lines of experiments
he wished to follow during 1905-06. He promised that he would very soon after
consultation with his supervisor send a note on what experiments he was going to
conduct at Leeds. Bergtheil would later charge Bloxam that while he had fulfilled the
condition about communicating with him “in a literal sense,” he had throughout abstained
from providing any “information as to the [actual] lines of his work.” 22
In his response, Bergtheil proposed to Bloxam what he thought would be a
judicious and practical division of work between them. Considering the physical distance
that separated them and the time it would take to correspond, he suggested each of them
take up distinct areas of work. They could then share the results from their respective
fields to benefit the corresponding side of query. Bergtheil reserved for himself work on
the problems relating to the cultivation and manufacturing of indigo. He invited Bloxam
to work on finished indigo. He further suggested that he study the improvement of indigo
“from the dyer’s stand point.” In what form did the dyer want the product? Which
constituents of the dye were more useful for the users? Any information on these subjects
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would be of “greatest value” to their common concern to protect the natural indigo
industry. In suggesting this division of labor Bergtheil seems to have expanded on the
line earlier proposed by the Bengal bureaucrats. 23
Bergtheil also claimed a right to work on the processes of color estimation and the
nature of “red bodies” in indigo thus denying Bloxam any exclusive right to work on
those areas. It was this denial that offended Bloxam the most. Bergtheil agreed that the
division left work on finished indigo to Bloxam. But he had to make an exception in this
particular case since he had been working on these two areas for some time and disclosed
would be soon submitting papers for publishing.
Whatever the pretext that Bloxam and Bergtheil may have used, a core element of
the current round of correspondence between them was the effort to secure separate
territories for individual research and publishing. Bloxam’s initial letter invited dialogue
referring to the terms of his appointment that had obligated him to collaborate with his
counterpart in India. Bergtheil’s response discussed the advantages of dividing work
between production and consumption imperatives. But, equally importantly, Bloxam’s
first letter proposed a “mutual agreement” between them on the “time and place of
publication” resulting out of their work. Bergtheil’s letter was even more explicit. He said
that as far as the results of “practical value” at Sirsiah were concerned, he was bound to
communicate them to BIPA. But for work of “more scientific nature” he was ready to
enter into an agreement with Bloxam so that they could publish independently “with no
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disadvantage to one another.” He encouraged Bloxam to respect the arrangement he was
proposing.
Bloxam was bitterly offended to learn that Bergtheil was working on red bodies
and on perfecting the methods of color estimation. He claimed he was the first to raise
doubts on the accuracy of assays to check color percentages as pointed out in his
published report on the work done in India. He was similarly the first to fathom the
nature of red bodies present in the blue dye. He raised his objections in two ways. First of
all, he alleged that only he could claim “sole ownership”  [his emphasis] of the findings.
According to him it was wrong on the part of Bergtheil to pick up an unfinished line of
experiments that he had left in India and which he was now following up. His second
objection was targeted to move the administrators. Bergtheil, according to him, had
intruded into the purely chemical [his emphasis] part of the work that had been originally
assigned to him. Bergtheil was after all the Imperial Bacteriologist and should therefore
confine his work to the areas that best matched his qualifications as a bacteriologist. 24
He was also alarmed to know that Bergtheil was about to publish papers on color
estimation for the natural indigo dye. He hurried early in 1906 to submit his paper at the
Yorkshire section of the Society of Chemical Industry in order to get precedence over
Bergtheil. The full text of Bloxam’s paper appeared in the 15th August issue of the
Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry. But much to his bewilderment he found out
that the same issue also included a paper on the same subject by Cyril Bergtheil and R V
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Briggs entitled, “The determination of indigotin in commercial indigo and in indigo-
yielding plants.”
Bloxam was indeed very angry with Bergtheil. He was so reproachful that he
went on to complain to the officials at India House arguing that Bergtheil had ignored
legitimate work on the bacteriological aspects of indigo improvement, which he was
primarily expected to undertake. Such dereliction of duty on the part of Bergtheil was
going to prove detrimental to the future of the natural indigo industry where much
bacteriological work was still required, Bloxam argued. He also contended that
Bergtheil’s insistence to work on the chemical aspects of the estimation of indigotin, an
area that he had been working on, had led to the “unseemly” situation when an important
chemical journal had publications on the same subject by two experts both of whom were
employed by the government. Such a duplication of work on the government’s money
was wasteful. Bloxam also raised a technical issue that under the current rules results of
research done in India with the support of the Government of India could not be
published in Europe except by special permission. Bergtheil had not sought such
permission to publish. He asked that remedial measures be taken so as to avoid such
duplication in future. He also asked that rules be amended to clearly specify which types
of scientific work originating in the colonies could be published in Home scientific
journals. 25
Bloxam’s personal indignation apart, a sense was emerging in the metropolis that
Bergtheil had failed in collaborating with Bloxam, and therefore that a great opportunity
was being lost. A G Perkin, a natural dyes and pigments expert at the University of
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Leeds, was one of those who believed that. Bergtheil was present “on the spot” in India
where the cultivation and manufacture of indigo was taking place. Thus he had an
intimate knowledge of the actual system of production. On the other hand, Bloxam in
England had access to “many more facilities and advantages for working out the
scientific side of the question.” If anything, Bloxam’s insistence on claiming his
exclusive right to publish in the journals in the West was also impinging on attempts to
reserve to metropolitan scientists the right to publish in the most prestigious journals. At
the same time, he offered to Bergtheil that he would be glad to examine specimens that
he may want to send home to him. 26
Perspectives like those of A G Perkin advanced a particular vision of science
critically centered on the metropolis. Such visions incorporated a “division of labor”
between the scientists and between the natures of scientific pursuits in the metropolis and
the colony – at the “core” and in the “periphery.” In such a conception the experts placed
in the colonies were primarily engaged in the job of data collection. The critical advances
in the process of knowledge took place in the metropolis on the basis of data supplied
from the colonies.
Substantial literature already exists in the field of colonial science that analyzes
the relationship between the metropolitan “core” and the colonial “periphery.” Lately
scholars have been critical of the core-periphery paradigm, and have criticized it as being
“West-centric.” They have argued that such conceptions advance a thesis about the lack
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of contribution of the nonwestern world in the making of “Western” science beyond
providing data through field studies. They charge that such arguments foreground
developments in the metropolis and minimize the importance of the developments in the
colonies. Going against the grain, more recently scholars have highlighted circulation of
people, artifacts, and knowledge among the colonies and the metropolis in their attempt
to de-center Europe from the current narratives of history of science. New knowledge, it
has been argued, also evolved in the colonies through circulation, adaptation,
experimentation, and then became part of world’s larger repertoire of technical know-
how. Therefore, the argument runs, “Science” does not have an exclusively European
lineage, but is rather transnational in its origin.
  On the specific question of the hegemonic ability of the metropolis to shape the
nature of science in the colonies, this study furnishes a split verdict. Within the larger
understanding that the indigo experiments in India by Western-trained experts were
colonial because they were influenced by local resources and conditions (as discussed in
Chapter Three), this study makes further contributions to the study of core-periphery
relations. Since political power was centralized in the office of the Secretary of State in
England, decisions emanating from that office could have a determining influence on the
nature of science on a case-to-case basis. Certain appointments of experts could be
sanctioned or disapproved, which directly affected the nature of scientific investigation in
India. But, more importantly, the scientists working in the colony gravitated towards their
peers in England. They aspired for a certain degree of visibility in the community of
metropolitan scientists, which in turn ensured a degree of connection with metropolitan
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science. It was this type of deference to peers in England that was perhaps more relevant
in this regard.
But there were countervailing forces at work that ensured an autonomous line of
development for science in the colony. In politics, and in science, the physical distance
from the metropolis ensured a certain degree of autonomy a priori for the colonial
bureaucrats and scientists. Bureaucrats responded to local needs in devising plans for
setting up laboratories. Post facto they persuaded the metropolis to agree with their
decisions. Experts ran the risk of losing their patronage if they did not respond adequately
to demands placed on them by the local patrons – both planters and the government.
Bloxam’s experience at failing to find sponsorship for his work in India is a splendid
example. In contrast, Bergtheil worked more in deference to the wishes of his local
patrons and thus enjoyed their support until the time when curtains were drawn on all
scientific efforts in India.
Indeed, the case of India House trying to force Bergtheil placed in India to
“collaborate” with Bloxam in England in deference to the wishes of metropolitan
scientists Arthur G Green, A G Perkin and others is insightful, and so is their failure in
evoking the response they wanted. As mentioned before, Perkin had sent a letter
expressing regret that cooperation had not been ensured from the experts in India. Acting
along the same lines, India House wrote to the officials in India pointing out the failure of
Bergtheil to collaborate with Bloxam. 27 But such efforts to force a collaborative effort
between the two experts did not succeed. The physical distance between the experts and
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the personal acrimony between Bloxam and Bergtheil were certainly two factors
inhibiting cooperation. But the more deep-rooted cause was the fact that the
administrators and their experts, Bergtheil in particular, found the results of Bloxam’s
endeavors irrelevant in practice for the type of work being done in India. As we shall see
below in the next section, the laboratory work at Sirsiah in India had evolved in quite a
different direction from the line of query being pursued at the University of Leeds in
England. The very nature of that laboratory cum agricultural station was more in tune
with the demands placed by the local patrons. It was more adapted to the scientists’ and
patrons’ knowledge of local conditions.
Not unexpectedly, then, the bureaucrats from India put up a strong defense of
Bergtheil. They regretted that the collaboration between the researchers as initially
envisaged by the officials in India and England had not worked out. But perhaps they
were in a better position to appreciate why such collaboration had not worked. On the
specific issue of encroachment on each other’s area of research, too, the officials
defended Bergtheil: “ Mr. Bergtheil does not appear to be to blame in his action.” Such a
defense in effect killed any chance of collaboration or understanding being reached
between experts either for purposes of future scientific efforts on indigo or towards their
individual, professional ambition with regard to academic publications.28 The “distance”
between Bloxam and Bergtheil persisted through the period. This distance was fomented
by both personal acrimony and the divergence in their approach to their ongoing work on
indigo.
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The Turn To Agricultural Experiments In India: Cyril Jonas Bergtheil, 1905-08
Reflecting on the status of indigo experiments in August 1905, Bergtheil made
two vital observations. Firstly, he spoke of ways in which his perspective on making
manufacturing processes more efficient differed from that of his former colleague
Christopher Rawson. Rawson had asserted in one of his last reports before departing for
England that the efficiency of the manufacturing processes had been improved to the
limit.  In that report Rawson had claimed that the yield obtained by the scientists was
already within ten per cent of the theoretical value. Bergtheil believed that Rawson’s fine
work on purifying water for use in manufacturing, oxidation of liquor, and after-treatment
of recovered indigo had left little scope for further improvement in those areas. But
Bergtheil believed that the yield from the stage of steeping could still be improved.
Bergtheil argued that Rawson’s conclusion about the efficiency of manufacturing was
faulty because he had used an “erroneous” method of analysis for checking indigotin
percentage. This belief encouraged Bergtheil’s efforts toward analytical work to perfect
the procedures for estimating color percentages. 29
Secondly, and more importantly, Bergtheil’s note indicated his growing belief that
the greatest hope for yield improvement now rested in the direction of enhancing the
plant’s characteristics through better farming practices. He especially wanted selection
and hybridization of plants to be in the forefront of all scientific efforts. Speaking of the
potential of selection and hybridization specifically, he said:
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As has been frequently pointed out, this is a most important aspect of the
work, and perhaps the direction in which the chief hope of permanent
assistance to the industry lies. 30
Bergtheil was the head of the Sirsiah Laboratory and it was he who defined the
agenda for scientific explorations there. With the help of his assistants RV Briggs and R
S Finlow, Bergtheil basically followed three lines for his work at that station. A few
experiments were conducted to streamline the process of steeping. A second group of
analytical experiments was conducted to perfect the processes of estimating color
percentage, the results of which were presented to the Society of the Chemical Industry in
1906. But the strongest and widest emphasis was put on the agricultural lines of
experimentation.  The chemical experiments to improve manufacturing were given a
second place at Sirsiah. It would be fair to say that spearheaded by the efforts of
Bergtheil and his team at Sirsiah this period in India saw a clear turn towards agricultural
experiments.
Bergtheil conducted a few chemical experiments on manufacturing at Sirsiah and
Pusa in 1905. His experiments were constrained due to his inability to produce absolutely
pure cultures of the indigo enzyme, indimulsin, and also because of his failure to obtain
the glucoside, indican in a crystalline form. As pointed out in the previous chapter,
Bergtheil failed in obtaining indican using the methods proposed by the Dutch chemists
Hoogewerff and ter Meulen in1900. At this time, the Dutch scientists, especially
Beyerinck, Hazewinkel and van Romburgh, had been very successful in understanding
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the character of the indigo enzyme.31  Incidentally, as we shall see in the next section,
Bloxam in England procured samples of both indican and indimulsin from the Dutch
chemists in Holland. The availability of these key specimens was going to provide
considerable edge to Bloxam in his similar analytical work.
The majority of Bergtheil’s experiments on steeping consisted of varying the
temperature of liquor and duration of steeping to assess their effect on the output of the
dye. He made a separate set of recommendations for steeping Java and Sumatrana plants.
For the Java plant the planters were advised to keep the temperature of water during
manufacturing at 90 F and to carry on steeping for ten hours. The Sumatrana plant was to
be steeped for seven hours in water at a higher temperature of 104 F. Bergtheil expressed
confidence that if the planters maintained the optimal conditions relating to temperature
and duration of steeping, they would be able to extract up to 83% of indigotin recoverable
from leaves. His report also claimed that since 5% of indigotin inevitably got soaked in
the refuse plant and was apparently not recoverable, and because Rawson’s method of
oxidation was “as perfect… as can be desired,” there did not exist any room for
enhancing productivity of either the oxidation or the fermentation stage. Such conviction
put a cap on future experiments on manufacturing at Sirsiah. 32
Bergtheil also devoted some time to conducting experiments on fermentation that
were not connected with indigo. He was aware of his position as the Agricultural
Bacteriologist and therefore his obligation to contribute to scientific investigations of a
                                                 
31 For Dutch chemists’ work on indican and Bergtheil’s failure in obtaining indican see A G
Perkin and A E Everest, The Natural Organic Colouring Matters. (New York: Longmans Green
and Company): 482-483
32 “C Bergtheil’s account of scientific work at Sirsiah, 1905-06,” NAL, Indian Planters’ Gazette
(December 22, 1906): 730-731
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more general nature. Thus he presented the results of some of his experiments on
fermentation to agricultural journals in India. 33
The annual report for 1905-06 mentioned that “several agricultural
experiments” had been initiated during the year. The scientists first conducted
comparative trials of the Java and Sumatrana varieties to assess their respective potential.
Preliminary results of trials at Pusa showed that the Java variety of plant gave 60% higher
yield than the Sumatrana variety. Additionally, the quality of dye obtained from the Java
plant was found “in most cases” to be better than Sumatrana. After having affirmed the
superiority of the Java variety, the experimenters conducted extensive trials to establish
the optimum
                                                              Table 6.1
                     Area under Java indigo at the Belsand factory, 1904-1909






       Source: Adapted from D J Reid, “Ten years’ practical experience of Java indigo
in Bihar” 34
                                                 
33 C Bergtheil, “The Study of Fermentation as Applied to Agriculture,” The Agricultural Journal
of India (1906) 1, 1: 68-75; C Bergtheil, “The Study of Fermentation as Applied to Agriculture,
Part II,” The Agricultural Journal of India (1906): 1, 3: 230-236
34 D J Reid, “Ten years’ practical experience of Java indigo in Bihar. Agricultural Journal of
India (1917): xii 1: 19
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cultivation practices for the Java plant – analyzing the best farming methods with regard
to “spacing,” “topping,” and “cutting back.” The agricultural orientation of experiments
at Sirsiah was the direct result of a key development in the agricultural side of indigo
manufacturing in Bihar. The period in focus saw a major switch in Bihar away from the
native Sumatrana to the imported Java variety of indigo. We have data on the growth in
Java acreage from the Belsand factory (see Table 6.1 above). The case of the Belsand
factory, one of the largest indigo factories of the times, owned by the influential planter D
J Reid, can be safely taken to be representative of the general trend. The initial success
with the introduction of the higher yielding Java variety had generated optimism. Many
planters were drawn to growing the new variety. But even as the adoption of the Java
variety continued, the planters faced new types of problems that came up with the
cultivation of Java indigo. The Java variety proved to be a breed difficult to tame over the
long-term. Problems related to the germination of the Java seed confronted the planters.
Pest attack also continued to adversely affect the cultivation of Java variety in the local
environs of Bihar. Under such circumstances the planters demanded that the experts
devote their time to confronting problems related to the acclimatization of the new
variety of indigo plant.
To handle the problem of “hard” seed coat obtaining in Java indigo, which
delayed its germination, Bergtheil and his associates suggested treating seeds with
concentrated sulfuric acid, as opposed to scarifying (physical scratching), which was the
usual practice so far. In his papers published subsequently Bergtheil explained that the
hard seed coat arose from the depositing of extra cellulose, and that scarifying removed a
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portion of this resistant covering and allowed water to penetrate. Bergtheil instead
suggested immersing the seeds in sulfuric acid for some time, washing, and then drying, a
combination of steps that was easier and required less labor. He also claimed that after
treatment with sulfuric acid the arrecta variety’s germination rate would go up from 3%
to 95%. Dipping seeds into acid for about forty minutes usually sufficed in case of most
arrecta species plants, although the exact time for every category of arrecta seed,
originating from different regions, could also be easily determined by means of
preliminary experiments on factory premises. The suggestion regarding treatment with
sulfuric acid was well received by other scientists working in the field. In his assessment
of the work of BIPA’s scientists, Eugene Schrottky called acid treatment one of the best
innovations ever suggested. According to Schrottky, acid treatment not only facilitated
unhindered germination, but also made indigo less prone to the widely prevalent plant
disease, called blight.
The scientists at Sirsiah also explored the effect of the addition of nutrients for
improving the color-yielding ability of the indigo plant. In their experiments involving
manures, the experimenters tried to look, more precisely than their predecessors, for
possible effects of the addition of compounds on an increase in the content of glucoside
in leaves, the color-giving principle. Previously the scientists at Dalsingserai had faced
problems in validating the results of their agricultural experiments. The varying nature of
soil on the experimental farms on the one hand and the induced artificiality of growth
conditions in case of trials within “glass-houses” on the other, had continued to intrigue
them. By filling a pit with soil of uniform quality the experimenters at Sirsiah tried to
obtain standardized conditions for their trial, while also retaining the advantage of natural
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weather conditions for plant growth outside the laboratory. Lastly, during the course of
the year, Bergtheil laid the groundwork for the planned selection and hybridization
experiments at Sirsiah. He entertained high hopes in the efficacy of botanical
manipulation to improve the stock of plants grown in Bihar. In anticipation of such
experiments he systematically grew indigo plants originating from different regions on a
large-scale. 35
In conformity with the recent demand for agricultural and botanical experiments
the scientists at Sirsiah demanded the appointment of a botanist to aid their ongoing
efforts in this direction. Bergtheil in his annual report to BIPA strongly urged that a
botanist be employed as soon as possible to assist with the plant selection.
BIPA requested the Secretary of State in London through the provincial
government that a botanist be sent from England. Apparently some delay occurred in the
process of communication among administrators within Bengal, and in Simla and
London. Showing impatience with the bureaucratic delay, BIPA went ahead and
appointed a botanist, A. Turnbull, without obtaining prior official approval from the
government, an act that generated consternation among the bureaucracy. They simply
refused to consider Turnbull as a government appointee. But they agreed that the expert’s
                                                 
35 “Cyril Bergtheil’s account of scientific work at Sirsiah, 1905-06,” NAL, Indian Planters’
Gazette (December 22, 1906): 730-731; Schrottky’s letter of February 1907 to the BIPA, NAL,
Indian Planters’ Gazette (March 16, 1907): 299; Cyril Bergtheil and D L Day, “On the Cause of
‘Hardness’ in the Seeds of Indigofera arrecta,’ Annals of Botany (1907): 21, 81: 57-60; R S
Finlow and C J Bergtheil, “A Method for Producing Immediate Germination of “Hardcoated”
Seeds,” Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1908): 3, 10: 77
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salary could be paid out of the grant given by the government to BIPA for indigo
research. Turnbull had already joined Sirsiah station in the summer of 1906. 36
The Permanganate Tests: The Analytical Issue Between Bergtheil And Bloxam
The experiments conducted at Sirsiah from 1904 also took on a third dimension,
one involving analytical work to check the efficiency of the manufacturing process. As
we saw, Bloxam had earlier questioned the reliability of the diagnostic tests used in India
for the estimation of indigotin. His claim that the potassium permanganate test, as applied
in India, was faulty and gave misleading results had crucial implications for the future
design of experiments. These tests could ascertain the percentage of indigotin at various
stages during the production cycle. Therefore they could help establish the effectiveness
of different stages of production and suggest which stage needed further attention –
fermentation, oxidation, or boiling. Bergtheil devoted part of his efforts to preparing
grounds for responding to the objections raised against the reliability and validity of the
permanganate tests by Bloxam.
Both Bloxam and Bergtheil believed that the indigotin test used in India had
problems. However, they attacked Rawson’s permanganate test on different grounds. In
his report of 1904 Bloxam had objected firstly to the fact that the test had not been
validated with pure indigo. Further, he attacked the reliability of the test, noting that in
his trials with the test he got differing percentage values. As we showed earlier, he
explained that Rawson’s method comprised of a “progressive” chemical reaction, which
                                                 
36 Letter of R W Carlyle, Revenue Secretary, Bengal, dated, December 3, 1906, to Revenue
Secretary, Government of India. BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.), May 1907, File 2I/2 5-6, No. 1
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gave conflicting results depending on the length of time for which titration with
potassium permanganate was carried out. 37
Bergtheil did not consider Bloxam’s criticisms to be definitive. He did not think
that the lack of validation with pure indigo was such a serious limitation. He suggested
the relatively less accurate method of validating the permanganate test using results from
Kjeldahl’s test. Kjeldahl’s test also enabled determination of the indigotin percentage by
measuring the nitrogen content of the dye, although the percentage results from
Kjeldahl’s test could not be guaranteed to be “very” accurate. That was because its use
for determining indigotin percentage was based on the assumption that the dye did not
contain any nitrogen-based impurity or the isomer, indirubin. In further responding to
Bloxam’s criticism, Bergtheil noted that the reaction that took place during titration was
indeed a progressive one and not a “quantitative” one, but again he did not consider that
to be problematic. He turned everyone’s attention to the long continuing convention of
completing titration quickly in order to avoid additional chemical reactions, which in his
opinion worked fine. 38
In addition to Bergtheil, other chemists associated with the dye trade such as J
Grossman and Edmund Knecht also endorsed the effectiveness of the existing titration
tests with some modifications.  Since 1885 the permanganate test had sufficed as a rough
and ready test for those interested in measuring the dye’s purity and fixing its value in the
market. Manufacturers, drysalters, and buying and selling brokers had readily employed
                                                 
37 W Popplewell Bloxam and H M Leake, with the assistance of R S Finlow, An Account of the
Research Work in Indigo, Carried out at the Dalsingh Serai Research Station From 1903 to
March 1904. (Calcutta: The Bengal Secretariat Book Depot, 1905):  26-28. Henceforth, “Bloxam
and Leake”
38 C Bergtheil and R V Briggs, “The Determination of Indigotin in Commercial Indigo and in
Indigo-Yielding Plants,” Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry (1906) 25: 729-730
 227
the test in their trade.  Easy to administer and relatively quick, the test lent itself well to
the requirements of the commercial transactions. At a meeting of the Society of Chemical
Industry in 1905, Grossman argued that Rawson’s method was “best and most
convenient,” despite the presence of a plethora of other methods. He suggested a
modification in the method to facilitate better precipitation of impurities. 39The same year
Edmund Knecht, a lecturer at the Manchester Technical School, proposed a method at the
Society of Dyers and Colourists, which also worked on the similar principle of dissolving
indigotin in sulfuric acid followed by titration. Knecht preferred precipitation of
impurities by calcium carbonate and titration by reduction with titanium trichloride. 40
The broad endorsement of the existing methods for estimating indigo, even though they
were not extremely accurate, has to be understood in the context of that method’s
adequacy in meeting the requirements of the trade.
But now the scientists had to decide how the permanganate test measured up to
the task of checking the efficiency of the manufacturing process, and on this there was a
deadlock between Bergtheil’s and Bloxam’s perspectives. Bergtheil largely endorsed the
accuracy of the permanganate method aside from suggesting one minor modification to
Rawson’s process. His trials with the permanganate test had convinced him that the
addition of barium chloride precipitated some amount of indigotin and thus caused the
                                                 
39 J Grossman, “An Improved Method of Indigo Testing,” Journal of the Society of Chemical
Industry (April 1905) 24: 308
40 Edmund Knecht, “A method for the Volumetric Estimation of Indigo, Some Basic Colours and
Eosines,” The Journal of the Society of Dyers and Colourists (November 1905) 21: 292-295
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final percentage figure to be lower than the actual. Therefore he suggested that barium
sulfate be used as a precipitant for removing impurities.  41
Bergtheil also suggested a minor modification to Rawson’s persulphuric acid
method for estimating the dye-yielding potential of indigo leaf. Rawson’s method
consisted of extracting the glucoside from the leaf by boiling it with water, and then
converting a known quantity of the glucoside extract into indigotin through the addition
of reagents hydrochloric acid and ammonium persulfate. Thereafter the weight of the
indigotin, calculated with the permanganate method (Rawson’s), would give the
theoretical value of indigotin recoverable from unit weight of indigo plant. Bergtheil
compared Rawson’s method with his own “fermentation method,” which involved
conversion of the glucoside in the extract by the action of enzymes separately obtained
from indigo leaf. In his trials he repeatedly got a higher weight value for indigotin
percentage when using the fermentation method as against Rawson’s “chemical method.”
After investigating this anomaly he concluded that the disparate value resulted from the
addition of excessive persulfate in Rawson’s method. He therefore suggested a
modification wherein the amount of persulfuric acid added would be closely monitored.42
Bergtheil’s endorsement of Rawson’s method with minor modifications invited
vehement attack from Bloxam subsequently. Bloxam determinedly and persistently
challenged the accuracy of permanganate test and the procedure for its administration in
                                                 
41 C Bergtheil and R V Briggs, “The Determination of Indigotin in Commercial Indigo and in
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42 Christopher Rawson, Report of the Cultivation and Manufacture of Indigo. Bradford: William
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Commercial Indigo and in Indigo-Yielding Plants,” Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry
(1906) 25: 734-735
 229
papers read before the Society of Chemical Industry in 1906 and 1907. A more elaborate
critique of permanganate tests appeared in Bloxam’s report of 1908.
Analytical Science In A Metropolis: William Popplewell Bloxam, 1905-08
From 1905 on Bloxam focused on developing a clearer understanding of the
various constituents of the amalgamated natural dye. He worked using samples from
indigo’s manufacturing cycle of 1903 at Dalsingserai that he had brought with him.
While working at the Clothworker’s Laboratory at Leeds, Bloxam also drew on the
expertise of some of the most credible chemists of vegetable dyes, most notably A G
Perkin, and his supervisor, A G Green. Additionally, he had access to the relevant
literature on the latest research on plant indigo, especially those relating to indican and
indigo enzyme published by the Dutch chemists. Lastly, Bloxam obtained samples of
plant extract, indican, and indigo-enzyme from scientists in Netherlands, the facts that
bear testimony to his far superior access to scientific information in a metropolitan
setting, especially as compared to the lack of access for Bergtheil in India.
In order to determine the efficiency of manufacturing operations used in India,
Bloxam decided to devise more accurate tests for measuring the output of indigotin at
different stages of manufacture. He had earlier condemned the permanganate test used for
measuring color percentage as inaccurate and unreliable. Bloxam’s critique was
especially directed at the strategy of precipitating “some half dozen impurities” in the
amalgamated dye with a single precipitant in those tests. He pointed out that in
Bergtheil’s and Knecht’s methods the use of a precipitant failed to remove all impurities.
As a result, the oxidizing and reducing agents reacted with additional compounds during
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titration and gave an inflated estimate for indigotin. To circumvent the problem of
separating multifarious impurities from the soluble indigotin derivative, especially
because the precise nature of those impurities was still unknown, Bloxam followed an
alternative strategy – of precipitating indigotin from the amalgamated dye.
Bloxam’s tetra-sulphonate method, first proposed at the meeting of the Society of
Chemical Industry in August 1906, promised a higher level of accuracy in indigo testing.
The new method involved precipitating crystalline potassium indigotin tetra-sulphate by
adding fuming sulfuric acid to crude indigo in the presence of potassium acetate. 43A
solution of the resulting salt was then made to undergo titration with known quantities of
permanganate. Bloxam provided a new “factor” for deriving the amount of indgotin in
the solution – predicting the presence of 0.00222 gm. of indigotin for every 1.0 cc. of
permanganate solution (1/1,000) consumed. Bloxam had validated this conversion rate
with the help of pure indigotin that he had earlier produced in laboratory.
In his subsequent experiments Bloxam focused attention on understanding the
nature of the “impurities” in natural indigo. He isolated indigo-gluten, indigo-brown,
indigo-yellow, the other components of natural indigo besides indigotin, and
demonstrated that they remained non-reactive when potassium acetate was added to them
separately. Thus he underscored that the addition of potassium acetate in the tetra-
sulphonate test did not precipitate the impurities and therefore that the precipitant enabled
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“quantitative separation” of indigotin derivative in his test. As a consequence the tetra-
sulphonate test was able to provide highly accurate results. 44
To settle the efficiency question Bloxam next turned his attention to the test used
by scientists in India for measuring the color yielding ability of indigo leaf – the
persulphate method, and found it wanting in reliability and accuracy. First proposed by
Rawson and subsequently modified by Bergtheil, the persulphate method involved
hydrolysis and oxidation of leaf extract by ammonium persulphate and hydrochloric acid.
The resulting indigotin would then be checked with the percentage test. Bloxam and his
associates pointed out that despite its modification by Bergtheil the persulphate test gave
inconsistent results in laboratory trials and therefore claimed that the test was unreliable.
Bloxam also noticed the formation of brown substances during the reaction and suspected
that some indican was being lost as indigo-brown. Bloxam next tried to validate the
results obtained from the persulphate test. He procured leaf extract from the Dutch
chemist Beyerinck, and used indigo-enzyme (obtained using Beyerinck’s method) to
convert the leaf’s indican into indigotin. A comparison of the results conclusively proved
that the persulphate test then widely used in India was inaccurate. 45
In January 1907 Bloxam proposed an alternative “isatin method” for accurately
and reliably estimating the indigotin yielding ability of indigo leaf.  Not able to validate
Rawson’s/Bergtheil’s method, Bloxam searched for an alternative route, and settled on a
                                                 
44 Bloxam and Leake, 106-107; W P Bloxam, “The Analysis of Indigo,” The Journal of the
Society of Chemical Industry (August 15, 1906) 25: 735-744; I Q Richardson, S H Wood, and W
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rather well known reaction, involving treatment of leaf extract with hydrochloric acid and
isatin; the resulting indirubin (an isomer of indigotin) gave an estimate of the dye content
in the leaves of the indigo plant. Bloxam indicated that Baeyer had originally thrown
light on this chemical pathway, and that more recently Beyerinck had suggested its
potential use for purposes of estimating indican.  Bloxam wanted to confirm the results
obtained from the isatin method with pure indican. In association with A G Perkin and by
generously drawing on information emerging out of experiments of a similar nature by
the Dutch chemists, Bloxam now obtained indican in the laboratory. Using pure indican
he confirmed the results of the isatin method, and confidently declared:
The isatin method for the analysis of the [indigo] leaf is at present the only
trustworthy method. 46
Bloxam arrived at drastically different conclusions regarding the color bearing
ability of indigo plant and the efficiency of the manufacturing process. Putting dried
indigo leaves to isatin test he found that the average indigotin yielding potential of the
indigo plant (including stem and leaves) was much higher than the 0.3% by weight
estimate as previously believed by the scientists in India. He also tested more than 70
samples of finished cake of indigo from the 1903-04 season at Dalsingserai, which had
been produced from the same indigo leaves using the common method of manufacturing.
His “accurate” tetrasulphonate method showed that the percentage of color in the final
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dye was 60-62% and not 75% as claimed on the basis of application of Rawson’s
“inaccurate” permanganate test. The combined results of his tests made him conclude that
the efficiency of the currently employed manufacturing processes was far less than the
85% commonly assumed in India. Bloxam would present a full-fledged description and
analysis of the “low” efficiency of manufacturing processes in India in his report in
1908.47
Eugene Charles Schrottky: A Maverick, 1905-08
The case of Eugene Schrottky, planter and chemist, and his experiments in this
period is both unique and presents problems in interpretation. It is difficult to establish
his personal and professional credentials due to claims and counter claims about him in
the sources. It is especially very difficult to establish his motivations for the conduct of
indigo experiments and his claims about positive results that were supported by a handful
of planters at different times.
 Between 1889 and 1902, Schrottky held shares in the Bengal Indigo
Manufacturing Company that was registered in London. The company had
manufacturing, trading, and dealership interests in indigo. Schrottky had sold his patents
dating from the 1870s and the 1880s related to innovations in the manufacturing of indigo
to the aforesaid company in lieu of his shares. The company was finally dissolved in
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1902. 48 From 1903 onwards, Schrottky remained quite visible in the indigo world. He
had apparently cultivated the friendship of a handful of planters and administrators. Some
of the planters let him conduct a limited number of trials to improve manufacturing on
their premises.
Schrottky’s activities were found so intriguing that they generated a confidential
query on him in the metropolis. In 1906 Wynstan R Dunstan, the head of the Scientific
and Technical Department at the Imperial Institute in London, wrote to William P
Bloxam who was stationed at the time at University of Leeds asking if he could
independently confirm Schrottky’s credentials. Bloxam in his reply characterized
Schrottky as a “perennial charlatan” as far as his contributions to indigo manufacturing
were concerned. Disparagingly, Bloxam said of him: “His plan seems year after year to
start some new notion for improvement and to induce people to finance him. Wonderful
increase in produce is claimed but as far as I hear never substantiated.” Bloxam also
doubted that he had “any professional qualifications at all.” 49However, Schrottky’s
patent dating from 1906 listed him as a former student of famous German chemist Justus
von Liebig. 50  The patent also claimed that Schrottky had taught botany and chemistry at
the Grant Medical College in Bombay (India).
                                                 
48 Papers related to the incorporation of the Bengal Indigo Manufacturing Company, PRO, BT
31/4628/1000052
49 Private, Letter from W P Bloxam to Prof. Wynstan R Dunstan, dated, October 4 1906, PRO
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No additional information is available on Schrottky. Although definitely kept at
an arm’s distance by the government officials and their chemists, Schrottky figures
consistently in the trade journals either claiming success with the improvement of
manufacturing processes or making other recommendations to bolster the prospects of the
natural indigo industry. It is not unlikely that through this period he also retained business
interests among the indigo factories in Bihar.
Schrottky continued to conduct a few experiments at the factories of individual
planters. Although he claimed to obtain good results in improving yield from isolated
trials at a few factories, he failed to obtain those results on a consistent basis. In 1906,
Schrottky employed a new process of fermentation – now called the “glucosode process,”
at the Burhurwah factory (Turcouleah Concern) belonging to planter James B S Hill.
When conducted under his supervision, the trial returned a very good yield of dye. A
comparative trial with the old process gave a much lower yield of 12 seers of indigo dye
having 69.2% indigotin. Another planter, G.W.C. Moore of Buthnaha Indigo Concern in
Bihar also confirmed that he got very high yield using the invented process. He said:
I have tried Schrottky’s Glucosode Process this Moorhun Mahai in a very
exhaustive manner. It has given me from 15 to 17 seers of Indigo per hundred
maunds of green plant. The usual Process yielded 10-11 seers. 51
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July 28, 1906 1,306 17.70 70.9%
July 29, 1906 1,504 16.75 73.8%
        Source: English Patent, 10,506 of 1906, PRO, AY4/2048/100168, p. 6
Schrottky went on to receive patents for his glucosode process separately in India and
Britain in 1906, a process that involved adding a reagent glucosode to the fermenting
liquor.
However, the new fermentation process received a lukewarm response from other
planters. In July 1906, Schrottky wrote to the secretary of BIPA and offered to conduct a
trial of glucosode process at their Sirsiah laboratory. The directors of BIPA did not show
any interest. Cyril Bergtheil, BIPA’s scientist did not consider Schrottky’s innovation
worthy of an extended trial. In his annual report to BIPA, Bergtheil belittled the
innovation in question. He summarily dismissed the usefulness of the innovation stating
that the planters who had tried the process had not found it to be having a positive impact
on the yield. Schrottky countered Bergtheil’s elucidation of the glucosode process in the
report, arguing that the glucosode process did not simply amount to addition of an alkali
to the steeping vat, as explained by Bergtheil. He belabored the point, citing chemists at
Lincoln’s Inn (London), that chemical glucosode contained several compounds in
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addition to the alkali such as methylated ketonic acid, salts of sodium, and other
secondary products, and that a combination of several compounds in glucosode
contributed to enhancing the efficiency of the fermentation of indigo. He criticized
Bergtheil for “making a public statement calculated to most seriously harm the prospects
of a new and useful invention.” 52
Schrottky conducted more extensive trials at Turcouleah in 1907, one of the
largest indigo growing concerns of Bihar, to establish the credentials of his innovation.
At Turcouleah’s head factory, Schrottky put the morhun crop aggregating 62,478 maunds
of the plant through his patented process and obtained a yield of 17 _ seers per 100
maund of the plant. The yield at this factory in the previous morhun season had been 9
3/4 seers. Since the indigo output was known to vary sharply among the factories and
over different seasons, Schrottky employed several “controls” to confirm that the increase
in yield at Turcouleah had resulted from the employment of the glucosode process. He
subjected the subsequent khoontee crop at Turcouleah to the ordinary process and got a
yield of 9 3/4 seers. At two neighboring Turcouleah factories, Muckwah and Ghyree,
where soil and water supply as well as weather conditions were similar, the ordinary
process for morhun crop returned 11 5/8 and 10 14/15 seers. The gain in yield recorded at
the head factory for morhun came to 76%. The same year Schrottky carried
advertisements in the trade journal Indian Planters’ Gazette inviting planters to buy the
patented process from him. The advertisement guaranteed an increase in yield of at least
                                                 
52 “Eugene Schrottky’s letter to Behar Planters’ Association Limited of February 1907,” NAL,
Indian Planters’ Gazette (March 16, 1907): 299-300
 238
50%, also stating that the indigo produced by the process had tested 76% indigotin on the
Calcutta market, and sold at Rs. 185 per maund on February 2, 1907. 53
In the days following the trial at the Turcouleah head factory, Schrottky exuded
confidence that a practical new scheme existed to ward off the competition of synthetic
indigo. Early in 1907, he wrote:
With Java-Natal indigo and the Glucosode process we can produce indigo so
cheaply that the (natural indigo) Industry will be able to undersell the
synthetic product. 54
Notwithstanding Schrottky’s claims, the majority of planters did not adopt his
fermentative method. In a subsequent letter Schrottky himself referred to the fact that the
planters using his method got “a very low class” indigo, although their total yield went
up. He then returned to his laboratory, conducting experiments to remove the “defect” in
the glucosode process that had caused deterioration in the quality of the dye produced.
Schrottky also introduced alterations in the composition of glucosode.
It is not difficult to understand the reasons for the lack of a positive response to
Schrottky’s experiments. The results obtained by the German chemist were not yet
definitive. Most trials in which Schrottky claimed success were the ones conducted under
his direct supervision. The trials also gave inconsistent results depending upon whether
morhun or khoontie crop was processed, the site of the trial, and local weather conditions.
Besides, as one of the planters rhetorically argued, the key to success lay not in getting
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exceptional figures of yield every once in a while, but getting them consistently. This
early response from a planter, appearing in the Planters’ Gazette of March 1904,
criticized Schrottky because by his own admission his process seemed to work “on
occasions or in very favourable years.” He drew Schrottky’s attention to the fact that the
output from plant indigo was known to be highly erratic, and additionally that other
planters too had obtained comparable figures on odd days. But the real challenge was to
make high yields a permanent feature of the production system on indigo tracts in Bihar;
in other words, to get a sound understanding of the processes that enabled high yields.
Thus, it was no surprise that the planters continued to be skeptical of Schrottky’s claims
and never adopted his “innovation.”  Schrottky’s letter, dated as late as October 1, 1909,
admitted that the merits of his manufacturing methods were still being “greatly
questioned” by the planters. 55
Without abandoning his chemical experiments, Schrottky also continued with his
other mission of popularizing the cultivation of the Java-Natal variety. He believed that
the introduction of the Java-Natal variety held promise for the future of the region’s
indigo industry even if the newer manufacturing methods were not employed.
Schrottky achieved relatively more success in his attempts to spread the
cultivation of the Java variety at indigo factories, although less so in Bihar than in the
neighboring United Provinces, a province to the immediate west of Bihar. On Schrottky’s
personal initiative the Java variety was introduced at two factories in United Provinces -
Surriyat and Belwar. Schrottky also won the favor of Sir John Prescott Hewitt, the
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Lieutenant Governor of that province, who took personal interest in enabling Schrottky’s
trials and experiments at the local Gazia Indigo factory.56
In the end, Schrottky did little more than earn the reputation of a maverick in
India. On the basis of his isolated experiments he continued to make claims about high
yields coming from his processes. Neither the majority of planters nor the other scientists
could replicate his results. Whatever his motivation for conducting these trials and his
claims, neither the planters nor the scientists could ever bring themselves to take
Schrottky seriously.
Bloxam’s Report Of 1908
Bloxam’s report of 1908 authoritatively declared that a huge loss of color was
taking place during the process of manufacture of dye in India. Bloxam had set out to
provide a quantitative method for estimation of color-giving body in the leaf and the
color present in the dye manufactured in India. He was quite successful in doing this. His
methods allowed him to provide very precise figures for the percentages. His study
indicated that the amount of color-giving glucoside in the indigo leaf was 0.6% by weight
and not 0.3% as believed earlier. This doubling of the estimate for obtainable color in the
leaf had major implications for the new efficiency he was proposing. He also pointed out
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that the indigo cakes that he had examined had a color percentage of 60.3 – 61.9%. 57 In
qualitative terms what these numbers implied was that the efficiency of the present
processes of manufacturing was quite low. Bloxam’s claims regarding “low” efficiency
had momentous messages for the scientists, planters, and government in colonial India.
To the scientists working in India the report suggested the prospects of improving the
extraction processes. To the planters and the colonial government the report announced
that it was still possible to save the natural indigo industry:
The Debates In England And India Leading Up To 1908
Dramatically varied reception greeted the report of 1908. Even before the
publication of the final report in 1908, the presentations of Bloxam and Bergtheil at the
Society of Chemical Industry in 1906 had stirred considerable controversy. All concerned
– the metropolitan chemists and the India House bureaucrats in England, the experts and
bureaucrats in India, discussed the two different scientific viewpoints in their own ways
and developed separate conclusions.
Without delay India House turned to A G Perkin, the metropolitan chemist who
had supervised Bloxam’s work, to get his opinion on the controversy between the two
experts. The bureaucrats wanted him to interpret for them the difference in the account
between the two experts, provide his evaluation of the two standpoints, and also enlighten
them as to which set of tests the commercial classes were leaning towards. A G Perkin
was a much-respected expert working in the field of natural dyes. Besides, not only had
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he supervised the experiments of Bloxam and the writing of his report, but he had also
witnessed the presentations of Bloxam and Bergtheil as well as the follow up discussion
among those present at the Society of the Chemical Industry. Thus he had first hand
information on what had transpired at the meeting of the professional organization. The
officials noted that Bergtheil had claimed in his report to the agricultural department in
Bengal that it was his method that was being adopted by the analysts in Calcutta and
London in preference to Bloxam’s. They trusted Perkin to tell them about the views of
the chemists and the leading analysts in the country. 58
Perkin assured them that leading chemists in the country including those present
at the meeting on November 4, 1907 when the two experts had engaged in a dialogue,
had overwhelmingly expressed themselves in favor of the superiority of tests presented
by Bloxam and his associates. The objections of Bergtheil to the tetrasulphonate and
isatin methods had been published in the Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry,
which in turn had been repudiated by Bloxam in the same journal very recently. On the
other hand, he argued that the Bergtheil-Briggs method for color estimation was
demonstrated to him on two or three occasions and he did not think that it was more
accurate than the previous version – the permanganate test. He shared the view that
Bergtheil’s test was faulty and certainly gave inflated estimates. 59
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In the same letter Perkin also doubted that Bergtheil’s claim that analysts in
England favored his method could be true. He did not have information about what was
happening in Calcutta. But he was far more knowledgeable about the situation in
England. He knew of just a couple of experts/consultants that still remained in the
business of administering estimation tests. That was because the scale of indigo imports
had dwindled in England. Also, most dyers now employed their own in-house chemists to
obtain analytical estimates. He did not think that the surviving few chemists and colorists
were using the method proposed by Bergtheil. While he agreed that Bergtheil’s criticism
had slowed down the acceptance of Bloxam’s methods, there was no doubt that Bloxam’s
processes were becoming widespread. Even A. G. Green used the same method for
teaching purposes at the University of Leeds and students of the dyeing department did
not face any problem in getting accurate results with his procedure. In this context, he
also mentioned that it had been anticipated that given the senior position occupied by
Bergtheil, his opposition might have an impact on the users of indigo. To counter that
influence the approval of many eminent chemists had been sought by Bloxam for his
tests. Many British chemists like J Norman Collie, Alfred C Chapman, W H Perkin, and
Arthur G Green had been invited to attest the accuracy of the tetrasulphonate tests and
append personal notes of support to his report. 60  The isatin method on the other hand
was based on a well-known and widely acknowledged quantitative method and according
to him the criticisms by Bergtheil against that test simply did not stand.
The response in India to the presentation of Bloxam’s and Bergtheil’s results at
the Society of the Chemical Industry and the reported difference of opinion between them
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was quite different. For some of them at least, the response to Bloxam’s findings ranged
from being indifferent to outright cavalier and dismissive. A categorical support for the
nature of work being done by Bergtheil even precluded any consideration of the specifics
of the questions being debated at the Society of the Chemical Industry.
When the central government passed along the relevant papers by the two experts
to the regional government and to the Inspector General of Agriculture, they responded
with indifference. There just did not seem enough concern to examine the scientific
questions. J W Mollison represented the sentiments at the local level by stating that work
like Bloxam’s did not have any relevance for the agricultural needs of Bengal. He said
with a sense of definitiveness, “From a practical point of view no great importance needs
to be attached to Mr Bloxam’s indigo research work in England. He may have worked
out problems in the laboratory which are of interest to pure scientists, but I am strongly of
the opinion that for the time being, and probably for all time, his results (so far as I know
them) will be of no value to the ordinary growers of indigo in India.” 61Mollison’s
comments turned out to be true and paradigmatic of the sentiments in Bengal. Local
bureaucrats never showed any interest in the findings of Bloxam, even as they continued
to support Bergtheil’s work. A detailed discussion of the nature of the agricultural station
at Sirsiah that Bergtheil headed between 1909 and 1912, and the fundamental reason for
the support given by the planters to Bergtheil will appear in the next chapter.
The Bureaucratic And Policy Response In England
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Participating in a follow-up discussion at the Society of the Chemical Industry
another metropolitan chemist Professor Raphael Meldola, a long time advocate of British
India’s natural indigo industry, had prophetically summed up the relevance of Bloxam’s
findings. Meldola pointed out that from all appearances Bloxam’s isatin test seemed to be
an accurate test. But he added, “the end of the matter was not reached when the most
perfect of analytical processes had been devised.” It was the “bounden duty” of the
planters and the government to get to the bottom of the matter while investigating at
which point, and by how much, potential color was being lost. But even more than that,
they had to determine if it was possible to plug the holes in the manufacturing processes
and recover the extra indican whose existence the new test had predicted. It was one
thing to analytically prove in the laboratory that the indigo plant could yield more color,
and quite another to actually recover that extra color on a manufacturing scale by using
available capital and technology. 62
India House bureaucrats seem to embraced Meldola’s argument that analytical
work on indigo in England had reached its apogee. Therefore they refused to extend
Bloxam’s further work despite his passionate appeal to them. In the end Bloxam was
quite bitter that even important work like that just completed by him at Leeds had been
unable to get him an extension of his job with the national government in England. 63
Indeed Meldola and his prescriptions became a critical part of the relevant
bureaucratic structure for decision-making with regard to the administration of the Indian
colony. On February 20, 1909 Raphael Meldola repeated his opinion, speaking in front of
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the Indian Government Advisory Committee of the Royal Society. While he proposed
that experimental work on indigo should be continued and that it clearly seemed that the
natural indigo industry had a glimmer of hope, he did not seem to favor the continuation
of more analytical work. “What is now wanted is field work carried out in India both
from the chemical and biological point of view,” he recommended. In their wisdom the
metropolitan bureaucrats decided to go with that advice. 64
The Response Of The Central Government In India
Only the central government in India conjured up the resources to investigate the
implications of Bloxam’s report as opposed to the nonchalant attitude of the Bengal
government. Their response was cautious. In order to have the report critically evaluated
the government set up a committee comprising of three agricultural experts – J Mollison,
Inspector-General of Agriculture in India, B Coventry, Director of the Agricultural
Research Institute at Pusa, and J Hector Barnes, Agricultural Chemist in the province of
Punjab. 65
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The terms of reference of the committee reveal the concerns and priorities of the
central administrators. The officials explicitly asked the committee to submit an early
report on “three questions.”
1) what portions of Bergtheil’s work at Sirsiah were affected by the results of Bloxam’s
investigations?
2) how far was Bloxam’s characterization of Indian manufacturing processes being
inefficient justified, so far as it was possible to form an opinion on the basis of materials
available and without undertaking independent research involving delay?
3) what was the prospect of work currently being done at Sirsiah?
As revealed by the brief of the committee, the administrators did not intend to analyze in
detail the scientific import of Bloxam’s chemical experiments, or settle the controversy
raised by Bloxam’s statements about the efficiency of manufacturing. As the title of the
report suggested, the government basically wanted to assess the impact of Bloxam’s
findings on its own research program at Sirsiah. Which part of the current research
remained unaffected by Bloxam’s assertions and could be judiciously carried forward?
Which parts of experiments had become contentious in the wake of Bloxam’s claims, and
therefore of doubtful efficacy?
Submitted shortly afterwards, the committee’s most significant recommendation
related to the positive appraisal of Bergtehil’s experiments then being conducted at
Sirsiah. The members concurred  that only a long-winded investigation by a separate
body would resolve the controversy regarding the efficiency of manufacturing operations.
The members of the committee admitted that they did not have the qualification to carry
out an experimental investigation of that nature. Many planters had in person testified to
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the benefits offered by the ongoing investigation at Sirsiah, which implied that those
efforts be continued. Accordingly the committee’s report favorably spoke of the
contributions made by the scientists at Sirsiah, especially with regard to improving the
method of steeping, acclimatizing the Java variety, and adopting sound farming practices.
Federal administrators at the center endorsed the positive evaluation of work at Sirsiah. 66
On the question of settling the controversy generated by Bloxam’s arguments
about the efficiency of manufacturing, the administrators at the center accepted the
submission of the committee that only a different committee with different credentials
could examine such issues. In a rejoinder to the report they also added that if the planters
did not agree with Bloxam’s assertion about the low efficiency of the manufacturing
processes, it [was] for the planters to decide (original emphasis) if they should set up an
independent committee to settle that question. A later report by the Director of
Agriculture in Bengal makes a reference to the fact that the planters’ body, BIPA, had
“taken proper steps” to have the specific question relating to the efficiency of current
processes of manufacturing investigated. But that is the last one hears of this in the
records. It is quite probable that the issue was never scientifically settled. Nobody had the
qualifications to settle a question as specialized as thus other than Bloxam and his
associates in England. 67
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 Meanwhile, undeterred and uninfluenced by Bloxam’s critiques, indigo
experiments in India from 1909 came to bear a primarily agricultural orientation. The
context in which such decisions emerged will be the focus of discussion in Chapter
Seven.
Concluding Remarks: Why Bloxam’s Report Was Not Acted Upon?
Bloxam was deeply distressed by the lack of interest in his report by
administrators and planters in India; he was saddened. Bloxam suffered a paralytic attack
two years later, and died in 1913. Even the wider community of chemists working on
dyes in Britain was amazed at the indifference in India to Bloxam’s evidently accurate
experiments. 68
Several factors ensured the irrelevance of Bloxam’s key findings. From all
appearances Bloxam’s tests seemed to be accurate. But as Meldola pointed out the end of
the matter was still not reached when the most perfect of analytical processes had been
devised. It was left for the planters to get to the bottom of the matter while investigating
at which point, and to what extent, potential color was being lost. Also, the business
community had to determine if it was possible to plug the holes in the manufacturing
processes and recover the extra indican whose existence the new tests had predicted. It
was one thing to prove analytically in the laboratory that the indigo plant could yield
more color, and quite another to actually recover that extra color on a manufacturing
scale by using available capital and technology. That never happened.
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Secondly, Bloxam was also trying to turn back the clock for the scientific
community based in colonial India. Scientists in India had moved on to biological lines of
investigation since 1905. High yield of the new Java variety of plant provided them hope
for results from such experiments. Now Bloxam was imploring the Indian scientists to
return to chemical experiments without suggesting a concrete way of recovering the extra
indican. None of the scientists in India had the skill and training to carry forward
Bloxam’s line of query to its logical conclusion. Under such circumstances it is no
surprise that Bloxam’s findings appeared irrelevant to the scientists and bureaucrats in
India.
Thirdly, the government too stopped short of putting its weight behind the
research possibilities opened up by Bloxam’s findings. The administrators were hearing
conflicting voices. Imperial Bacteriologist Cyril Bergtheil contested the findings of
Bloxam. Additionally, the administrators found a majority of planters solidly united in
demanding agricultural experiments in the field rather than chemical experiments in
laboratories. The bureaucrats decided to go with the reasoning of the planters whose
welfare was the rationale for government’s funding of indigo experiments. A year after
the publication of Bloxam’s report, R W Carlyle, Government of India’s Revenue
Secretary, stated that the planters were still “inclined to place reliance chiefly on the
improvement of seed and of methods of cultivation,” thus justifying the focus on
agricultural experiments. 69Perhaps it would be fair to say that the colonial context – the
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local conditions and the preferences of scientists and bureaucrats there - effectively
resisted the implementation of scientific advice emerging out of the metropolitan context.
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CHAPTER 7
BERGTHEIL, BENGAL BUREAUCRATS, AND THE AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENTS,
1908-13
Introduction
The scientific efforts to improve the yield of indigo in India from 1908 to 1913
largely involved the pursuit of agricultural experiments. Cyril Bergtheil supervised the
conduct of these experiments and trials at the Sirsiah Laboratory/Station. Only a few
chemical experiments of an analytical nature were conducted, and these were essentially
intended to close the controversy over the efficiency of the manufacturing processes.
Bloxam’s report of 1908 had emphasized that efforts be re-focused on to the
manufacturing stage (rather than on the crop in the field) because those currently in use
were quite inefficient and left much of the dye behind in the leaf. His claims were backed
by a group of metropolitan chemists who attested that the analytical work performed by
Bloxam at Leeds and presented at the Society of Chemical Industry was credible. By
contrast, from the perspective of the patrons of experiments in Bengal – the provincial
bureaucrats and the planters -- the controversy provoked by Bloxam’s report was soon
settled.  They believed in the interpretation provided by the Imperial Bacteriologist, Cyril
J Bergtheil, one that implied that Bloxam’s assertions were based on “misapplications” of
experimental procedures. They continue to allow Bergtheil to define the agenda of
scientific work in India. Bergtheil moved on to conduct agricultural and biological trials
because he believed these to be the best course for improving the yield of the natural dye.
This was a period marked by minimal metropolitan interest in the prospects of
India’s natural indigo industry. English chemical manufacturers and some sections of the
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public raised questions like: Should the German manufacturers of synthetic dyes be
allowed to dominate the British markets? What role would the indigenous manufacturers
play in meeting national needs? Chemical industry entrepreneur Ivan Levinstein even
demanded that the “imperial” natural indigo industry based in colonial India be
encouraged through trade protection policies to prevent the dominance of English
markets by the German synthetic manufacturers. These pleas were ignored. Others called
for the reform of patent laws, arguing that the current set of regulations gave undue
advantage to the foreign dye manufacturers. However the patent reforms of 1908 made
little real difference. Prompted by the new regulations, one manufacturer, the MLB
(Meister, Lucius & Bruning) set up its base to produce synthetic indigo in Britain.
Production at MLB’s unit in England kept rising till it supplied 50 percent of total British
consumption of synthetic indigo by 1913. 1
Meanwhile, political economy in the province of Bengal took center stage. These
years witnessed the outbreak of peasant agitation on the indigo tracts in Champaran, the
largest producer of indigo among the four districts (see Table 7.1 below). Citing non-
remunerative purchase prices the native growers refused to plant indigo for the European
planters. The growing agitation brought a new sense of urgency among colonial
administrators with regard to developments within the indigo industry. On the one hand,
they counseled the planters to keep wages and purchase prices remunerative. On the other
hand, they wholeheartedly supported the conduct of scientific experiments with the hope
of turning the indigo industry into a profitable venture for the planters.
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Table 7.1
         Indigo Acreage in Four North Bihar Districts in India, 1894-1934 (in hectares)
Year Champaran Saran Muzaffarpur Darbhanga Total
1894-
1895
21,853 20,638 55,441 37,837 135,769
1899-
1900
38,849 18,413 24,280 20,598 102,140
1904-
1905
33,993 7,284 14,366 13,314 68,957
1909-
1910
14,568 3,925 8,134 4,735 31,362
1914-
1915
3,277 930 3,035 2,630 9,872
Source:  Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and
Gandhian Politics. New Delhi, 1999, Table A (unpaginated)
Finally, towards the close of the period in question, a curtain was drawn on the
planters’ initiative to use laboratory science for improving the yield and quality of the
natural dye. Planters’ profits plummeted to a dismal level. By taking into account the cost
of factors of production (land, wages, financial capital) on the one side and the falling
prices for indigo and returns from divesting into profitable crops on the other side of the
equation, historian Jacques Pouchepadass has calculated that the average profitability on
planters’ invested capital decreased from 25-35% in the 19th century to 3-3.5% in the pre-
War years. 2 Political agitation brought additional costs for court litigations and also
raised concerns about the physical safety of European planters against attacks from
locals. All these factors resulted in a very high rate of turnover as European planters
deserted their business in great numbers. In the context of such adversity the planters
stopped the scientific work of Cyril Bergtheil in 1912 and in early 1913 requested that the
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Sirsiah Station be permanently closed down. The government transferred the indigo
experiments and trials in progress to Pusa.
The Outbreak Of Indigo Disturbances In Bihar, 1906-1908
The indigo disturbances during the period provided the backdrop against which
the provincial government adopted a new set of policies towards the planters and the
plantation industry. One measure taken by the government to deal with these disturbances
was to regulate the plantation industry.
Jacques Pouchepadass has provided a comprehensive account of indigo revolts
during the period being considered in this chapter - 1908-13. 3 Pouchepadass has pointed
out that the indigo revolts during the first decade of the 20th century were related to the
fall in the market price of natural indigo. The planters took several steps to offset the low
prices in the market. And the measures taken by the planters in managing contractual
obligations with the agriculturists and in divesting were perceived by the popular masses
as “excesses” and by the rural oligarchy as an encroachment on their financial interests.
The widespread agitation reflected the crisis that had beset the industry, and
further aggravated it. Towards the end of 1906 the first agitation broke out on the Sathi
plantation (Champaran).  Despite police repression and the arrest of leaders the
movement showed no signs of dying out. By the end of 1907 and early 1908 the agitation
had gathered full momentum.
A major cause of discontent was the fact that the native growers were being
forced by the planters to pay additional charges called abwab. The obligation to pay
abwab had a long history in the region. The term referred to numerous types of exactions
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demanded from the subordinates in a feudal agrarian set up. The superior classes freely
enjoyed this privilege. As a matter of fact the payment of this charge was not recognized
under the rule of law. But in the countryside it was not uncommon that long-standing
conventions rather than Pax Britannica would determine rural relations.
On this occasion the planters were demanding the payment of abwab based on
their authority as the local landlords and contractors. Most planters had purchased
zamindari rights from the superior landed classes. The possession of these coercion rights
enabled them to exercise a better control over the indigo growers. At the same time the
planters had signed indigo contracts with the growers that were recognized by the rule of
law. Seventy per cent of land in Champaran was under the asamiwar system of
cultivation in which the peasants cultivated indigo on their own land and supplied the
produce to the planter. A clause of the asamiwar system was tin-kathiya that allowed the
lease-holding planter to demand that the growers put 3/20th (that is three katthas per
bigha) of their land holdings under indigo. The latest complication arose because the
planters were now showing a preference for divesting - growing food crops instead of
indigo, for one. Food crops fetched them a better price in the local markets and helped
offset the loss on indigo. The planters now insisted that the growers put 3/20th of their
land under food crop or pay compensation if they did not. Natives considered such a
demand to be irregular because their contract originally obliged them to grow indigo.
Therefore they turned to the courts requesting that the “illegal” abwab payments be
stopped.
Friction also rose over the planters’ drive to engage in sugar manufacturing,
which brought them into competition with the rural oligarchy. The planters were
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relatively more resourceful. They began to offer higher prices to the producers of
sugarcane in the countryside and thus challenged the position of native sugar interests. 4
Rich peasants, merchants, and bankers – all natives – had so far dominated the niche of
sugar manufacturing. These aggrieved upper classes saw the arrival of European
businessmen as a threat and therefore joined with the contract indigo farmers in opposing
the planters. 5
The agitation in Champaran increasingly invited the attention of the nationalist
elements at a time of a growing national movement against the colonial rule. The court
cases brought the indigo growers in contact with lawyers in locations as far as the
divisional city of Patna. And in the first decade of the 20th century the spread of
nationalist ideology was most prominent among the legal professionals in urban Bihar.
The nationalists in turn were motivated to intervene in the conflict to exploit a local
grievance to push their agenda of broadening the anti-colonial, nationalist platform. Thus
there were linkages emerging between the local indigo growers and the nationalist middle
classes.  These emerging connections threatened to enlarge the scope of the indigo
disturbances. 6
The administrators could not afford to let the situation drift out of control. They
faced a dilemma. They had all along known that the abwab was an illegal payment and a
vice perpetuated on the plantations. But the administrators had never made any efforts to
check them. The colonial officials regarded turning a blind eye to this legal infraction to
                                                 
4 Letter of the manager of Parsa factory in Champaran, dated, October 8, 1908, in Proceedings of
the Government of Bengal, Political (Police), No. 16, April 1909
5 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: 150-160
6 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: 160-166
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be a small cost in favor of pushing the colonial enterprise of indigo manufacturing. But
the spreading political unrest and violence on the indigo tracts forced a re-evaluation of
the official perspective on the peasant movement.
A confidential enquiry was ordered by the government to get an assessment of the
prevailing tensions on indigo tracts. W R Gourlay, the Director of the Department of
Agriculture, conducted this enquiry. Gourlay’s report submitted in April 1909 stated in
no uncertain terms that the purchase price given to indigo growers by the planters was not
remunerative. It recommended that the prices be enhanced by 12.5%. Gourlay also made
a set of recommendations to streamline the working of the contract system. The
departmental report suggested that the government should initiate necessary measures to
limit the term of indigo contracts to a maximum of nine years, reduce the obligation to
grow indigo from 3/20th to 2/20th (that is from three to two katthas per bigha) of the
peasant’s holding, and forbid the efforts to force peasants to switch from indigo to food
crops, sugarcane etc.
The analysis in Gourlay’s report reflects the emergence of new considerations in
the official standpoint towards the indigo industry. The colonial bureaucrats were wary of
political costs emerging out of the planters’ transfer of their financial losses to the indigo
growers. They expressed these reservations by openly talking about their opposition to
“coercion,” something that they had not done before in Bihar. The Lieutenant Governor
of Bengal thus commented on Gourlay’s report: “India has none too many industries, and
no one wishes to destroy or discourage any that she has; indigo as little as any. But the
indigo industry must stand on a commercial footing and be dependent in no degree
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whatsoever on compulsion or even pressure. I am ready to help the planters in every
legitimate way. But if indigo cannot subsist without coercion, indigo must perish.” 7
Bergtheil At Sirsiah, 1908
 Backed by the Bengal government’s unflinching support, Bergtheil’s work
continued uninterrupted during the year. He conducted some “dye tests” in order to
compare the dyeing potential of natural and synthetic indigo and a few trials to streamline
the manufacturing operations. But the majority of his experiments were of an agricultural
nature aimed at increasing the percentage of indican in the leaves. 8
Bergtheil’s experiments on dyeing potential were more in the nature of
“demonstration experiments.” Did natural indigo give more color than an equal weight of
synthetic indigo? Was the higher price of the natural product in the market justifiable? A
lot was at stake in these questions. An affirmation would demonstrate the superiority of
the natural product. These experiments were not fundamentally directed towards the
improvement of yield. Bergtheil conducted them at the behest of the planters. They were
targeted to persuade the consumers.
But the tests proved inconclusive. Bergtheil was specifically called upon to test
the statement made by some dyers in Britain that the natural dye was capable of
imparting more color than the synthetic. He prepared separate vats with equal amount of
natural and synthetic dye. Equal loads of fabric were then dyed for similar lengths of
                                                 
7 Gourlay’s Report and Lieutenant Governor’s comments are cited in Jacques Pouchepadass,
Champaran and Gandhi: 154-155
8 “An Account of the Scientific Work on Indigo During the Year 1908-09,” Appendix IV,
Agriculture, October 1910, File, 7-R/15 1-3, Board’s Agriculture File 150 of 1910, BSA, GOB,
Rev (Agr.). The report describes Bergtheil’s work done up to January 1909.
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time. The results were identical as far as the shades were concerned. But the garment in
the two instances consumed equal amount of dye, whether natural or synthetic. This
seemed to go against the original claim according to which a lesser amount of natural
should have been consumed. Bergtheil admitted that if the difference in the amount of
dye consumed was miniscule his apparatus might not have detected it. Therefore on the
basis of his trials he was not in a position to confirm or deny that natural indigo had a
superior coloring power. At the same time he stressed that the question was worth further
study. A marginal difference, if it existed, could result in cost savings for large concerns
that used large amounts of dye.
 The trials connected with manufacturing were focused on the processes of
loading the vats, filtration of the run off liquid, and grinding of the indigo cake into
powder. Bergtheil first experimented with the Java plant. He categorized the plants into
superior (40% leaf content and 0.8% indican content) and inferior quality (35% leaf
content and 0.7% indican content). On the basis of his trials (see results as tabulated
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                  Variation in efficiency of manufacturing due to different loading of vats













                  Source: An Account of the Scientific Work on Indigo During the Year
1908-09, BSA 9
                                                 
9 Appendix IV, Agriculture, October 1910, File, 7-R/15 1-3, Board’s Agriculture File 150 of
1910, p., ix, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.)
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above)he recommended that good quality Java plants should be lightly loaded at 80
maunds for every 1,000 cu. feet space in the vats and inferior quality plants at 100
maunds for every 1,000 cu. feet of vat space. The weight in the tank should never exceed
120 maunds. He faced problems in acquiring samples of the Sumatrana plant in a
sufficient quantity. But he was able to conduct a limited number of trials with Sumatrana.
On their basis he felt reasonably confident to recommend that similar weight ratios for
loading should be followed for the Sumatrana as for Java variety.
Bergtheil’s efforts on the filtration of run-off liquid from the fermentation tank
and on making indigo powder were not successful. The mechanical process of filtering
being tried out at Sirsiah posed problems. Cloths of looser texture did not hold back the
dye in a sufficient quantity. But when a cloth of close weave was tried the process of
filtration was too slow to be practical for implementation on an industrial scale. To
prevent this wastage Bergtheil suggested intervention in the oxidation tank. He
recommended that Rawson’s patented “ammonia gas process” of oxidation be used by
the planters as it offered two advantages. In the first place it enabled better oxidation. At
the same time it also facilitated a better settling of color to the bottom of the oxidation
tank leaving very little dye suspended in the vat.
The powder-making machine procured the previous year did not perform as
expected. It did manage to turn out flakes that could be easily ground. But the flow and
speed of producing flakes was too slow. Therefore another machine was ordered from a
firm in Edinburgh for a trial.
 The vast majority of Bergtheil’s experiments were along agricultural lines. In his
annual report for the year he had said:
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The future of experimental work on indigo lies almost entirely in agricultural
directions, in attempts to improve the indigo plant by selecting and breeding,
to stimulate the production of indigo [indican] in it by manurial treatment, or
to discover new plants capable of yielding more indigo [color] than anything
we yet have. 10
In 1908 Bergtheil mostly focused on enhancing the content of indican in the indigo
leaves. Improved knowledge of indican and the wider circulation of that information
must have facilitated his work in this direction. He had clearly shown an increased
familiarity with the subject. He used the word indican for the first time in his scientific
papers in 1907, as opposed to “the glucoside” or “the coloring principle” as before. He
also explicitly referenced the work of the Dutch scientist, Beyerinck, on indican and
indigo enzyme, revealing his familiarity with the relevant technical literature.
Bergtheil primarily tried the route of adding metallic salts, mostly sulfates,
to plants and measured their effect on the increase of indican in the leaves. He prepared
pot cultures to complete these experiments. He found that the addition of copper salts
caused maximum increase followed by magnesium, iron, and nickel in that order (see
results in Table 7.3 below).
                                                 
10 Cyril Bergtheil, “An Account of the Scientific work on Indigo during the year 1908-09,”
Appendix IV, Agriculture, October 1910, File, 7-R/15 1-3, Board’s Agriculture File 150 of 1910,
p., viii, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.)
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                                                                               Table 7.2
                             Effect of salts on the production of indican
Metallic salt Average indican in the leaves





                      Source: An Account of the Scientific Work on Indigo During the Year
1908-09, BSA 11
The importance of these trials lay in the forming of Bergtheil’s initial conjectures.
He found out that if the copper salt was added to the soil prematurely in the pre-planting
stage it had an adverse effect on germination. But when added at a later point of growth
of the plant it positively affected the production of color.  In his mind there was no doubt
that the addition of salts was causing differences in the level of the color-bearing
principle in leaf. That is why the first cutting that transpired soon after the addition of
salts gave a higher weight of indican than the second cutting. These early results made
him hypothesize that the copper salts led to vigor of growth and early development of
high indican content. Magnesium salts, on the other hand, caused good leaf development
with a moderately high and steady indican content in leaves. He was encouraged by the
results with magnesium because the soil in Bihar was rich in magnesium salts and thus
little additional treatment was needed to augment the magnesium content of soil, in case
the final results confirmed what he had learnt.  He also explained that the relatively low
                                                 
11 Cyril Bergtheil, “An Account of the Scientific work on Indigo during the year 1908-09,”
Appendix IV, Agriculture, October 1910, File, 7-R/15 1-3, Board’s Agriculture File 150 of 1910,
p., x, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.)
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yield in his pot-cultured plants was due to the especial and regimented conditions of
experimental analysis. This was intended to deflect criticism of overall poor yield in his
trials, because Java plants as ordinarily grown by the planters were known to give an
indican content of 0.7-0.8%. Although his trials were in a preliminary stage he felt quite
confident that this line of inquiry would be fruitful.
Bergtheil highlighted the importance of  “selection” experiments of a biological
nature. He had become a firm believer in the potential of such procedures of supervised
isolation of plants with the best phenotypes and genotypes and their propagation through
controlled breeding. He was especially inspired by the example of the beet sugar industry
in the West of India where such principles had been successfully utilized to improve
yield.
In the case of indigo there were still many open questions. Not even a simple
process of selection had been ever implemented on an industry wide scale. Would such
methods bring results in the case of indigo? The ability to produce indican was “a
chemical property” as against “physical” properties that were widely known to be
inheritable. Could this ability be inherited? He begged for the appointment  of a botanist
who was in touch with new knowledge on the principles of heredity to resolve these
questions:
The field here is an enormous one, calling for years of patient work from
both a chemist and a biologist schooled in the most recent views on
heredity.12
                                                 
12 Cyril Bergtheil, “An Account of the Scientific work on Indigo during the year 1908-09,”
Appendix IV, Agriculture, October 1910, File, 7-R/15 1-3, Board’s Agriculture File 150 of 1910,
p., xi, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.)
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The Decision To Continue Bergtheil’s Experiments At Sirsiah
Even as Bergtheil continued his trials at Sirsiah the continuation of his work
became an issue of debate between the central and provincial officials. In 1908 it was the
provincial government in Bengal that showed an exceptional commitment to continue the
indigo experiments. The laboratory complex at Sirsiah had achieved a certain legitimacy
that the provincial officials were better positioned to appreciate. They witnessed at first
hand how the local community of planters appreciated the work in progress at Sirsiah
under Bergtheil. And thus they became forceful campaigners for the continuation of
ongoing work there.
In contrast, the officials at the center were lukewarm to the question of indigo
experiments. They first expressed concern that the absence of Bergtheil from Pusa was
disrupting the imperial plans of supporting agricultural research and education in the
colony. Subsequently the publication of Bloxam’s report in 1908 also threw a spanner in
the works. Now Bloxam’s claim that the current line of experiments at Sirsiah was not
the appropriate one, and Bergtheil refusal to accept his criticism, gave mixed signals. In
such a situation the commitment of central government officials to support the indigo
experiments at the Sirsiah Laboratory became fragile.
The Argument Of The Provincial Government In Favor Of The Sirsiah Station And
Bergtheil
Back in 1904 the central government had approved a proposal originating from
Bengal to allow Bergtheil to work at Sirsiah for a term of two years. Subsequently the
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provincial government had obtained another year’s extension to Bergtheil’s deputation.
The Bengal bureaucrats requested a third time that Bergtheil’s term is extended for
another two years until 1 April 1909. But this time the central bureaucrats turned down
their request, and instead demanded that Cyril Bergtheil, who was after all the Imperial
Bacteriologist, return to join his primary appointment at Pusa from 1st April 1908. 13
The next few months proved to be eventful. The Lieutenant Governor and his
team in Bengal were a little surprised by the response from the center. They made
frenetic efforts to retain Bergtheil at Sirsiah. They realized that the transfer of Bergtheil
would inevitably cause a rupture in the experiments at Sirsiah, something that they did
not want. They first contacted the Inspector General of Agriculture in Pusa, J. Mollison,
and sought his intervention on the matter with the Revenue Department officials at the
center.
Mollison was happy to oblige. He was a supporter of the agricultural paradigm the
way Bergtheil had defined it. He was also known to hold a positive opinion of Bergtheil’s
expertise. In more recent times he had expressed appreciation of the current work at
Sirsiah. He interceded on behalf of the Bengal officials. On his initiative the officials
were able to get a reprieve for a few months beyond April.
Meanwhile Bloxam’s report of 1908 further hardened attitudes at the center on the
question of sparing Bergtheil. By introducing doubts about the appropriateness of the
direction of experiments in Bengal the report invited a fresh review of the experimental
work at Sirsiah. The central government set up a committee to study the implications of
                                                 
13 Letter from J Wilson, Revenue Secretary, Government of India to Revenue Secretary,
Government of Bengal, letter no. 1114, dated, July 1 1907, No. 27, Serial No. 2, Government of
India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for June 1907, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, P/7613
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Bloxam’s report and the report of that body further de-legitimized in their eyes the
experiments at Sirsiah. Now the officials were not sure if they wanted to compromise
their own agenda of agricultural research and education at the imperial center in Pusa for
the sake of indigo experiments at Sirsiah.
The Bengal bureaucrats were convinced, however, that Bergtheil’s work at Sirsiah
was important. They decided to write another letter to the center arguing how important it
was to keep Sirsiah running and to retain the scientist there. This second time they
prepared a belabored defense of their position. They made two kinds of arguments. One,
they cited the good work accomplished by Bergtheil at that station in the past, described
what work was still incomplete and in progress, and how the prospects of results coming
out of that work looked good. Two, they argued that Bergtheil was the most suitable
expert by training and experience to undertake the required research on indigo. They also
tried to establish Bergtheil’s individual credibility in the light of counter claims from
chemist Bloxam in England about the efficacy of experiments being supervised by the
former in India.
Rhetorically making a point, they argued that it would be a “mistake” to dilute in
any way the long-standing commitment that they had so far shown to indigo experiments.
The government had started subsidizing the experiments in 1900 because saving an
important industry of colonial India was considered a task worthy of their attention.
Support for the indigo industry was also considered tactically advantageous since the
European planters in India were significant political allies. The laboratory experiments to
date had proven fruitful, and there was “great hope” that continued efforts would further
improve the yield of the dye. At the same time, the need for “political advantage”
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accruing from support to the planting community had not diminished in any way.
Therefore they advised that the government must not now withdraw its support of the
work. 14
On manufacturing, they noted how Christopher Rawson had earlier contributed to
perfecting the oxidation stage. Following him Bergtheil had made useful contributions
toward improving the yield from the fermentation stage. It was now believed that those
two core processes in manufacturing were working at an optimal level of efficiency. But
the “subsidiary processes” in manufacturing still needed more attention. They pointed out
that there was scope to devise procedures to recover color from the run off liquid.
Savings could also be made through recovery of color during the stages of boiling and
drying that came before indigo pulp was pressed into cake. More efforts were similarly
required in the direction of turning indigo cake into a powder of uniform texture. The
planters and their experts were increasingly considering the production of indigo in the
form of a dry powder. It was now believed that supplying indigo in the form of a powder
would improve user processes at the consumers’ end and enhance its market value.
But the central focus of future experiments was going to be the plant in the field.
The Bengal officials pointed to the need for agricultural and biological experiments
especially through a focus on “field selection.” The final goal was to get plants of “pure
type” that would give more leaf per unit area, that would have more indican in the leaf,
and that would be disease resistant. Experiments with manures were continuing in
parallel supervised by Bergtheil to get such plants. But the best hope lay through
                                                 
14 Letter from F W Duke, Revenue Secretary, Government of Bengal to Revenue and Agriculture
Secretary, Government of India, dated, June 17 1908, letter no. 1182T.-R, Government of India,
Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for October 1908, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, P/7896
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biological selection. The center at Dasna was already working on the selection of the
Sumatrana variety of indigo plant, but those efforts were in a very early stage. Three
small centers had been recently inaugurated for the selection of the Java variety. The high
yield prospect, the Java variety, had proven to be a breed difficult to tame in the local
environs of Bihar. Pests were routinely attacking this foreign variety and year after year
crops were being destroyed. It was thought that a disease resistant Java variety could be
obtained through the process of isolating and propagating plants with better phenotypes.
The administrators in Bengal also underscored the importance of Sirsiah for
addressing the day-to-day problems of a sundry nature faced by the planters in Bihar.
Sirsiah was a very useful “advisory center” for the planters. The experts at Sirsiah
routinely conducted scores of analyses with samples of dye, water, leaf etc that the
planters brought to them and provided expert advice on agricultural practices. The need
for such a center was especially critical when the planters were adopting a new variety of
indigo plant – the Java variety. The officials gave examples of how in the absence of
appropriate knowledge the planters had made mistakes in the culture of Java seeds. Many
of them ended up with seeds that failed to germinate and thus had their entire season’s
crop destroyed. There were many similar problems faced by the planters on their
plantations requiring expert advice.
Bergtheil, with his training in chemistry, bacteriology, and agricultural sciences,
seemed to be the most suitable person to carry out the proposed work. The task at hand
required the skills of a botanist and a laboratory chemist because monitoring the
economic value of the plant depended on estimating leaf percentage in the field and
indigotin content in the laboratory. Bergtheil alone was best positioned to do both. All
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that he would need, it was thought, was a botanist of relatively little experience to assist
him. Besides, Bergtheil also had “great personal qualifications.” He had lived with the
planters; he fully identified with the interests of the planting community, and had won
their complete confidence.
The administrators in Bengal proposed a plan for reorganizing the scientific
infrastructure of the province of Bengal that would accommodate the interests of the
indigo industry as well as meet the needs of the region’s agriculture. The planters’
organization, BIPA, wanted to continue indigo experiments under Bergtheil. But due to
financial constraints they were only in a position to offer him temporary employment.
And in the absence of more permanent prospects in India Bergtheil was likely to leave.
The bureaucrats did not want the regional industry to lose the services of a person whose
assistance they considered was critical for that industry. Therefore they were willing to be
accommodative in a proactive way.
They submitted the blue print of a plan that involved turning Sirsiah into the
government’s own agricultural center focusing on the needs of north Bihar, for five years
to begin with, and appointing Cyril Bergtheil as its head. The province of Bengal was too
large to be administered by the single Deputy Director of Agriculture stationed at Pusa.
Pusa had anyway not focused on many of the staples of north Bihar such as sugarcane
and tobacco. The second agricultural station that the administrators planned at Sirsiah
with Bergtheil as the additional deputy director could serve well the agricultural needs of
the region. The Bengal Government also disclosed that they intended to lend the services
of Bergtheil to the planters to undertake indigo research as long as their annual grant to
the indigo industry was operational. Such a blue print for reorganization had been
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prepared in consultation with the Inspector General of Agriculture, J Mollison.  The
favorable attitude of this important official must have been an important factor
encouraging the Bengal bureaucrats to come up with such a plan for proposing to the
center.
 In their letter the Bengal bureaucrats also went out of their way to express their
trust in the ability of Bergtheil as well as the experiments he wished to pursue. Obviously
they were trying to dispel the doubts that Bloxam’s report had sown into the minds of the
officials at the center. They were quite willing to engage the central bureaucrats in a
debate, and try to persuade them about the appropriateness of Bergtheil’s experiments in
Bengal.
The bureaucrats stated that their faith in Bergtheil was “unshaken.” Bloxam had
argued that the tests currently in use overestimated the content of the color in the dye by
5-6%. He had also claimed that the use of his novel isatin method of testing proved that
the content of recoverable color in the leaf was 50% more than what was believed in
India. All these meant that there was much more color to be extracted from the leaf. The
Bengal bureaucrats brushed aside these claims. They instead highlighted the fact that
Bergtheil had pointed to problems in the procedures adopted by Bloxam, which were at
the root of his “erroneous” conclusions. Bloxam’s third claim was that indigo plants had
higher average leaf content than was generally assumed in India while calculating
efficiency. The bureaucrats once again argued that the opinion of Bergtheil who was a
“man on the spot” and who had made “hundreds, even thousands” of determinations
about leaf content had to be more trustworthy. On the face of it, the Bengal authorities
should have welcomed Bloxam’s assertion that Bergtheil was underestimating yield.
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Such inference only pointed to scope for increasing yield through agricultural and
chemical means. But instead they were dismissive of Bloxam. Such was the level of their
distrust in Bloxam from his previous stint that the Bengal bureaucrats simply brushed
aside his claims.
The Bengal officials also highlighted the fact that the favorable assessment of
Bloxam’s work by the chemists at the Society of Chemical Industry in England pertained
only to one of his three conjectures. Much had been made of the support for Bloxam’s
experiments by the renowned chemists in England. In that context, the officials noted that
the discussion at the Society of Chemical Industry had revolved only around the
reliability and validity of Bloxam’s tetrasulphonate method of dye testing, and that the
relevance of that discussion was marginal to his claims on overall efficiency. On the basis
of the new terasulphonate method Bloxam had contended that older methods of testing
overstated the color content in the final product by 5-6%. If one were to believe in those
figures then it only implied that the margin for improvement was wider by that
percentage. That was a small margin compared to Bloxam’s overall claim that the
manufacturing processes could be made 60% more efficient. Practically no discussion
had taken place among the chemists at the Society of Chemical Industry over the
accuracy of the isatin method or over the issue of the average leaf content of indigo
plants. Adopting this line of reasoning the bureaucrats in Bengal tried to minimize the
impact of opinions expressed by the metropolitan chemists in England.
The officials argued that it was only “natural” that in the context of existing
difference of opinion among experts they should believe in Bergtheil’s account.  Due to
their previous experience with the two experts they considered Bergtheil to be more
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worthy of their trust. In his scientific endeavors Bergtheil was always guided by the
pursuit of “practical issues.” In the past he had delivered results that were found to be
“useful.” In contrast, Bloxam’s experiments, though based on valid procedures, only led
to claims of theoretical interest and not to ready application.  Way back in 1903 Bloxam
had asserted that the manufacturing processes in India had an efficiency of only 12 %.
Now he was claiming that the processes had a slightly higher efficiency than the 12%
mark he had earlier proposed. But he could never suggest a way of extracting the extra
color that he hypothesized was present in the leaves. Thus the planters and administrators
in Bihar generally perceived Bloxam’s objections as “destructive criticism.” In that
context, even as the experts in India and England debated the technical issues at stake, the
administrators in Bengal readily accepted Bergtheil’s judgment over what types of
experiments were likely to bear results.
It needs to be underscored here that although Bloxam was making claims that a
huge improvement in yield was theoretically possible, he was simply brushed aside in
Bengal at this time. The Bengal bureaucrats had decided to support their in-house expert
Bergtheil, come what might. They supported the idea of agricultural improvement over
potential manufacturing improvements. As we shall see in the next chapter, such a
dogmatic attitude was later given up. After 1913 the Bengal bureaucrats were again
willing to consider the possibilities of improving manufacturing through the application
of chemical knowledge. This was not merely vacillation. It reflected a very basic problem
in colonial India – that no one could identify the “best point” of attack for improving
indigo with any degree of conviction or certainty.
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The Different Perspective Of The Imperial Government
The officials at the center were not moved. They insisted that Cyril Bergtheil must
quit his work on indigo at Sirsiah and take up his appointment as Imperial Bacteriologist
at Pusa.
Their stance clearly revealed a new attitude at the center that now laid less stress
on the importance of indigo relative to general public obligations towards research and
development of colonial agriculture. First and foremost they referred to the procedural
issue that Bergtheil’s appointment at Sisrsiah in 1904 was of “a purely temporary nature.”
That year Bergtheil had accepted the appointment of Imperial Bacteriologist made to him
by the Secretary of State. But on Governor Andrew Fraser’s request he had been allowed
to work out definite experimental issues related to indigo in Bengal. The understanding
reached at that time was that Bergtheil would revert to his position at Pusa as soon as the
laboratory and other infrastructure there were ready. For this reason alone they affirmed
their right to recall Bergtheil to Pusa. 15
But significantly, they also questioned the usefulness of experiments in progress
at Sirsiah and the contribution that Bergtheil could possibly make. They referred to
Bloxam’s report and the report of the committee that they had set up to evaluate the
implications of Bloxam’s findings. Admittedly they skirted the discussion of
contradictory technical explanations put forth by Bergtheil and by Bloxam and other
metropolitan chemists. Instead they based their argument on another set of factors. The
committee set up at the center had pointed out that the planters had not brought their
                                                 
15 Letter from R W Carlyle, Revenue Secretary, Government of India to Revenue Secretary,
Government of Bengal, dated February 3, 1909, letter no. 152, No. 20, Serial No. 2, Government
of India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for February 1909, IOR,
GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, P/8174
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manufacturing operations even to the level of efficiency that Rawson’s and Bergtheil’s
experiments had shown to be possible. The planters were more inclined to try and
improve the stock of seeds and the cultivation practices. They argued that Bergtheil, a
bacteriologist by training, was not suited to work out and improve agricultural practices
in the field. In making such an argument they differed from the suggestion put forth
earlier by the Bengal bureaucrats. The latter had contended that agricultural bacteriologist
Bergtheil was ideally suited to split work between the laboratory and the field. They
considered his practical experience of six years with indigo planting and manufacturing
in Bihar rather than his formal training to claim that he was the most suitable expert.
The contention of the center was that a bacteriologist was more appropriately
required at Pusa. Research and education work had been going on at Pusa in every branch
of agricultural sciences except in bacteriology, the field for which Bergtheil had been
originally appointed.  The Imperial Mycologist, for instance, had to put aside some
experiments in the absence of the bacteriologist with whom he needed to collaborate. The
federal government had also received representation from a provincial government to
start instructions in bacteriology for native apprentices as soon as possible. The
government had so far been distracted from its original plans at Pusa in order to protect
the interests of the planting community. But enough had already been done, they argued.
The federal officials now believed that it was time they considered the “general interest”
as against the interests of one industry and one community.
The Counter-Proposal And Decision
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The final decision to continue the experiments at Sirsiah under Bergtheil came at
the end of a third round of negotiations during which the planters in Bihar very forcefully
articulated their demand. The chain of events started after the decision of the central
government was received in Bengal. The planters met in an extraordinary session to
discuss the implications of losing Bergtheil. They unanimously proposed that the work at
Sirsiah should be continued. They requested the Director of Agriculture in Bengal to
intercede on their behalf and to ask the central officials one more time to allow Bergtheil
to stay at Sirsiah. They also offered to pay a major part of Bergtheil’s salary and
laboratory expenses if their request was granted.
Bergtheil also exuded confidence on his part. He offered to step down from his
lucrative post of Imperial Bacteriologist to accept the position of indigo specialist at
Sirsiah if the planters could assure his employment for a reasonable period of time. He
believed in the indigo work that he was pursuing, and was confident that he could deliver
positive results.
The Revenue Secretary of Bengal again wrote to his superiors at the center
pointing out that new conditions had emerged and asking if they would re-consider their
earlier judgment. The planters had shown an utmost interest in favor of the continuation
of Bergtheil’s experiments, and Bergtheil himself had conveyed his availability for the
indigo work. The federal officials were requested to decide firstly whether they would be
ready in principle to let Bergtheil resign and stay at Pusa. They were also asked if they
would waive their right to let Bergtheil resign without the six months’ prior notice as was
required by the terms of his contract. 16
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Secretary, Government of India, dated, April 17 1909, letter no. 61TR, No. 37, Serial No. 7, File
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On their part the Bengal bureaucrats contended that the new direction of work on
biological lines at Sirsiah was indeed worthy of all the support the government could
provide.  They had studied the annual scientific report for Sirsiah for 1908-09, which
outlined that the station would focus on identifying and selecting plants with the
appropriate physiology, on studying conditions that augmented the production of indican
in the leaves, and on controlling pollination to ensure that the indican-producing faculty
was inherited. In their opinion this was a very legitimate agenda for the improvement of
indigo.
They also seconded the plans for experiments at Sirsiah led by Bergtheil assisted
by a new botanist. In saying so they stuck to the earlier line that due to his long
experience with indigo experiments in India Bergtheil was the most suitable expert to
lead the scientific endeavors. The officials also supported the plan to bring a new botanist
to the station. They agreed with the rationale that a botanist, one with an expertise in
plant breeding and plant physiology, would make a good team with Bergtheil.
This time they put forth a fresh assessment of Bloxam’s experimental results
while defending the preferred route of biological experiments. In their earlier letter they
had been more or less dismissive of Bloxam’s point of view in favor of Bergtheil’s. But
this time they remarked that the planters had set up an independent committee to settle
the “debatable” issue of efficiency. The report of the same committee was expected to
resolve the question whether the manufacturing processes could be further improved. If
those experts concluded that Bloxam’s objections were valid, then focus would be
reverted towards the processes in the vat. But until proven otherwise by that committee,
                                                                                                                                                  
No. 18 of 1909, Government of India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture
for June 1909, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, P/8174
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they argued, it was appropriate to focus efforts on augmenting the color bearing ability of
the plant.
They also underlined the fact that neither Bloxam’s report nor the other expert
committee’s report in the possession of the central government had discounted the
prospects of improving yield through biological experiments. Bloxam had certainly
suggested that primary attention revert to the manufacturing processes. In his opinion the
chemical pathway held maximum promise rather than anything else. But he also
suggested in his report that a secondary line of biological and agricultural experiments
should be maintained. The other report available with the central government had also
mentioned how the planters were persuaded about the potential of agricultural
experiments.
The center finally showed willingness to spare Bergtheil for Sirsiah as long as
they could insure that his absence from Pusa would not hamper research and educational
work there. The first issue that they considered was the length of time for which
Bergtheil’s services were required at Sirsiah. They were told that the biological
experiments in the province were being planned on a long-term basis. Results from
breeding and selection trials would only emerge gradually. The Inspector General had
also advised the Bengal officials that experiments should be planned for a period of five
years. Accordingly the government in Bengal had committed their support to Sirsiah for
five years, and made provisions in their budget for financial support to indigo
experiments for the same length of time.
Under the circumstances the central officials began to lean towards allowing
Bergtheil to resign his position. The fact that the Bengal government had committed
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support to indigo experiments for the next five years spoke for itself. They had shown
exceptional support, and deserved encouragement. The repeated extensions of Bergtheil’s
absences had been more in the nature of temporary measures. Now that the Bengal
government had a long-term plan in place it was considered more prudent to relieve him
and let him be re-employed by the provincial government.
A letter was also dispatched to Mollison, at Pusa. He was asked to comment on
the effect that Bergtheil’s resignation without prior notice of six months was likely to
cause. He was also asked to state the measures he contemplated to fill the void created by
Bergtheil’s resignation. 17
Mollison did not think that the absence of Bergtheil at Pusa would pose
insurmountable problems. The station already had a mycologist, Dr Butler. Mollison was
confident that even without Bergtheil the current mycologist would be able to perform
the functions expected of the bacteriologist in the short-term. The boundary between the
fields of agricultural mycology and agricultural bacteriology was a blurred one. In fact he
preferred to merge the two departments. He also suggested the name of a person currently
employed by the Mysore State for filling the position to be vacated by Bergtheil. 18
The path was finally cleared for the retention of Bergtheil at Sirsiah. The Revenue
and Agriculture Secretary dispatched a telegram stating that the central government did
not have any objection to Bergtheil resigning his position. They also waived the clause in
                                                 
17 Letter from Secretary, Revenue and Agriculture, Government of India to the Inspector General
of Agriculture, dated May 15, 1909, letter no. 543, No. 40, Serial No. 10, Government of India,
Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for June 1909, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev
& Agr, P/8174
18 Letter from the Inspector General of Agriculture to Secretary, Revenue and Agriculture,
Government of India, dated May 18, 1909, letter no. 1939, No. 41, Serial No. 11, Government of
India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for June 1909, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, P/8174
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the contract that required Bergtheil to give six months’ notice before resigning. 19 The
Bengal government sanctioned a grant of Rupees 32,500 per annum for the next five
years to Sirsiah. The government also received a commitment from BIPA that they would
contribute Rs. 10,000 per annum for funding the experiments at Sirsiah. 20
“Reforms” And Scientific Experiments
The Government Implements Wage Reforms, 1910
The government persuaded the planters to implement a set of measures in 1910.
Most importantly, they made the planters raise the purchase price for indigo to Rupees 13
and 8 annas per bigha. There was an additional relief built into this price. The planters
previously drew land rent from the growers separately in their capacity as landlords. The
new price was supposed to be a net price after deducting the rent. It was also stipulated
that in the case of destruction of the indigo crop due to circumstances beyond the control
of the peasant the latter would not incur any type of financial liability. Lastly, new rules
were created reducing the obligation of the peasants to grow indigo only on two katthas
                                                 
19 Telegram from Secretary, Revenue and Agriculture, Government of India to Revenue
Secretary, Government of Bengal, dated May 26, 1909, No. 42, Serial No. 12, Government of
India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for June 1909, IOR, GOI, Proc.
Rev & Agr, P/8174
20 For sanction of 32,500 to the BIPA, see “Order – By the Government of Bengal, Revenue
Department,” Agriculture, October 1909, File 2-I/3 1-7 _, Board’s file 114 of 1909, No. 10, BSA,
GOB, Rev (Agr.); for reference to BIPA’s acceptance regarding payment of 10,000 per annum,
see the letter of Director of Agriculture, Bengal, W R Gourlay’s to Revenue Secretary, Bengal,
dated March 31, 1909, Agriculture, October 1909, File 2-I/3 1-7 _, Board’s file, 114 of 1909, No.
5, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.)
 281
out of every bigha of land they possessed, a recommendation that had been endorsed by
Gourlay’s report. 21
The measures of 1910 only brought a temporary relief from the agitations. The
new norms failed to create an administrative structure that would preclude the possibility
of the planters transferring their net loss in the market on to the native growers. The
continuing drop in the price of indigo prompted the planters to adopt other financial
measures that were equally unpopular. Two obvious routes to enhance obligations due
from the growers were foreclosed. The indigo prices could not be touched. Secondly, a
demand for the “illegal” abwab was also not possible in the days following the
submission of Gourlay’s recommendations. The planters therefore tried to exact other
types of payments that were more easily defensible in the court of law. Depending on
whether they held the plantation in perpetual lease (mukarrari) or on contract (thika),
they offered to change the obligation of growing indigo into sharahbeshi, an enhanced
rent payment, or tawan, a payment that brought freedom from growing indigo. Many
growers accepted the offer to pay shrahbeshi and tawan as they were so desperate to get
out of the contractual obligation to grow indigo. But most growers fell into financial
distress as a consequence. The annual increase in rent was usually of the order of 50-60%
and could even be as high as 100%. The tawan payments could vary between Rupees 40-
60 per bigha. As year after year the burden of rent and tawan installments continued to be
felt the wave of discontent continued among the indigo growers. 22
Bergtheil’s Experiments, 1909-10
                                                 
21 Government of Bengal, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue (Land Revenue) for the
month of June 1910, Nos. 31-47, BSA, GOB, Rev (Agr.)
22 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: 158-160
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Work was suspended at Sirsiah in early 1909. A decision was awaited over
Bergtheil’s future assignment. Was he going to continue work at Sirsiah? Would the
Bengal government’s proposal to retain him at Sirsiah be finally approved at the center?
Funds for the experiments at Sirsiah were also not disbursed since funding of
experiments at Sirsiah was tied up with the decision on Bergtheil. As the bureaucrats at
various levels debated those issues, work was temporarily stalled at Sirsiah. Bergtheil
also moved to the Agricultural Research Institute at Pusa.  Indigo improvement work was
finally resumed at Sirsiah from July 1 1909. 23
The year’s scientific work did not begin well for Bergtheil. Two of the measures
involving treatment with reagents and cultures proved unsuccessful. He first followed on
leads from the trial with metallic salts in the previous year. Plants treated with copper
sulfate had shown a maximum output of indican. Therefore he decided to use the same
compound as a plant stimulant. Experimental plants were treated with copper sulfate. But
the results were discouraging. While the plants treated with copper sulfate showed a
content of .478%,  those in the control plot showed an indican content of .483%. The
difference was marginal and it was assumed that the reagent had failed in stimulating the
production of color in the plant. 24 This line of experimentation was then given up and
never pursued again.
More elaborate trials were made with an inoculation for leguminous plants called
nitro-bacterine. This was a culture of nodule organisms. In his 1906-07 report Bergtheil
had referred to a similar culture that reportedly brought positive results to leguminous
                                                 
23 Report of the Indigo Research Station, Sirsiah, For the Year 1909-1910. (Calcutta: Bihar
Planters’ Association, 1910), p., 1
24 Report of the Indigo Research Station, Sirsiah, For the Year 1909-1910. (Calcutta: Bihar
Planters’ Association, 1910), p., 4
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plants in the United States.  A Professor Bottmley of King’s College in London had
recently prepared nitro-bacterine as a special culture for use on the indigo plant. Many
planters during the current manufacturing season had applied nitro-bacterine on an
experimental basis. At Sirsiah, two adjacent plots of 1/3 acre each containing regular Java
crop were marked off. One was treated with nitro-bacterine while the other was kept as
                                                       Table 7.3











from the plot (in
seers)
Treated 44 – 6 33.6 .506 3
Untreated 38 – 30 35.7 .532 2.94
           Source: Report of the Indigo Research Station, Sirsiah, For the Year 1909-1910
a control. When the plants rose to a height of about 3 inches the culture was watered on
them. The growth of plants was closely monitored. The output was subjected to a careful
physical and chemical analysis.
The results were discouraging (see Table 7.3 above). A heavier cutting of plant
was obtained from the plots that were treated with the culture. Bergtheil suspected that
some of this extra growth might have resulted from the better quality of soil in that plot.
But there was no doubt that the treated plants showed a better growth overall. However
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the increased vigor of growth was accompanied by a loss in the quantity of leaf. The
leaves also had a relatively lower percentage of indican. In the end the total indigotin
obtained from the two plots was almost identical. This was a second disappointment for
Bergtheil.
A great deal of effort was invested into producing indigo in the form of powder.
The new machine imported from England was installed at the Barah factory. It was a
drying machine. The mal or finished indigo coming out of the washer and boiler was fed
into it, which was dried into the form of a powder. Two preliminary trials were made in
September and November.
The operations for producing indigo powder ran into mechanical problems as well
as those related to increased cost of production. The best rate for the production ever
obtained was about 25lbs of indigo powder per hour. If the speed of drying was increased
the output tended to be coarse, which required grinding. The process of grinding would
make the total cost prohibitive. Bergtheil was disappointed: “The hope with which I
originally started these experiments … does not seem capable of realisation except either
by considerably complicating the process of production or by making it extremely slow,
in either case increasing its cost to an impracticable extent.” 25 Nonetheless he proposed
that the machine be retained at Barah and trials be made again under the supervision of a
skilled engineer in the next season to improve speed and volume.
There were other critical issues that also needed to be thought through. Would it
be more advisable to grind the indigo cake instead? The latter option offered definite
advantages in some cases. For instance, it made sense to grind the cakes that were of
                                                 
25 Report of the Indigo Research Station, Sirsiah, For the Year 1909-1910. (Calcutta: Bihar
Planters’ Association, 1910), p., 2
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inferior quality and fetched a low price when sold in that form. In their case value
addition by turning into powder would be substantial and would easily recover the extra
effort invested in crushing. But there did not exist facilities in India for crushing large-
sized indigo cakes. Bergtheil proposed instead  that the feasibility of making powder
from cake be examined in England and if found successful, it be tried out in India during
the next manufacturing season.
Bergtheil also addressed the issue of making a “uniform paste.” The European
consumers had a clear preference for a uniform paste of indigo rather than indigo powder.
He proposed “bulking” of indigo consignments of different qualities in locations where
the processing of the product for consumers could be undertaken.  He referred to certain
consultations that had taken place between some home firms and BIPA about the
viability of producing indigo paste in India and selling it to industrial consumers in
England. 26
Eugene Schrottky
As before, Eugene Schrottky continued to undertake a range of scientific and
commercial initiatives on indigo. He worked independently of  BIPA and its experts at
the premises of individual planters. Just like Bergtheil he too lost faith in the utility of
conducting any more chemical experiments in the laboratory. He also thought that the
extractive processes were already working at an optimal level of efficiency. About the
possibility of extracting more color by improving the manufacturing processes, he wrote
                                                 
26 The making of indigo paste was certainly an important issue. However, only feeble attempts
were made to produce indigo paste during this period and not much came out of such efforts. A
more concerted effort was made later during the War when metropolitan interest was revived in
Indian indigo due to stoppage in the supply of synthetic indigo from Germany.
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in October 1909, “I have reached bottom now, and have come very near to what I know
the indigo plant can yield.” 27
Schrottky turned his attention to an agricultural question. There was a growing
concern all around over the deterioration in output from the Java variety of indigo plant.
Some planters thought that the local soil and climate conditions in Bihar were not
amenable so that seed grown locally in Bihar gave a low yield. They wanted someone to
culture Java seeds outside Bihar in a location where the conditions would be more
favorable. In 1910, Schrottky undertook the culture of Java seeds at Surriyat, Belwar, and
Gazia indigo factories in the neighboring United Provinces. Java seeds at the Belwar
factory were totally destroyed by frost. He realized that the frosty conditions in January
and February, considered normal for that time of year in the region, would continue to
pose problems in the years to come.  He then explored the option of growing seeds in the
Godavari district in south India, which had traditionally supplied seeds to yet another
important indigo growing province of India – Madras. Schrottky’s proposal for shifting
the seed factory to South India met with the approval of many planters. 28
Schrottky also encouraged planters to undertake the production of indigo paste.
He claimed that the planters would have to sell the natural dye in a paste form to win
back those dyers and printers that had already switched to synthetic indigo. He referred to
his interview with some of the industrial consumers in Britain in this regard.
                                                 
27 Indian Planters’ Gazette, October 9, 1909. The holdings of this newspaper are present at the
National Agricultural Library, Beltsville, U.S.A.
28 Eugene Schrottky, “The Natural Indigo Industry,” Indian Planters’ Gazette, August 27, 1910,
p., 378; Schrottky’s letter, addressed to the planters in Bengal and Bihar, ”Indigofera Arrecta,”
dated February 1911, Indian Planters’ Gazette, March 4, 1911, p., 304; Letter to the Editor by
“An Old Biharite,” dated, April 5, 1911, Indian Planters’ Gazette, 597
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They [British dyers and printers] acknowledged that natural dyes had some
advantages and declared themselves ready to return to it, if they could get it
in a paste and as cheap as the synthetic dye. 29
He undertook trials to make indigo paste at numerous factories on small scale. But he did
not report any major success in this regard.
The Collaboration Between Bergtheil And Botanist,F R Parnell At Sirsiah
A new botanist, F R Parnell, joined the Sirsiah Station in October 1909.
Experiments related to plant physiology and plant breeding had been declared to be the
mainstay of research efforts at Sirsiah. Bergtheil had been contributing to this effort as a
chemist. But the purely biological line of query had not taken off. Bergtheil himself and
the planters had long demanded a botanist for Sirsiah, and the government obliged.
With the arrival of Parnell a new range of experiments was inaugurated at Sirsiah.
Parnell applied his knowledge of botany to investigate the basis of formation of indican.
He utilized “sand cultures” to monitor the plant’s metabolism. He studied the processes
leading to the deposition of the glucoside in the leaves.
Bergtheil used a chemist’s approach for a similar line of inquiry. He tried to find
the links between chemical substances stored in the seed, those produced at the different
stages of the plant’s development, and indican. His experiments were directed at
establishing whether it was possible to manipulate the plant’s growth or add nutrients to
augment the final deposition of indican.
                                                 
29 Eugene Schrottky, “The Natural Indigo Industry,” Indian Planters’ Gazette, August 27, 1910:
378
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The selection of the Java plant had not proceeded well. In the previous season
Bergtheil had sown seeds obtained from high-yielding plants at Pusa. He returned to Pusa
to inspect the plot. The leaves produced an overall high figure for color content. But the
plants did not exhibit any type of uniformity morphologically or in terms of percentage of
indican. Their qualities also failed to correspond with their parent plants’ characteristics.
No strong inference could be drawn from this round of trials. It was not certain if the high
yield characteristic had been inherited or was the result of environmental factors.
Parnell supervised the second round of selection trials. He soon noticed an
anomaly that explained how the previous selection trials had been compromised. Indigo
plants normally cross-fertilized. In Bergtheil’s specimens of the previous year no special
precaution had been taken to ensure self-fertilization. Thus no purity from the plant to the
seeds had been maintained. To rectify this problem Parnell isolated the high yield plants
and ensured self-fertilization. He collected a sample of such seeds for planting in the next
season.
The efforts on the selection of the Sumatrana variety had been continuing at
Sirsiah for some time. Different sub-varieties of the plant had been identified and plotted
separately. But now doubt was cast on all previous efforts in the face of new knowledge
about cross-fertilization. Just as in the case of Java, the Sumatrana specimens would also
have been cross-pollinated disrupting the line of inheritance from the parent plant to the
progeny. Accordingly it was planned to re-start the selection trials for the Sumatrana
plant.
The Incidence Of Wilt, 1911-13
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It is difficult to re-construct the specifics of Bergtheil’s and Parnell’s experiments
for the last two years. The annual report of the Sirsiah Station for 1912-13 has not
survived in its complete form in any of the likely locations. Only some excerpts from the
report have survived as citations in the annual reports of the Agricultural Research
Station at Pusa. A few references also occur in the government papers from which the
general nature of efforts made at Sirsiah may be inferred.
It can be safely stated that the nature of experiments at Sirsiah remained
predominantly agricultural. 30 One part of these efforts was directed at the botanical
selection of Java indigo. Towards those efforts Parnell made a detailed study of the
nature of pollination and fertilization of the Java plant. Botanical study revealed that the
morphological structure of indigo flowers inhibited self-fertilization. The particular
placement of anthers and stigma was geared to facilitate cross-fertilization with the help
of insect visitors. Two common Indian bees, Apis florae and Halictus gutturosus were
identified as the vectors. These discoveries were valuable in themselves. Later the experts
at Pusa followed up on this work by Parnell. 31
The second annual report of the agricultural department of Bihar and Orissa
mentions that the selection trials of Bergtheil and Parnell at Sirsiah were compromised
due to a ferocious flood and later due to the spread of the disease-like condition in the
                                                 
30 Cyril Bergtheil’s autobiography also implies that a search for higher-yielding varieties
continued. Cyril Berkeley, My Autobiography, privately published and undated, p., 10. A copy of
the autobiography survives with the scientist’s granddaughter Prof. Mary N Arai at the University
of Calgary in Canada.
31 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, Third Report on the Improvement of Indigo in
Bihar,  Bulletin No. 67  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, , 1916): 23-24
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indigo plant called wilt. 32 In particular it blames the incidence of wilt for having “largely
diverted the attention of the experts” from their selection experiments.
                                                          Table 7.4
                       Decrease in the yield of Java crop due to wilt at Belsund
                        Factory
Year Number of cuttings Yield per bigha in
seers and chattak
1904-05 2 16 s. 5 _ cht
1905-06 1 9 s. 7 _ cht
1906-07 3 23 s. 2 cht
1907-08 3 23 s. 7 _ cht
1908-09 2 6 s.
1909-10 2 13 s. 8 cht
1910-11 2 10 s. 2 cht
1911-12 2 6 s. 15 cht
1912-13 1 3 s. 1 cht
1913-14 2 9 s. 9 cht
                               Source: D J Reid, “Ten years’ practical experience of Java indigo
in Bihar” 33
                                                 
32 Second Annual Report of the Agricultural Department, Bihar and Orissa, 1913, p., 5,
Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue Department, Agriculture Branch, File no. 1A/189 of
1913, Nos. 29-32. The province of Bihar and Orissa was carved out of the larger Bengal in 1911.
The Agriculture Department files of the new province are preserved at the Bihar State Archives in
Patna (India). Henceforth these files are referred to as GBO, Rev. (Agr.)
33 D J Reid, “Ten years’ practical experience of Java indigo in Bihar,” Agricultural Journal of
India XII  1 (1917): 19
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The first incidence of wilt in Bihar was reported in 1908. It increased in ferocity at
the turn of the decade. In every season beginning 1911 much of Java crop in Bihar was
infested with wilt. The external symptoms of wilt included a slowing down of growth and
leaf fall. The leaves that remained turned in color from ordinary bright green to
yellowish-green. The trouble began after the first cut. The new set of leaves on the plant
never matured to be ready for a second cutting. In the absence of the second and third
cutting the total yield from the indigo fields dropped. The figures of yield available for a
very large factory in Muzaffarpur (see Table 7.4 above) are representative in indicating
the decline in yield precipitated by wilt.
Still worse, wilt created a severe shortage in the supply of Java seeds in Bihar.
Under the diseased condition the plant died after the first cutting. Thus it never reached
the last stage of growth during which the plant would ordinarily bear seeds. After
repeated failures of Java indigo over the years the planters in Bihar faced a situation of
shortage of Java seeds.
Albert Howard, the Imperial Economic Botanist, and Gabrille L C Howard have
stated in their report of early 1914 that wilt was the primary cause for the closure of the
Sirsiah Station.34 Despite their best efforts the experts at Sirsiah failed to induce the Java
plant to form seed on their experimental plots. The failure to beget seeds stalled their
selection experiments that were based on the principle of propagating healthy and well-
suited plants.
The tone of the annual report of the agricultural department of Bihar and Orissa
referring to the work at Sirsiah is also indicative of the general hopelessness with regard
                                                 
34 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, First Report on the Improvement of Indigo in Bihar,
Bulletin No. 51  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, , 1915): 2, India Office Records,
V/25/500/121
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to the experiments being run currently at Sirsiah:  “These … experiments have not
produced any practical results.” In the context of such despondency the planters
terminated their contract with Bergtheil prematurely and paid him a lump sum to
compensate for his early termination. Wanting to seek fortune in the business of orchards
in Canada, Bergtheil left India in early 1913. F R Parnell obtained the post of
Agricultural Chemist to the Government of Madras in southern India. The BIPA was not
interested any further in the experiments at Sirsiah. On their request the Sirsiah Station
was closed down from March 31, 1913. 35
Thereafter the government concentrated all research on indigo at the Botanical
Section of the Agricultural Research Institute at Pusa. The focus of research on wilt had
anyway shifted to the Imperial Agricultural Department at Pusa. The last report from
Sirsiah mentions the fact that after “a fruitless examination” the scientists at Sirsiah had
sought the aid of Pusa experts. The same report also mentions the involvement of the
entomologist, mycologist, bacteriologist, and the economic botanist in the study of wilt.
Thus the government thought it wise to maintain the continuity in such investigations at
Pusa. 36
Epilogue
A review of the scientific efforts during the period 1908-13 shows a clear
dominance of the agricultural paradigm. The planters had expressed preference for such
                                                 
35 Second Annual Report of the Agricultural Department, Bihar and Orissa, 1913, p., 5,
Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue Department, Agriculture Branch, File no. 1A/189 of
1913, Nos. 29-32
36 Cyril Berkeley, My Autobiography, pp, 11-13; Second Annual Report of the Agricultural
Department, Bihar and Orissa, 1913, p., 5, BSA, Government of Bihar and Orissa, Revenue
Department, Agriculture Branch, File no. 1A/189 of 1913, Nos. 29-32
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experiments. The Java variety of indigo that was introduced into India from Southeast
Asia and from the Natal province in South Africa proved to be a breed difficult to
domesticate. Problems related to pest attack adversely affected the cultivation of the Java
variety in the local environs of Bihar. In this situation the planters asked their experts to
focus on devising and perfecting appropriate agricultural practices for the Java variety.
Bacteriologist Bergtheil also favored agricultural investigations to understand and
control the indigo plant’s physiology and metabolism. He had a domineering presence in
Bengal. His voice carried weight with both officials and the planters in the province. As
the “imperial” bacteriologist he occupied an elevated stature. He also enjoyed a
privileged access to the Inspector General of Agriculture in India, J W Mollison, who was
stationed in the province at Pusa. The latter was always willing to go all the way to back
up Bergtheil and his experiments. Besides, Bergtheil also enjoyed exceptional credibility
with the planting community. As “a man on the spot” he was always available to offer
advice. He had earned the reputation among the planters of being “a practical
agriculturist,” rather than being “ an academic laboratory chemist.” Therefore the planters
accepted his sense of judgment over the advocacy of the agricultural line.
Ultimately it was the provincial government’s resolve that determined the “turn”
to agricultural experiments. The funds for the Sirsiah Station came out of the Bengal
Government’s budget. As the primary sponsor the provincial government had a final say
on the nature of experiments to be conducted at that station. After the publication of
Bloxam’s report in 1908 the central government was leaning towards the chemical
approach. They were more influenced by the impulses coming from the metropolis. But
the provincial government took a firm stand on the issue. They stood by the opinion of
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their own expert at Sirsiah – Cyril J Bergtheil. They also backed the views of the planters
in Bihar, the protection of whose interests was the principal reason for the subsidy on
indigo experiments. It was their opinion that prevailed, securing the shift to agricultural
experiments.
 Was the chemical path, then, irrevocably doomed? Not quite. Bloxam in England
pursued his chemistry-based line of query for quite some time. Between 1909 and 1910,
he published additional papers on indican, indigo-brown, and indirubin. In 1909, most
notably, Bloxam presented his findings on the chemical nature of indican. To replicate
the chemical processes of manufacturing in the laboratory, Bloxam studied the effects of
the indigo-enzyme, indimulsin on the glucoside indican. The resulting solution of indoxyl
was found to be characteristically unstable and underwent change to other substances
including indigo-brown and indirubin. Although he identified the instability of indoxyl to
be the major cause of low yield in manufacturing, Bloxam was still not in a position to
suggest concrete measures to prevent wasteful secondary reactions from taking place.
Predictably, in his subsequent experiments he focused on understanding the nature of
indirubin and indigo-brown. 34
But Bloxam was a lone warrior. His efforts were driven by personal motivation.
He did not get any institutional support in the context of a diminished interest in indigo in
the metropolis. He appealed to the India Office in London for an extension of his research
contract. Bloxam was confident that he could build on his research to suggest measures
that would hold the key to the survival of the natural indigo industry.  However, the India
                                                 
34 Frederick Thomas, W P Bloxam, and A G Perkin, “XCIL – Indican. Part III,” Journal of the
Chemical Society, Transactions 95 (1909): 824-847; W P Bloxam and A G Perkin, “CXXXV –
Indirubin. Part 1,” Journal of the Chemical Society, Transactions 97 (1910): 1460-1475
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Office did not renew their contract with him. Soon after Bloxam suffered a paralytic
stroke from which he never recovered, and he died on December 26, 1913. Writing the
obituary for Bloxam, A G Perkin mentioned that it was a matter of keen disappointment
to Bloxam that his results were so little appreciated in India. 35
 But the chemical approach came back in India. As the next chapter will show,
during the period from 1914-22 the agricultural and chemical sciences were put on an
equal footing one more time. Many of these efforts were made at the Agricultural
Research Institute at Pusa in India. An Indigo Research Committee was also formed in
London, which took the ultimate responsibility to coordinate efforts made to improve the
plant-derived indigo during the War. The doyen of British chemistry, Henry E
Armstrong, was the overall head of this committee.
CHAPTER 8
                                                 
35 A G Perkin, Obituary, “William Popplewell Bloxam,” Journal of the Chemical Society,
Transactions, 105 (1914): 1195-1200
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WORLD WAR: THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE INDIGO EXPERIMENTS, 1914-
1919
Introduction
The singular most striking feature of this period was that the metropolis gained
the upper hand in the formulation of plans and programs for the indigo industry of
colonial India. Prior to 1913 the provincial government in Bengal defined the agenda of
experiments. The closure of Sirsiah brought that era to an end. The imperial department
of agriculture in Pusa absorbed the remaining agricultural experiments at Sirsiah. This
signified the decline in importance of the provincial research station. Beginning in 1913 a
number of new initiatives were taken in England. A new phase was thus inaugurated in
which the actors, institutions, and the framework of policy-making in England began
overwhelmingly to determine the nature of indigo experiments in India.
The outbreak of the War in July 1914 brought a new sense of urgency in the
metropolis.  The Indian cake indigo became a much-desired commodity as the supplies of
the synthetic substitute were disrupted by the War and the stocks in England dried up. As
English dyers clamored for more blue dye India House in London was quite willing to
examine any suggestion that seemed to offer a possibility to revive the dilapidated natural
indigo industry of colonial India.
Two important conferences called in 1915 defined the agenda of the subsequent
experiments in India and England. Prodded by the administrators in London the colonial
government called the Delhi Conference on February 22, 1915 to meet with the planters’
representatives, the administrators from all the Indian provinces manufacturing indigo,
and a few select scientists. The Secretary of State in England also called a conference in
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London on September 20, 1915 at which he met with selected scientists, planters, and
dyers. The deliberations at the two conferences shaped the nature of initiatives in the
following years.
With supply interrupted, consumers in England now came to play a direct role.
Except for the niche market where natural indigo had prevailed, the majority of English
dyers and printers had already switched to synthetic indigo by the outbreak of World War
I in 1914. Now the consumers faced a difficult dilemma. Synthetic indigo was
unavailable while the old techniques of dyeing with cake indigo had fallen into disuse.
Consumers preferred to use natural indigo if it was presented to them in the form of a
standardized paste rather than as cake, i.e.the same way as the synthetic was offered to
them. They approached the imperial administration hoping to use the office to persuade
the indigo producers in colonial India to switch to paste production. Following the
intervention of the Dyers Guild, the largest organization of dyers in England, and on the
personal initiative of its President, Rowland E Oldroyd, in late 1915 the Secretary of
State invited the planters to put natural indigo onto the market in the form preferred by
the consumers. More assistance from India House followed in this regard. With its active
intervention an Indigo Paste Committee was formed in England.  Its main aim was  to
find economical ways to turn indigo cake into  user-friendly indigo paste. Despite its best
efforts the project did not succeed and a viable method of making indigo paste was not
found.
Meanwhile English entrepreneurs manufactured synthetic indigo for the first time
in England in 1917. The Levinstein family managed to produce the first supplies of
English synthetic indigo from the sequestered MLB factory that they had taken over.
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Later Swiss and even French sources of supply were revived. At the end of the war the
technique of making synthetic indigo made its way from Germany to England. With the
synthetic substitute available at home the British government lost all interest in colonial
India’s natural indigo at the end of the War in 1919.
The Continuing Experiments Of The Agricultural Research Institute At Pusa, 1913-15
The indigo experiments in India between 1913 and 1915 were conducted by
scientists at the Botanical Section of the Agricultural Research Institute (ARI) at Pusa.
The person in charge of the experiments was the Imperial Economic Botanist Albert
Howard. Howard was a biological botanist by training who had come from England to
join the ARI at Pusa in May 1905, the year when the institute was inaugurated. The very
next year he was promoted to the rank of Imperial Economic Botanist.
The attribution of indigo work to Albert Howard was a deliberate decision. Since
1911 the experts at Pusa had been trying to resolve the mysterious disease wilt. A
consensus had emerged that the “disease-like” condition was connected with the
waterlogged conditions and with cultivating practices rather than with infection by any
outside vector. The Imperial Entomologist confirmed that wilt was not connected in any
way to the common pest Psylla or to any other insect. Similarly the mycologist had
subjected samples of the diseased plants to tests and did not detect the presence of any
fungus. C H Hutchinson, the imperial bacteriologist had similarly discounted the
presence of any bacteria in the affected plant through his examinations. The introduction
of a plant with wilt into a group of healthy plants did not automatically cause the spread
of the unhealthy condition. This at least discounted the possibility of wilt being a
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contagious and infectious disease. As more evidence accumultaed the conjecture that wilt
was due to waterlogged conditions or cultivation practices seemed more probable.
Aside from the goal of conquering wilt the other important ambition in 1913 was
to improve the stock of indigo plants through a process of biological selection.  The
economic botanist seemed the man best suited to achieve both ends. 1
The Season Of 1913-14
Albert Howard’s trials in the first year were directed towards growing Java seeds
and reducing the incidence of wilt in the Java crop. Some preparatory work was also done
towards the selection of the Java variety. Wilt had become so widespread in Bihar that
there was an acute scarcity of seeds to plant the next crop (of Java). In such a situation
the priority was to culture the seeds and secure their supply to the plantations. But
parallel efforts were also made to devise ways to eliminate wilt and improve the stock of
higher-yielding varieties through biological selection. 2
 Howard built on the small-scale trials from the previous season (1912-13) and the
preliminary inferences he had drawn from them. He planted the new crop at Pusa and the
adjoining Dholi estate based on the premise that the Java plant could not tolerate rainy
conditions for more than two months. Normally indigo was sown in Bihar before the
beginning of summer. Bihar received the bulk of its rains between mid June and mid
September. To avoid maximum incidence of rainfall during the period of growth the
                                                 
1 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, First Report on the Improvement of Indigo in Bihar,
Bulletin No. 51  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, 1915): 3-4, India Office
Records, V/25/500/121
2 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, First Report on the Improvement of Indigo in Bihar,
Bulletin No. 51  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, 1915): 1-27, India Office
Records, V/25/500/121
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seedlings were planted in August. They were also put on highlands to ensure that
subterranean water from other areas did not accumulate underneath the fields.
The seedlings were sown in lines two feet apart. The intention was to facilitate
proper pollination of flowers through the activity of insects. The common practice
followed in Bihar todate had been to broadcast the seeds or to sow them by drills in lines
close together, which did not provide adequate space for branching. Howard believed that
such a practice inhibited pollination. It also made weeding of the ground between the
plants a near impossible task.
 In a major departure from the past no cuttings were made when the experimental
plants reached maturity. The plants escaped wilt and came to flower in
October/November. Affirming the appropriateness of the methods followed a good
harvest of seeds was gathered in February/March. Normally in Bihar a second and
possibly a third cutting followed the first cutting. Thereafter the plant was allowed to
flower to produce the seeds. Thus the same plant that gave a harvest of leaves also
produced seeds. Howard recommended that the plants for seeds should be different from
those that were grown for leaves. He said, “The practice of growing seed from an old
worn out plant cannot be too strongly condemned.” 3
Howard also provided a critique of the way the Java crop was ordinarily harvested
for leaves in Bihar. Normally the first cutting was made in the month of July. Howard
claimed that the way the plant was “completely” cut down harmed its subsequent growth.
Harvested this way the plant had to grow all of its shoots at the peak of the rainy season
                                                 
3 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, First Report on the Improvement of Indigo in Bihar,
Bulletin No. 51  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, 1915): 5, India Office Records,
V/25/500/121
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when its roots were in a very moist soil. A total cutting down of leaves also disturbed the
transpiration currents from the roots. The transportation of food and water was disrupted.
As a result either the new leaves were unhealthy or the plant died completely.
The experts at Pusa suggested “pruning” leaves instead of cutting them. Half the
crop that was sown in the previous year was pruned in the month of July, and its behavior
was compared with the other half that was cut down completely. The pruned plants were
also left with a branch to carry on an uninterrupted growth. The results (see Table 8.1
below) confirmed what Howard had hypothesized. The first cutting in the pruned plant
obviously returned a lower yield. But the plant escaped wilt-like degeneration and went
on to give a second cutting. The shortfall of the first cutting was more than made up
during the second cutting. The total yield was appreciably
                                                                Table 8.1
                  Comparative yield of leaves from pruned and cut down plants
“Pruned” plants “Cut down” plants
First cutting 15 maunds, 11 sers 22 maunds, 39 sers
Second cutting 23 maunds, 37 sers 6 maunds, 19 sers
Total 39 maunds, 8 sers 29 maunds, 18 sers
                  Source: First Report on the Improvement of Indigo in Bihar, ARI
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more from the pruned plants. Howard also suggested removal of the crop after two
cuttings. The yield from the third cutting would not be much. The plant would have
already exhausted itself and would neither be good for harvest or for seeds. It would
make more sense to replace indigo with a rabi crop in the field.
The efforts toward biological selection began with a review of Parnell’s previous
works. Parnell had earlier noted that the indigo plant was ordinarily cross-pollinated with
the help of bees that visited the plant during the flowering season. Experiments made
with the Java plant confirmed Parnell’s observations. A large number of healthy plants
were put under frames before the flowers had appeared on them. Then they were covered
with a net. In all cases where the plants had been covered up no pods were formed. The
plants from the same batch grown under ordinary circumstances bred seeds in abundance.
These results re-confirmed that Java indigo did not normally self-fertilize. The plants
under ordinary circumstances would never breed true and thus progeny would not bear
the same characteristic as the parent plant from which seeds had been collected.
Therefore it was clear that the application of the ordinary single plant selection method
would not work in this case.
The Season Of 1914-15
The scope of the agricultural trials in the following year was widened to include
an emphasis on the Sumatrana indigo in addition to Java indigo. Through a focus on the
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functioning of the root nodules a new set of recommendations were made regarding
appropriate cultivation practices for Java and Sumatrana crops. 4
The nodules (which contained the bacteria rhizobium) in the root system needed
an appropriate supply of food and air in the soil for their proper functioning. The “nodule
factory” was responsible for the general health of the plant as well as for the
accumulation of indican in the leaves. When grown in soil rich in nitrates the indigo plant
absorbed the nutrients through the root hairs. It was characteristic in such cases for the
plant to show a good amount of leaves. But those leaves had a low indican content. On
the other hand, when the soil was poor in nitrates, its nodules worked at a brisk pace in
order to fix the atmospheric nitrogen. In such cases the leaves showed a high level of
accumulation of indican in their leaves. This explanation accounted for the fact that the
indigo grown on relatively poor lands (zilla) gave a high color content in the leaves.
Howard emphasized proper drainage of the soil to ensure an adequate supply of
oxygen so that the bacteria could work well in the nodules.  In his view, persistently
waterlogged conditions of the soil inhibited the functioning of nodules and was the
primary reason for the onset of wilt. When the air spaces of soil were filled with water for
a prolonged time the nodules stopped functioning and the formation of indican too
stopped. The plant then fell back on its reserve of indican thus exhausting the amount of
color in the leaves. Any prolongation of this unfavorable soil condition caused the decay
and death of the entire plant. A “Pusa method of drainage” was devised to prevent
subterranean water from the adjoining areas accumulating beneath the plants.
                                                 
4 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, Second Report on the Improvement of Indigo in
Bihar, Bulletin No. 54  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, 1915): 1-18. India Office
Records, V/25/500/121
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Howard also took strong exception to the current cultivation practices in Bihar.
With respect to Java indigo in particular, he said, “The present practices in Bihar in
growing Java indigo are about the worst that could be devised.” 5 Separate methods of
tilling and preparing of soil were recommended for the Java and Sumatrana variety of
indigo with emphasis on the need for the proper aeration of the sub soil.
The Java crop was sown in October under the cover of another rabi crop. As soon
as the cover crop was reaped, Howard suggested deep harrowing of the soil with lever
harrows. The topsoil should not be allowed to bake and get infested with weeds. Any
crust (papri) that might form after the rains must also be broken. Such crusts blocked air
supply to the roots. He also recommended leaving 2-3 inches of loose soil at the top to
conserve moisture.
The Sumatrana crop presented a dilemma. Since it was sown at the beginning of
the summer the soil had to be compacted to bring the moisture near enough to the top
through capillary action. Compacting at the same time compromised the availability of
air spaces in the soil. Some young shoots withered as a result. As soon as the plant was
large enough, Howard recommended harrowing. Since the root system of Sumatrana was
more delicate as well as nearer the surface than Java, he suggested using the “spring-tine
cultivator” instead of the lever harrow. He recommended harrowing again after the first
cut.
Two indirect methods of improving the indigo industry were also being perfected
at Pusa. The first of these was the singling out of Pusa 4, a particular breed of wheat, as a
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Bihar, Bulletin No. 54  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, 1915): 6. India Office
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“cover crop” for the indigo plant. The cover crop was a quick grower and developed
strong shoots in loose soil that was prepared for indigo. At the same time it did not have a
lot of foliage that would cut off light and air to the primary plant. For that reason many of
the high yielding wheat varieties were ruled out as they all had thick foliage. Thus Pusa 4
seemed to suit all the requirements expected of a cover crop very well. It also had a
market in the nearby mills. Thus the breed was tried at Pusa and Dholi with the indigo
crop. Its trial proved successful.
The other indirect method being tried out at Pusa was to improve the value of seet
– the refuse from indigo manufacturing. Seet from indigo manufacturing was popularly
known to be a good manure for the tobacco crop. Thus planters sold it to the tobacco
growers in the neighborhood adding to their profits. In order to improve the utility of seet
as manure, the effect of adding tile (thikara) to the refuse was explored. The intention
was to provide an aerating power to the land in addition to improving its fertility. If the
trials proved successful the value of seet would go up.
The Season Of 1915-16
By the beginning of the 1915 season the experts at Pusa could take satisfaction
from some of their achievements. The problems in the supply of Java seeds had been
positively solved. The report published from Pusa in 1915 said, “The experiments carried
out at Pusa and Dholi in 1913 and 1914 have been uniformly successful…The production
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of seed now offers no difficulty and yields of 8 to 10 maunds per acre can be obtained.” 6
Later yields of 23.5 sers were also obtained.
The efforts on biological selection, however, remained a challenge. Even after
continuous efforts in this direction since 1913 the project did not seem any nearer to
completion. Much of the trials at Pusa in the year 1915 were directed towards the
biological selection of the Java and Sumatrana plants. 7
Howard also pointed to a paradoxical situation wherein the plants with low
indican had gotten “selected” on the Bihar plantations. A correlation existed between
plants that grew slower and a high content of indican in the leaves. Similarly the plants
that grew fast and luxuriantly upfront had a lower content of color in their leaves. But
most planters now tended to favor the quick growing “cart-fillers.” The longer the plant
stayed in the field the greater were the chances that floods, pests, or even wilt could harm
it. The considerations in favor of having an early harvest outweighed all others. Therefore
the experts at Pusa also tried to select the “early types,” the plants that came quickest to
maturity.
The evidence was adding up that indigo plants were “natural” cross-fertilizers and
that any induced self-fertilization would be counter-productive. Java plants raised from
self-fertilized seeds showed a marked falling off in both size of the plant and in general
growth even in a single generation. If individual plants with high indican content were
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7 Albert Howard and Gabrielle L C Howard, Third Report on the Improvement of Indigo in Bihar,
Bulletin No. 67  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, Pusa, 1916): 22-31. India Office
Records, V/25/500/122
 307
artificially self-fertilized, they were likely to turn sterile. Thus there was no point in
avoiding cross-fertilization.
Under the circumstances it was going to be preferable “to control crossing rather
than to attempt to prevent it.” 8 But the selection of the favored “early types” was not
going to be easy. It was the “least satisfactory” of all methods of selection. It had to be
“continuous” over a period of time and over several cropping seasons to be effective. The
principle followed was to isolate the stock of successful plants and make them grow
together. After the next crop matured the odd ones were weeded out and another round of
healthier varieties were planted. The experts were pessimistic from the very beginning.
The report from Pusa for the year said, “The improvement of the Java crop by selection
will not be easy.” Two methods were tried out – the “selection of mixed early types” and
the “selection of single early type.” In the first method seeds of good plants from a
season’s crop were selected for propagation. These breeds were then grown together in a
separate location. In the second method all seeds of a single “successful” breed were
collected and planted together. Howard pointed out that the indigo planters themselves
could implement these types of selection on their farms.
The work on the selection of the Sumatrana variety proved to be even more
tortuous. Characteristically the Sumatrana variety bred fewer seeds than the Java variety
and that made any procedures of propagation an intrinsically difficult one. The methods
of selection were virtually the same. There were three regional varieties of Sumatrana  –
the Madras type, the Northwest type, and the Cawnpore type. The Madras type, though
having more color than the other two, was a deep rooted, late growing variety. It was not
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suited to the local conditions in Bihar. The Northwest variety too was inappropriate.
Therefore all selection trials had to be limited to the Cawnpore variety.
There was an additional consideration. Small farmers in the region around Delhi,
a location that was several hundred miles away from Bihar, grew the Cawnpore variety of
indigo plant. From all available indications it seemed that it would not be economically
viable to grow the seeds locally in Bihar. Therefore, assuming that the selection of this
variety was successful, it would still be very difficult to motivate the growers to
implement selection and control such procedures if they were initiated.
Parallel Developments In The Metropolis, 1913-15
Sir Lewis John Enroll Hay And A G Perkin In England
In the summer of 1913 Sir Lewis John Enroll Hay of Edinburgh in England was
the tireless campaigner pushing for the initiation of scientific measures on natural indigo.
A baronet and an indigo planter, he had retired to England after spending much of his
active life in Bihar. His close relatives still remained in the indigo business in India, a fact
that explains his interest in matters related to indigo.
He proved quite successful in initiating a new range of debates. There were
reasons for his credibility. For several years he had been engaged with indigo plantations
and could thus claim to have first hand information about the indigo industry. His opinion
was valued when he provided details about the nature of reactions underlying the
manufacture of indigo. Knighted and a distinguished person in British society, he used
his privileged access to important figures including the Secretary of State for India to
project his viewpoint.
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Lewis Hay did not have an advanced scientific training. He attended Fettes
College in Edinburgh, but did not receive any higher university education. However, he
was an experienced planter and an astute observer. When in India he had diligently
recorded the changes in color taking place in the indigo liquor as it passed through the
various stage of manufacturing. On their basis he prepared “color charts” and formed a
preliminary hypothesis about the nature of chemical reactions in the manufacturing vats.
He passed along his color charts to a number of key persons. Utilizing the good
offices of the Secretary of State at India House he first sent his chart to J. Mackenna, the
new Agricultural Adviser to the Government of India and to the General Secretary of the
Bihar Indigo Planters’ Association in India. Through this chart he argued that it was
possible to vastly improve yield from manufacturing. The communication only elicited a
placid response from Mackenna in India. The Agricultural Adviser pointed out that he
had not been able to get the opinion of Cyril Bergtheil on the charts. The Sirsiah Station
had been closed down and Bergtheil was anyway preparing to leave India. The BIPA
Secretary on the other hand was reported to have expressed disagreement with the claims
made in Hay’s chart. In agreement with the views of Bergtheil the BIPA Secretary argued
that only 12-15% of the dye was getting wasted during the manufacturing cycle. Such a
loss was generally “unavoidable.” The Secretary also pointed out that there were ways to
plug the residual wastage but that it was “not worth the cost.” 9
Other than the officials in India Lewis Hay also contacted a number of chemists in
England to win support for his assertions. The most prominent chemist that he contacted
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at this stage was A G Perkin. Perkin was a very respected British chemist at Leeds
University and a well-known natural dye expert. He was perhaps most suited to comment
on Hay’s observations. His affirmation was bound to carry weight generally.
Perkin sent a reply to Lewis Hay affirming that there was a margin for
improvement.10  He put the losses at about 30 per cent, which was far below the 38 per
cent proposed by Bloxam in his report of 1908. Perkin referenced his previous
experiments conducted with Bloxam to clarify that the primary cause of loss of color was
the unstable nature of indoxyl – an intermediate compound formed in the fermentation
tank. Instead of being oxidized into indigotin parts of this compound automatically
disintegrated into isatin. Other reactions also took place leading to the transformation of
some of indoxyl into indoxylic acid that in turn got converted into what was commonly
called brown substance.  In laboratory trials it was possible to prevent some of this
conversion of indoxyl by the addition of a small amount of sulfuric acid to the fermenting
mixture.
There was no doubt that the most wasteful conversions took place during the
stage of fermentation. Perkin therefore suggested that the possibility of bypassing
fermentation altogether should be further explored. There was an alternative “hot water
process” that required treating leaves with hot water and then hydrolyzing indican in the
extract with a small quantity of acid. This alternative for fermentation had been known
for some time. Rawson had actually considered it for a while. But finally he did not adopt
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it due to the high costs involved in heating. Perkin wondered if the use of natural sources
of energy or the creation of efficient plants to prevent loss of heat would make the hot
water process workable in Bihar.
Hay also forwarded a small amount of residue from seet water (the run off liquid
that along with seet or the steeped plant was the byproduct of the manufacturing
processes) to Perkin for experimental analysis. Hay wanted him to confirm what he
suspected - the presence of products of indican decay in the waste water. The presence of
such compounds in large amounts would prove his thesis that a huge proportion of the
color element was getting wastefully converted during manufacturing and, therefore, that
the manufacturing processes needed streamlining.
Perkin noted that while there were indications that the sample supplied to him
contained elements from indican decay it was perhaps too early to make definitive claims
in this regard. His preliminary examination of the residue revealed the presence of indigo
brown-like substances in the residue. But one could not assume that indigo brown and
similar substances in the sample from waste water came out of the disintegration of
indican in the leaves. Firstly it was known that the amount of indican in the leaves varied
according to the season of the year. Thus the leaf itself must contain compounds released
from the conversion of indican. He also noted that during manufacturing the leaves were
brought into contact with water and acids. These reagents would also have acted on the
substances present in the leaves to form other substances. Therefore the mere presence of
substances like indigo brown, indigo glutten, and indigo yellow in the waste, if
confirmed, would not directly lead to the hypothesis that they were all byproducts of the
decay of indican.
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Perkin also noted that the sample sent to him was without specifications. It was
not clear from what amount of seet water the residue had been deposited. Neither did he
know how much indigo leaves had been used in the cycle from which the seet had been
obtained. In the absence of such data it was difficult to work out the ratio of wasteful
versus useful conversion even if one were to assume that all “waste” in the seet came out
of indican.
Lewis Hay interpreted Perkin’s communication as supporting his view that there
was a margin for improving the production process of indigo. He forwarded Perkin’s
letter to India House hoping to persuade them that more scientific efforts were required to
improve manufacturing. The fermentation stage required maximum attention. Hay stated
that the exact scope for improvement was still an open question. He believed that the
processes could be made a lot more efficient than the 30% that Perkin had proposed. He
was still in the process of consulting additional chemists on the issue of margin for
improvement. 11
Indeed Hay confronted Perkin pointing out the probable ‘secondary’ routes for the
decay of indoxyl. He belabored the point that under actual conditions of manufacture
there were other chemical reactions taking place that might not take place under
laboratory conditions. And therefore Perkin might not be immediately aware of them.
One particular loss was taking place through the production of indi-humin. Indigo
manufacturing in Bihar invariably took place under hot and humid conditions. The vats
were infested with various kinds of bacteria. It was well known that some parts of indican
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underwent early breakdown into indoxyl and dextrose. He conjectured that the latter was
acted upon in turn by lactic and then butyric bacteria. The final products in this case were
carbonic acid and hydrogen, the emission of both of which was earlier detected by
Christopher Rawson. The last two reagents also reacted with indole, one of the
substances formed by the breakdown of indoxyl to produce indi-humin. He pointed out
that chemist Schunk had documented the production of indi-humin as a byproduct of the
chemical reactions underlying indigo manufacturing in the mid-nineteenth century. 12
The primary goal pursued by Hay was to turn everyone’s attention to seet – the
liquor and the refuse plant usually discarded after the manufacturing cycle was over. The
planters in India were then resisting the suggestion of any further trials on manufacturing.
Their experts had convinced them that there was no possibility of improving
manufacturing. Hay’s strategy was to demonstrate the presence of certain elements in the
seet and thus prove that the planters’ convictions were misplaced. If that could be done,
the planters would be once again open to the idea of new experiments. He said, “I am
anxious that this question of the brown residue of the waste liquor should be thoroughly
investigated by skilled analysts as soon as possible.” 13He considered early results from
the experimental analysis by Perkin to be encouraging. He was trying to obtain more seet
from India in order to facilitate further analytical examination in England.
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In 1913 Lewis Hay, backed by supporting assertions from Perkin, was demanding
something not very dissimilar from what Bloxam had demanded in 1908. Bloxam’s
report of 1908 had argued that color was being lost in the process of manufacturing and
therefore that the scientists in the Indian laboratories should turn their attention to what
was happening in the manufacturing vats. In substance Hay was also demanding the
same. He wanted the India Office to use its influence to convince the central and the
provincial governments to re-start chemical experiments in India.
The communications from Hay along with Perkin’s papers were promptly
forwarded to India. 14 J Mackenna, the Agricultural Adviser in India also took timely
action. The issue of reviving chemical experiments had cropped up repeatedly in India in
recent times. Eugene Schrottky in India had also asked for the involvement of chemists in
the task of making indigo paste. Mackenna decided to elicit the opinion of the planting
community on the issue whether the chemical experiments should be resumed.  He called
a meeting with the representatives of the planters at Pusa. 15
The planters were provided with all the relevant information including the
communication from Hay and the letters from Perkin. Mackenna clarified the
implications of Perkin’s intervention on the question of efficiency. He also provided
those present with an overview of the continuing biological experiments on indigo by the
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Imperial Economic Botanist at Pusa. Two questions were put to the planters. Were they
completely satisfied with the biological work being carried out at Pusa without the
involvement of the chemists? In the context of Prof. Perkin’s opinion that the efficiency
of the manufacturing processes could be improved by another 30% did they think that the
resumption of chemical experiments would be of any value?
 The planters were clearly in favor of the continuation of biological selection
trials. They emphasized that an increase in the indican content of the leaves must be
made the basis for plant selection. To determine and select the plants with high indican
content they suggested that a chemist should be employed to assist the current botanist
Albert Howard. Thus they more or less persisted with the model of collaboration between
a biologist and a chemist that they had been emphasizing since 1908. They believed that
if Howard’s trials could help increase the color of the leaves by about twenty-five per
cent there was a good chance of overcoming price competition from the synthetic
substitute. But they were clearly against the idea of initiating any experiments to improve
yield from manufacturing. They reportedly said that such efforts were “unnecessary and
practically useless in the present [depressed] state of the industry.”
The discouraging response from the planters did not preclude the next round of
communications from the officials at India House. They again forwarded a letter from
Lewis Hay in which the ex-planter expressed regret over the negative response from
India. He reiterated that the experts in India had inadvertently made an “omission.” They
had tested the seet for indigotin and found only small traces of it. On that basis they
formed an opinion that a very small amount of color was being lost. They committed an
error in not testing the liquor for substances wastefully converted from indican.  He
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argued that a different picture of the efficiency of manufacturing processes would emerge
on taking into account the presence of these other substances in the waste that had also
been formed out of indican. 16
Perkin was currently occupied analyzing the exact composition of the indigo
residue. Hay was quite confident that the completion of Perkin’s experiments would put a
seal on the debate over efficiency. There seemed little doubt in his mind that the results
of that investigation would conclusively establish the need for improving the
manufacturing processes.
This time Hay, Perkin, and India House succeeded in eliciting interest in India on
the subject. The perseverance shown in the metropolis was beginning to pay off. A
relatively more encouraging reply came from India. The central government officials
expressed interest in Perkin’s experiments on the nature of substances in seet. They
requested that they be acquainted with the outcome of the researcher’s investigations in
England. 17
War And A New Sense Of Enthusiasm Over The Future Of Natural Indigo
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The outbreak of World War I in July 1914 excited those in England with an
interest in the future of the natural indigo industry. They sensed a new opportunity, as
disruption in the supplies of synthetic indigo of German origin created an artificial
scarcity for the blue dye in England. Consumer demand for the natural product was
restored in the metropolis.
In a letter to his brother-in-law, also a planter in India, dated August 19, 1914
Lewis Hay said, “Our ‘Hour’ has arrived… Now, I think is the appointed hour and we
should strike quickly and hard.” 18 He also wrote another letter to the India Office asking
for immediate help to the indigo industry in two respects. First he suggested that India
Office facilitate the procurement of Java seeds from Zululand in South Africa where the
plant grew wild. It was believed by many that the spread of wilt disease on the indigo
plantations was the outcome of the Java plant becoming progressively weaker on account
of cultivation through generations. Albert Howard was addressing the problem of wilt in
India. He was engaged in the biological selection of plant at Pusa through which he
hoped to obtain a disease resistant stock. But such procedures would inevitably take a
long time to bring results. Previously uncultivated and wild strains found naturally-
growing in Zululand would not suffer from any such disadvantage. Hay further suggested
that Sir David Prain, the director of the Botanical Garden at Kew be consulted on the
issue. He also suggested that Martin J Sutton of the transit company Sutton and Sons of
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Reading, and Major Gage, the Superintendent of the Botanical Gardens in Calcutta, be
asked how to safely transport seeds to India. 19
Hay also wanted the assistance of the Home Government in the training of the
dyers in England in the use of natural indigo. For a good number of dyers, dyeing with
natural indigo had become a thing of the past. They had long switched to synthetic indigo
and used chemical vats. The hydrosulphite and woad vats for dyeing with natural indigo
had fallen out of use generally. The new generation of dyers was also oblivious of the
skills required for dyeing with the natural product.  Therefore Hay wanted the
government to assist with the re-training of the dyers with the aim of popularizing the use
of natural indigo among them.
Perkin was also enthusiastic about the possibilities that the War had opened up for
natural indigo. Referring to the conflict and its implications for the natural indigo
industry, he said, “It is an ill wind which blows nobody any good,…[but] in this case the
war should be of great benefit to the indigo planter, and give him opportunity and
breathing space to set his house in order.” 20  He was of the opinion that it would be
difficult to immediately produce synthetic indigo in Britain. Even if efforts were initiated
it would be another two to three years before such attempts would succeed. After the War
the Germans would also take a while before they would be able to supply synthetic
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indigo again at pre-War prices. Therefore now was the time. In Leeds the indigo from
Bengal was fetching ten shillings for every pound. The profits from these enhanced prices
should enable the planters to put their product on an even keel.
Perkin was also pushing for the chemical route for the improvement of yield. He
wrote to Lewis Hay,  “Apart from the agricultural side, I am certain that if your industry
is to be saved it must be by purely chemical means.” Earlier communications from Perkin
21 reveal that his work on the seet water and residue was getting impeded due to the delay
in procuring appropriate samples. Also, the paths that he was traversing in his
investigations were totally new. The only publication on the nature of indigo-brown was
the paper that he had co-authored with W P Bloxam several years before. There was
nothing published on glutten. Indigo glutten was different from the more familiar
vegetable glutten in many respects. It was also a mixture rather than a pure substance and
that brought additional challenges to investigators. But despite the difficult nature of the
problem he was optimistic about the final outcome. He had found a large amount of
indigo-brown and indigo-glutten in the residue. He suspected that the substances in the
residue had been formed during the fermentation of the leaf extract, and was hopeful that
with more effort such wasteful conversions could be stopped.
On receiving the communication from Hay and Perkin the administrators at the
India Office acted with a heightened sense of purpose. The context in the metropolis had
changed. There was a revival of interest in Indian natural indigo due to disruption in the
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supplies of the German synthetic substitute. Sir Lewis Hay and A G Perkin were only
advocates. It was up to the officials to act on their suggestions or to dismiss them. But in
1914 the suggestions of these two eminent individuals were followed up and acted upon
with resolve.
The director of the Botanical Garden at Kew, David Prain, was approached and
asked for his advice on the issue of procurement of Java seeds from South Africa.  Prain
supported the idea that a “fresh” strain of wildly growing Java indigo from Zululand
might help tide over the problem of weak and disease-prone strains in India. The Java
seeds had been originally procured in India either from Southeast Asia or from Natal.  In
both these places indigo had been sown for several years by the agriculturists and some
kind of conscious or sub-conscious selection of stocks may have taken place there. In that
sense a “pure” strain had never been tried in India. The wildly growing Java indigo in
Zululand could be a legitimate source for the supply of a strain that had not been
acclimatized previously in any farming environment. There was a chance that such a
strain might prove to be stronger. 22
The general mood at India Office was supportive. The officials were more willing
at this time to examine suggestions on a case-to-case basis and extend whatever support
they could. On receiving the response from Prain they contacted Hay again and asked
him to formulate a concrete scheme about Zululand seeds. The government would then
see what help it could render. But most importantly, the officials at India House
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forwarded the communications by Hay and Perkin regarding the manufacturing
experiments to the Indian authorities “for consideration.”
William Beddome Bridgett In London
Another interlocutor in the re-emerging debate on natural indigo in Britain was
William B Bridgett. Bridgett clearly had a vested interest in promoting natural indigo. He
was a very important importer and distributor of the plant-derived dye in Britain. He
owned the East India Indigo Company located in London whose transactions were of a
considerable size. Having been in the business of importaing indigo for more than thirty
years Bridgett had seen the ups and downs in the fortunes of the natural dye. Obviously
he was not pleased that the industry had fallen onto bad times. With the outbreak of the
War and the disruption in the supply of synthetic indigo he sensed his chance.
“There is practically no stock [of natural indigo] available,” Bridgett wrote to the
Viceroy in India in early September. A bit dramatically, of course, he sent to the Viceroy
a copy of the monthly statement of his firm. The demand for natural indigo had soared.
Within weeks of the declaration of the War all indigo had been already sold. Whatever
remained with him was already committed to the buyers and was awaiting delivery.
Cables were being received in London from overseas locations requesting supplies. But
the stocks of natural indigo in London warehouses had dried up just as in Bridgett’s. He
wanted to apprise the Viceroy of the new trade opportunity presented to natural indigo in
the markets of the West. The Viceroy’s office in India promptly acknowledged the
receipt of Bridgett’s letter and other information. A copy of the letter with enclosures was
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then forwarded to the Secretary of the Commerce and Industry Department of the
Government of India. 23
Bridgett appealed to the need for patriotic support for the natural indigo industry
of India. The English consumers had made a mistake in the past by preferring cheaper
synthetic indigo and thus promoting a German product at the cost of natural indigo that
came from within the Empire. Now the same Germans were at war with their country.
The Indians continued to be loyal having sent their troops to fight side by side with the
English soldiers against the Germans. Therefore the government should do everything
possible to resuscitate an imperial product. Such demands for support to an “imperial”
industry were not absolutely new. But in the context of the War such rhetoric assumed
added meaning and appealed to popular sensibilities.
In a follow-up letter addressed jointly to the Viceroy in India and the Secretary of
State for India in England Bridgett stated that natural indigo was a more powerful dye
than its synthetic substitute. But, Bridgett argued, inappropriate norms of selling had
brought ruin for natural indigo. The two dyes routinely sold in the market on the basis of
percentage of indigo. BASF Rein was sold in 20% concentration of indigo. On the other
hand, the permanganate test/titration test was used to check the percentage of indigo in
the natural dye and its value was fixed according to what percentage of indigo was found
in it. Bridgett pointed out that natural indigo was comprised of indigo, and then
additionally, indigo-red, indigo-brown, and indigo glutten. Apart from indigo the other
constituents in the natural dye also provided color in the vat. Any practical dyer would
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attest to that. This was an aspect that was often missed by chemists who had rendered
support to the theory that only indigo provided color and that the value of the dye should
be fixed on the basis of indigo percentage. Thus a true comparison of the dyeing power of
the two dyes could only be made with the help of “color tests” that measured their
respective coloring potential rather than indigo percentage. 24
Once again, in appealing to the need for color tests Bridgett was making an
argument that many planters had often made in the past. A few public trials had also been
conducted both in India and England previously. But such trials had failed in convincing
those concerned with the trade that the natural dye had more potency. Nevertheless,
Bridgett’s arguments were still favorably entertained at a time like this. When he offered
to organize public trials in England to show the higher dyeing power of natural indigo the
India Office in London encouraged him. A personal note from Secretary of State Sir
Thomas W Holderness was communicated to him: it suggested that he should try to
arrange for as much publicity as possible for his vat trials. 25
The office of the Secretary of State encouraged Bridgett to submit a “memorial”
to different government departments seeking their commitment to promote the use of
natural indigo in Britain. Bridgett accordingly took the lead in organizing a joint appeal
on behalf of the supporters of natural indigo. It asked the British consumers and
government offices like the War Office, Board of Trade, Admiralty, and Post Office to
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support the indigo industry in India. 26 The India Office also warmly received a
deputation led by Bridgett on September 18, 1914 that submitted a memorandum listing
the ways through which the government should help the natural indigo industry. The
office of Secretary of State sent a telegram to the Government of India informing them of
the contents of the memorandum. Later all the documents were forwarded to India. 27
The Crystallization Of A New Plan For The Indigo Experiments
The Delhi Conference
The Government of India finalized plans to call a conference to discuss all
suggestions related to improving the health of the indigo industry. The conference was
being called, admittedly, to discuss suggestions “received from various quarters.” But
there is little doubt that the persistent pressure from the officials at India House provided
the primary impetus for calling this conference.
The conference was to be held in Delhi on February 22, 1915. The Indian
Government wanted input from all concerned in order to form a clear view on the
question of indigo improvement. It needed all the information it could get so that it could
decide whether the government should invest further in that direction. And if the task of
indigo improvement emerged as a legitimate agenda from the deliberations of the
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participants, the government needed to know to what extent and in what manner it should
assist such programs.
The authorities solicited the participation of all concerned. A letter was dispatched
to the Secretary of the Bihar Planters’ Association asking the planters to send their
representative. Separate letters of invitation were also sent to the revenue secretaries of
Bihar and Orissa, Madras, Punjab, and the United Provinces asking if they would be
interested in sending their representatives. The effort to involve the other states represents
a certain turn at the level of policy. The ground realities of indigo manufacturing had
changed. Bihar and Orissa, which was formed out of the larger state of Bengal in 1911,
no longer enjoyed a clear dominance in terms of its share of the total indigo exported
from India. The relative share of both the Punjab and the United Provinces had gone up
although it was still far below the output in Bihar. Madras had always been a supplier of
an inferior quality of indigo called kurpah. But the relative importance of Madras as an
indigo-manufacturing state had risen in the context of a decline in the production of
indigo in Bihar. The central officials now wanted the opinion of administrators from all
four provinces where indigo was manufactured. 28
In the end the conference was widely attended. The officials of the agricultural
department in the provinces and at the center had a sizeable presence. A few
administrators of the commerce department also turned up. Among others were the office
holders and a few members of the Bihar Planters’ Association, the representative of the
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indigo trading company Moran and Co., and F Marsden, a dyeing expert from the Madras
province.
The participants first of all discussed whether natural indigo had a future in terms
of surviving the competition from synthetic indigo at present and after the War. Would it
make sense for the planters to simply divest at this stage? A consensus emerged that the
indigo industry had a prospect. D J Reid, Chairman of the Bihar Planters’ Association
asserted that taking the average yield at 16 sers per acre a profit of Rs. 100 for the acre
could be obtained. That was a more generous level of profit than that possible by growing
country crops on a large scale in Bihar, generally considered a fine business prospect by
many. All those present at the meeting apparently agreed with this assessment. 29
Moving on to discuss the scientific steps required to strengthen the industry, all
participants generally expressed satisfaction with the pace of results on the agricultural
front. The problem of the scarcity of Java seeds had been solved. The work of Albert
Howard at Pusa came in for special praise. Planters suggested that the work earlier
completed at Sirsiah on botanical selection to improve the amount of color in the leaves
should be followed up. Howard assured them that such steps would indeed be taken soon.
The immediate concern was to introduce early maturing varieties in Bihar. Bihar was
currently facing the problem of severely reduced output. The main cause of the shortfall
in production was bad weather and attacks by pests. The longer the plant stayed in the
field the greater was the risk of losing it. In the short-term therefore the introduction of
early maturing varieties in place of the present stock appeared to be the right strategy.
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On manufacturing, the conference strongly recommended hiring a chemist to
supplement current research work. The Agricultural Adviser to the Government of India,
Bernard Coventry, was a prominent participant who took the initiative to articulate this
demand. For the past two years Albert Howard and Gabrielle Howard at Pusa had been
engaged with botanical and physiological work including a culture of the seed. Such
work was urgent as the plant was threatened with extinction due to the onset of wilt. The
chemical work had to be restarted in parallel with research on the agricultural side. In
support of his viewpoint Coventry quoted Henry E Armstrong, Professor of Chemistry at
Central Technical College, City and Guilds of London Institute, that “chemical problems
of utmost importance are awaiting solution.” Armstrong had recently visited the
plantations in India. He had talked to many planters, advising them on the ways and
means to resurrect the natural indigo industry so that the natural dye could compete with
the synthetic on its own merits after the end of the War.
A new role was being envisaged for the chemist who the participants to this
important conference proposed to hire.  The new chemist was not to engage primarily in
the improvement of yield from manufacturing. His central duty was going to be the
purification and standardizing of natural indigo. Obviously he would deal with the
manufacturing processes. Any effort to have the final product in a consistent form
required a manipulation of the chemical processes underlying manufacturing. But his
main aim would be to standardize the output. “The main object was not to increase
indigotin recovery but to change the process of manufacture so as to standardize it,” the
participants agreed.
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Though it is not possible to verify directly, there are indications that Henry
Armstrong’s views persuaded the officials and indigo interests in India that
standardization was crucial. 30  There were others too at the conference who drew
attention to the need for a standardized commodity from the dyer’s perspective. F
Marsden, the dyeing expert from Madras in south India told everyone that the preference
for synthetic indigo shown by the Indian dyers was due to one reason – “the ease with
which it could be handled.” The dyeing methods had been revolutionized since the
introduction of the synthetic indigo. Earlier natural indigo cakes had to be soaked and
ground to uniformity before the vats could be prepared. This often required enormous
time, effort, as well as skilled hands. Then came synthetic indigo that was available in the
form of a paste. It offered to the users a major convenience over the natural, as it was
readily usable. The paste could be immediately used and did not require any preparation
time.
Indeed a candid admission of the factors that seemed to have attracted the buyers
to synthetic indigo distinguishes the actors in 1915 from those in any time period
previous to this. E C H Cresswell from Moran and Company of Calcutta, the leading
indigo exporter from India, stated that there was a certain segment of market for indigo
cake that was likely to persist. He was concerned to the contrary that the push towards
making natural indigo available to the consumers in a paste form might disturb the
already existing niche market for cake indigo. 31
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 329
The clearest articulation of the factors that had differentiated the market into two
segments – the major part that used synthetic indigo and a minor part that used natural
indigo – came from Bernard Coventry. He confronted the claims made by a few that
natural indigo was a better dye. He began by clarifying the fact that at that time 90% of
the market used synthetic indigo and only the remaining10% natural indigo. He chided
many for being “blind” to this fact. What was now needed was to try and understand the
basis for this overwhelming preference for synthetic indigo. He said, “Now, it is
maintained by some of our friends that natural indigo is superior to the synthetic; that the
indigotin of the synthetic is not true indigotin; and that the artificial product has been
taken up by the dyeing trade not on account of its superior intrinsic merits but to the
bribery and intrigue of the Germans. I hope to show this to be an utter delusion.” 32
Coventry provided an analysis of the nature of surviving markets for natural
indigo. There was no denying that in the “semi-civilized” countries like Russia and Persia
the use of natural indigo had persisted. The dyers in those countries only knew how to
test and use the natural dye. The carpet-makers of places like Smyrna had their carpets
dyed with natural indigo in England. The smell of the natural dye emanating from the
carpets was considered a confirmation of its genuineness.  Thirdly, in the countries that
produced natural indigo a sufficient demand had persisted. The three groups together
accounted for 3/5th or about 30,000 maunds of natural indigo consumption. The
remaining 20,000 maunds was used by the dyers in England and other foreign countries
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for a certain class of dyeing of heavy woollens in which the impurities of natural indigo
appeared to have some tinctorial value. The surviving use of the old-fashioned
fermentation wooden vats also drove the demand for the natural dye to an extent. The
superiority of natural indigo was acknowledged in these parts of the world and for certain
classes of dying. But based on their claims some had rushed to the conclusion that the
natural indigo “was intrinsically a better thing.” This was simply not true, said Coventry.
In fact, the contrary was true. The majority of the dyers the world over considered
natural to be relatively the “inferior” dye. This was for two reasons, Coventry explained.
One reason was simply that the synthetic was intrinsically more suitable for use with
certain classes of dyeing than the natural. In printing, the synthetic was preferred because
the impurities present in the natural were an obstruction in the obtaining of fine prints. In
the case of dyeing with lighter shades, too, the use of synthetic was dominant. The second
reason for the dominance of synthetic was its cheapness and better usability. The lower
price of synthetic indigo was an important factor especially considering that indigo was a
particularly expensive dye. The standardized synthetic offered the advantage of easier
manipulation. Since it was known to be of standard strength its quantity in the vat and the
nature of shades could be controlled and any possible wastage also avoided.
Keeping these facts in mind Coventry called for the appointment of a chemist.
The aid of chemistry was needed. Such a chemist could be on the rolls of the Pusa
Institute. The team of agricultural experts at Pusa was doing everything possible on the
agricultural front. The chemist was needed to make the natural dye more “user friendly.”
The chemist could also focus on improving yield from manufacturing since there was a
 331
belief that their efficiency could be improved. But improvement of yield, Coventry
asserted, should only be “a secondary object of investigation.” 33
The conference also discussed purely commercial factors. Producing indigo in a
paste form for the consumers was not the end of the matter. It was admitted that the
indigo planters did not have any trade organization to push their product in the market
place. It was important “to get in touch with different markets.” The members discussed
the possibilities of starting such organizations to push natural indigo in the Western
markets to begin with. Such a step to facilitate “distribution” as against “production” was
again a new aspect that the indigo planters in India were addressing frontally now.
The central government extended its wholehearted support to the indigo industry
on the matter of the appointment of a chemist. A letter from the Viceroy’s Council was
sent to the Secretary of State in London requesting that a chemist be dispatched to Pusa.
They justified the need for a chemist. They also argued that the government should bear
the expenses incurred towards the salary of the chemist and the establishment of a
separate indigo research section at Pusa. Such assistance seemed like a legitimate aid that
could be provided by the government to an industry. 34
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The influence of the metropolitan chemists was perceptible in this entire exercise.
The influence of Henry Armstrong was now pervasive among both the officials and the
planters. His suggestions influenced the forming of consensus among the planters for the
appointment of a chemist. In his letter the Viceroy in India suggested to the Secretary of
State that the opinion of the English chemist should be elicited for the selection of the
chemist that they were demanding. The letter from the Viceroy also quoted another
prominent chemist in England, A G Perkin who had said that the natural indigo industry
had to be saved “by purely chemical means.”
The Initiatives Of The Secretary Of State In The Metropolis
India House wanted to develop its own perspective on matters related to the
natural indigo industry. Its officials called their own conference on indigo on September
20, 1915. The two chemists, Armstrong and Perkin, four planters or ex-planters T Martin
Macdonald, Lewis J E Hay, C J Wilson, C B Gregson, and a representative of the Moran
Company attended the conference. Sir William Duke from India House chaired the
meeting.
The deliberations at this conference turned out to be crucial in shaping the
perspective of the Secretary of State who held the reins of decision-making in the
metropolis. In particular, the Secretary of State accepted the argument of the two
chemists.  These men were not only accomplished scientists who had a long association
with the world of dyes. Having lived in the metropolis they also had a privileged
perception of the developments in the market.
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Armstrong and Perkin persuasively argued that the planters should become more
responsive to the market. They were invited to evaluate and re- consider consumer
preferences and reorient the organizational basis of production and distribution. Planter T
M Macdonald was tentative on the issue of consumer choices. He made a reference to
some of the efforts that had been made from time to time to make and sell natural indigo
paste, though without success. Some preliminary effort at producing the natural indigo
paste was made way back in 1898. This effort and the subsequent efforts had been only
made on an experimental basis. But the handful of dyers contacted demanded that the
paste be provided to them at the same price as the synthetic paste. That doomed any
further coordinated effort to produce natural paste. 35
The discussants then converged on the view that the competition with synthetic
indigo would have to be met on two planes. The natural would have to be offered at a
reasonably comparable price on the one hand and in the form of a paste on the other. For
cheapening the dye the most likely path lay through agricultural trials to improve the
yield per acre. Marginal scope to cheapen the dye also existed through streamlining the
production process. But more concerted efforts than those attempted previously were
required to make natural indigo paste in a commercially viable manner. The participants
wanted the employment of a chemist primarily to advance the efforts on standardizing
the production of paste.
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The other major recommendation concerned changing the organizational basis of
manufacturing. Armstrong argued that the production of a standardized paste required
that the planters set up a centralized factory or a few factories where the indigo planters
should forward their indigo in a semi-manufactured state. Such a consignment would
possibly be in a liquid or semi-liquid state and would have to be sent in tanks. At the
factories the raw product would be assessed for indigotin, bulked, standardized, and made
into a paste ready for export. What Armstrong had in mind is that indigo of different
strengths be collected at central locations. The actual number of factories would depend
on a consideration of the costs of carriage etc. The individual planters would be
compensated according to the quality of their consignment. Thereafter the indigo would
be mixed and turned into standardized paste of 20% strength.
The planters present on the occasion pointed to the problems at ground level. C B
Gregson stated that indigo acreage had shrunk and many factories were deserted in Bihar.
A revival of those factories required major financial investment. Before the planters
showed a willingness to invest afresh they would need assurance of some form that their
indigo would be purchased at a remunerative price. There was also a fear that at the end
of the War the Germans would once again sell synthetic cheaply. Some even feared a
“dumping” of inventories from Germany at throwaway prices. Gregson suggested that
government contracts should be made available to the planters as a sop. Such a
suggestion was not seriously entertained. However, the meeting conceded that if English
entrepreneurs manufactured synthetic indigo in the future, Indian natural indigo should be
afforded the same type or protection as the English synthetic indigo against the German
synthetic indigo.
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Martin T Macdonald was unsure how successful the efforts would be to induce
cooperation among the planters for production and especially distribution/selling. The
sending of indigo to the factories in a semi-finished condition did not pose too much of a
difficulty though. There were ways and means to forward the consignment. The main
problem, according to him, would accrue in forcing co-operation among the planters.
Lewis Hay was also doubtful that the planters would be able to co-operate to have their
ware centrally processed. Gregson was relatively more optimistic. He thought that the
planters could be induced to cooperate “if the advantages were clearly demonstrated.” 36
Henry Armstrong was very assertive on this issue. He made it clear in no
uncertain terms that unless the planters cooperated towards the production of
standardized paste there was no point in the government sanctioning the appointment of a
chemist. In the absence of corresponding efforts from the planters the mere appointment
of the chemist would be a waste of public money. Incidentally this was a line that the
Secretary of State would later take, insisting that the planters do their part by getting
organized in co-operatives if they wanted any state help.
The participants also established the need for reducing transaction costs and for
dealing “in the most direct manner with the consumer.” By organizing for distribution the
planters could ensure both “economy” and “continuity of supply.” It was also suggested
that the disposal of the product should be under the control of the proprietors. The present
arrangement wherein the planters lost all control over indigo once it passed into the hands
of the brokers was faulty. Two boards should be established. One board would be at
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Muzaffarpur and its subsidiary at London. The primary responsibility of the boards
would be “to supervise within their respective spheres all [activities] pertaining to
marketing.”
“Eminent men of both business and science” should head the proposed boards, it
was suggested. The role envisaged for the board was to make it the overall hub of
industry-wide reforms in trade and marketing. But the agenda of standardization, an
important aspect of marketing of the product, involved the spheres of both science and
the market. Scientists were to work out the methods for turning out standardized paste to
be sold to all consumers. Norms regarding color percentage, test assays, and units of
measurement had to be established and popularized among the producers and the
consumers. With that end in mind the members of the conference planned to constitute
this board with scientists and businessmen equally
 represented. 37
On the issue of how scientific research was going to be administered, once again
the metropolitan chemists were able to corner the initiative. Perkin was in favor of the
formation of a committee of experts in England that would supervise and direct the work
of the chemist if he was appointed to work in India. “In the past young men sent out had
been without expert advice or criticism,” Perkin noted. Such experts had more or less
worked in isolation and had made errors in judgment. There was a need to take corrective
measures in this regard. Henry Armstrong agreed with the proposal to appoint a
committee. In fact the two scientists spoke in absolutely one voice on the issue of
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“management” of research in colonial India by a team of experts in England. 38 The
suggestion on the appointment of a committee in the metropolis was another idea taken
up by the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State was in broad concurrence with the major recommendations
of the conference. The India Office without delay forwarded the minutes of the
conference to the Viceroy in India for information. In a subsequent telegram, the
Secretary of State asserted that the production of standardized paste on a commercial
basis was “essential to success and the first step towards all other improvements [of
indigo].” He agreed to appoint a chemist to carry out that work. But he put some
conditions before the planters. The planters were required to commit that within a year of
the appointment of the chemist they would also take steps to get organized for co-
operative production and selling of natural indigo. Lastly, the telegram also indicated that
an expert committee would be formed in England to monitor the experiments in India. 39
In a significant development support for the idea of standardized natural indigo
paste came from the largest organization of the dyers in England – the Foremen Dyers’
Guild. On November 20, 1915 at a public meeting the dyers of the Lancashire and
Yorkshire region belonging to this body gathered to discuss the shortage of the blue dye
that they were facing. For the past six weeks the dyers had not received any supply of
synthetic indigo. A member of the Board of Trade, who had been invited to attend the
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meeting, asked why the dyers were, then, not using natural indigo? The dyers present
confessed that they could only use the dye in a paste form. 40
Rowland E Oldroyd, the President of the Guild, who addressed the public
meeting, further elaborated on the need for a standardized paste. In a scathing attack on
the planters he condemned them for their thoughtlessness with regard to consumers’
requirements. In his opinion that was the primary cause why the planters had lost the race
against synthetic indigo. The indigo obtained out of the boiler was in a semi-liquid state
and actually in a more appropriate form for use by the dyers. Then the planters put it
through several stages so as to dry it and finally cut it in the form of a cake making the
indigo far less usable. In this way he brought out the irony and highlighted the sheer lack
of interest of the planters in putting their product in the market in an appropriate form.
“The Indigo Planter … has never been in touch, or taken any interest in the actual
user of his product,” charged Oldroyd. The President argued that it was now the duty of
the Guild to have the situation remedied. They needed to communicate with the planters
and tell them in what form the dyers needed natural indigo. To do so was patriotic, as it
would promote a product from the “Empire.” But it was also sensible from a business
standpoint. Therefore, he argued, “If these people [meaning the planters] will not come
and see what the users require, the users as represented by the “Guild” must … go to
them.” 40
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A resolution was passed at the end of the meeting imploring the planters in India
to start making indigo paste. It was supposed to sensitize everyone connected with the
natural indigo trade – planters, businessmen, and administrators – to become aware of the
user’s requirements. The resolution also directly addressed the Secretary of State and
asked him to intervene urgently on this matter. It said, “We … ask you to press the Indigo
Planters’ Association and similar bodies interested in natural indigo, to make some
arrangements to supply to us Indigo in the condition we require it for our work, i.e., in the
form of a paste similar to …Synthetic Indigo.”
This was the clearest articulation ever of consumer requirements. And it had the
desired effect. It got the Secretary of State passionately interested in the issue of
consumer requirements and the operation of the market. The natural indigo market
comprising of the indigo planters/producers in India, the vast number of intermediaries
including the shippers and brokers, and the consumers in England was not rationalized to
an extent where the laws of demand and supply would take their course sui generis. At a
time like this when the War had disrupted the supplies of synthetic indigo, the consumers
required the political intervention of the Secretary of State to get their product in an
appropriate form.
The office of the Secretary of State contacted Oldroyd seeking his further opinion
on the competition between natural and synthetic indigo in the market. He had an interest
in the issue. He wanted more information on whether at all, and in what manner natural
indigo could be made to compete with synthetic indigo on its own. Before putting any
additional resources in the improvement of the natural dye the Secretary wanted to assure
himself and the political classes in Britain that the natural dye had a fair chance. The
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President of the Foremen Dyers’ Guild seemed to be the most appropriate person for the
purpose. The Guild represented the majority of dyers in England that used the blue dye.
His opinion mattered. Indeed what he told the Secretary of State influenced the decisions
taken by him.
Oldroyd was willing to oblige. He responded promptly to the Secretary of State’s
query. In his response he focused on the inadequacy of efforts in the past by the planters
in organizing the sale of natural indigo. In particular he praised the German method of
selling “from Manufacturer to Consumer direct.” This gave the German producers a
better control over their product. In contrast the profits of the natural producers were
compromised by the “profits of the intermediate handlers.” This was just one example of
the lack of “proper organization” in the natural indigo business. Oldroyd was also
cautious. He wanted the officials in England to be careful  that “the planters will not be
allowed to whittle away the new opportunity.” He suggested watchfulness over the
planters and that “constant pressure is brought to bear” 41 on them.
The views of Oldroyd imparted additional credibility when India House sent them
across to the Government of India. The Revenue Secretary at the center in turn forwarded
them to the BPA for information and action. 42 The officials in England and India thus
made it clear that in their view the recommendations of the dyers in England could not be
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ignored. In the light of Oldroyd’s comments they were now expecting the planters to
acquiesce with the wishes of the dyers.
The Reaction In India
The central administrators thought that the demand from the metropolis that the
planters organize their production and distribution as a pre-condition for the continued
appointment of  research chemist was a legitimate one. They implored the planters to
assure the authorities that this would be done. The message from England had clarified
that the chemist’s tenure would be reviewed after one year. If the planters had not taken
the initiative to get organized in cooperatives his term would not be renewed. But the
central officials told the planters that they would request the Secretary of State to appoint
the chemist for an initial term of three years. This was because they felt that no concrete
results could be expected from the chemical experiments in less time. 43
But the Secretary of State was insistent on planter’s commitment to fulfill the
condition. He explained why he thought this was necessary. Experts had assured him that
finding methods for bulking and standardizing indigo and producing a paste would not
pose too many difficulties. One year was a reasonable time in which to expect results.
Neither would the procedure be very expensive to put up on an industrial scale. Therefore
he wanted the planters to be ready to proceed as soon as the methods had been devised
and perfected. At the same time he was very impatient with the fact that much of the
natural indigo industry was still conducted “on old lines.” He was sure that such
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industries would necessarily wither away as soon as free competition with the synthetic
resumed. Thus he wanted a re-organization of the industry implemented within the first
twelve months failing which, in his opinion, the government should withdraw from the
“special efforts” for indigo. 44
The BPA decided to call an Extraordinary General Meeting of the association to
discuss all aspects of the proposals from England. They were of a wide-ranging nature.
They involved a shift in the focus of experiments. They also required a re-organization on
an industry-wide scale. A consensus had to be built among the planters on the issue of
forging cooperation. Such proposals could only be considered at a general meeting,
which represented the planters as widely as possible. 45
The planters expressed broad agreement with all the recommendations made in
the letter from the Secretary of State. They agreed that a chemist should be gainfully
employed to make the standardized paste. As an aside, of course, they even ventured to
suggest the name of a chemist already in India for consideration of the post – one Mr.
Barnes, the Principal of the Lyallpur Agricultural College in Punjab. He could be
available on short notice. He also had knowledge of the indigenous conditions. However
the planters claimed that it was difficult to give “an absolute guarantee” that they would
set up a central factory or factories for making the paste. The chemist would first have to
work out the exact cost and other details and convince them of the viability before such
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steps could be undertaken. 46 In support of this line they cited the opinion expressed by
Prof Henry Armstrong and Prof Arthur Smithhells (Professor of Chemistry at Leeds) who
had stated that the first task was to show by concrete examples that such a paste could be
commercially produced, and only then the planters could be expected to take requisite
measures. 47
The planters assured the local authorities that they would keep in contact with the
chemist. They undertook to take steps to cooperate in producing at centralized factories
as soon as the chemist’s trials were deemed to be successful.  They were also ready to
cooperate in the marketing of indigo. They were already working out the modalities of a
co-operative sale of indigo at Calcutta. This was going to be tried out in Calcutta in the
coming season. Once the paste was available they would set up offices in Calcutta and
London where co-operative sale of indigo could be effected.
Such assurances sufficed for the time. The Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State
that he considered the assurances from the planters “sufficient.”  He therefore requested
the appointment of the chemist at the earliest possible date so that maximum advantage
could accrue from it. 48
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The planters also responded to Oldroyd’s comments that had been sent to them
earlier. They totally agreed with the general point made by the President of Foremen
Dyers’ Guild that efforts were required to present the natural in the form of paste to the
consumers in England. But they took strong exception to  “the extraordinary nature of the
communication addressed to the Secretary of State by Mr. Oldroyd.” Oldroyd had in fact
gone overboard in painting the planters as a class barely interested in making quick
profits and totally unresponsive to the needs of the market. The planters considered such
criticism to be totally unwarranted. They documented the entire range of efforts that had
been made to date in producing and selling natural indigo as powder and paste.  While it
was true that the planters had been unsuccessful in meeting their goals that was not
because of a lack of effort on their part. 49
The Appointment Of The Indigo Chemist And The Establishment Of The Indigo
Committee
The next stage in the evolution of a strategy to improve natural indigo was
drawing to a  close. The first manifestation of the culmination of this process was the
appointment of W A Davis, a chemist recommended by Prof Armstrong, as the Indigo
Research Chemist. He was to leave for Bombay on April 29, 1916. 50 He was to be placed
within the Imperial Department of Agriculture in India. He was therefore asked to
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proceed to Pusa on arrival in Bombay. 51 The choice of Davis once again reveals the
determination in the metropolis to take charge of the situation in India: the imperial
authorities apparently had no interest in appointing the planters’ preferred man, Mr.
Barnes.
They also made organizational changes. To provide focus to the impending work
on the indigo paste they formed an Indigo and Paste Committee within the Bihar
Planters’ Association.
The other major landmark for this phase was the formation of an Indigo
Committee in England to liaison with and to monitor the work of the Indigo Research
Chemist. The Secretary of State announced the formation of this committee headed by
the Revenue Secretary at India House, L J Kershaw. Two other members were the
chemist Henry Armstrong and a dyer, Mr. Burgess of Burgess, Edward and Company.
The third member was to be a planter. India House wanted the planters to nominate their
own representative on this committee. 52
The administrators in England also wanted the committee to interact as directly as
possible with the Indigo Chemist. A close monitoring of the experiments and trials in the
colony by actors in the metropolis was a hallmark of the plans being formulated in
England. Therefore the Secretary of State proposed that the committee correspond with
W A Davis through the Agricultural Adviser to the Government of India, J MacKenna,
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by-passing the provincial administrators. The stationing of W A Davis at Pusa was also
supposed to ensure a close liaison through the Agricultural Adviser who also had his
office there.  The Viceroy in India did not have any problems with that arrangement. He
approved the arrangement. 53
The planters proposed L J Harington to be the planter representative on the Indigo
Committee in England. The name of another member, T Martin Macdonald, was
proposed as a standby.  An “Indigo Committee and Paste Committee” was also formed
within the Bihar Planters’ Association to coordinate efforts with the Indigo Committee in
England. Thus the stage was finally set for the conduct of next round of experiments on
natural indigo. 54
New Experiments And New Results, 1916-17
W A Davis, The Indigo Paste, And Its Marketing
Indigo Research Chemist W A Davis achieved considerable progress toward the
making of indigo paste during the 1916-17 manufacturing season. In a letter of November
1916 the Agricultural Adviser pointed out, “Mr. Davis has been able to demonstrate the
possibility of making a paste.”55 There remained some work on bringing the consistency
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to an exact 20%. There were also problems of fermentation in consignments. But the
basic path to the making of the paste had been demonstrated. The Bihar Planters’
Association also appeared optimistic. Analyzing the progress made by Davis until then
they saw “no insuperable difficulty in producing a paste of 20 per cent indigotin.”
In a follow up communication Davis explained the procedures he had followed
for making the standardized paste. The natural dye contained 15-20% indigo glutten and
another 15-20% indigo-brown. Davis removed the former by boiling with dilute acid and
the latter by boiling with alkali (caustic soda). By successive boiling with the acid and the
alkali a dye of 90% consistency was obtained. There was yet another impurity, the isomer
indirubin present in the dye. Its removal required the use of complex procedures that
would be impractical to implement on an industrial scale. The amount of indirubin in the
dye produced in Bihar was anyway negligible and thus Davis decided to ignore its
presence. Davis was confident that a paste containing 35% color could be fabricated for
sending to England. 56
Davis also suggested the de-centralized manufacturing and standardizing of
indigo paste at separate factories. He dropped the previous idea of a “Central Factory” as
proposed in particular by Armstrong . The distance between the individual factories and
the state of the transportation system in Bihar would make consigning and bulking too
difficult a task. The Indigo Chemist instead suggested that standardizing should take
place “factory by factory.” That would of course involve employing analytical assistants
at the different factories who would monitor that 20% consistency was maintained in the
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daily output at individual factories. But this was considered to be a less challenging task
than bulking. Possibly the training of native hands in the task of analysis might have
solved the problem of technical manpower in the numerous factories. The engagement of
the natives at subordinate levels of the scientific establishment had anyway become a
common practice by now. 57
Very soon, however, a new perspective began to emerge independently in India
and England that favored making of the standardized paste in England. The immediate
impetus for this, at least among the planters in India, was the high freight costs prevailing
on account of the War. The BPA passed a resolution highlighting the higher cost incurred
on freight for the 20% paste as against the cake that had a dye content of about 60%. In
the case of paste the freight charges went up simply because the weight of the
consignment went up three times for an equivalent amount of the dye. The planters
therefore wanted the London Committee to explore the prospects of making the paste in
England out of cakes sent from India. The BPA secretary wrote to the planter member on
the Indigo Committee in England L T Harington in this regard. 58
The proposal was put before the London committee that in turn “unanimously”
favored the route of standardizing the natural dye in the metropolis. In a personal
communication to the General Secretary of BPA, Harington seconded the latter’s views
on the matter, saying that undertaking the standardizing work in England offered many
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advantages. It would save the higher cost of packing the paste and of freight.
Additionally, the new scheme would allow those responsible for the final processing in
England to keep in close touch with the consumers locally and make the product to
customer specifications. Salesmen could also be hired to travel among the dyers and
printers. 59
Harington also warned that the planters must expedite the work on the making of
natural indigo paste. The Levinstein family, who had a long association with the business
of dyes, had taken over the previous MLB factory at Ellesmere Port Works. They soon
planned to turn out 1,000 tons of synthetic indigo paste of 20% concentration at the
sequestered factory. The output in the short-term from the English sources was not going
to be considerable. But slowly they were likely to augment supplies. The Swiss and the
French sources were also likely to very soon begin sending synthetic indigo into the
British markets. Therefore the planters needed to make their mark in the British markets
before other synthetic producers established their dominance.
Another letter followed from the Indigo Committee in London that detailed the
plans in order to expedite the production of a standardized paste in England. It involved
the establishment of a “Home Syndicate” in England. The planters were to send the
assortment of indigo to England. They would be paid individually according to the
quality of their consignment. The home syndicate would oversee the making of paste to
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specifications. The London Committee recommended that the planters immediately
subscribe funds for the steps to be taken towards the setting up of the syndicate 60
The response from the planters was very positive. They immediately collected the
funds for meeting the expenses of the work to be done by the proposed Indigo Paste
Committee in England. They nominated three members to serve on the organization. One
was L T Harington who was already serving on the erstwhile Indigo Committee formed
by the Secretary of State. The other two were George Macdonald and T Martin
Macdonald. 61 Later Sir George Sutherland of the Calcutta-based Moran Company was
added. The actual scientific work was to be undertaken by Henry Armstrong and
Reginald Brown. Brown was intentionally chosen because of his close association
previously with the manufacture and marketing of synthetic indigo. It was thought that he
could use his intimate knowledge of synthetic indigo and consumer’s preference for it to
improve natural indigo along the same lines.
The Re-Interpretation Of The Causes Of Wilt
Davis also contributed to the ongoing agricultural investigations. In particular he
studied the incidence of wilt on the plantations. Before Davis began his duties at Pusa it
was primarily the Economic Botanist Albert Howard who carried out the agricultural
investigations on indigo. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Howard had
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achieved some success in overcoming the problem of wilt. He had succeeded in growing
Java seeds through August cropping. That had solved the immediate problem of
dwindling supplies of Java seeds.
But Howard had not been able to solve the problem of wilt in plants grown for
harvesting of leaves as opposed to those grown for seeds. Wilt usually attacked the plant
before the time of khoontie or the second harvest. Howard’s solution had largely been to
promote the cultivation of fast-growing varieties with characteristically shallow roots that
gave maximum output in the early stages before succumbing to wilt by the time the plant
would ordinarily give the second harvest. Davis considered the eradication of wilt to be
an important instrument in meeting the competition from synthetic. Removing wilt
offered the chance to increase yield through a second harvest.
As Davis analyzed the causes of wilt and made efforts to overcome its occurrence,
he offered a radically different explanation for the onset of wilt in the indigo crops of
Bihar. 62 Davis claimed that wilt was connected with the deficiency of “available”
phosphates in the soil, especially deeper in the ground. He defined available phosphate as
that component of phosphates in the soil that could be dissolved in the carbolic acid
produced by the bacteria in indigo nodules and was thus “available” to the plant, as
against the phosphate that could not be dissolved and therefore whose presence was
irrelevant to the growth of the plant.
Davis warned that unless the soils of Bihar were immediately supplemented by
adding super phosphates the future of the indigo industry was doomed. While the alluvial
plains of Bihar had some amount of “available” phosphates in the topsoil, the lower part
                                                 
62 W A Davis, A Study of the Indigo Soils of Bihar: The urgent necessity of immediate phosphate
manuring if crops are to be maintained.  (Calcutta: Agricultural Research Institute, 1918): 1-77
 352
was absolutely deficient. Indigo, especially Java indigo, possessed deep roots. The young
plant showed normal growth as it kept using whatever little amount of phosphates were
found towards the upper portion of the soil. But by the time the roots grew six inches or
more they ran into that portion of the sub soil that was totally deficient in phosphates.
The growth of the plant then suffered.
Davis countered Howard’s claim that the onset of wilt was connected with
waterlogged conditions and the resultant unavailability of air in the sub soil for the proper
functioning of bacteria. In a trial in three fields in three different locations he monitored
the growth of the plants (see Table 8.2 below). In the three plots the soil was well drained
and there was practically no water logging. In the case of one of them, the Dholi field, the
soil had actually been mixed with thikara in order to further improve its aeration.
                                                           Table 8.2







Available phosphate in top 6 inches 0.00154% 0.0012% 0.0050%
Available phosphate in 6-12 inches
from the top
0.0004% 0.0003% 0.0014%
Available phosphate from 1-3 feet
from the top
Nil 0.0003% 0.0002%
   Source: W A Davis, A Study of the Indigo Soils of Bihar
Also, the three fields did not lack in any other nutrient in significant amounts except for
phosphates. In all three cases the plants grew exceedingly well till they reached a height
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of about 12-18 inches. Finally the crops in all three experimental plots wilted. and died.
Davis explained that crop failure in these trials was the direct result of a deficiency of
soils in phosphates especially at the deeper levels. 63
Davis also collected evidence from different plantations to prove that wilt was not
caused by water logging, but rather by phosphate deficiency. He had evidence for this
from Jorhat, Assam. The plantation at Jorhat had received 90 inches of rainfall during the
season. One-sixth of the land was waterlogged for three weeks. Even May and June,
usually the pre-monsoon months without rains, were not dry. Yet indigo grew well on
this plantation. More evidence came from Jalpaiguri also in Assam. The plantation had
sandy, black soil that normally remained “badly waterlogged” for three months every
year. The annual rainfall in the area in the current season was 150 inches as against the
average 40-50 inches in Bihar. The plants on this estate grew well to give an excellent
khoontie crop despite the water logging. This was quite unusual given the general pattern
of the destruction of khoontie in Bihar. J M Wilson, the General Secretary of Bihar
Planters’ Association, visited the Jalpaiguri estate to witness and report on this plantation.
The planters wanted to see for themselves if the news of successful khoontie was
accurate, and if there were any lessons to be drawn from Jalpaiguri. Wilson confirmed the
good health of the plants and a successful khoontie harvest. He brought back samples of
soil from the plot so that Davis could examine them.
On testing the soil Davis found out that the Assam soil overall had up to 200
times the amount of available phosphate as compared with Bihar. The sub-soil had up to
1,000 times more phosphate than in Bihar. This re-confirmed what Davis had long
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maintained – that wilt was the result of soil depletion and not waterlogged conditions.
Davis also disclosed that two-thirds of soils tested by him in Bihar to date were found
deficient, containing between 0.002 to 0.001 percent phosphates. He used this statistic to
underscore his thesis that wilt was caused by mineral deficiency. 64
Davis explained that the soil in Bihar had been progressively depleted. Bihar had
traditionally grown shallow root crops in the past that consumed the phosphates in the
upper levels of the soil. When Java was introduced into Bihar in 1903 it did well during
the first few years. Its deep roots could tap the available phosphates in the sub soil that
had never been used before. But after a few years the stock of nutrients was exhausted.
These minerals had not been replaced through the use of fertilizers. Davis recommended
an immediate use of super phosphates during the rainy season so that they could be
drained down. But at the same time he also warned that the rate of recovery would be
very slow for these depleted soils. This was because it took a long time for the
phosphates to descend to the lowest levels.
 Davis’ claims on the cause of wilt generated a fresh controversy. He had
disturbed the picture painted by Howard earlier who had attributed wilt to waterlogged
conditions. The planters were predictably confused. In an important meeting of their
association they noted the ‘sharp divergence of opinion” between the two experts over
what caused the onset of wilt and the possible methods for its elimination. 65 The
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deadlock over this issue was never really resolved even as wilt continued to ravage the
second harvest in Bihar.
Davis And Hutchinson On Steeping
Davis also favored the improvement of the manufacturing processes. Like many
experts before him, he too believed that the efficiency of the production processes in use
currently in India was low. In his estimate the efficiency was a mere 50%.
According to Davis the problem lay in the steeping stage of manufacture. The
solution according to him was in controlling the presence of bacteria and the conditions
in the vat to catalyze the appropriate type of fermentation. Firstly indican was not getting
extracted fully from the leaves. Secondly some of the color-giving body was getting
dissipated in the fermentation vat. In order to devise a way to regulate fermentation the
scientist collaborated with the new Imperial Bacteriologist at Pusa - C M Hutchinson. 66
Indeed the improvement of the fermentation processes turned out to be the most
promising line of investigation between 1916 and 1920 and were those in which the
planters and their experts had maximum hopes.
Incidentally in 1903 Cyril Begtheil had also considered the option of “artificial
regulation” of microorganisms in the steeping vat in order to improve the yield of color.
His plan was to kill all the bacteria present with the help of disinfectants and then to
induce fermentation with especially cultured bacteria. The task of culturing appropriate
strains of bacteria at that time proved formidable and was given up. The experts at Pusa
now wanted to follow up those threads. Pusa was a more resourceful organization. It had
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a larger budget for scientific research and a complete team of numerous experts including
a chemist, mycologist, bacteriologist, entomologist, economic botanist etc.  At Pusa, it
seemed more plausible now that the pursuit of the bacteriological line might produce
results. In a way, research had come full circle and attention was again focused on the
fermentation stage of indigo manufacturing.
Davis and Hutchinson foresaw two major problems: (a) that the indican was
incompletely extracted from the leaves, and (b) that the hydrolysis of indican was
inappropriately performed.  There was an alternative: extract the color principle from the
leaves with hot water. But the procurement of hot water on a large-scale was still
considered prohibitive due to the high costs involved. Thus the fermentation route had to
be persisted with for the time being. 67
To overcome the impediments connected with the hydrolyzing of indican the
experts thought of developing an appropriate strain of bacteria. Davis found that a
connection existed between fermentation in an acidic environment and higher output.
Along with Hutchinson, he hoped to isolate a bacterium that would combine an acid-
producing power with the power to hydrolyze. Working towards that goal numerous
strains of bacteria were isolated. They were cataloged according to their power of
hydrolyzing. 68
Further trials were required before the procedures for output enhancement from
the fermentation tank could be finalized for adoption. According to the annual scientific
report published from Pusa the experts were far from the stage where they could claim
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that they had the means to control bacterial action in the fermentation vats. The biggest
challenge was to make the laboratory processes replicate on a factory scale. 69 But the
planters were hopeful that further experiments on fermentation would provide positive
results. The Agricultural Adviser in a letter of December 1916 quoted the planters as
saying that numerous bacteriological questions connected with fermentation deserved
further detailed investigations. In a latter of March 1917 Harington, the planter-member
on the London Indigo Committee, expressed great faith in the ongoing fermentation
experiments by Hutchinson and Davis at Pusa. 70
New Challenges For Science And Its Organization, 1917-18
Carrying Research Forward: Different Perspectives
A novel idea that the indigo experiments should be financed through the
imposition of an export duty on indigo was born during this period. Since the beginning
of indigo experiments in India in 1898, the planters in Bengal/Bihar and the government
had provided all the funds for the conduct of indigo experiments. The Bengal
Government had largely supplied the government’s share until 1913 after which the
imperial government took over the responsibility for the experiments out of central funds
at Pusa.
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The demand for the imposition of a duty on indigo first came from the indigo
planters in Bihar. At their meeting held towards the end of 1916 the members of the BPA
passed a resolution recommending that a duty of Rupees 1 should be imposed on every
maund of indigo shipped out of the Indian ports. They asked the government to legislate
the imposition of the duty. They also wanted the government to be responsible for the
collection of the duty. Then after setting aside the amount spent on its collection the rest
of the money could be made available for the indigo experiments. D J Reid, the Chairman
of BPA, calculated that at the present level of exports from India Rs. 70,000-75,000 could
be collected through the duty. If up to Rs. 10,000 was left as charges for its collection
then Rs. 60-65,000 could be utilized for the experiments. The Chairman disclosed that the
planters hoped to pay the salaries of the experts through this amount. The Indigo
Research Chemist would receive up to Rs. 40,000. The planters also wanted to employ a
new botanist to specifically work on improving the indican content of the leaves. The
botanist would also receive his salary of about Rs. 30,000 out of the collected funds. 71
The size of funds would be further enlarged if the exports increased, as it seemed they
would.
The planters reasoned that new realities had emerged, which required that the
indigo planters in the other parts of the country also contribute towards the indigo
experiments. The cultivation of indigo had gradually spread to the other provinces.
Especially in Madras, United provinces, and Punjab the expansion of indigo cultivation
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had been rapid. In terms of acreage Bihar no longer occupied the first position. The
annual figures for 1916-17 showed that Bihar and Orissa had 76,000 acres of land under
indigo while Madras and United Provinces had 344,300 and 150,300 acres under indigo
respectively. Of course in terms of quality and value of indigo exported the province of
Bengal still enjoyed preeminence. But since the other provinces had bridged the gap with
Bihar in terms of indigo value, the planters in Bihar wanted them to share the burden of
scientific research to improve the farming and manufacturing of indigo. 72
The idea of imposing a tax on the export of indigo was well received by the
administrators. It seemed a step in the direction of the organization of the planters on an
industry wide scale. It was an attempt by the planters to self-finance their experiments.
The bureaucrats were more than willing to act as facilitators. They initiated steps to forge
consensus among the indigo planters and traders across the country on the issue. They
dispatched letters to the concerned provinces and to the Bengal Chamber of Commerce
telling them of the new levy that was intended to fund scientific experiments on indigo.
They declared themselves to be in favor of the levy. And they wanted to be informed as
to what the other indigo producers and sellers across the country thought of the measure.
In case there was agreement in principle over the levy the central government also
wanted to be advised as to the form which the indigo interests wanted it to take– as a
fixed duty or as an ad valorem tax.73
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The governments of Bihar and Orissa, Bengal, Punjab, and the United Provinces
agreed in principle that a duty should be imposed. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce
also agreed with the proposal, but added that the incidence of the tax should fall on the
producers and not the traders. However, the government in Madras had reservations.
They wondered what benefit such a payment would bring to the small-scale cultivators in
their province. Natives undertook indigo manufacturing in Madras. These producers
worked independently and their farms were located in isolated pockets leaving minimum
chance of coordination between them. They employed primitive techniques of cultivation
and production and the indigo produced by them was predictably of an inferior quality
that fetched a low price in the market. In such a situation the Madras bureaucrats did not
see a real chance of promoting better techniques of farming and manufacturing among
the natives even if such methods were devised through scientific research. The situation
was different in Bengal where the European planters who were relatively well organized
controlled large plantations. The undertaking of scientific measures to improve
production was more possible in Bihar. They would be the likely beneficiaries of the
results of scientific research and therefore the Madras administrators argued that they
should alone pay for them. 74
The central government was not going to let Madras off the hook. They were
ready to go the extra distance in persuading the Madras officials and fostering
organization in the industry. More letters were sent to Madras. Finally, the administrators
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in Madras agreed to the proposal. They demanded that in the new plans special
consideration be given to address “Madras conditions and problems.” 75
The letter sent to London requesting the approval of the Indigo Cess clarified not
only the consensus built on the issue of imposing a duty for carrying forward indigo
experiments, but also brought into relief the different elements of the experiments that
were being planned. 76 The Viceroy’s letter expressed satisfaction over the fact that the
proposal would enable the indigo planters themselves to pay for part of the experiments
being conducted for their benefit. This would justify the expenditure on indigo
experiments made by the government out of money belonging to “the general tax payer.”
The letter broadly delineated the directions in which the funds collected through
the cess would support scientific pursuits. Part of the funds was to go towards providing
the salaries for the chemist Davis, the bacteriologist Hutchinson, and the economic
botanist Howard, all of whom were at Pusa. Thus a broad continuity in the experiments
from the previous years was being envisaged. In addition, it was planned to employ a new
botanist. This new specialist was expected to work specifically on improving the indican
in the leaves through the application of manures and by controlling other conditions of
plant growth. This work was considered beyond the remit of the current economic
botanist. Lastly, a portion of the funds to be collected was earmarked specifically to study
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conditions of the indigo industry in Madras. The regional administrators from Madras
had succeeded in having this special clause on Madras inserted. 77
The Experiments During 1917-18   
The experiments to improve indigo continued at a certain pace on several fronts
during the year. But the mood overall was somber. The agricultural experts did not devise
anything that could drastically alter the prospects of natural indigo. The manufacturing
experiments on steeping moved forward and then finally hit a ceiling leaving the experts
clueless as to what their next steps were going to be. The trials on making natural indigo
paste in England were successful. But the natural paste faced a new challenge from an
unexpected quarter – the synthetic indigo now manufactured by the Levinstein family in
England.
Albert Howard at Pusa continued the agricultural line of query as before. Much of
his focus was on Java indigo. He expanded on his findings of the previous years. The
growing of Java seeds was undertaken on a larger scale. Howard also studied soil
conditions and other conditions of plant growth in order to understand the ways to
stimulate a larger harvest of leaves from the Java plant. 78
The plans to employ a botanist to complement Howard’s work in the field did not
materialize. By the summer of the next year one had still not become available. The exact
reason for the failure of this search is not mentioned in the sources. But getting an expert
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from England was always a relatively difficult task. It always required more effort and
cost additional time and money. Usually the colonial administrators in India tried to hire
someone from the pool of European experts already available within the cadre of the
Indian Agricultural Services. But on this occasion the planters wanted a “full time”
botanist who would be versatile in the latest knowledge emerging in the field of botany.
Such an expert was probably not available in India. In the end the administrators were
unable to hire a qualified botanist in the home country and have him or her sent to India.
The endless delay frustrated the planters. They put the plan on hold, declaring, in a
meeting of the Bihar Planters’ Association on May 17, 1918, “the question of indigo
yield in the plant will be again studied [later].” 79
The planters also invested efforts along chemical/bacteriological lines. They were
solidly behind chemist W A Davis. They looked at his work performed on the making of
the indigo paste, on wilt, and on steeping with favor. They recommended that Davis’s
tenure at Pusa be extended for a further period of “at least five years.” The Agricultural
Adviser, J MacKenna, wanted to retain Davis at all costs. He argued that having “an
officer of Mr. Davis’ age and standing in the chemical world” would be advantageous
anyway regardless of his contributions to the indigo experiments. The scientist was an
asset to the imperial agricultural department.  He would be extremely valuable in the
development of commercial agricultural chemistry in the colony when new opportunities
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presented themselves at the end of the War. In the light of the forceful demand for the
retention of W A Davis the government extended his tenure for another three years. 80
In fact, the collaboration between Davis and Hutchinson on the improvement of
the steeping processes turned out to be the direction in which most work was performed
at Pusa during 1917-18. 81The experts followed the basic approach of controlling the
character of the bacterial flora in the steeping vats. Davis made numerous analyses using
the persulfate and isatin methods to determine the content of indican, indoxyl, and
indigotin before and after the inoculation with bacteria. Hutchinson focused efforts on the
mass culture of appropriate bacteria and on the processes of removal of unwanted
microorganisms and inoculation with appropriate strains of bacteria.
 Hutchinson experimented to determine the best ways for the mass culture of
bacteria. He wanted to devise a way to produce sufficient number of bacteria that would
ferment 6,000-10,000 gallons of water in the steeping vat, the usual quantity processed at
an average sized factory on a daily basis. He successfully prepared a medium with
ammonium sulfate, super phosphate, wood ash, and sugar. One gallon of this culture after
six hours’ incubation sufficed to induce fermentation in 1,000 gallons of water in the
steeping vat. However, the optimum functioning of the artificial inoculums continued to
be interfered with. There were problems with maintaining optimum temperature of the
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steeping liquor. But the trickiest problem lay with the activities of other “destructive”
bacteria that more than offset the positive effects of the addition of appropriate bacteria.82
The biggest problem that defied solution was to get rid of the undesirable bacteria
from the water, especially when a large amount of water was being processed on a
factory scale. The two sources of these bacteria were identified as the water from
khazana (reservoir) that supplied the steeping vats and the plant itself. Bacteria from the
latter source were not that big a hazard. The leaves generally had a relatively small
number of microorganisms. If the artificial inoculation was made quickly in the steeping
vat, the effects of microorganisms present on the leaves could be very well countered. To
rid the water of pre-existing bacteria a practical solution seemed to be the of use large
reservoirs. If steeping water was stored in large tanks for some time much of the bacteria
settled to the bottom along with other sedimentation. But this was only a partial solution.
Not all of the harmful bacteria could be removed with this process. The experts struggled
to overcome this problem of the presence of undesirable bacteria, but without immediate
success. 83
Natural Indigo Paste – The Challenge Of Levinstein Indigo And Fluctuating Agricultural
Productivity
The Indigo Paste Committee in London proved adequate to the task of preparing
standardized indigo paste of 20% concentration. Henry Armstrong and Reginald Brown
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claimed that they had overcome all difficulties in the way of making “a standard and
stable” paste.84
The first lot of natural indigo paste had been sent to several dyers who had
expressed complete satisfaction with its quality. In fact, for dyeing loose wool in heavy
shades, the natural paste was found superior to the English synthetic indigo. The War
Office had ordered ten thousand pounds of natural indigo paste from the Indigo Paste
Committee. Accordingly orders had been placed for the supply of 200 chests of natural
indigo from India. It was planned to pay the owners of cake indigo after selling the paste
and deducting the working costs.
The Indigo Paste Committee expressed confidence about the prospects of the
natural indigo paste in the English market. The prevailing Calcutta rates for natural
indigo were reasonable. If the consignment made its way to England the paste formed out
of it could easily compete with the synthetic indigo supplied by Levinstein and Company
in England. The English company was selling synthetic indigo (20% by weight) currently
at a price between 2s. 3d. to 2s. 9d. The natural could be offered at a competitive price of
6s. (60% by weight) to the consumers.
The task of making paste having been completed, the chemists led by Henry
Armstrong in London embarked on a new project of making “reduced indigo.” Just
before the War started the German manufacturers of synthetic indigo had begun
supplying their indigo in a “reduced” form. The reduced indigo could be directly utilized
in the vats as opposed to the previous form that had to be reduced with acids by the dyers
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before dipping the fabric. It was thought that the new generation of synthetic indigo
would indeed be presented to the consumers in this form, and therefore that the natural
paste should also be offered in a similar, conveniently-usable form. There was another
advantage in preparing reduced indigo. The process of making reduced indigo would
impart further purity to the natural dye. This was crucial because that would help in
capturing the market of cotton printing. The cotton printers were particularly wary of
impurities in the natural dye. The market of cotton dyeing and printing was indeed the
largest segment of the market for the blue dye. Additional funds were being demanded
for the experiments towards making reduced indigo. These would pay the costs of
chemicals and the fees for Henry Armstrong and a new chemist who was employed on a
temporary basis, a Mr Robertson. 85
The planters in India were broadly appreciative of the work done by the Indigo
Paste Committee in London and were also supportive of the committee’s new efforts to
produce “reduced” indigo. They did make certain suggestions regarding the
“stabilization” of the indigo paste. An important aspect of the packaging of the natural
paste was its sterilization by chemicals. Poor sterilization caused the onset of anaerobic
fermentation even while the consignment was in transit. There were some reports to the
effect that the sterilizing chemical used in the natural paste was not very effective at
temperatures above 90 F. The temperature during the manufacturing season in India was
generally above this. The planters wanted to be assured that the chemical recommended
by the chemists in England would hold good in the Indian temperatures. The second
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concern of the planters was related to the markets in China. There was a general
consensus that the eastern markets would turn out to be the largest consumers of indigo in
the near future. The planters once again wanted the chemists to confirm that the
chemicals used as preservatives in the paste would not interfere with the dyeing process
in the “fermentation vats” that were in use in China. The dyers in England had used and
recommended the paste made available to them. But the dyers in the West generally used
“chemical vats.” The planters wondered if the chemicals would also be conducive to
dyeing in the fermentation vats in China. 86
But the biggest problem pointed out by the planters related to bad crops in the
season and the inflation in the price of natural indigo. Due to the destruction of the indigo
crop during the year the price of natural indigo in India had suddenly risen to Rupees 420
a maund. If cake were purchased at that price, the paste made out of it would be
uncompetitive with the synthetic’s price in the market. Much of the paste would have to
be sold at a loss. This situation was a true eye-opener in the sense that it revealed the kind
of problems that the natural indigo producers would continue to face in the future. The
plantations in India were subject to the vagaries of nature. Insufficient, overabundant, or
untimely rains as well as seasonal temperatures could potentially harm the harvest. Every
time the crop was destroyed the lack of supply would force up the price of natural indigo.
Inconsistency in agricultural output would forever threaten the market prospects of the
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natural paste despite the fact that the making of the paste had been successfully
demonstrated. 87
Funding Indigo Experiments –The Government Clarifies Its Position To The Planters
The Indigo Cess Act III of 1918 came into effect from April 1, 1918. The act
mandated the imposition of a duty of Rupees 1 on every maund of indigo exported from
any of the Indian ports in British India, as well as from the ports in the princely states of
Travancore, Cochin, and Kathiawar. 88The legislation was sweeping in its coverage. It
had subjected all the indigo produced and exported from British India to a duty in order
to pool funds for the conduct of scientific experiments on indigo.
Some debates arose on the matter of utilization of the proceeds from the cess. The
planters and the government had different opinions as to how those funds should be
utilized. These debates provide a window on the perspective of the planters and the
government on indigo experiments and its organization.
Following the promulgation of the Indigo Cess Act the Board of Directors of the
Bihar Planters’ Association had met in May 1918 to formulate their recommendations on
the nature of future scientific endeavors on indigo. Among other things they proposed
that the expenses of the London India Committee (including the Paste Committee) should
be a charge on the funds collected under the new law. They argued that much of the work
being performed in London was of an “experimental” nature and therefore should
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rightfully be financed through the cess. 89The planters passed another resolution in a
subsequent meeting of the association in July 1918 in which they demanded that the
salary of the Indigo Chemist should continue to be borne by the government. Looking at
the current level of exports from India, the total amount collected under the Act was not
going to be considerable. Therefore the planters requested that the cess amount should be
freed up for other projects on indigo improvement. Additionally, they demanded that the
efforts of the Paste Committee on “marketing” should also be a charge on the cess. The
Agricultural Adviser supported such a demand. He said,” I would strongly recommend
that the cost of the experimental work and trade propaganda be taken over by the cess.” 90
The expenses under the head of “trade propaganda” referred to the money spent in
persuading the dyers in England to buy the natural indigo paste. The Paste Committee
had kept in close contact with the dyers as they endeavored to produce the natural indigo
paste. They had aspired to produce the paste to suit the requirements of the users. Once
the paste had been prepared it was sent to a large number of dyers. The latter were
induced to use the natural paste and communicate how it fared. Subsequently the
committee also intended to employ a commercial traveler that would liaise between the
paste producers and the dyers. All this money spent on associating with the dyers was
considered inseparable from the money spent on making the paste.
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The Viceroy’s Council, while communicating its recommendations to the
Secretary of State, responded to the issues of making the expenses related to the work of
the Indigo Chemist and the Paste Committee a charge on the cess. 91The Council rejected
the request to continue meeting the entire expense of the work of Indigo Chemist from
the government’s own sources as before. They also took the opportunity to explain to the
planters that the government expected them to pay for their experiments, and that they
should no longer take government’s subsidy for granted. In fact, the Council members
further explained that the government had taken the initiative on the issue of cess with the
motive of getting the planters organized so that they could fend for themselves. It was
quite in order that they should take responsibility for their indigo experiments.
They agreed to let some of the funds be used for the experimental work by the
Indigo Committee. But they turned down the proposal that any of the work undertaken
for the marketing of the indigo paste among the dyers should be a charge on the cess.
They took the position that the indigo cess was imposed for scientific research alone.
Therefore those funds should not be used for any purpose other than research.
While the Viceroy’s Council did not say anything unexpected a certain change in
attitude towards the natural indigo industry is perceptible in the government’s stipulations
at the end of 1918. The eagerness to help the natural indigo industry that the metropolitan
and imperial government had shown in 1914 was no longer there. By 1918 the
government was far less sympathetic than before towards the indigo industry. It was no
longer willing to do anything exceptional to promote the planters’ cause. One can perhaps
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hazard a guess that the changed attitude had something to do with the increasing
availability of synthetic indigo in Britain. 92
Diminishing Enthusiasm For The Indigo Experiments And Their Final Stoppage
Late in 1919, as the indigo manufacturing season progressed in India from August
onwards, the scientific efforts of the previous years in the laboratory and farm stations
were conspicuously modest. Indeed the manufacturing/mahai of 1919 seems like a useful
cut off point in the history of efforts to scientifically improve the natural dye in India and
England. The momentum of previous years carried the different scientific projects
forward for some more time. But there is no doubt that the research was running out of
steam.  No new initiatives were emerging to use science for “improving” the natural dye.
It was only a matter of time before they would completely fold up.
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There were several dimensions to this decline. The specific projects were facing
insurmountable impediments. But an overriding aspect of this gradual winding down of
effort was the withdrawal of the government from its role as the primary sponsor of
scientific experiments. Through the course of 1918 the government had made it clear to
the planters that they must bear the responsibility and the costs of scientific research on
natural indigo. The Indigo Cess Act came into effect from April 1, 1918. By announcing
that the proceeds from this duty – and not any public funds – were to fund the
experiments, the government passed the burden onto the indigo industry. This marked a
watershed. Public funds and bureaucratic initiatives had been the main vehicle promoting
indigo experiments in colonial India. Bereft of that support the efforts on behalf of
natural indigo simply lost their motive force, lost direction, and soon folded up.
German Dye Technology Makes Its Way To England/Allies At The End Of The World
War
The renewed assault from synthetic indigo played an important role in the demise
of the natural product at this time.  The appropriation of the German techniques of
chemicals manufacturing by the Allied powers after the War is a well-researched topic,
and a territory that has been well traversed by many scholars before. 93 The Treaty of
Versailles provided the official sanction for the inspection of German chemical plants and
for the dismantling of “warfare chemical processes” in Germany. But the phrases used in
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the Treaty were intentionally vague. Articles 168- 172 of the Treaty in effect provided the
victors with unrestricted access to all chemical knowledge including those for the dyes.
The initial inspections of the German chemical factories by the Allies started as
early as late 1918 beginning with the Rhineland. The Hartley Mission of 1919 was
followed by the commercially motivated visit by the Association of British Chemical
Manufacturers to Germany in May and June of 1919.  Rigorous and continuous
inspection of the German chemical plants continued under the powers of the Inter-Allied
Commission of Control, which was the principal facilitator of the process of transfer of
technologies. The military/political control over the German territories continued up to
1927, but there is a general consensus among historians that by the early 1920s most
relevant chemical technologies had already passed into the hands of England and France.
As in the case of information on many other organic and inorganic compounds,
the victors also appropriated the knowledge related to the processes of indigo
manufacturing. Without going into detail we can confidently affirm that henceforth
Britain and France did not face any technological impediments to the manufacture of
synthetic indigo; the Allies were in a position to use or disregard the indigo technologies
of German origin as the need be. 94
Some specific instances of the transfer of dye techniques are well documented and
too prominent to escape notice. To give a few examples, the French extracted the
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dyestuffs technologies through forced licensing arrangements with BASF and I G Farben.
The British members of the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control got the
technique for producing ethylene and ethylene chlorohydrine, which were very important
intermediates for the manufacture of synthetic indigo. And, the mission of the
Association of British Chemical Manufacturers in May-June 1919 appropriated for the
British entrepreneurs the Hoechst version of the indigo process. Apart from the official
pathways the knowledge related to the production of indigo also exchanged hands
through espionage and bribery by individual companies as in the well publicized case
when Bayer accused the English indigo manufacturers Levinsteins of commercial
espionage. 95
The Indigo Paste Committee Stops Work In London
 An essential corollary of the efforts to fabricate and sell synthetic indigo in
England was a corresponding decline of metropolitan interest in the future of
colonial/Indian natural indigo. Indeed there are clear indications that India House in
London was beginning to lose interest in the affairs of the Indigo Committee and the
Paste Committee in London formed with so much fanfare previously. This lack of interest
emerged over several months and the period bears an uncanny coincidence with precisely
the time when the production of synthetic indigo was rising in England and synthetic
indigo technologies from Germany were making their way into the country
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Matters came to such a point where colonial officials in India had to remind India
House in London to take a more active interest in the affairs of the indigo committees in
London. In August 1918 J MacKenna, the Agricultural Adviser to the Government of
India, was exasperated with the attitude of the officials in London. He reminded them that
the Paste Committee “at its inception received the benediction of Mr. Kershaw [the
Revenue and Statistics Secretary at India House, L J Kershaw].” Therefore he wanted
India House officials to invest more time supervising its functioning. 96 But obviously
matters were not going to improve. Thus in December the Agricultural Adviser again
expressed dissatisfaction with the “half official half un-official” position of the indigo
committees in London. The London Committees were formed with an “official
benediction,” but now the officials in London were neglecting the same committees that
they had helped form. He wanted the authorities in London to review the work being
done by the Paste Committee more carefully and to pass more information on to India
about it. 97Needless to say, the gentle reminder from India failed to change the situation
or to make India House more interested in the work of the indigo committees.
The Paste Committee members were by and large left to fend for themselves. As
1919 drew to a close the committee began direct correspondence with the planters in
India. Their first priority was to negotiate an arrangement whereby the planters would
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agree to ship their indigo to England for conversion into paste. The Paste Committee had
standing orders for more paste from the dyers in England and they were running out of
supplies. The continuing experimental work on the making of reduced indigo also
required fresh supplies of cake indigo. They asked for an immediate supply of 350 chests
of plant indigo.
The experts in England received an unfavorable response to this request.  The
modus operandi for the sale of indigo was in a state of flux. Those planters that still
remained in business had pooled their season’s indigo in an effort towards the co-
operative sale of their produce. In a letter, the planters’ representative, Moran and
Company, pointed out to the indigo committee that the prices for indigo had picked up
lately in Calcutta. A good portion of the season’s cake indigo was already sold and the
prospect of the rest being picked up by the buyers looked very good. Under the
circumstances the planters did not see any need to send their indigo to England for
conversion, knowing that the natural indigo paste would have to be sold at a loss in order
to be offered at a competitive price vis-à-vis the synthetic indigo available in England. 98
In fact the planters made counter-proposals to the Paste Committee with regard to
the plans for making indigo paste. First of all they wanted the experts to examine whether
the “low” grade indigo, containing 50-58% color [less than the 60-65% available in high
quality indigo], could be converted into paste for selling in the Western markets. The low
grade indigo was at present difficult to sell in the Calcutta market in the form of cake. It
would be profitable for the planters if the experts could convert such cake into a paste of
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consistent composition for the Western markets. Thus the planters were thinking more
about the readily available, local market. They prioritized selling to the local market as
long as the demand was good. What they could not sell locally, they would ship to the
West. But the experts pointed out to them that the low grade indigo could not be
converted into paste.
The planters were thinking more about the prospects of selling indigo paste in
future in the Chinese markets. The markets in East Asia were being generally considered
by all to be the best prospect for the sale of indigo in the future. China was closer to India
and shipment to the Chinese markets would be easier. The planters wondered if a paste-
making plant could be set up in China and if the present expert, Reginald Brown, would
be willing to go to China. They were also willing to consider the appointment of a new
chemist for sending to China. Once again there was a deadlock. Henry Armstrong
overruled the idea of building the paste-making plant in China. Cheapness would be the
single most important factor for the Chinese markets. He thought that 60% indigo in the
form of a powder would work best for the Chinese markets. Chemist Brown anyway was
not willing to travel to China and the appointment of a new chemist seemed too difficult a
task in the given situation.
More correspondence followed between the planters and the Paste Committee, but
the planters could not be persuaded to send the consignment of indigo to England. The
experts made a scathing attack on the planters for their lack of action in sending the cake
to England. They called their policy a “short-sighted” one. The future belonged to paste
indigo. The experts argued that the traders were making a fundamental mistake in putting
an obstacle in the way of the paste committee. Not only was the scientific work on paste
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indigo compromised, but also the carefully cultivated groups of buyers for the natural
paste were being lost. Finally the Paste Committee wrote to the India House pointing to
the scarcity of indigo and the consequent stoppage of their work. 99
Meanwhile the government officials in India refused in principle to provide funds
out of the Indigo Cess for the experiments on indigo paste and reduced indigo in England.
The Indian officials insisted that they would use the proceeds from the cess to pay the
salaries of the experts working at Pusa. Thus, following the nonchalant attitude in the
metropolis, the administrators in India also washed their hands of the indigo committees
in London. But in a way the issue of funding of the Paste Committee was redundant
because without the indigo from India the Paste Committee was not even able to use the
money already available for the current year.
The New Botanist Faces Disappointment At Pusa
Botanist Major W R G Atkins was the last dedicated staff member to be employed
specifically for indigo research in India. His appointment was a long overdue
administrative measure dating back from 1917. To recapitulate, the Indigo Cess Act was
planned with the aim of raising money for the works of a chemist and a botanist at Pusa.
The search for a full time botanist was carried out in England for one full year, and
finally shelved when an appropriate candidate for the job could not be immediately
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found. 100 Now that the Indigo Cess Act was in place, and the proceeds from the act had
started flowing, the search for the botanist was revived in England.
In August 1920, finally, the new botanist, Major W R G Atkins was hired in
England. 101He arrived at Bombay on September 29 and started his duties as the Indigo
Research Botanist at Pusa from October 2, 1920. 102
Atkins did not have a pleasurable experience in India or a fruitful time. Within
three weeks of his joining, he dispatched a letter asking to be relieved of his duty. He
complained of the tropical weather. The extreme conditions did not suit him and he was
convinced that he could not live in India for long. He was not willing to make any
commitment for a longer stay or to get involved in any long-term project. He offered to
pay back the passage money given to him by the government if he could be immediately
relieved. 103
                                                 
100 Letter to the Secretary of State, dated August 3, 1917, No. 7 of 1917, No. 37, Serial No. 29,
Government of India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for August
1917, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, Z/P/1981; No. 99, “Bihar Planters’ Association Ltd., An
informal meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bihar Planters’ Association,” Government of
India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for March 1919, IOR, GOI,
Proc. Rev & Agr, Z/P/1983
101 Letter from Secretary, Revenue and Statistics, India House to Secretary, Revenue and
Agriculture, Government of India, dated August 30, 1920, letter no. R&S – 6476, No. 1, Serial
No. 1, Government of India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for
October 1920, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, P/10846
102 Letter from S Milligan, Agricultural Adviser, Government of India to Secretary, Revenue and
Agriculture, Government of India, dated October 2, 1920, letter no. 1540, No. 2, Serial No. 3;
“Notification – By the Department of Revenue and Agriculture,” letter no. 155-337, dated
October 14, 1920, No. 4, Serial No. 4, Government of India, Proceedings of the Department of
Revenue and Agriculture for October 1920, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, P/10846
103 Letter from W R G Atkins to the Director, Agricultural Research Institute, dated October 20,
1920, Government of India, Proceedings of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture for July
1921, IOR, GOI, Proc. Rev & Agr, P/11050
 381
But the more central problem pointed out by Atkins was on the research front that
was being carried out for the benefit of the indigo industry. He was clearly despondent as
to the application of botanical principles to improve the yield from the leaves. He said,
“There is no work of a purely botanical nature to be done upon indigo that can give any
results inside at least five to seven years.” There were two ways to improve the amount of
color in the leaves – by selecting and propagating their cultivation. Such a process would
take a long time to come to fruition. He did not see any other way to improve yield. 104
Atkins was also collaborating with Davis on some secondary processes of
manufacturing. He had some previous experience on plant acidity. Davis had pointed to a
certain positive relation between acidity introduced by bacterial action and the rate of
fermentation. Also, beyond a certain level of acidity, the yield started decreasing.
Therefore the control of acidity at an optimal level was an important aspect for the
experts. Atkins with his background in similar pursuits proved helpful to Davis. But that
certainly was not the main work for which he had been brought to Pusa.
The Agricultural Adviser forwarded the offer of resignation from Atkins to his
superiors.105 In a follow up letter the Agricultural Adviser supported the view that Atkins
should be allowed to resign his position, and that there was no need to immediately
replace him at Pusa. He forwarded a copy of the proceedings of a special meeting called
by the Bihar Planters’ Association and a letter from its secretary on the matter. The
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planters apparently agreed with the view that the chances of success from selection work
were “remote.” Citing the planters’ views the Agricultural Adviser recommended that the
replacing of Atkins at Pusa be kept in abeyance. The centra106l government accepted
those recommendations, allowed Atkins to leave India, and advised the Secretary of State
not to make any efforts towards replacing him. 107
W A Davis Leaves India
  The curtain was formally drawn on the scientific experiments in India with the
decision that the Indigo Research Chemist W A Davis would depart from India after May
1922. Actually Davis stayed on India much longer after the momentum of indigo
experiments had withered away. There were two reasons for this. Davis’s job contract
with the government did not expire until May 1922. The government did not want to
violate its contract. Besides, Davis was based at the Agricultural Research Institute where
he could always be involved with other types of research on agricultural chemistry in the
colony.
The decision not to renew Davis’ contract was taken through the due democratic
institutions. The post-War period had seen some progress towards the creation of the
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democratic institutions in British India. 108 The Standing Finance Committee of the
Central Legislative Assembly met in the month of January 1921. Its members decided
that the retention of Davis after the expiry of his agreement in May 1922 was not
desirable. 109 Armstrong disapproved of this decision but to no avail. 110 His
recommendations to promote the natural indigo industry had carried weight in 1917, at a
time when the English dyers and printers needed their supplies of the blue dye. With the
manufacture of synthetic indigo going ahead full steam in England, the dyers and printers
fully satisfied with the supplies, the metropolitan officials in England and the colonial
officials in India saw no reason to pay any attention to him. There was no commercial
future for natural indigo now, and the administrators knew it.
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It is perhaps pertinent to begin the concluding remarks by underscoring the
importance of the present work. Is the story of the death of natural indigo a “dead” story?
Not quite. In fact natural indigo is still produced by traditional means in small pockets,
resulting in a dye, which, although it has a restricted market, is highly prized by many. 1
There is also a renewed consumer demand for “natural” dyes, in part to overcome
pollution problems created by the manufacture of synthetic dyes. 2 Such demands have
raised new possibilities for the colorants like indigo. In fact attempts are currently
underway to produce the natural dye in 90% purity to cater to the newly emerging
demand. Possible sources of indigo currently under investigation include the use of
biotechnological approaches to produce genetically modified Escherichia coli (Genencor
international), and the cultivation of suitable crops in Europe as part of the $3.2 million
sustainable production of plant-derived indigo project (SPINDIGO), launched by the
European Commission in 2001.
The significance of the indigo story, in terms of responding to disciplinary
concerns, lies in providing a new history of science and technology for Modern South
Asia based on the review and analysis of documents not used before, and the presentation
of a fresh interpretation of the history of natural indigo industry from the perspective of
science and technology. The events related to the history of indigo in India are well
                                                 
1 For a review of the prospects of plant indigo, see Jenny Balfour-Paul, Indigo. (London: British
Museum Press, 1998)
2 Anthony Travis, Dyes Made in America, 1915-1980: The Calco Chemical Company, American
Cyanamid, and the Raritan River. Part II (Jerusalem: Edelstein Center/Hexagon Press, 2004)
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documented. Not without a reason. Indigo was a major industry of transcontinental
dimensions throughout the nineteenth century. For the time and place in question it was
quite deeply capitalized; the European manufacturers and traders had invested sizeable
capital into it.  3By employing thousands of natives the indigo plantations also touched
the lives of many Indians in critical ways. What generally happened on the plantations
interested all – the colonial administrators, the nationalists, the native indigo growers, the
business classes, and, after 1897, also the scientists working to improve the yield of
indigo. But historians have previously only highlighted the roles of the first three
categories of actors.
Much of the primary sources on indigo, especially those left by the colonial
government, have been exhaustively used before for writing the history of indigo. The
official records in conjunction with the vernacular newspaper reports have been utilized
to recount the story of the growing nationalist movement in India wherein the middle
class-based nationalist leadership was pitted against the “colonialists.” In one stroke, this
historiography huddles together the British civil servants, European indigo planters, and
the scientists as belonging to a single “class.”  Such an approach is not sensitive to the
fact that the official reports portray the perspective of the bureaucracy, not essentially of
the planters. Such histories also disregard the publications of the experts, which were by
all count the product of some of the most sophisticated scientific research on indigo
conducted in colonial India.
                                                 
3 By the account of one planter, W Hudson, around the end of the nineteenth century the planters
had invested a total capital of four and a half million pound sterling in the indigo plantations.
 386
From another perspective, the past literature also assumed that the interests of the
indigo growers ultimately coalesced with that of the Indian nationalist leadership. Some
of the native landed elements collaborated with the nationalists on account of their vested
self-interest. They had leased their lands to the indigo planters. In the new economic
situation when the sale of food crops became more remunerative than indigo, they
preferred to withdraw their land from indigo. They generally assumed local leadership in
the agitations that broke out against the planters in the first two decades of the 20th
century. But the teeming workers/indigo growers have left no record for themselves.
Writing “their” history poses methodological challenges. 4While being somewhat
sensitive to the tenuous links between the immediate concerns of the peasantry and the
nationalist agenda, the dominant literature on the history of indigo has assumed that the
local and nationalist elites adequately and justifiably represented the aspirations of the
under-class. 5
On the one hand, this dissertation has turned attention to some of the other equally
important alternate sources that owe their origin to the scientists and the planters. One,
this research has utilized the publications of the indigo experts at the Anglo-Indian
laboratories in several important scientific journals of the times. The major reports on the
improvement of indigo left by the experts have also been discussed in detail.
                                                 
4 It may be stated in parenthesis that some “subaltern” histories of the native peasants do exist
though they do not focus on the indigo growers. This school believes in a creative interpretation
of the sources left by the dominant classes to furnish a history of the under-class. But largely
these writings are narrowly focused on isolated episodes, and stop short of providing a complete,
alternative interpretation.
5 This is the perspective that inheres in the most comprehensive account of the indigo plantations
to date: Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian
Politics. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
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Additionally, a reading of the sources belonging to the users of the blue dye in England,
the dyers and printers, has enabled us to gain a unique perspective on the nature of
demand that guided the scientific efforts in India. Two, the dissertation has used the
holdings of the Indian Planters’ Gazette that provides the indigo planter’s perspective as
businessmen.
On the other hand, going against the perspectives adopted in the past, this
dissertation has provided a fresh interpretation of the history of the indigo industry. In
both Deepak Kumar’s and Jacques Pouchepadass’s analyses the colonial government
appeared as apologists for the indigo planters. This research has argued quite to the
contrary that the fear of peasant discontent prompted the colonial government to dissuade
the planters from implementing wage cuts on the plantations. This dissertation re-
interprets the motivations of the national and colonial governments for the sponsorship of
science in the colony through a more textured analysis of the official documents
originating from London, Simla, and Calcutta – the three different levels of governance.
The metropolitan government’s response to the natural indigo industry’s demand for
support was shaped by its perception at different points of time as to how important the
Indian indigo was to the dyers and printers in the home country. The central government
in India always tried to balance its commitment to support indigo experiments vis-à-vis
its commitment to initiate general agricultural research and development in the colony.
The provincial government provided its limited resources to the indigo laboratories as a
matter of priority based on the commitment to saving a regional industry.
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This research distinguishes itself clearly from the current dominant literature on
the history of science in colonial India 6 and the history of the indigo industry. 7Deepak
Kumar’s Science and the Raj is an appropriate representative work of the genre that
describes how science was organized in pre-independence India under the colonial
regime. Likewise, Jacques Pouchepadass’s Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants
and Gandhian Politics represents well the state of the literature on the history of the
indigo industry. For that reason the two monographs are useful for the purposes of
drawing comparisons, and in showing how the present work advances the research on the
history of colonial science and of Indian indigo.
Kumar’s book fundamentally focuses on the early beginnings and the
establishment of “science” in British India at the behest of the colonial administrators.
His book displays the gradual establishment of scientific infrastructure in colonial India
that included the setting up of research institutions, laboratories, building cadres of
scientists, and popularizing science education. The focus is throughout on the efforts
initiated by the officials in this regard.
In short, Kumar discusses colonial patronage of science. Such efforts were part of
the slow modernization that the colonial administration introduced in India. At the same
time, Kumar is critical of the lackadaisical attitude of the colonial administrators in this
regard and the “limited” investments made in launching science in the colony. He implies
that such feeble and half-hearted attempts compromised scientific and technological
                                                 
6 Deepak Kumar, Science and the Raj, 1857-1905 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995)
7 Jacques Pouchepadass, Champaran and Gandhi: Planters, Peasants and Gandhian Politics.
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999)
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development in British India. Such critiques of “dismal” patronage of science have
become untenable. In another context, historians have looked for reasons as to why and
how imperial Britain lagged behind Germany and the United States in the fields of
scientific development and technological innovations at the dawn of the twentieth
century. 8The implications of those studies for the debate on colonial science in India are
clear - that limited investment in scientific R&D was a feature of Britain’s colonial and
national policies.
In a contrast to Kumar’s approach, the present work investigates the organization
and progress of scientific research from a Laboratory Studies perspective. It considers the
expertise of the scientists and their actual work within the laboratories to understand the
direction of the scientific experiments in the colony.
This dissertation does not simply explain the motivations for the organization and
support of the laboratories in terms of “short-sighted colonial policies,” as earlier done by
Kumar. To understand the motivations for the sponsorship of indigo experiments, this
research additionally connects the patronage of scientific experiments to the actual results
obtained in the laboratories. To what extent did the scientific results in the laboratories
help meet the requirements of the planters in the market place? How did the credibility of
experts and their rhetorical authority inspire confidence from the national government in
England and the central and provincial governments in India that natural indigo still had a
chance?
                                                 
8 For a synoptic review of the relevant literature, see Harm G. Schroter and Anthony Travis, “An
issue of different mentalities: National approaches to the development of the chemical industry in
Britain and Germany before 1914,” in Ernst Homburg, Anthony S Travis and Harm G Schroter
(eds.), The Chemical Industry in Europe, 1850-1914: Industrial Growth, Pollution, and
Professionalization. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1998)
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In contrast to the works of both Kumar and Pouchepadass, 9 this research places
the perspective of the planters at center stage. The unique access to planters’ sources has
enabled pointing to the priorities of this business class vis-à-vis the preferences of the
government. The dissertation shows that the planters could not take the government’s
support for granted as they tried to find ways to withstand the synthetic’s competition.
Saving natural indigo was primarily the concern of the indigo planters. Once they found
their resources insufficient to the task, they turned to the government to seek their
support. They tried to persuade the government at various levels – the Secretary of State
in London on the one hand, and the imperial administrators in Simla and the provincial
bureaucrats in Calcutta on the other. In the end they received substantial state subsidy for
their indigo experiments. In fact, in the colonial context, government’s aid very soon
became the principal vehicle for the progress of the indigo experiments in India.
In writing the history of the indigo industry Pouchepadass has not made use of
any of the scientific documentation. 10 His econometric analysis of the production process
of the dye has thus resulted in a critical omission by leaving out an engagement with the
research and production issues.
This dissertation highlights the fact that the planters addressed the key problem of
facing the competition in the market place. Their response towards particular laboratories
and appreciation or disapproval of particular scientists was based on their assessment of
the scientific results at different times. They evaluated the scientific results by asking:
                                                 
9 It may be pointed out that Pouchepadass’s account of the plantation industry does not make use
of the Indian Planters’ Gazette, the only source left by the planting community that has survived
aside from a few personal memoirs left by the individual planters.
10 B. Chaudhuri before him and P K Shukla after him have also not made use of any of the
scientific publications.
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which scientist was doing “practical” work? Whose work was of merely “academic
interest”? On the basis of their assessment they singled out some experiments for
appreciation and denounced others. After a time it was apparent that the initial promises
made by the scientists that they could drastically improve the yield and the consistency of
the natural dye appeared unduly optimistic. The scientists stopped delivering in the
present, only promising results in the future. In such a situation the planters became
despondent about the prospects of returns from “science,” abandoning it altogether. Thus
this dissertation draws the important conclusion that the lack of support by the planters to
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